Introduction

Hi all,

This is a Premier Debate backfile for the topic “Resolved: The United States ought to promote democracy in the Middle East.” Subscribers should have also received the original brief, but this document is a compilation of cards from speech docs from the 2011-2012 college policy topic on democracy assistance. The cards were compiled from open source documents released online from Georgetown and Wake Forest. We hope this organization and compilation is useful to you!

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We want to remind the readers about standard brief practice to get the most out of this file. Best practice for brief use is to use it as a guide for further research. Find the articles and citations and cut them for your own personal knowledge. You’ll find even better cards that way. If you want to use the evidence in here in a pinch, at the very least, you should re-tag and highlight the evidence yourself so you know exactly what it says and how you’re going to use it. Remember, briefs can be a tremendous resource but you need to familiarize yourself with the underlying material first.

Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

Bob Overing & John Scoggin
Directors | Premier Debate
# Table of Contents

## Contents

**Introduction** .......................................................................................................................... 1  
**Table of Contents** ................................................................................................................. 2  
***Areas*** ................................................................................................................................. 7  
**Afghanistan** ......................................................................................................................... 8  
**No Impact** ............................................................................................................................ 9  
**Bahrain** ................................................................................................................................ 11  
**AT Solvency** ....................................................................................................................... 12  
**No Iran War** ....................................................................................................................... 18  
**Saudi Relations DA** .......................................................................................................... 19  
**Saudi Oil DA** ..................................................................................................................... 22  
**Egypt** ..................................................................................................................................... 25  
**Aff Solvency** ...................................................................................................................... 26  
**Aff Iran Impact Scenario** .................................................................................................... 35  
**Impact – U.S.-Egypt Relations key to Terror** .................................................................... 37  
**Impact – Stability ~> Middle East/Africa War** .................................................................... 38  
**Impact – Oil Shocks** ........................................................................................................... 40  
**Proliferation Adv** ................................................................................................................ 41  
**Sudan Adv** ........................................................................................................................... 46  
**AT Egypt-Israel War** ......................................................................................................... 51  
**AT Predictions/Security K** .................................................................................................. 53  
**AT Saudi Relations DA** ..................................................................................................... 54  
**AT Solvency** ...................................................................................................................... 56  
**Iran DA** ............................................................................................................................... 62  
**Saudi Relations DA** .......................................................................................................... 66  
**Iran** ...................................................................................................................................... 67  
**Yes Iran Aggression** .......................................................................................................... 68  
**AT Iran Attacks – Rational / MAD** .................................................................................. 69  
**AT Iran Attacks – No Capability** ....................................................................................... 71  
**AT Iran/Saudi War** ............................................................................................................. 74  
**Iraq** ........................................................................................................................................ 76
No War .................................................................................................................. 77
Libya ..................................................................................................................... 78
  Aff Solvency ......................................................................................................... 79
  Qatar Consult CP .................................................................................................. 87
  AT Instability Impact ........................................................................................... 92
  AT Solvency .......................................................................................................... 93
  No Impact ............................................................................................................. 95
Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................................... 96
  US-Saudi Relations Key ....................................................................................... 98
  No Prolif Impact .................................................................................................. 99
  AT Relations ......................................................................................................... 100
  AT Pakistan Sells Nukes to Saudi Arabia ............................................................. 101
Syria ....................................................................................................................... 102
  Saudi Relations DA (Link) .................................................................................. 104
  AT Iran Influence ................................................................................................. 105
  AT Iran Advantage ............................................................................................... 106
  AT Solvency .......................................................................................................... 107
Yemen ..................................................................................................................... 111
  AT Agent CPs ...................................................................................................... 112
  AT Circumvention ............................................................................................... 113
  AT Politics ............................................................................................................ 114
  Civil Law Enforcement Mechanism (Terror + Multilat Adv) ............................... 117
  Key to Al Qaeda ................................................................................................... 125
  Saudi Relations DA (Links) ................................................................................ 129
  AT Pirates ............................................................................................................ 131
  Impact – Yemen Collapse Causes Saudi Collapse .............................................. 133
  Impact – Terror Causes Intervention, Collapse U.S. Heg .................................. 136
  AT Saudi Relations DA ..................................................................................... 137
  AT Saudi Relations Impact ................................................................................ 141
  AT Saudi Prolif ..................................................................................................... 143
***Counterplans*** ............................................................................................... 144
  EU ....................................................................................................................... 145
  Private Aid – Tax Credit ..................................................................................... 147
Econ > Democ

Hegemony Key to Middle East

Indo-Pak War

Middle-East War

Pak Terrorism

Terrorism – India

AT Africa War

AT Anti-American Sentiment

AT Indo-Pak War

AT Iran-Saudi War

AT Middle-East Escalation

AT Middle-East Prolif

AT NATO

AT Oil Shocks

AT Terrorism – AQAP

AT Terrorism – Retaliation

AT Terrorism

***Aff Solvency***

Aff

Generic

Democracy = Peaceful

NGO Assistance Good

U.S. Must Act, Terror

Blocks

AT Leads to Intervention/War

***AT Aff Solvency***

General

AT Accountability

AT Spillover / Global Democracy

Democracy Doesn’t Solve War

S’quo Solve

Trade-Off (Link to Some DA)

Defense
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No Impact

No impact to Afghanistan- their impacts are inflated and incorrect

Friedman ‘9

Cohen approvingly cites Obama’s foolish claim that Afghanistan is a war of necessity. One can’t say enough that this is senseless; even wars of pure self-defense aren’t strictly necessary, and Afghanistan, at this point, isn’t that. He then drops the dominos. Should we leave, he says, the Taliban will take over Afghanistan and then Pakistan, grabbing nukes. India then invades Pakistan, and we get 1947, but nuclear. He doesn’t say how the Taliban columns advancing on Kabul will suppress our airpower. The widespread Afghan and Pakistani hostility to the Taliban — especially among the non-Pashtuns who support and dominate both governments — doesn’t impress him. He doesn’t mention the fact that the Pakistani military keeps close hold on its nukes, no matter who is officially in power. One could go on, but suffice it to say that there is an equally plausible worst-case scenario that results from following Cohen’s advice and expanding the war. To be fair though, Cohen is a clear-eyed realist compared to Daniel Twining, who writes for Foreign Policy’s Shadow Government blog. Twining sees the war in Afghanistan as a means to keep Russia in a box, China down, India up, world trade humming, and the current international order, whatever that is, intact. I’m not going to bother to explain how all this works, but I picture the causal diagram as somewhat psychedelic. It’s almost like a parody of Jack Snyder’ work on imperial myths, like he missed the part of the story where it says these aren’t theories you copy but BS people use to sell wars. For a relatively coherent version of the idea that we should fight in Afghanistan to help Pakistan, read Steve Biddle. Biddle has two arguments that he thinks are one — that instability in Afghanistan will spread to Pakistan and that Taliban power in Afghanistan (not the same thing as instability) will provide extremists a base to attack Pakistan’s government. One problem with the first claim is that historically Afghanistan’s troubles have not destabilized Pakistan. The second argument struggles with the fact that we likely cause insurrection among Pashtun Pakistanis by warring with their Afghan cousins. And, as Justin Logan and Matt Yglesias note, the Taliban was in power for Afghanistan for years while Pakistan did OK, and many Pakistani elites want it back.

Shanker 11, 12/15/11

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Wednesday that the United States and its Afghan and foreign allies have been able to "seize the momentum" in Afghanistan and were winning the war. Panetta, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, spoke in glowing terms of the progress made in battling insurgents and stabilizing the country. He was less outspoken when asked for details of a U.S. espionage drone flown from Afghanistan that apparently crashed in Iran this month. He said only that the United States would continue to carry out intelligence missions that would enhance the security of the United States and Afghanistan. On a day when he met with senior Afghan officials, senior U.S. commanders and troops deployed in the volatile eastern part of the country, Panetta was unexpectedly upbeat about a war where progress has often proved fragile. "We're winning this very tough
conflict in Afghanistan," Panetta told troops at Forward Operating Base Sharana, in Paktika province, about 35 miles from the border with Pakistan. Later, at an evening news conference with Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, Panetta said, "There is no doubt that over the last two years Afghan and international forces have been able to seize the momentum from the Taliban insurgency and establish security in critical areas, such as the Taliban’s heartland in the south."
Bahrain

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AT Solvency

No one will compromise and there is no mechanism for dialogue.

Hussein ibish is a senior research fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine, “Bahrain: an opportunity squandered?” 11/29/2011,

As they have several times since the protest movement began early in the year, moderates in both the government and the opposition appeared to be allowing themselves to be outflanked by more hard-line elements. Rather than taking advantage of whatever opportunity might have been presented by the commission report, opposition figures can continue to insist that no real reforms are on the table, and government supporters can continue to claim the opposition are simply subversives and continue on the path of confrontation rather than accommodation. Nothing in the aftermath of the commission report suggests either side is seriously adapting its approach and both are behaving much as they did before it was published. Most troublingly, there is still no working mechanism or venue for meaningful dialogue between the parties.

The King of Bahrain will not cooperate

Ghezali, 9/13/11 – member of the Transatlantic Network 2020, and special to CNN (“Bahrain at the heart of Middle East tensions.”

Inside the regime, the gap has widened between reformists led by Crown Prince Salman and hardliners grouped around the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa. The conservatives gained the upper hand after attempted negotiations in March between the Prince and the opposition were derailed by radicals of both sides. Since then, the Prime Minister is Bahrain’s strongman to the dissatisfaction of the reformist and the Shias. The King of Bahrain recently called for a national dialogue and lifted the state of martial law. Al-Wefaq, Bahrain’s main Shia opposition party, welcomed King Hamad’s call but the changes Al-Wefaq is seeking such as a constituent assembly to write a new constitution designing a parliamentary monarchy would certainly not be accepted by the King. However, the negotiation could perhaps focus on giving more powers to the Parliament and on a redrawing of the constituencies, which today are designed to ensure that the Shia party remains permanently in opposition. Any changes to the King’s power or the removal of the Prime Minister are red lines.

The monarchy will circumvent any agreement.

Toby Jones is an assistant professor of history at Rutgers University, “We Know What Happened in Bahrain: Now What?”,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/01/we-know-what-happened-in-bahrain-now-what/7yf0

Bahrain’s rulers have predictably given no indication that real political reform is even on the table, and on this, the commission provides no guidance. In his comments following the report’s release, King Hamad indicated that he sought to turn the page. But in reality, officials appear to be looking for ways to evade the structural political issues facing them. One of the king’s first directives was to establish a second commission to study BICI’s recommendations: a project that could drag on indefinitely and which was rejected by the opposition. The government has sought to implement minor security reforms, but these seem mostly cosmetic—gestures that technically comply with report’s recommendations, but do little more. On November 29 the king sacked Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdullah, who had headed the National Security Agency. Authorities also announced that they would develop a code of conduct for police and bring in foreign security
personnel to help with training. Most telling about how far the ruling family may be willing to go is that the security presence on the streets has hardly diminished—if anything, state violence has intensified. Just hours before the public ceremony in which the commission outlined its findings, police killed Abdulnabi Kadhem in the village of A’ali. At the same time Bassiouni was outlining the report’s findings in front of the king at a public press conference, police brutally dispersed protesters in nearby villages.

Saudi Arabia and political opposition to reform kills aff solvency


Bahrain was in the spotlight when opposition forces staged massive demonstrations in the kingdom’s capital Manama between the months of February and March this year. However, the entry of Saudi troops on March 14 was followed by a large-scale crackdown by local security forces, and efforts towards dialogue and political reconciliation have been in vain. The Saudi intervention took place only a day after the Crown Prince had publicly agreed to negotiate on the bulk of the opposition’s demands, and mainly served the purpose of shifting the balance of power within the ruling family in favour of its conservative camp. This undermined the Crown Prince’s efforts to reach a negotiated solution with the protesters. Urged by a heightened sense of insecurity, representatives of the Sunni community and Sunni MPs strongly encouraged the King to restore law and order and declare a state of martial law. The subsequent crackdown by security forces resulted in the arrest and trial of 21 opposition leaders, the arrest and layoff of hundreds of individuals and the destruction of a few dozen Shiite religious structures in a series of repressive measures that have brought the protest movement to a standstill. Today, Bahraini society remains very much divided between the mainly Shiite opposition and Sunni loyalists. Sunni representatives have argued that at first they were sympathetic to most of the opposition’s demands, but were then alienated when polarized, radical figures took centre stage and began calling for the downfall of the regime. Some have even raised concerns over the prospect of civil strife: clashes between Sunni and Shiite citizens, the emergence of vigilantes and calls for the creation of popular committees of protection have become an increasingly common phenomenon.

Bahrain will say no – hardliners are firmly in control and reject any reform


Whatever opening there was for real dialogue in Bahrain, it appears to have closed. While the Crown Prince is busy touring Europe and the U.S. promoting himself as a force for moderation, it’s the hardliners in the royal family who currently hold power. Rather than reconciliation, their priority continues to be to oppressing -- and often punishing - the protesters calling for a more representative government. The regime has taken extreme, frequently violent measures to destroy the country’s political opposition and defeat the forces of democracy. Over the last few months, as the regime’s security forces have cracked down even more brutally, the prospects for meaningful reform may well have passed. Since mid-March, when Saudi Arabia sent a contingent of its National Guard into Bahrain to help violently clear the streets of protesters, Bahrain has been the scene of terrible suffering. Hundreds languish in the country’s dungeons, where they are subject to horrifying torture and the humiliation of being paraded in front of military tribunals. Thousands of others have been sacked from their jobs. The island’s Shiite majority, long politically marginalized and discriminated against, is paying the heaviest price. They have been stunned into silence by the vicious behavior of the Sunni regime. Bahraini politics have been polarized
by sectarianism and the country’s rulers are systematically creating an apartheid state. Reconciliation, let alone accountability for those responsible for the violence, is a remote possibility. So deeply ingrained are mutual antagonisms that, if this conflict continues, the most likely outcome may be an enduring hostility and the potential for perennial violence.

The U.S. has no leverage over Bahrain

The situation in Bahrain may well be providing Iran the opportunity to influence the emerging new regional order, which it has not been instrumental in creating or shaping until now. The Bahrain crisis is also showing the limits of U.S. influence and power in a region vital to U.S. interests. The Obama administration’s calls to speed up political reforms and its more recent condemnation of the crackdown have fallen on deaf ears in Manama. Instead, King Hamad has sought counsel or been influenced by Bahrain’s big brother, Saudi Arabia. For their part, the Saudis, increasingly upset with Washington, have warned both the United States and Iran not to interfere in Bahrain’s affairs. We really are in unchartered territory.

Any reform will just be a front – not genuine – 2001 proves
Andoni, 8/30/11 – Middle East consultant for Al Jazeera (Lamis, “Bahrain's contribution to the Arab Spring.” english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/08/20118301473301296.html)

In 1994 an uprising, led mainly, but not exclusively, by Shia parties finally culminated in the signing of the National Action Charter (NAC) in 2001. It represented an historic accord between the opposition and the royal family based on the restoration of parliamentary elections and political reforms. But in spite of two parliamentary elections, Hamad Ben Issa Al Khalifa, who succeeded his father and changed his title to king from emir (prince) - a move that was supposedly aimed at establishing a constitutional monarchy - continued the regime's authoritarian and repressive policies. Thus it was natural that Bahrainis were inspired early on by the success of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt to pursue a new stage of their struggle. As early as February 14, Bahraini youth followed the example of their peers in other Arab countries by staging protests and sit-ins demanding constitutional and political reforms. The organisers of the earlier protests were originally young people who did not necessarily belong to the predominantly Shia opposition parties. They did not rise as Shia but as youth who wanted to have a say on their fate through active political participation. The protests were peaceful and initially they sought the implementation of 2001 NAC and an end of the security control over the country’s political life. Bahrain’s Tahrir Square Like many people in Bahrain, the youth activists felt cheated by the regime which agreed to political reforms included in the NAC. The regime did not honor its end of the agreement although the document was approved by 98.4 per cent of voters in a national referendum held in February 2001.

AND, Even if they say yes – Saudi Arabia blocks any meaningful reform
Anti-Americanism and the King’s reliance on hardliner Sunni’s make it impossible for the King to promote reform or the Prince

Gengler 11


In a July 6 interview with Egyptian journalists carried in the Al-Ahram daily, a leading Bahraini revealed that his country’s February uprising was “by all measures a conspiracy involving Iran with the support of the United States,” the latter aiming “to draw a new map” of the region. “More important than talking about the differences between the U.S. and Iran,” he insisted, are “their shared interests in various matters that take aim at the Arab welfare.” Who is this Bahraini conspiracy theorist? A radical Arab nationalist, perhaps? Or a leader of the popular Sunni counter-revolution that mobilized successfully against the Shia-led revolt? Not exactly. In fact, he is none other than Marshall Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa: Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force, and, as his name indicates, a prominent member of Bahrain’s royal family. His outburst decrying American duplicity in Bahrain is but the latest in a string of similar incidents and public accusations that once more raise the question of political radicalization in Bahrain. But this time, in contrast to the usual narrative, the radicalization is not emanating from the country’s Shia majority. The rise of this anti-American narrative among Bahrain’s pro-government Sunnis can be traced back, ironically, to a March 7 protest in front of the U.S. embassy in Manama organized by Shia political activists. Those present condemned the muted if not outright hostile American response to their then still-hopeful popular revolution. A seemingly trivial detail of that demonstration -- a box of doughnuts reportedly brought to the protesters by the embassy’s then-Political Affairs Officer, who had ventured outside to hear their complaints -- provided fodder some weeks later for a widely-circulated online article portraying the official as a veritable enemy combatant. Photographs of him and his family, along with his local address and phone number, would soon appear on militant Salafi forums, where readers were urged to take action against this Hezbollah operative. Within a few weeks, the U.S. embassy had a new Political Affairs Officer; the old one had been very quietly sent home. Around the same time, Bahrain’s most hawkish government newspaper, Al-Watan, ran a series of editorials detailing the U.S.’s alleged duplicitous dealings in Bahrain. Titled “Washington and the Sunnis of Bahrain,” the articles chronicled a wide range of U.S. policies and institutions meant to undermine Sunni rule of Bahrain and of the Arab Gulf more generally. These include the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative, the National Democratic Institute, Human Rights Watch, and the (subsequently “reorganized”) American Studies Center at the University of Bahrain. In late June, this series gave way to a new and even less-subtly titled one: “Ayatollah Obama” and Bahrain, which draws on the president’s Muslim name to portray not only a country whose strategic interests have led it to abandon the Arab Gulf to Iran, but a U.S. president who harbors personal ideological sympathies for the Shia. Spanning nearly a dozen issues from June 26 to July 6, the articles ended only after an official protest by the U.S. embassy. This is more than a mere media campaign. Bahrain’s largest Shia opposition society, al-Wifaq, held a festival last weekend to reiterate
its demand for an elected government to be submitted at this week's sessions of an ongoing National Dialogue conference. Loyalist Sunnis countered with a rally of their own, one aimed not at domestic policy but at ending U.S. "interference" in Bahraini affairs. A 15-foot-wide banner hung directly behind the speakers' podium bore the flags of "The Conspirators Against the Arab Gulf," the United States, al-Wifaq, Hezbollah, and Iran. Below it was the message: "Bahrain of the Al Khalifa: God Save Bahrain from the Traitors." Rising Sunni cleric Sheikh 'Abd al-Latif Al Mahmud told listeners that, among other things, it is the United States that has divided Bahrain into Sunnis and Shia, just as it had done in Iraq. "If the regime is too weak to stand up to the U.S., they need to declare that so people can have their say," he continued. "And if the regime needs a ... rally ... in front of the U.S. embassy, the people are ready." And then the crescendo: "And if the U.S. is threatening to withdraw its troops and the facilities it gives to Bahrain, then to hell with these troops and facilities. We are ready to live in famine to protect our dignity." This is from a man who just months ago led pro-government rallies that attracted several hundred thousand Bahraini Sunnis. **This anti-U.S. mobilization by regime supporters in Bahrain is ominous,** and of course ironic inasmuch as the Obama administration’s lukewarm response to the February protests was premised in large part on the assumption that a Bahrain controlled by the Shia would be a Bahrain without the U.S. Fifth Fleet. But unfortunately the story only gets worse. Underlying this popular sentiment is a still more troubling cause: a longstanding political dispute dividing members of Bahrain’s royal family that the current crisis has brought to a head. Post-February, Bahrain has seen the empowerment of the less compromising factions of the ruling Khalifa family -- in particular its prime minister of 40 years -- at the expense of the more moderate king and crown prince. The former holds precariously to power; the latter, despite concerted U.S. efforts to revive his political standing highlighted by a June 7 meeting in Washington with President Obama, has been all but banished entirely following his failure to broker a deal to end protests in the early days of the crisis. What is most remarkable about Mahmud's exhortation of nationwide Sunnis is not his threat directed at the United States, but the threat directed at his own government. His suggestion that if "the regime is too weak to stand up to the U.S., they need to declare that so people can have their say" is no less an explicit challenge to Bahrain's ruling faction: either do what is necessary to guarantee the country's interests, or get out of the way of those who will. That King Hamad has yet to put a stop to either strand of rhetoric - the embarrassing months-long harassment of the American embassy and president, or the overt criticism of his own political handling of Bahrain's crisis -- evidences a fear of losing what precious little support he still enjoys from among the country's significant Sunni Islamic constituency. Indeed, rather than move to silence these radical voices, King Hamad has perhaps out of necessity legitimized them. On June 21, he went so far as to pay a personal visit to the home of Mahmud where, according to Bahrain's state news agency, he “lauded [him] for his efforts to serve his nation and religion.”

**Plan can’t do anything**

Hokayem 11, Middle East analyst – International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/19/11


*With* the international attention elsewhere and unerring attempts at a national dialogue going nowhere, protesters are taking back to the streets and clashing with police in villages around the capital Manama. By-elections to fill the seats of opposition parliamentarians who resigned during the uprising attracted a meager 17 percent of voters. Later this month, an independent investigation commission will submit a report and recommendations about the bloody events of February and March. Whether it will name those who directed the repression, call for a reversal of the often severe and unfair punishments inflicted on protesters, or serve as a national healing mechanism is still unknown, as is the willingness of the Bahraini government to implement its suggestions. It is doubtful that the report, however needed, will be a game-changer. Two entrenched, increasingly sectarian narratives have crushed any goodwill and middle ground. The battered opposition is struggling to devise a political strategy and contain its frustrated youth, some of whom risk being radicalized. The opposition last week released a new platform, the Manama Document, which restates its demands but is unlikely to inspire its base. The Sunni ruling elite, confident that it won this round decisively and restored a measure of normalcy, is displaying as much complacency as intransigence. For the U.S., too, this is an uncomfortable moment. It has been mostly silent on Bahrain recently, though President Obama’s mentions of Bahrain (and his pointed naming of Al-Wifaq, the largest Shia opposition group) in a May speech and again at the UN last month have ruffled the government and comforted the opposition, which fears the U.S. will ultimately side with the royal family. For many in Bahrain and the U.S., though, this falls short of U.S. responsibilities to Bahrain. Criticism of the U.S. administration over Bahrain has abounded. The plight of Bahraini workers, teachers, and medical professionals has attracted attention from the international media and from Congress. Influential NGOs and a handful of U.S. congressmen are trying to block the arms sale to the kingdom. At this time, however, direct U.S. diplomacy can achieve little and it would be unrealistic to
expect the U.S. to be able to redress all that has happened in Bahrain or to block an arms sale at the risk of upsetting watchful allies in the region. In fact, the U.S. can hardly play a bridging role between protesters and the monarchy at this point. Many in the Sunni community, a minority here that includes the royal family, see the U.S. as a protector of opposition group Al-Wefaq, which Obama mentioned by name in his UN speech. This explains the Bahraini parliament and media’s silly campaign against Tom Krajeski, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Manama. The parliament voted "no confidence" in the ambassador (who has not yet arrived in Bahrain) after he met with opposition groups. "This diplomat has a volatile agenda against Bahrain and the nation and we can't accept having him here," member of Parliament Ali Ahmed said. Some of the opposition's charges, such as that the U.S. has given Saudi Arabia carte blanche to interfere in Bahrain or that it keeps silent out of sheer strategic expediency, are simplistic. A better characterization is that Washington, having supported the daring but failed secret dialogue talks of Bahrain’s crown prince, folded after Saudi Arabia intervened in March.
No Iran War

Iran won’t launch a war over Bahrain

Barzegar 11. [Kayhan, Faculty Member, Department of International Relations, Science and Research University, Tehran, Iran, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2010–2011; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/international Security Program, 2007–2010, “Iran’s interests and Values and the ‘Arab Spring’” 4-20 -- http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20954/irans_interests_and_values_and_the_arab_spring.html]

Iran will not initiate any military expedition in the Persian Gulf in the near future, because this policy would fortify the adversarial and entrenched strategy of the United States and Israel, which represents Iran as the main source of regional instability. Such a policy will become even more precarious when it relates to Iran’s nuclear program. It is highly unlikely that Iran will make the same mistake as Saudi Arabia did with Bahrain, since this policy would increase political-security divisions in the region and provide an ideal justification for foreign forces by legitimizing their continued presence in the Persian Gulf.
Saudi Relations DA

**American support of Bahraini democratic reform causes Saudi Arabia to sacrifice relations**

Vali Nasr, Tufts, May 23, 2011. “Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring?”

In fact, the choice between U.S. values and interests is a false choice, as the president made clear in his speech. Now, American policy has to reflect this truth. So far, Washington has tried to placate the Saudis. It is time we challenged their words and deeds, instead.

**Tectonic Shift** It’s no surprise that the tectonic shift in Arab politics, a popular revolt calling for reform, openness and accountability, worries the Bahraini monarchy. The kingdom, like the rest of the Arab world, has a young population that wants jobs, freedom and a say in politics. Thirty-nine percent of Saudis ages 20 to 24 are unemployed. Having watched Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down amid protests in which Egyptian youths played a key role, Saudi King Abdullah announced $35 billion in new social benefits to head off demands for reform at home. That bought the monarchy time, but too many dominoes are falling in its direction to allow for complacency. Violent protests on Saudi Arabia’s borders, inside Bahrain and Yemen, have been particularly troubling. From the outset, Riyadh encouraged every Arab ruler to resist reform. The more Washington embraced the Arab Spring, the more Riyadh worried. Saudi rulers took particular exception to Washington’s call for Mubarak to resign, and when the U.S. urged reform in Bahrain, they saw U.S. policy as a direct threat to them. Encouraging Dialog Washington had encouraged Bahrain’s king, Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa, to enter into dialog with the opposition there, and American diplomats were directly involved in mediating talks. An agreement was almost at hand when Riyadh took the rare step of undermining U.S. policy. Saudi rulers persuaded Bahrain to scuttle the talks and bring in troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to suppress the protests. The weak excuse for this clumsy crackdown was that Iran was orchestrating the protests and Iranian expansionism had to be stopped in its tracks. A local protest inspired by popular demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt was transformed into a regional conflict. The Saudi strategy was clear: shift the focus from democracy to the bogeyman, Iran.

**US push for reform in Bahrain will break US-Saudi relations**

ICG, 11
(International Crisis Group, 7/28, Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform,

Following on the heels of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the Bahrain events presented a serious dilemma for Washington. The U.S. has huge assets in Bahrain – its Fifth Fleet is based there – and has a close, long-standing relationship with the Al Khalifas it is loath to jeopardise. Perhaps most importantly, the administration does not wish to further harm its pivotal relations with Saudi Arabia, already significantly undercut by Riyadh’s anger at Washington’s abandonment of its long-term Egyptian ally, Mubarak. For reasons noted above, Saudi Arabia views Bahrain as an existential issue, and any significant divergence of views between Washington and Riyadh over it could have near-fatal consequences to their relationship.

Moreover, although the administration concluded that – contrary to Saudi assertions – there was no evidence of direct Iranian meddling in Bahrain, it nonetheless agreed with Riyadh that Tehran would benefit from instability there. Also factoring in Washington’s calculations was the realisation that the Bahraini military, unlike its Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, would not desert its political leadership but rather rally around it. At the same time, the U.S. has sought to make clear that it supports the aspirations of protesters region-wide and fears being accused of inconsistent behaviour – or, worse, outright hypocrisy – if it comes out firmly against regime repression of opposition movements in Libya and Syria, but not in Bahrain.
Saudi Arabia will crush the plan
Al Ahmed, director – Institute for Gulf Affairs, 7/19/11

Give the Saudi monarchy their due. They are experts when it comes to manipulating [a] political environment in their region to work in their favor without attracting too much attention. Some would call that style stealthy and deadly. This is exactly what the monarchy has been able to achieve in Yemen and Bahrain by propping up pro-Saudi rulers in these two countries to keep them in power despite massive protests that would have toppled the toughest regimes elsewhere. The house of al-Saud has become highly adept in exploiting regional ethnic and religious fault lines to advance its own political goals. 

The Saudi recipe calls for a combination of media, religious, security and political pressures aiming to halt any meaningful change in the region especially if it can negatively affect the monarchy’s standing. The Saudi regime has a formidable arsenal which includes its massive oil revenues, media empires, religious establishment, intelligence services and the gravitas of its political leadership. The monarchy wields this unrivaled collection of assets with skill and fluency to push leading western political establishments to compromise, making Obama’s national security team look like amateurs in comparison. Take Bahrain, for example. The Saudis invaded the country with no objection from the United States. One would think that the U.S. would at least show some concern for the safety of its Fifth Fleet personnel who are now forever stuck a small patch of land with thousands of well-armed soldiers without any supposed coordination. The rest of the world, too, supported the invasion and continued to sell arms to the country that targets peaceful protesters, and will not be leaving Bahrain anytime soon.

As for Yemen, the monarchy’s many years of involvement in the affairs of its poorer neighbor yielded great results—Saudi President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his main rival Ali Abdullah Al-Houthi are loyal to Saudi Arabia and have been on its payroll for decades. Meanwhile, the latest wave of the fighting have been sidelined and left with nothing more than going speechless or publicly denouncing rallies. Some might believe erroneously—what the United States is taking the lead in Yemen. U.S. officials may get photos ops with Yemeni leaders, but these leaders dance to Saudi music alone. The reason is simple: the Saudis pay for those who obey them and complicate things for those who defy them.

The kingdom understands the importance of winning the loyalty of the security forces, which played the deciding factor in Tunisia and Egypt. The calculus of political power in these states is such that the regimes fall when their military remains neutral or sides with the protest movement, and survive when the military stays loyal to the government. This explains the deal with which the Saudis have been coming and funding the Yemeni army, national guards and tribal fighters so that the Saleh regime can use that sizable military force to quash any thought of regime change. This is exactly what the monarchy has deftly used its media assets including the respected Al Arabiya TV station and plethora of religious channels run by its religious and security organizations, to exploit sectarian and ethnic fears across the region when the Saudis pay for those who obey them and complicate things for those who defy them.

The monarchy also used its media assets to exploit sectarian and ethnic fears across the region. The monarchy has been able to keep its head above the water, but also has continued to actively shape the region to fit its needs.

Breakdown of relations spurs Saudi prolific
Lippman 11

So let us suppose that Saudi Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the United States deteriorated to the point where the Saudis no longer felt they could rely on Washington’s protection. If the Saudis could no longer assume that the armed forces of the United States are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a different ultimate weapon? With that in mind, could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of an alternative security relationship, and perhaps a nuclear agreement, with another major power should relations with the United States deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role...
would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part of any international communist movement, China could theoretically be an attractive partner. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, or that China would undertake such a mission, but to be unaware of any such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. THE STRATEGY GAP The Saudi Arabian armed forces have never developed a coherent national security doctrine that could provide a serious basis for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. But to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: it is a rich but weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by combat-hardened, truculent and potentially nuclear-armed neighbors; and no longer confident that it can count on its American protector. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L. Russell of the National Defense University argued in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “From Riyadh’s perspective,” continued Russell, “the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary.” Those “secure delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace” — namely, the CSS-2s. Military experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political difficulties — so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure, rather than more.
Saudia Oil DA

Moves towards constitutional reform spark uprisings in the Eastern province and rapid price spikes
Youssef, 12/13

MANAMA, Bahrain — Even as mainly Shiite Muslim protesters camp out in Pearl Square demanding major reforms, the deciding factor in the outcome for Bahrain could be neighboring Saudi Arabia. Behind the scenes and away from the streets, Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally and top oil supplier, is seeking to return to the status quo in Bahrain — or at least to slow down calls for change. That Bahrain's Shiite majority could gain more rights and powers from the ruling Sunni Muslims, Saudis think, could lead to unrest among their own Shiites, who live in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. In that case, reforms and economic incentives might not be enough to stop a movement from spreading there. Bahrain is the first Persian Gulf country to be hit by the unrest that's sweeping the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia is one of the last U.S. allies in the region since the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia fell. Although Bahrain is a tiny island of less than a million, what happens here could unleash calls for change in the much larger and powerful Saudi Arabia. It's a case of Goliath fearing David's wrath. At stake are oil prices, which are now at their highest since October 2008, and even relations with the United States, which is walking a fine line between promoting the will of the people and supporting a long-standing ally. In Saudi Arabia, officials already have quashed several small attempts to launch protests against some government decisions. Three days after the revolt began in Egypt, for example, roughly 50 residents protested the government response to deadly floods in Jeddah. They were promptly arrested. Protesters in Manama are calling for Bahrain to become a constitutional monarchy, rather than an absolute one. Such a shift probably would give the Shiite majority more power. As the Saudis see it, that represents instability for them; Saudi Arabia's Shiite minority could then rise up and ask for more freedoms its own. Protesters in Manama threatened Wednesday to lash out at the Saudi regime if it thwarted their efforts, though they refused to give their names. "If they stop us, we will go there," one protester yelled. For Saudi Arabia, the best outcome in Bahrain is enough change to pacify protesters but not so much that it risks government structure, said James Denselow, a Middle East writer and former researcher for Chatham House, a policy research center in London. "Instability could not get more on Saudi's doorstep than Bahrain," Denselow said. "The outcome that Saudi Arabia wants is . . . for everybody to leave the streets and that small changes be managed by the elite. They want a slow process." Collapses the global economy
Snyder, McIntire School of Commerce – University of Virginia, has two law degrees from the University of Florida, 2/23/11

If revolution strikes in Saudi Arabia and a major production disruption happens it could be catastrophic for the global economy, David Rosenberg, the chief economist at Gluskin Sheff & Associates, is warning that if there is major civil unrest in Saudi Arabia we could end up seeing oil go up to $200 a barrel... "If Libya can spark a $10-a-barrel response, imagine what a similar uprising in Saudi Arabia could unleash. Do the math: we'd be talking about $200 oil." 200 dollar oil? Don't laugh - it could happen. In fact, if it does happen the global economy would probably go into cardiac arrest. The truth is that if the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia gets disrupted there is not enough spare capacity from the rest of the globe to make up for it. Paul Horsnell, the
The world has only 4.5 million barrels-per-day (bpd) of spare capacity, which is not comfortable. Hornsby also said that even in the midst of potential supply problems, the global demand for oil continues to grow at a very robust pace. "In just two years, the world has grown so fast as to consume additional volume equal to the output of Iraq and Kuwait combined." For now, Saudi officials are saying all the right things. They say that there will be no revolution in Saudi Arabia and that there are not going to be any supply problems. For example, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi recently announced that the rest of the world should not worry because his country is definitely going to be able to make up for any shortage in the global supply of oil. "What I would like you to convey to the market: right now there is absolutely no shortage of supply." But what happens if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia? Suddenly the whole game would change.

Collapsing the CCP

For China, though, the Libyan engagement is not entirely positive. Beijing is surely overjoyed to have the world’s attention focused elsewhere, and away from its increasingly harsh repression of political opponents. On the other hand, rising oil prices will buttress higher inflation in China, and consequently feed dissent. Beijing's escalating crackdown on dissidents has shocked the international community—especially since the international community began to shift its gaze from the calamities in Japan and Libya. In the past few days, after the arrest of famous artist Ai Weiwei, the world has seen the extreme lengths to which Beijing has gone to preempt uprisings of the sort that have convulsed the Middle East. Tentative efforts to import Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” to China have met with beatings of bystanders and assaults on journalists, the shut-down of innumerable web sites, widespread arrests and the “disappearing” of a steadily growing number of activists—so terrified is the government of civil unrest.

It is an extraordinary setback for a country that "came out" to the world just three years ago hosting the most spectacular-ever Summer Olympics. In staging that extraordinary event, Beijing presumed to take its rightful place near the top of the pyramid of nations. With the reign of terror now underway, that ascension seems premature. The increased crackdown in China may presage Beijing’s expectation that its remarkable economic gains of the past thirty years are unlikely to continue. Chinese officials may fear that slowing growth will not provide the employment opportunities so necessary to satisfy those still migrating from the country to the cities. China’s Minister of Human Resources and Social Security recently reported that notwithstanding indications of labor shortages in certain industrial cities, worker supply still exceeds demand, requiring China to create about 25 million new urban jobs annually for the next several years. The possible disruptive impact of high unemployment makes a potential slowdown in the country’s growth a serious threat. China’s problems are exacerbated by the need to rein in inflation, running at 5.4 percent in March, which has led the government to raise interest rates five times since the financial crisis. It is also causing some to expect a speedier revaluation upwards of the yuan, which would further curtail growth. These issues perhaps explain why China will spend roughly $95 billion this year on security—an outlay for the first time topping the military budget, expected to be about $91 billion. (Many think that China’s military spending substantially exceeds the stated budget, but it does provide a benchmark.) Recent economic news from China indicates that its prospects may have changed. Beijing recently projected that growth will decline from about 10 percent to 8 percent this year and to 7 percent for the next four years. Since the country has a long history of outperforming expectations, most economists continue to project near-double digit growth. However, with interest rates and currency levels on the rise, it is possible that analysts are too optimistic. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development suggested as much in a report out this week in which it forecast moderating gains for China. Certain data points support this notion. Economists at the OECD and elsewhere were taken by surprise by news that in the first quarter China recorded its first net import deficit since 2004. Soaring commodity prices were blamed, and it is expected that more common trade surpluses will again become the norm, but the change in tone is noteworthy. Similarly, recent vehicle sales gains in China have slowed drastically, with the industry posting gains a mere fraction of former levels (up 5 percent in March, for instance, against a 75 percent gain a year ago). Overall, the picture is unusually cloudy. The Libyan conflict may have distracted the world’s attention from the repression in China. However, in helping to push up oil prices it also feeds the inflation that ultimately may create the greatest threat to China’s society. Beijing may not be a winner after all. It might prove easier to squash Gaddafi’s forces than to put the “inflation tiger” back in its cage.

Extinction
Yee, Associate Professor of Government @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Storey, Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, '2
Herbert and Ian, China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, p. 5

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario — nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
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The plan reinvigorates U.S. regional credibility – our stance on Egypt is key
Human Rights First 11 October

Human Rights First believes that building respect for human rights and the rule of law will help ensure the dignity to which every individual is entitled and will stem tyranny, extremism, and violence. Human Rights First protects people at risk: refugees who flee persecution, victims of crimes against humanity or other mass human rights violations, victims of discrimination, those whose rights are eroded in the name of national security, and human rights advocates who are targeted for defending the rights of others. These groups are often the first victims of societal instability and breakdown; their treatment is a harbinger of wider-scale repression. Human Rights First works to prevent violations against these groups and to seek justice and accountability for violations against them. Human Rights First is practical and effective. We advocate for change at the highest levels of national and international policymaking. We seek justice through the courts. We raise awareness and understanding through the media. We build coalitions among those with divergent views. And we mobilize people to act. Human Rights First is a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York and Washington D.C. To maintain our independence, we accept no government funding.

This update to Human Rights First’s April 2011 blueprint, How to Seize the Moment in Egypt, makes the case that the dramatic transformations taking place across North Africa present a unique opportunity for the United States to reshape its policy towards the region, placing human rights at the core of its bilateral relationships with governments. It identifies specific human rights benchmarks that must be met in Egypt’s transition process if it is to deliver more representative, democratic governance to the Egyptian people. These are: □ The military takes definitive steps to cede executive power; □ Repeal of repressive legislation; □ An end to arbitrary detention and torture; □ An end to harassment and official defamation of independent civil society organizations; □ Protecting the rights of religious minorities; and □ An end to state domination of broadcast media and monopolistic control over the telecommunications and Internet sector. It includes recommendations for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling authority in Egypt, and for the Egyptian government as a whole, focusing on achieving progress towards the benchmarks identified above. It also includes recommendations for the U.S. government, noting particularly that the U.S. government needs to strongly support its democracy assistance programs in Egypt, currently coming under attack by parts of the Egyptian government. It also emphasizes the importance of the bilateral military relationship between the United States and Egypt as a way to have a positive impact on the transition process currently underway in this key regional ally.  

A New Approach for U.S. Policy in the Middle East  

Forced to endure decades of repressive, corrupt, and unresponsive government, people across the Middle East and North Africa are rising up to demand a better life. Protesters have many motives, from lack of economic opportunity to police brutality to unchecked official lawlessness and corruption. But central to all the protests is the demand for governments that respect human dignity—that is, for governments that uphold human rights. In his “Address to the Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, President Obama underlined his commitment “to governments that reflect the will of the people.” He promised that the United States would support human rights “everywhere” and identified them: “the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose.” This is a reasonable encapsulation of the demands of the protesters. The United States, a longtime supporter of repressive regimes in the region, bears its share of responsibility for the suffering there. The damage inflicted by these corrupt and sometimes brutal regimes will now have to be remedied by emerging governments that will need support from the international community, not least from the United States. The United States now has an unprecedented opportunity to support the push for more representative government and in so doing to overhaul its approach toward the region. This is the ideal moment to place a commitment to human rights at the center of U.S. policy towards the Middle East. It is in countries like Egypt...
where the United States has a long history of providing financial assistance and cultivating close military and security cooperation that it now has the greatest opportunity to exert positive influence. Events of the past ten months have demonstrated that the old paradigm for U.S. policy—trying to maintain stability in the region through close relationships with autocrats—has suffered a blow; a fatal blow, we hope. The stability engendered through repression has long been largely illusory. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been little stability in the Muslim World, and the region has provided more than its fair share of threats to U.S. strategic interests. In recent years, authoritarian leaders like Mubarak found it politic to mask their dictatorial ways with a pretense of democratization and promises of reform that never came. This option of winking at sham reform while benefiting from cooperation in key strategic areas will now carry a heavier price for U.S. policymakers. The choice going forward will be between unseemly alliances with unmasked dictators and brazen military autocrats or forging new partnerships with sovereign, democratic governments. The United States should make clear that it will have a new approach to its allies in the region based on building mutually supportive alliances with sovereign, democratic states. President Obama noted in Cairo that governments that support human rights are more stable, successful and secure. They make better strategic partners than the despots the U.S. government had supported for so long. The United States must seek the stability it needs to protect its interests through the promotion of democracy and human rights, not through abetting autocrats and dictators. While change is inevitably unsettling, there is no reason for pessimism, which could be self-fulfilling. There is, however, a need for a new approach, and the patience to see it through. The benefits of this new approach could be considerable instead of U.S. alliances with dictators in the region becoming a rallying call for Al-Qaeda and other violent anti-American extremists, partnerships with democratic allies would improve the popular perception of the United States and thereby serve its interests.

Backlash is inevitable and irrelevant

Shadi Hamid 10–1, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, What Obama and American Liberals Don’t Understand About the Arab Spring, http://www.tnr.com/article/environment-energy/95538/arab-spring-obama-reality-democracy-neoconservatives-mubarak?page=0,1

Throughout the Arab spring, analysts and policymakers have debated the proper role that the United States should be playing in the Middle East. A small number argued that the U.S. should adopt a more interventionist policy to address Arab grievances; others, that Arab grievances are themselves the result of our aggressive, interventionist policies; and still more that intervention was simply not in our national self-interest. The Obama administration, for its part, attempted to split the difference, moving slowly, especially at the outset, to censure dictators like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Bashar Al Assad in Syria, while eventually supporting aggressive military action against Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. The reasons for the Obama administration’s passivity during the Arab spring have been many, but perhaps none is more helpful in explaining it than the notion of “declinism.” With the exception of neoconservatives and a relatively small group of liberal hawks, nearly everyone seems to think America has less power to shape events than it used to. An endless stream of books and articles has riffed on this theme. The most well-known of the genre are Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, Parag Khanna’s The Second World, and, from a more academic perspective, Charles Kupchan’s The End of the American Era. The Obama administration has appropriated some of the main arguments of this literature. An advisor to Obama described U.S. strategy in Libya as “leading from behind,” which Ryan Lizza, in The New Yorker, explained as coming from the belief “that the relative power of the U.S. is declining ... and that the U.S. is reviled in many parts of the world.” But in an ironic twist of fate, even as Americans seem to be placing an all-time low amount of faith in their ability to effect change around the world, many Arabs participating in the recent uprisings—despite their apparent fear and loathing of U.S. power—placed a disproportionate amount of their faith and hopes upon us. Americans—and American liberals, in particular—have yet to grasp this basic paradox. In their time of need, facing imprisonment, torture, and even death, protesters, rebels, and would-be revolutionaries still look to the United States, not elsewhere. Whether they find what they’re looking for is another matter. During the Bush Administration, when anti-American sentiment spread like wildfire across the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq, policymakers on all sides of the political spectrum, but particularly liberals, gravitated away from support for interventionism in general and democracy promotion in particular. The “kiss of death” hypothesis—in which overt American support for Arab democracy movements is considered toxic to the cause—became commonplace. But it is worth noting that Bush’s short-lived embrace of Mideast democratic reform—despite his deep personal unpopularity throughout the region—did not appear to hurt the Arab reform movement, and, if anything, did the opposite. This is
something that reformers themselves reluctantly admit. In 2005, at the height of the first Arab spring, the liberal Egyptian publisher and activist Hisham Kassem said, “Eighty percent of political freedom in this country is the result of U.S. pressure.” And it isn’t just liberals who felt this way. Referring to the Bush administration’s efforts, the prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh told me in August 2006, “Everyone knows it. … We benefited, everyone benefited, and the Egyptian people benefited.” Liberals had often told the world—and, perhaps more importantly, themselves—that the Bush administration’s destructive policies were a historic anomaly. When a Democrat was elected, America would undo the damage. For many liberals, including myself, this was what Obama could offer that no one else could—a president with a Muslim name, who had grown up in a Muslim country, who seemed to have an intuitive understanding of the place of grievance in Arab public life. But, after President Obama’s brief honeymoon period, the familiar disappointments returned. In a span of just one year, the number of Arabs who said they were “discouraged” by the Obama administration’s Middle East policies shot up from 15 percent to 63 percent, according to a University of Maryland/Zogby poll. By the time the protests began in December 2010, attitudes toward the U.S. had hit rock bottom. In several Arab countries, including Egypt, U.S. favorability ratings were lower under Obama than they were under Bush. Indeed, an odd current of “Bush nostalgia” had been very much evident in Arab opposition circles. In May 2010, a prominent Brotherhood member complained to me: “For Obama, the issue of democracy is fifteenth on his list of priorities. … There’s no moment of change like there was under Bush.” Indeed, while the Arab spring was and is about Arabs, it is also, in some ways, about us. If for decades, the U.S. was seen as central in supporting autocratic Arab regimes, so it was assumed that it would be just as critical in facilitating their demise. Before the Egyptian revolution, the leader of the liberal April 6 Movement, Ahmed Maher, told The Atlantic: “The problem isn’t with Mubarak’s policies. The problem is with American policy and what the American government wants Mubarak to do. His existence is totally in their hands.” Islamists, meanwhile, have a specific term—the “American veto”—dedicated to a belief in America’s outsized ability to determine Arab outcomes. The United States, so the thinking went, could prevent democratic outcomes not to its liking. When unrest broke out in Egypt, activists therefore hung on every major American statement, trying their best to interpret the Obama administration’s sometimes impenetrable language. On Al Jazeera, Egyptians asked why the U.S. and Europe weren’t doing more to pressure the Mubarak regime. Two of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading “reformists,” Esam el-Erian, as well as Abul Futouh, wrote op-eds in The New York Times and The Washington Post. Futouh’s op-ed—simultaneously overestimating America’s influence, decrying it, and believing that, somehow, it could be used for good—is representative of the genre: “We want to set the record straight so that any Middle East policy decisions made in Washington are based on facts. … With a little altruism, the United States should not hesitate to reassess its interests in the region, especially if it genuinely champions democracy.” The more repressive the Egyptian regime became, the more impassioned the calls grew. I remember receiving urgent, sometimes heartbreaking calls from Egyptian friends and colleagues. One broke out in tears, telling me that if the U.S. didn’t do something soon, the regime was going to commit a massacre under the cover of darkness. That the military did not open fire appeared to confirm America’s still considerable leverage. Two days before Mubarak stepped down, I met with several of the Muslim Brotherhood’s youth activists. The well-known blogger Abdelrahman Ayyash—only 20 years old at the time—told me that he and other members broke out into applause in Tahrir Square when Obama called for an “immediate” transition to democracy in Egypt. Ayyash’s remark stood out because it echoed something I have been hearing from activists across the political spectrum for more than five years: Despite their sometimes vociferous anti-Americanism, they almost always seemed to want the U.S. to do more in the region, rather than less. Indeed, while the Egyptian activists were happy to see Obama act, nearly all of them told me the administration stood by Mubarak too long, siding with the protesters only at the last moment. Across the region, activists were even less forgiving in their condemnation of American policy, even as they called on Obama to do more to pressure their regimes to democratize. In March, about a thousand Bahrainis protested in front of the U.S. embassy in the capital of Manama. One of the participants, Mohamed Hasan, explained why they were there: “The United States,” he said, “has to prove that it is with human rights, and the right for all people to decide [their] destiny.” And well before the most recent crackdown, the opposition figure Abdellajil al-Singace tried to give President Bush a petition signed by 80,000 Bahrainis—around one-seventh of the entire population—calling for a new democratic constitution. In 2009, al-Singace wrote in The New York Times that “it would be good if Mr. Obama vowed to support democracy and human rights. But he should talk about these ideals only if he is willing to help us fulfill them.” Al-Singace—by no means a liberal—is a leader of Al Haq, a hard-line Shia Islamist group with sympathies toward Iran. Yet he was not asking Iran, but rather Iran’s enemy, the United States, for assistance in his country’s struggle for democracy. This same logic holds true in places like Libya and Syria, where regimes have effectively waged war on their own people, pushing, once again, the question of external pressure to the forefront. In effect, it argues for doing nothing at the precise moment that doing something would be most effective. Some liberals, in other words, would like the U.S. to manage its own presumed decline and adapt to a changing world where America cannot and will not act alone. The Arab revolutions, however, make clear that there is no
replacement for American leadership, even from the perspective of those thought to be the most anti-American. This puts America in a strong position but also a potentially dangerous one. While the world continues to look to the U.S. for moral leadership, it often comes away disappointed. This is likely, then, to be remembered as a costly era of missed opportunities for the United States. The Obama administration, and liberals more generally, found themselves unprepared for the difficult questions posed by the Arab spring. Far from articulating a distinctive national security strategy, Democrats were content to emphasize problem solving, drawing inspiration from the neo-realism of the elder Bush administration. But a sensible foreign policy is different than a great one. Pragmatism is about means rather than ends, and it has never been entirely clear what sort of Middle East the Obama administration envisions. Ahead of Obama’s May 19, 2011 speech on the Arab revolts, the White House promised a comprehensive, “sweeping” approach. Instead, the speech promised more of the same — a largely ad-hoc policy that reacts to, rather than tries to shape, events. Of course, in the case of Libya, as Qaddafi’s forces marched toward Benghazi the United States did act, albeit at the eleventh hour. In rebel strongholds, Libyans raised American flags and offered their thanks to President Obama, something that is difficult to imagine happening anywhere else in the region. The episode only reinforces the idea that, in their moment of need, pro-democracy forces do not look to China, Russia, or other emerging powers. They look to the West and, in particular, the United States. This is what the declinist literature — and the Obama administration — seems willing to discount. Economic power, as important as it is, is no substitute for the moral and political legitimacy that comes with democracy. Declinists draw disproportionate backing from statistics that paint a dim picture of American military and economic competitiveness. Gideon Rachman’s January/February Foreign Policy essay on American decline (subtitled “this time it’s for real”) is based almost entirely on economic arguments. The moral components of power, however, cannot be so easily measured. But, more than nine months since the Arab spring began, America’s window of opportunity is closing. Arabs can wait for a change in heart, but they cannot wait forever. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that the Obama administration has done a passable job in response to the Arab revolts. Passable, however, is not good enough. The gravity of the situation demands bold, visionary leadership — a grand strategy that capitalizes on an historic opportunity for the U.S. to fundamentally re-orient its policies in the region and make a break with decades of support for “stable,” repressive regimes.

Nothing else matters

Miller says this is part of a long trend for the U.S.: America’s credibility, he argues, has been sinking to new lows. "We are neither admired, respected or feared to the degree that we need to be in order to protect our interests, and the reality is — and this is just another demonstration of it — everybody in this region says no to America without cost or consequences," he says. "[Afghanistan’s] Hamid Karzai says no, [Iraq’s] Maliki on occasion says no, [Iran’s] Khamenei says no, [Israel's] Netanyahu says no, [Egypt's] Mubarak says no repeatedly." U.S. credibility fell over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, analysts say, and again last year when Israel rejected U.S. calls for a building freeze in the occupied West Bank. Egypt is one place where the U.S. can stop this decline, says Amjad Atallah of the New America Foundation. But, he says, the administration needs to get its act together, first and stop giving Egypt mixed messages. "There is this back-and-forthing on any given day," he says. "On one day it might be that Mubarak looks like he has to leave; on another day you get a call from a king, you get a call from an emir, and you get weak-kneed and you think we are going to have to keep as much of the status quo as possible." And the longer this plays out, particularly in public, the weaker the U.S. looks to everyone, Atallah says. The great danger to the administration right now is that they might end up losing influence on both sides. They might lose influence with the autocrats we’ve been supporting for so long, but they might also lose influence with the protesters and the forces for democracy in freedom," he says. If there was ever a moment to play the aid card, Atallah says, this is it. The U.S. shouldn’t be spending nearly $2 billion a year to help Egypt buy American weapons, he argues, but should use some of that money to promote reform instead. "These are weapons that are purchased in a country where 50 percent of the people are below the poverty line," Atallah says. "So we need to shift that anyway. I think now could be a good time to start making that shift and linking it to demands that the United States is making for reform." There are others in Washington making the case for playing the aid card, especially now that the U.S. is making specific calls for reforms. Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution, the co-chairman of a bipartisan working group on Egypt, says the
U.S. used what leverage it had to make sure the army didn’t crack down on protesters. Now, he says, the Obama administration needs to use the aid card to make sure there are real reforms.

The plan reinvigorates U.S. regional credibility – our stance on Egypt is key

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http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/0426_middle_east_hamid.aspx

The revolutions are far from complete. Tunisia has faced sporadic violence and a succession of unstable interim cabinets. Despite being the original spark for the region’s uprisings, it has, perhaps predictably, become the forgotten revolution. Egypt is still governed by an institution— the military—that was long the backbone of the Mubarak regime. For many Egyptian activists, March 9 was a turning point, bringing back painful memories. That day, soldiers and plainclothes thugs armed with pipes and electric cables stormed Tahrir Square, detained nearly two hundred people, and then took them to be tortured in a makeshift prison at the Egyptian Museum. As their challenges grow, the country’s opposition groups have returned to their old fractious ways. Indeed, democratic transitions are notoriously messy and uncertain. Recognizing this, the Arab world’s new emerging democracies will need support and assistance from the international community, including the United States. This can be done through technical assistance and election monitoring. But more high-level involvement may be necessary as well, by putting pressure on the new governments to uphold their commitments and providing financial incentives to meet certain benchmarks on democratization. The question is whether the United States and its European allies, with their cash-strapped governments and skeptical publics, are willing to commit billions of dollars to helping democratize a still-troubled region. A great deal is at stake. America was rightly credited for helping facilitate transitions in many Eastern European and Latin American countries. If the U.S. is seen as helping make another transition possible, this time in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, it will give Americans much-needed credibility in the region. Successful transitions could herald a reimagined relationship between the United States and the Arab world, something that Obama promised in his 2009 Cairo address but failed to deliver on. To be sure, the United States has a checkered, tragic history in the region. For decades, the United States has been on the wrong side of history, supporting and funding Arab autocrats and undermining nascent democratic movements when they threatened American interests. So critics of Western ‘meddling’ have a point: whenever the United States and Europe interfere in the region, they seem to get it wrong. That is precisely why it’s so important that, this time, they get it right. But getting it right requires that the United States fundamentally reassess its Middle East policy and align itself with Arab populations and their democratic aspirations. This has not happened. Egypt and Tunisia, despite all their problems, remain the most promising cases. Elsewhere, the situation is considerably more grave, with U.S.-backed autocrats in Yemen and Bahrain having used unprecedented force against their own citizens. Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Bahrain has fanned the flames of regional sectarianism and made an already explosive situation even worse. Thus far, the Obama administration has been behind the curve in nearly every country, reacting to rather than shaping events. President Obama adopted a slow and deliberate approach, and refused to take a stronger stand with America’s Yemeni and Gulf allies. Even enemies such as the Syrian regime have so far escaped any real pressure. If anything is clear, it is that Arabs have shown that something more than caution and gradualism is called for in historic moments of change. This time, they—not the international community—are leading the way. But they and their countries need the international community to follow. Otherwise, their revolutions may still fail.

The US must transition to an ideational model of Mid East engagement or risk total irrelevance – Egypt is the key

Peter Fettner 11, prof and PhD candidate in philosophy at Temple, published writer and researcher on US foreign policy, (writing under the pseudonym Byron), “Investigative Analysis:
It’s easy to read the revolutions across the Middle East now as a vindication of Joseph Nye Jr.’s philosophy of foreign policy. American soft power has triumphed in the Arabs’ and Iranians’ demands for democracy, human rights, and socioeconomic justice. Yet simultaneously, American hard power has been shaken by the Middle Eastern people’s absolute rejection of Western-supported authoritarianism. But what kind of changes will American foreign policy require to genuinely respond to the transformations taking place in the Middle East? The solution seems, in Nye’s terms, for the U.S. to apply smart power, using its military and economic strength to stabilize the new democracies while simultaneously forming alliances based on a common set of democratic values. President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have had a tough time navigating the uncharted waters of the Arab revolutions and the Iranians peoples’ struggle against the IRI. With the sudden collapse of realpolitik, foreign policy has suddenly undergone a paradigm shift, and it’s clear that the executive branch is scrambling to keep up. Obama’s initial pronouncements that Mubarak’s regime should abide the will of the Egyptian people were responsible enough statements, but he did not at the time grasp the extent of the people’s demands. They insisted not on reform, and not just on the ouster of the authoritarian Mubarak or even his whole cabinet, but on complete regime change and constitutional reform. The President was poorly served by the old false dilemma between U.S. interest in supporting a stable authoritarian regime and American ideology in supporting the revolutionaries. With the escalation of state-sponsored violence against the protesters, the usual condemnations of violence were accompanied by the awkward knowledge that Mubarak’s thugs were using American-made tear gas against the peaceful protesters. Finally, in a January 30th interview, Hillary Clinton strongly reiterated support for the Egyptian people’s democratic aspirations, but denied any consideration of cutting off military aid. And she gave no indication that Mubarak has been urged to step down, even after his thugs had attacked and killed some of the protesters. In a February 14th interview with Aljazeera, Clinton was lukewarm about the danger of Egypt reverting to military rule, her answer lacking a strong call to the army to maintain the direction of the Egyptian revolution. The lack of a consistently supportive stance on democratic revolution in the Middle East threatens to undermine president’s aim of recovering U.S. legitimacy there. “While Obama may have partly succeeded in changing the image of the United States worldwide, how far is he willing to go to ensure that this change is permanent and not temporary? True, he has endeavored to reach out and has made many promises. Yet, will his good intentions help reverse what his administration inherited from the previous administration?”[2] The question remains whether Obama’s rhetoric will be matched by action; but action would mean a genuine paradigm shift in U.S. MENA policy, not just an adjustment of already existing policies.[3] What is the substance of that shift, and what are the political conditions for implementing it? In Egypt, the U.S. had to balance support for democracy with gratitude to the Egyptian government. In Libya, much less could be done by diplomatic means, although faster action on sanctions and freezing Quadaffi’s assets would have been desirable and entirely legitimate. Congressional criticism of the president’s imposition of the no-fly zone, which comes from both parties, reflects the same bafflement as that afflicting the executive branch, confusing the “ideological visions on foreign affairs”[4] that usually order debate on foreign policy. But if there is an uprising in Iraq, with U.S. security forces still present, Obama and Clinton will face the toughest foreign policy puzzle of their term, because involvement in Iraq is inevitable. In each case, there are opportunities for the executive to influence the course of events in a way favorable to the emerging democracies. But not by means of military intervention. It is now clear that the demand for freedom in the Middle East represents a turning point for U.S. Middle East policy. But of exactly what character? In the wider historical perspective, the Arab uprisings all have looming in the background America’s long-standing policy of supporting autocrats for the sake of maintaining “stability.” That policy is backfiring for a number of reasons. But one of its principle features is that the Arab and Iranian people are demanding freedoms and rights associated with the liberal democracies of the West, even though they don’t necessarily trust the West to act consistently with its own philosophy. On that reading, the future of American policy lies in shrugging off the benighted realism that has plagued international relations for so long in favor of Nye’s smart power model. Instead of
Carefully distinguishing between American ideals and U.S. interests abroad, we must accept that our interests overseas lie in identifying our national interests with our ideals. America can only win in the Middle East by genuinely embracing democracy. What the executive and the State Department are realizing is that it’s in America’s best long-term interests to see all of the Middle Eastern revolutions succeed. We will have allies, peace, trade, and a massive fiscal surplus. Democracies are generally very friendly to each other. If the Arabs and Persians were as friendly to the United States as Turkey and Israel, then America would be able to drastically cut its military spending. The “peace dividend” would be massive, enough to revitalize the American economy. Since a robust middle class is an indispensable element in democratic society, American foreign policy should turn from war to development in order to promote stable and enduring democracies.

As Clinton points out, discussing her plans for implementing Nye’s smart power concept, “development, when done effectively, is one of the best tools to enhance the United States’ stability and prosperity. It can strengthen fragile or failing states, support the rise of capable partners that can help solve regional and global problems, and advance democracy and human rights.” On the other hand, “countries that are impoverished, corrupt, lawless, or mired in recurring cycles of conflict are more prone to becoming havens for terrorists and other criminals.”[5] In order to regain its soft power, America must recover democracy. Our foreign policy must aim to spread economic stability, human rights, and freedom around the world, or it won’t be accepted by other nations. Our power both implies and depends upon responsibility. Condoleezza Rice’s idea that American foreign policy should aim to maintain our position as the world’s only superpower will not, and should not, be accepted by any other nation unless that position is clearly conducive to genuine advancement for humanity. For only the world-historical mission of spreading genuine democracy, with all that entails, can justify America’s tremendous power. But also, only commitment to that mission can maintain America’s position. Without that justification, without that commitment, America will inevitably lose its legitimacy.

That, along with the limitations of military power, is the lesson of the Bush administration’s failure in the Middle East. Here it’s worth mentioning that Nye’s concepts of soft power and smart power were prompted by the disaster of Bush’s foreign policy and which currently guide the improved approach of Hillary Clinton. In a April 13, 2004 interview, Nye explicitly linked America’s loss of soft power to the Bush administration’s failed foreign policy: “Saddled as we are with a foreign policy that largely relies on the hard power of our military and economic might, rather than capitalizing on the soft power of shared values, we would all agree that America’s recent foreign policy initiatives are seen as less than successful in the eyes of the world.”[6] In the historical context of American foreign policy, Nye’s position repudiates the “war on terror” frame articulated by Bush’s cabinet, along with the assumption that the U.S. should aim for global hegemony and the benighted doctrines of unilateralism and the pre-emptive strike.[7] Despite its departures from the politics of the cold war, the Bush doctrine continued to emphasize a military approach to international power over diplomacy or development, to the detriment of American standing in the Middle East. Nye’s task, like that of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, is to regain for the United States the soft power lost during Bush’s tenure. America’s recent failures in foreign policy can ultimately be explained by the fact that America’s foreign policy is not democratically framed. Instead, through their influence over the government, corporations deploy the American military according to their own interests. In order to resume its position of world leadership, America must be democratic in every aspect, which is to say that our relationships with other nations must be determined by civil society and not by multinational corporations.

Genuinely democratic nations usually don’t start wars unless there’s a broad consensus about an imminent threat because it’s the people who decide policy and who risk death in combat because they are the same people, and because of the power of citizen diplomacy and international friendship. One of the strongest features of Nye’s approach is that he recognizes the potentials of social media for expanding the power of civil society and perceives them as consistent with both America’s values and its interests. The decentralization of information and the development of citizen diplomacy, in his view, tend to shift the management of foreign policy away from governments and toward non-state actors. The result is that soft power takes on a new importance in foreign policy: “a new information revolution is changing the nature of power and increasing its diffusion. States will remain the dominant actor on the world stage, but they will find the stage far more crowded and difficult to control. A much larger part of the population both within and among countries has access to the power that comes from information.”[8] The increasing importance of soft power is especially so in the case of the Middle East. American success in the region can no longer rely on military supremacy deployed by the U.S. government, but must now draw on civil society. With the loss of legitimacy we suffered as a result of the Bush doctrine, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the scandals of Guantanamo Bay and Abu-
Gharib, and the endemic human rights violations of Israel’s government, and American support for authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, “our public diplomacy must acknowledge a world that is far more skeptical of government messages than we have assumed” (Nye, 2004:143). Meanwhile, the consistently non-violent quality of the Egyptian protests created an irresistible legitimacy in the face of violence and injustice, and many inspiring and terrifying accounts flowed out of Egypt through Twitter and Facebook, including from members of foreign media reporting from the ground. Egypt’s revolution thus raised the bar on the requirements and possibilities of soft power in a way that has forced the United States to respond.

No backlash -- The US can spin the plan

In difficult environments where immediate U.S. security interests might appear at odds with American values, public diplomacy allows U.S. policymakers an outlet to express and promote the ideals of freedom, democracy, rule of law, tolerance and human rights directly to the Egyptian people, while maintaining close bilateral ties and security cooperation with the government. Though this dichotomy created friction, it was most successful when Congress stood up to Egyptian constraints on foreign assistance. Though perhaps operating under such constraints limited the reach and effectiveness of U.S.-funded programs, the existence and operation of political training activities, TV and radio programming, and cultural, academic and professional exchanges suggest that the United States was able to get its message out. As Egypt continues on the path of democratic transition, training programs such as these stand to have the most direct impact on Egyptian politics. With a parliamentary election set for November, the party formation and campaigning skills that U.S.-funded democracy promotion programs have been teaching Egypt’s opposition will be put to the test. Another function of public diplomacy during this period should be the spread of democratic ideas and ideals.

SYMBOLISM of US direct aid is crucial, regardless of its MATERIAL impact
Human Rights First 11
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Egypt-Blueprint-Seize-the-Moment.pdf Human Rights First (formerly known as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization based in New York City and Washington, D.C. Since its founding in 1978, the organization has focused on protecting the rights of refugees, supporting human rights defenders around the world, and pressing for the U.S. government’s full participation in the international human rights system. In recent years, the organization also has turned its attention to the erosion of human rights in the U.S. in the post-9/11 period; to the rise in anti-Semitic, racist and anti-Muslim hate crimes and other forms of discrimination in Europe; and to war crimes and crimes against humanity in places like Darfur. The work of Human Rights First is based on the principle that core human rights protections apply universally, and thus extend to everyone by virtue of their humanity. While the organization draws on international law and diplomacy to advance its advocacy, it also recognizes and starts from the premise that long-term change is most likely to occur from within a society.
There are at least two important factors to consider in the allocation of the aid package: first, the concrete goals and outcomes that each specific outlay is intended to achieve; and, just as importantly, the political message sent by the way the funds are allocated. The Obama Administration ran into criticism for slashing the funds allocated to democracy and human rights, not because there were good projects that went unfunded, but because of the perceived message that the Obama Administration cared less about human rights and democracy than its predecessor. Sending an unequivocal and clearly understood message of support for a democratic transition in Egypt must be one of the highest priorities for the administration at this time and adapting the foreign assistance package would be one of the clearest ways to do that.

Domestic backlash doesn’t implicate broader regional credibility

A new political reality in the Middle East demands a new American approach. However, for the various countries currently experiencing upheaval, a simple call for rulers to abdicate will not suffice. America must promote the idea that stability should be linked to the legitimacy of a government rather than the degree of its repressiveness. At the same time, it is also imperative that the U.S. approach the democratization of the various Middle Eastern countries with caution, lest the instability that the U.S. is so justifiably concerned with overshadows the positive potential of the Arab Spring. Political scientist and President of Eurasia Group Ian Bremmer has developed a model that helps to account for the instability that previously closed states experience as they democratize. Using a graph with a horizontal axis labeled “openness” and a vertical axis labeled “stability”, Bremmer draws a J curve to illustrate that repressive but relatively stable countries (represented by the lower-curl lip of the J curve) experience a period of instability (the trough of the J) before they are able to rise up to the far-side of stability-openness function. The stability of the states on the left side of the J curve frequently depends on individual leaders while the stability of states on the right side of the J curve depends on institutions. As strong rulers are deposed, the state must go through a dangerous period where neither institutions nor rulers are able to guarantee stability – hence the dip in the vertical stability axis. As Bremmer points out, some states like South Africa survive the transition to democracy while others, such as Yugoslavia, do not. Additionally, economic and social shocks such as a famine, natural disasters, or rioting, can push the entire J curve lower, resulting in greater instability for every degree of openness. The strategic importance of the Middle East means that the U.S. must create conditions that would push the J curve higher so that a closed regime can safely pass through the least stable segment of the curve. The U.S. has already recognized that it cannot instinctively support immediate democratic elections in what are now closed authoritarian countries for fear of creating instability so great that it leads to widespread chaos and even the total dissolution of the state (as was a feared possibility during the civil strife in Iraq). At the same time, the U.S. period of instinctively supporting autocrats as long as they guaranteed stability has ended. Such an approach has never been ethical and in any case, the autocrats are no longer able to provide the stability that they previously used to justify their rule. The United States should therefore encourage Arab rulers in the rest of the states currently facing protests to cancel emergency laws that have allowed security forces to tyrannize citizens with impunity; to weed out corruption that stifles economic growth; and to give more power to representative legislative bodies. The U.S. should also promote initiatives such as the ones that are currently undertaken by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. These include civic advocacy education along with budget oversight, government monitoring and political party development. At the same time, the U.S. should offer moral support to the protestors by making clear that regimes which respond to legitimate protests with violence will be faced with sanctions and other penalties. In this way, rulers will be given a choice between ushering in a long period of civil strife, à la Libya, and navigating their governments along the precarious path to democratic reform, building increased legitimacy among their citizens along the way. Such an approach would slowly move the Middle East towards representative government in the least disruptive way possible while finally increasing U.S. credibility in the eyes of the Arab public.
Aff Iran Impact Scenario

Perception of US weakness emboldens Iran and causes other countries to bandwagon


Whatever the actual cost, and even if the durable U.S. commitment is only a handful of U.S. ships and a few thousand troops, the U.S. role in the Gulf remains central to the United States, the Gulf states themselves, and to the world that buys their oil and gas. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states rely on the United States to protect them from Iran, Iraq, and each other, while powers as diverse as China, India, and Japan rely on the United States to secure the free passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. As the Navy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps increases the activities of its small craft in the Gulf, all countries look to the United States to identify and combat potential threats. For most of a decade, European policymakers have argued that any international effort to deal with potential Iranian nuclear proliferation must have the United States at its core. The Gulf, then, represents the intersection of several forces: U.S. power, Iranian opposition to U.S. power, global vulnerability, and reliance on the United States.

Importance of U.S. Power

There is no region in the world where the perception of a rise or decline in U.S. power should be more consequential. Ceteris paribus, a sense of U.S. power waning should be expected to embolden Iran and cause U.S. allies in the region to bandwagon with Iran; a perception of rising U.S. power should stiffen the resolve of U.S. allies and provoke more conflict-averse Iranian behavior. Yet, a series of conversations with senior leaders in the Gulf in May 2010 and subsequent research suggest that U.S. power is merely one of several factors that Gulf nations evaluate when shaping their own behavior. Equally important (yet not wholly independent) are questions of U.S. commitment, intentions, and capabilities. Although such a finding undermines any effort to fit Gulf perceptions of U.S. power into a global model, it also suggests that key sets of determinants are firmly within U.S. control.

Whereas it is difficult for the United States to manage global perceptions of its rise and fall, the United States can shape regional perceptions of its commitment, intentions, and capabilities through a discrete set of actions and statements.

Credibility garnered from transitions solves Iran expansionism


America’s interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and reassuring Israel sufficiently to prevent a disastrous war remain urgent. But the United States cannot deal effectively with Iran in this new environment by containing it. Getting policy toward Iran right means getting U.S. policy toward the region right: aligning the United States with the emerging empowered Arab public and preserving key regional alliances, while denying Iran the ability to exploit the changing environment. Attempting to repolarize the region against Iran will only undermine U.S. interests. Iran thrives when the regional agenda is positioned as a bipolar struggle in which it is the only alternative to the American- and Israeli-backed regional status quo. Many Iran hawks
fear the Arab uprisings will distract attention from Iran, not realizing this is one of the greatest opportunities presented by the uprisings. These changes undermine the bipolar narratives on which Iran’s appeal depends, shifting attention away from the “resistance” and toward internal political struggles in which Iran has little role. The worst thing the United States could do is to overstate the Iranian menace and feed Tehran’s interests and narrative. Key Arab allies across the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, are pushing hard to restore the traditional regional order, resisting democratic transitions and hyping Iran’s role in countries from Bahrain to Yemen. The United States should resist such efforts, and be vigilant about feeding self-fulfilling prophecies about Iran’s role. The United States has a historic opportunity to align itself with the aspirations of the people of the Middle East, arguably for the first time in a generation, and risks squandering it by falling back on conventional policies. It faces a chance to move beyond the zero-sum political struggle between Iran and America’s regional allies that has dominated the last 30 years. While the domestic turmoil faced by America’s regional allies may appear to strengthen Tehran in the short term, over the long term the reform of these regimes will challenge Iran’s regime more than any effort to contain Iran ever did. In developing a new approach to Iran, the administration should: Engage newly empowered publics. The administration should lay out a vision that aligns the United States with the aspirations of publics in the Arab world and Iran, and demonstrate that commitment in practice.

Causes regional war and miscalc

As it struggles to recalibrate its Iran policy, the administration should pay attention to the risk of an unexpected escalation toward war, which would badly harm U.S. efforts to consolidate a new regional order. In tinderbox conditions, local incidents, such as the killing of an Iranian in Bahrain or a rocket hitting Israel from Lebanon, could lead to sudden and rapid conflagration that could draw in multiple parties. Iran might seek to capitalize on a perceived window of opportunity through aggressive action, or simply push too far. Particular attention should be given to Israel’s northern border with Hezbollah, the divided island nation of Bahrain and a collapsing Yemen as three flashpoints where simmering tensions could explode into broader regional war. The regional upheavals have clearly increased Israeli security concerns, which could lead to its lashing out – whether at Gaza, Hezbollah or Iran itself – to address these perceived threats. Saudi concerns about Iran are also more intense than usual, and developments on the ground in Bahrain could trigger direct Iranian-Saudi conflict. Iran may test the extent to which these developments have constrained its rivals, and take provocative steps that trigger unexpected responses. Hezbollah’s confidence and growing military arsenal combined with Israel’s concerns about the shifting balance of power could produce sudden and game-changing war.
Impact – U.S.-Egypt Relations key to Terror

Relations are key to solve terrorism.


The government of Egypt has in turn provided important help to the Pentagon. For example, Egyptian authorities grant U.S. military aircraft with over-flight rights and expedited processing for U.S. Navy ships to transit the Suez Canal. Furthermore, U.S. Navy personnel are allowed to make rest and recreation stops at Egyptian ports. Egyptian and U.S. intelligence cooperation is also extensive if less openly discussed. Some percentage of U.S. aid has supported building Egyptian intelligence capabilities, including elements within both the Egyptian military and the country’s internal security force. Egyptian and U.S. intelligence agencies have collaborated to counter Islamist extremist movements within Egypt as well as elsewhere in the Middle East. They have worked closely on a variety of specific counterterrorist activities, from identifying and destroying terrorist cells to curbing the flow of finances and weapons to Islamist militants. For example the Egyptian government has supported U.S. requests to freeze the assets of Islamic charities suspected of helping to support terrorist movements.
Impact – Stability ~> Middle East/Africa War

That makes regional war in the Middle East and Horn of Africa inevitable


In the preface to the Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook on Egypt, in 1995, I noted: If Egypt remains strong, and in all senses a power in its regional contexts, then world events will move in one direction. If Egypt’s strength is undermined, then world events will move along a far more uncertain and violent path. It is significant that Egypt began to fail to be strong, internally, within a few years of that 1995 book. It became less resilient as Mubarak became more isolated and the inspiration offered by Sadat began to erode. This resulted in the rise in Egypt of the Islamists who had killed Sadat, and the growing empowerment of the veteran Islamists from the Afghan conflict, including such figures as Osama bin Laden (who had spent considerable time living in Egypt), and Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al. The reality was that Mubarak’s management-style presidency could not offer the requisite hope because hope translates to meaning and identity to Egyptian society as it was transitioning from poverty and unemployment to gradually growing wealth. What are the areas of strategic concern, then, as Egypt transforms? The following are some considerations: Security and stability of Suez Canal sea traffic: Even temporary disruption, or the threat of disruptions, to traffic through the Suez Canal would disturb global trade, given that the Canal and the associated SUMED pipeline (which takes crude oil north from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean) are responsible for significant volumes of world trade, including energy shipments. Threats of delays or closure of the Canal and/or the SUMED, or hints of increased danger to shipping, would significantly increase insurance costs on trade, and would begin to have shippers consider moving Suez traffic, once again, to the longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope seaway. Disruption of Nile waters negotiations and matters relating: Egypt’s support for the emerging independence of South Sudan was based on that new state’s control over a considerable stretch of the White Nile, at a time when Egypt has been attempting to dominate new treaty discussions regarding Nile (White and Blue Nile) water usage and riparian rights. Already, Egyptian ability to negotiate with the Nile River states has entered an hiatus, and unless the Egyptian Government is able to re-form quickly around a strong, regionally-focused model, Egypt will have lost all momentum on securing what it feels is its dominance over Nile water controls. In the short term, the Egyptian situation could provide tremors into northern and South Sudan, and in South Sudan this will mean that the U.S., in particular, could be asked to step up support activities to that country’s independence transition. Such a sudden loss of Egypt’s Nile position will radically affect its long-standing proxy war to keep Ethiopia which controls the headwaters and flow of the Blue Nile, the Nile’s biggest volume input landlocked and strategically impotent. This means that Egypt’s ability to block African Union (AU) and Arab League denial of sovereignty recognition of the Republic of Somaliland will decline or disappear for the time being. Already Egypt’s influence enabled an Islamist takeover of Somaliland, possibly moving that state toward re-integration with the anomic Somalia state. Equally importantly, the interregnum in Egypt will mean a cessation of Cairo’s support for Eritrea and the proxy war which Eritrea facilitates but which others, particularly Egypt, pay against Ethiopia through the arming, logistics, training, etc., of anti-Ethiopian groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), etc. Overall security of the Red Sea states and SLOC: Egypt has been vital to sustaining the tenuous viability of the state of Eritrea, because Cairo regarded Eritrean loyalty as a key means of sustaining Egyptian power projection into the Red Sea (and ensuring the security of the Red Sea/Suez Sea Lane of Communication), and to deny such access to Israel. Absent Egyptian support, the Eritrean Government of President Isayas Afwerke will begin to feel its isolation and economic deprivation, and, may well, on its own, accelerate new pressures for conflict with Ethiopia to distract local populations from the growing deprivation in the country. The Israel situation: A protracted interregnum in Egypt, or a move by Egypt toward Islamist or populist governance could bring about a decline in the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, and provide an opening of the border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza region of the Palestinian Authority lands. This would contribute to the ability of Iran to escalate pressures on Israel, and not only further isolate Israel, but also isolate Jordan, and, to an extent, Saudi Arabia. The threat of direct military engagement between Israel and Egypt may remain low, but a move by Egypt away from being a predictable part of the regional peace system, would, by default, accelerate the growth of the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah Hamas ability to strategically threaten Israel. Moreover, the transforming situation would also inhibit the West Bank Palestinian Authority Government. Eastern Mediterranean stability: The instability, and the possible move toward greater Islamist influence, in Egypt reinforces the direction and potential for control of the regional agenda by the Islamist Government of Turkey. It is certainly possible that the transformed mood of the Eastern Mediterranean could inhibit external investment in the development of the major gas fields off the Israeli and Cyprus coasts. This may be a gradual process, but the overall sense of the stability of the region particularly if Suez Canal closure or de facto closure by any avoidance of it by shippers due to an Islamist government in Cairo would be jeopardized if the area is no longer the world’s most important trade route. Influence on Iran’s position: It should be considered that any decline in Egypt’s ability to act as the major influence on the Arab world enhances Iran’s de facto position of authority in the greater Middle East. It is true that Egypt’s position has been in decline in this regard for the past decade and more, and that even Saudi Arabia has worked, successfully to a degree, to compete with Egypt for regional (i.e: Arab) leadership. Without strong Egyptian leadership, however, there is no real counterweight to Iran’s ability to intimidate. During the period of the Shah’s leadership in Iran (until the revolution of 1979 and the Shah’s departure, ultimately to his death and burial, ironically, in Cairo), Iran and Egypt were highly compatible strategic partners, stabilizing the region to a large degree. The Shah’s first wife was Egyptian. Absent a strong Egypt (and, in reality, we have been absent a strong Egypt for some years), we can expect growing Iranian boldness in supporting such groups as those fighting
for the so-called Islamic Republic of Eastern Arabia. U.S. interests: A stable Egypt is critical for the maintenance of U.S. strategic interests, given its control of the Suez; its partnership in the peace process with Israel; and so on.

Horn of Africa instability causes major power wars
Glick '7 (Dec. 10, 2007 Caroline Glick, THE JERUSALEM POST)

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. The Horn of Africa includes the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya.
Impact – Oil Shocks

Instability ensures oil spikes – that crashes the economy and causes war


Egypt is the most populous and internationally influential country in the Arab world. This swing toward Islamic governance is highly significant, as it has the very real potential to turn Israel’s most important Arab ally into yet another enemy. Egypt’s Islamists generally oppose their country’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel, though the Brotherhood has said it will respect the treaty while seeking modifications acceptable to both sides. At this point, Egypt cannot really afford to dishonor the treaty, as it has bought the country billions in US military assistance. Regardless, in time almost anything can change, and the new Egypt will certainly be less compliant to American demands, cooler to Israel, and warmer to Iran than was the old Egypt. The Energy Implications

The world’s oil markets are sensitive animals, prone to overreacting and slow to heal. Their herders, the oil traders, are best able to control their flocks when supplies are stable and predictable. The Middle East is about as far away from stable and predictable as you can get right now. And since the Middle East is to oil as water is to fish, that means one simple thing: expensive oil. One word from an Iranian politician about the Strait of Hormuz would probably send futures up a percent in hours. The unexpected Nour victories in Egypt likely have oil traders lying awake at night, worst-case scenarios running through their heads. The world’s foreign ministers are praying to their various gods that Sunnis and Shiites somehow miraculously find peace in Syria, because there is no apparent solution other than a miracle. Expensive oil is more than annoying. With the US and the EU both facing unprecedented debt problems and struggling to breathe new life into stagnant economies, expensive oil could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and sends the world spiraling back into a recession...or worse. The world is at a precarious crossroads right now and a wrong turn could easily snowball into nationalist and sectarian violence compounded by global competition for scarce and shockingly expensive oil. Maybe those who are fatigued by Middle Eastern strife have it right: maybe ignorance would be bliss. Such bliss would be fleeting, though, because the only way to ride out a storm is to understand what drives it.
Assistance to Egypt is key to bolster US influence with the Egyptian government—causes them to play a constructive role in the non-proliferation regime

Morris, 11
Patricia Morris, Scoville Peace Fellow, Center for Arms Control and non-Proliferation, 2011, A New Nuclear Posture for Egypt?, http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/articles/a_new_nuclear_posture_for_egypt/

The Egyptian revolt creates a unique opportunity for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty members to encourage Egypt to begin taking steps to join the non-proliferation mainstream. Though Egypt is a strong proponent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has refused to sign up to many of the key linchpins of this regime, including the voluntary Additional Protocol. Without the protocol, Egypt is not obligated to accept inspections that are more intrusive. The IAEA and its member states should begin early work with the new Egyptian government to convince it that the agency can better help Cairo meet its energy needs with the Additional Protocol. Already, Canada, France, the United States and other states have conditioned economic and technical assistance to Egypt on participation in the Additional Protocol. Mubarak circumvented this demand by making deals with China and Russia, but a new government could build much-needed international support and credibility by agreeing to sign the Additional Protocol. Signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Pelindaba Treaty) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would also signal a commitment to international cooperation. Egypt’s past vacillation between non-proliferation champion and obstructionist makes the next Egyptian government’s nuclear policies hard to predict. In order to influence their decision, the international community should publicly provide support for the new government, and encourage it to pursue its nuclear interests safely and securely.

Egypt key—positive political development in Egypt prevents failure at the conference and NPT collapse

Cirincione, 11
Joe Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund President, 2/13/2011, "Egypt's Nuclear Dimension,"

More positively, Egyptians have played a central role in the creation and strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime. Mohamed ElBaradei, now a prominent political opposition figure in Egypt, was Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1997 to 2009. Egypt was also an early supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and some Egyptians, particularly Mohamed Shaker, were instrumental in its negotiation and early implementation. Egypt has made the creation of a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a central goal of its foreign policy. At the NPT Review Conference in 2010, agreement was reached only after all 187 nations agreed to the Egyptian-championed plan for a 2012 conference on the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. While all Middle Eastern nations have committed to participate, much work remains to be done to ensure that the 2012 conference is fruitful. Even before Mubarak fell, David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, feared that failure to make progress "could be a catalyst for [the Egyptians] to leave the NPT." This would be a disaster, as many nations have long followed Egypt's lead on these issues. Conclusion Overall, nuclear watchdogs have cause for concern. Egypt has played a central
role in the creation of the global non-proliferation regime and will continue to be an important U.S. ally in the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. As Einhorn concluded in his study: Egyptian leaders seem to have reached the conclusion years ago that a nuclear weapons capability would undermine higher national priorities, especially peace and stability in the region, economic development, and close ties with the United States. It would take a major change in circumstances to get Egypt to alter its long-standing posture, including the combination of a serious external threat and a substantial change in the composition and orientation of Egypt’s leadership. This, however, is exactly the situation we now confront, with the advance of an Iranian nuclear program and a peaceful revolution that has transformed the core of Egyptian politics. In the months and years ahead, the United States must ensure that Egypt's dormant nuclear ambitions stay that way.

The role of civil society in promoting a WMDFZ in the Middle East, Kane, 11
Chen Kane, Senior Research Associate at the Center for nonproliferation studies, 8/24/2011,
The role of civil society in promoting a WMDFZ in the Middle East,

As long as the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East remain unresolved, or at the very least serious attempts towards resolution are not made, it will be nearly impossible to push forward with a formal regional agenda of WMD disarmament and arms control. As a result, Track 1.5 and 2 activities are likely to remain the central locus for region-wide discussions, unless dramatic breakthroughs in other areas occur—such as progress in the Israel-Arab peace process, increased fear of a large scale war, or Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Areas of cooperation and collaboration which Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives could explore, but were scarcely considered in the past, include nuclear safety, security and safeguards in light of recent nuclear energy programmes in the region and the nuclear disaster in Japan. With a focus on the establishment of a regional WMDFZ, participants could examine areas of agreement identified in the recent CNS survey and reduce current differences between state positions. Further discussions could consider the following: Turkey's role in a WMDFZ; requirements for a WMDFZ compared to a nuclear-weapon-free zone; desired outcomes of the proposed 2012 WMDFZ conference; CBMs for advancing the prospects of a WMDFZ; and specific forms of involvement of outside powers in establishing such a zone. It will also be crucial to educate the next generation of experts. Many Middle East experts involved in Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives also participated in the ACRS negotiations but are now retired. Naturally, many of these individuals hold mainstream views on security issues and international cooperation and tend to favour the use of interest-based bargaining and zero-sum negotiations. The social unrest and revolutions across much of the Arab world in 2011 were started by young people pushing for reform of their current regimes. The potential benefits of the next generation of experts involved in existing and new initiatives goes well beyond the initiatives themselves. By sharing their experience and knowledge acquired through Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues, the individuals can influence their peers, their national The role of civil society decision-makers, along with other young people not necessarily involved in arms control and non-proliferation issues but who are interested in creating positive change in the region. The latest events in the Middle East have brought the role of civil society even further—and faster—to the front. The civil revolutions in several of the countries in the region may create a temporary vacuum or stalemate among decision makers until things settle. Such a vacuum could be filled and fed quickly by civil society input. Some of the experts currently outside the government may even take over official positions in newly formed governments. As opposed to the old-guard, authoritarian regimes, it may well be that the newly formed governments resulting from the civil revolutions will be more open and attentive to input from outside the government and more likely to adopt a new approach to regional security in the Middle East. There are certainly important security and WMD-related issues in which all states in the region share common interests. Civil society can play a valuable role in identifying mechanisms to advance the interests of all parties involved. If the process can be repeated for multiple issues, a pattern of cooperation can contribute to a reduction of overall tensions and improve the atmosphere for tackling the central issues in dispute. Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives have promoted a better
Overwhelms alt causes—their evidence doesn't assume the potential of civil society
Atwood, 6
David Atwood, Director of the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) in Geneva and manager of
QUNO's Disarmament and Peace Programme, NGOS AND MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT
DIPLOMACY: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES published in Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral
Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, December 2006,

“BEING IN THE MIDDLE BY BEING AT THE EDGE”: SHAPING AND FACILITATING PARALLEL
PROCESSES
This rather ironic phrase—“being in the middle by being at the edge”—was coined to describe
dimensions of “third-party” engagement in facilitating conflict transformation and
settlement. What this means in practice is described briefly by Diana Francis: The informal nature of the processes
and the absence of political profile or affiliation on the part of the mediators, their political
powerlessness [emphasis added], are what fits them for their task, rendering them non-threatening
and enabling them to be trusted by the different parties as having no axe to grind or to
wield. Anti-personnel landmines mechanisms apart, NGOs simply are not—or are they likely to become—
central players in a formal sense in multilateral disarmament processes, at least in the short run. But
this notion of third-party engagement in conflict prevention work gives a different sense of “being in the
middle” which can be helpful to us to understand NGO contributions to progress in the
multilateral system. Traditionally, NGOs are seen as advocates of different desired disarmament or arms control outcomes.
Moreover, NGOs' positioning vis-à-vis governments is correctly described as adversarial in many cases. NGOs “power” comes
from the public pressure they can marshal and bring to bear on decision makers. This remains an
important dimension of NGO work. But, as noted above, at the multilateral level such power remains peripheral. NGOs, even those with mass
memberships, may turn up in multilateral settings, may seek to bring pressure to bear on multilateral decision makers, and may be able to
direct large media attention to the failures of the processes (although, in fact, we see very little of this). But, because they are not engaged as
formal interlocutors in the processes themselves, their power in this sense remains largely elsewhere, principally at the national level. At the
multilateral level, NGOs must remain “at the edge”. So how can we understand this “in the middle” role? NGOs can be in the middle in this
sense by making use of their “powerlessness”, by establishing their reliability and trust-worthiness as partners to those governments (and
agencies) also seeking genuine improvement in the multilateral processes or as facilitators of dialogue processes which add parallel means for
the system to move forward. While there are genuine differences in this “middle role” of NGOs in multilateral processes and that exercised by
individuals or organizations in conflict mediation, in practice the behaviour is quite similar. An alternative form of power is accorded to such
players in settings where accommodation and progress by the parties themselves has become difficult or impossible. This role—at the opposite
end of the activity spectrum from advocacy or campaigning—can be seen to be no less important. It is also a role that has gone largely
unrecognized, under-analysed and underdeveloped. By its very nature, it will be an unpublicized role because it is in its very “invisibility” that it
has strength. The effective mediator does not seek attention nor claim the victory when actions are successful. It is not a neutral role; it is one
which is on the side of successful progress towards effective results rather than being focused on particular desired issue outcomes. The NGOs
involved in this style of work are likely, but not necessarily, to be quite different ones from advocacy organizations. Let me illustrate this line of
argument with some brief examples of how NGO action of this sort can supplement, support and, in some cases, partially substitute for formal
multilateral decision-making processes. These examples are drawn largely from our own experience at the Quaker United Nations Office
(QUNO) in Geneva. I highlight them not because I believe these are any more important than similar actions undertaken by others but simply
because I am closer to them and have seen them at work first hand. Facilitating key-actor dialogue in support of multilateral negotiations.

During the years of negotiation towards a Chemical Weapons Convention, QUNO in Geneva and the
regional office of the American Friends Service Committee in Jordan facilitated a series of off-the-

record seminars with senior leaders from Middle East countries. Their purpose was to promote dialogue and understanding by the states in that region of the world concerning their mutual interest in achieving a strong Convention. In this initiative it was clearly the “powerlessness” of the Quakers and trust in them as genuine “honest brokers” that made these exchanges possible and contributed an important piece to the ultimately successful outcome of the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations. A key factor in this was that participants knew that the off-the-record nature of the meetings would be respected and they could speak frankly and openly. This is often a critical feature of any successful mediation process, and it appears also to be true in third-party initiatives in the disarmament area. Hence, this important work undertaken by Quakers has not been written about in any detail to this day and the anonymity and interventions of the participants continue to be protected. An important feature of such processes is that the participants are able to gain a better understanding of the positions of those with different views of what is happening from inside the policy units of their opposite numbers, and also in the knowledge that signals shared and new understandings gained in the formal and informal parts of such meetings will be shared with capitals. A slightly different example of this kind of contribution NGOs can make can be seen in QUNO’s work in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention process. At various stages in this process—both before and after the Mine Ban Convention was achieved—QUNO sought to facilitate joint action by “like-minded” government and non-governmental actors through off-the-record dialogue opportunities. Within such a process an important feature can be the invention or furtherance of new multilateral ways of working, as has so much characterized the Mine Ban processes up to today. Working in parallel with governments in promoting multilateral attention to key issues. The “Biting the Bullet” partnership organizations (Safewor(l), International Alert, and the University of Bradford) have worked in recent years in tandem with the British government to move the issue of the development of conventional weapons transfer guidelines up the international agenda. While the United Kingdom has sought to build support among a range of governments for this through its “transfer control initiative” activities, Biting the Bullet partners have run a series of parallel processes (international and regional) with governments and NGOs to supplement and support this direction. This has been what might be called a “pull” process, while the “Control Arms” campaign, driven by Oxfam, Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms, holding up an eventual Arms Trade Treaty based in already agreed principles of international law as the eventual goal, has provided the equally important “push” factor. This demonstrates how this “third-party” role must be seen to be working along side many other types of initiatives by NGOs. The result of these “push” and “pull” dynamics has meant that the whole issue of the requirement of globally agreed rules of behaviour with regard to arms transfers has advanced much farther than many would have predicted at the time of the 2001 Programme of Action, even if this progress is far less than many had hoped. Non-formal complements to official multilateral deliberative spaces. NGOs have long played a role alongside official processes in offering space for engagement by official negotiators and other key actors to discern and discuss possible ways forward and explore the possibilities of accommodation. For example, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1995, have for many years not only sought to bring real expertise to bear on key security areas where more concerted joint action appears required, but have also been spaces in which government officials have been encouraged to participate across major divisions. These Conferences were an especially important space during the years of the Cold War, when dialogue in so many other ways was blocked. What this illustrates is that NGOs can often provide environments for engagement between governments that the latter have difficulty in achieving by themselves. In the multilateral disarmament setting of Geneva, the work of the Geneva Forum, a partnership arrangement by an NGO (QUNO), a UN body (the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), and a university research programme (the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies) demonstrates similarly how non-formal processes can be seen as significant adjuncts to official mechanisms, particularly when those mechanisms are stalled or dysfunctional. Over the years of its work in Geneva, the Geneva Forum has added to its original role of providing seminars for the expansion of awareness and understanding around relevant topic areas to being seen by key actors as being able to provide essential environments for dialogue, encounter and discernment. In addition to a central small arms focus, this has included dialogue promotion work on biological weapons and so-called “non-lethal” weapons developments. The work of the “Geneva Process”, an ongoing mechanism of governments, international agencies, and NGOs on the implementation of the 2001 UN Programme of Action on small arms, coordinated by the Geneva Forum, has, in effect, put in place a non-formal multilateral “institution” where none seemed possible. This has contributed not only to there being vital regular discussion at the multilateral level on issues related to small arms (there being no formal mechanism to do so), but also to consolidating Geneva as a key generator of energy around small arms issues, providing a contrast to New York-based processes. 13 In a variety of ways, the Geneva Forum is clearly demonstrating the potential of “being in the middle by being at the edge” at the multilateral disarmament level. This particular dimension of the contribution of NGOs to multilateral disarmament processes has gone largely unexamined, in part because, as noted, it is in the under-played and in some cases invisible nature of this work that that contribution is best made. It is not a role that has gone unappreciated by governments, however, which have increasingly demonstrated that they recognize the value of this role by means of their partnerships with NGOs, their important financial contributions to this kind of work, and their active participation in such processes. This role is being played even while the formal dimensions of access for NGOs in disarmament affairs remain highly constrained compared to many other transnational issue settings. Further analysis is clearly needed to fully lay out the various dimensions and possibilities of this role and measure
the real impact of such activities. But it suggests one important refinement of the meaning of “the greater engagement of civil society actors” as contributors to making multilateral processes more effective.

NPT collapse causes extinction

Hirsch, 6


Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.

Regional instability will inevitably go nuclear


Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Sudan Adv

Reinvigorated civil society solves Nile soft power
Grebowski 6/23/11
Sarah Grebowski blogs from Egypt at Cairo Comment. She is a former research assistant at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.

A curious thing has happened on the Nile since the fall of Hosni Mubarak: after decades of dictating the river’s politics, Egypt is finally acting like a downstream state. Sensing both its vulnerability and opportunity for change in the wake of the January 25 revolution, Egypt’s transitional authorities have shuttled representatives from one Nile Basin state to another, making gestures in the name of cooperation and mutual development. The emphasis on diplomacy is long-overdue, as Egypt’s control of the Nile has gradually but steadily loosened over the last half-century. Ultimately, it took a revolution to kickstart the country’s strategic thinking. The revolution has re-prioritized the Nile issue within Egypt’s foreign policy agenda and will provide a window for the country’s new leadership to cleanly depart with policies of the Mubarak era. Egypt now faces not just an opportunity, but an imperative to revamp its policies on the Nile by relinquishing notions of hard power based upon colonial privileges and regional dominance and instead embracing soft power. Egypt’s revolution brought the Nile issue back to the forefront of the foreign policy agenda in more ways than one. Firstly, when protesters in Tahrir Square demanded that Egypt’s role as a regional leader be restored, they were referring as much to Africa as they were the Arab world. Egypt’s monopoly over the Nile began to fray decades ago as upstream states like Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania started to develop their own irrigation and hydroelectric capabilities (and more importantly, ambitions), and the relevance of colonial-era water agreements that promised Egypt and Sudan roughly 90 percent of the Nile’s water faded with changing geopolitical realities. Failing to sense that the time had come for a new framework to govern use of the Nile’s waters, Egypt was taken aback by the drafting of the Cooperative Framework Agreement—a treaty first introduced by upstream states in 2007 that would potentially alter water-sharing agreements and create a Nile Basin Commission to regulate activity on the river. In behavior unbecitting of a continental superpower, Egypt’s unimaginative response once confronted with these changes was to cling to the anarchonistic water treaties of 1929 and 1959 and reject development projects of upstream states. Sharif El Musa, a political science professor at the American University in Cairo, even argues that for the last ten years, Mubarak failed altogether to put forward a serious Nile policy. More concerned with relations with Israel, the U.S., and European allies, Egypt’s communication with other Nile states faltered and the regime neglected to utilize expertise on Nile issues. Secondly, opportunistic actions of other Nile riparian states in the wake of the Egyptian revolution have upped the urgency of the need for a new Nile strategy. Closely following the fall of Mubarak, Burundi became the sixth state to sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement, giving the agreement the necessary majority in order to be ratified and implemented in the region. Furthermore, in late March, Ethiopia announced that it would commence construction of its massive, 5,000-megawatt Millennium Dam without the endorsement of Egypt or Sudan. While official statements deny that either state sought to exploit Egypt’s internal political turmoil in order to advance its own interests on the Nile, it proved the perfect opportunity to force Egypt’s hand. Recognizing that antagonistic policies on the Nile are no longer sustainable, Egyptian experts are advocating a new approach, starting with greater flexibility towards the Cooperative Framework Agreement. Egypt’s rigid rejection of the CPA stems from its fear that a new Nile agreement will reduce its allocation of water, a threat the state considers to be existential. However, as Ana Cascao, a Nile expert at the Stockholm International Water Institute, explains, changes that the CPA would usher in are firmly in Egypt’s interests. Geopolitically, downstream riparian states are the ones vulnerable to the repercussions of upstream actions and thus in need of protection. Upstream countries have been building dams and initiating projects that affect the Nile’s flow, if in minute ways, for years. With changes on the Nile already being set in motion by riparian states unbound by Egypt’s colonial treaties, Egypt could benefit from the creation of a Nile Basin Commission to regulate activity and promote transparency regarding where and how water is being used. Egypt’s cooperation does not necessarily mean giving up power on the Nile, but trading hard power for soft power. In an article in Al Masry al Youm, El Musa details several ways that Egypt can begin to exercise soft power, including assistance to other Nile riparian states in irrigation techniques; increased import of agricultural commodities from the other states; contracts to purchase electricity from hydro-electric power stations upstream that the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments wish to build; and cooperation in both public and private sectors in order to establish basic industries and in the design and construction of communication and transportation facilities. “The deployment of Egyptian soft power could influence how much water these upstream...
nations would demand, or actually use, and how they would divide it between hydroelectric power generation and irrigation,” El Musa writes. These sorts of changes are unlikely to crystallize in the near future, primarily because they necessitate a sitting (rather than transitional) government as well as the recovery of the private sector. However, transitional authorities and civil society groups are already hard at work to lay the foundation for a new strategy. Since March, popular committees comprised of prominent politicians, former diplomats and ministers, activists, and youth leaders have visited Uganda and Ethiopia in attempts to thaw tensions and pave the way for better relations. Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia topped Prime Minister Essam Sharaf’s list of official diplomatic visits upon assuming office. Egypt recently pledged to significantly boost trade and investment ties with Ethiopia. Egypt’s surge of diplomacy has been effective, convincing countries to delay the ratification of the CPA, as well as prompting Ethiopia to allow a commission to investigate plans for the Millennium Dam. This is likely due in part to the clear change in Egypt’s attitude and tone; signaling genuine change, a representative of the original popular committee to Uganda told Al-Ahram Online: “We wanted to give a message that Egypt now is not represented by Mubarak. The spirit of the 25 January revolution rules now.” Government officials’ recent statements are also indicative of a shift. Water Minister Hussein El-Atfy, for example, has described cooperation with Nile Basin states as an “imperative,” heralded a “new era” in Egyptian-Ethiopian relations that would see greater cooperation in all areas, and verbally committed support to projects that benefit upstream states. Also encouraging is the leadership that Egypt could put towards creating and implementing a new Nile policy. According to both Cascao and El Musa, Egypt has a core of diplomats, politicians, and experts who worked towards regional cooperation within the context of the Nile Basin Initiative in the early 1990s. These individuals would be well served by their recollection of what a cooperative Nile Basin community looks like, awareness of the pitfalls of mistrust among Nile states, and an acknowledgment that Egypt must waste no time in re-engaging its neighbors.

**Egyptian influence key to manage Sudanese transition**

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The new government of Egypt faces a similar challenge to its south, where the state of Sudan is slated to be divided in two in July 2011. Northern Sudan, led since 1989 by ICC indicted war criminal Omar al-Bashir, has pledged to institute sharia (Islamic law) after the south breaks off. Bashir faces a number of challenges, including a threat from the (even more militant) Islamist Hassan Turabi, as well as from Sudanese tribes, which have little interest in seeing Sudan become a truly Islamic state. Meanwhile, demonstrations in support of reform have also reached Khartoum. Amid these tensions, the concern is that after July, Northern Sudan will also deteriorate into civil war. As with the situation in Libya, the new government in Cairo can help stabilize Northern Sudan, either by deploying additional troops to the small Egyptian contingent already on the ground or by working to convince Bashir to not impose sharia after the south splits.

**Goes regional – only diplomacy solves**


Africa’s longest-running civil war — which claimed the lives of two million people in Sudan over 22 years — may be about to re-ignite and is threatening to engulf the surrounding region.
report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) warns the spreading conflict could spark a new, protracted civil war. “The growing war on multiple fronts poses serious dangers for the country, for its future relationship with the Republic of South Sudan and for the stability of the region as a whole,” it says. “There is a real possibility of a new era of protracted civil war in Sudan if key international actors are not able to contain it.”

Extinction
Glick 7

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.

Successful mediation stops Sudan transformation into key terror haven
Waller 9/4/11
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http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/11416

Much of Sudan’s future posture in international relations will be depend upon economic and ideological influences from within the country. As mentioned earlier, the country post-secession finds itself financially disadvantaged, especially in contrast to South Sudan’s potential. It lost most of the oil that once made up a considerable portion of its revenue. It also lost fertile lands and minerals, most of which were untapped. This, combined with a national religious uniformity, provides several factors which can increase the possibility of a resurgence in local terrorist groups. Bearing these new developments in mind, several countries will be strategically invested in Sudanese stability, South Sudanese stability, and the Sudan-South Sudan relationship. This multinational interest is not likely to waver for some time, especially as political alliances are built and economic disparity between the two countries grows. Both Sudan and South Sudan face a long and complicated road to stability. For this reason, regional terrorism may encounter a fertile environment in which to reestablish itself. At present, Sudan seems to be influenced by diplomacy more than in the past, as evidenced most through the allowed separation of South Sudan (Shinn, 62). It is nevertheless in a unique position to export violence into Africa. Although the regime has taken a stand against radical Islamist factions, such groups continue to be tolerated by many in the populace and perhaps some in government. Sudan has made noteworthy progress in eliminating terrorism from within its borders, but these borders remain permeable and this impetus could yet be stopped. Even the new country of South Sudan poses a threat of terrorism, having gained an unstable and volatile independence in much the same fashion as its northern neighbor 50 years earlier. Truly, both countries will play a principal role in shaping the landscape of Africa over the next decade. With appropriate international pressures, this landscape can be one of cooperation and collaboration. In the absence of productive diplomacy, though, Sudan could once again become a safe haven for terrorism and one of the most considerable threats to the region’s stability.
Nuclear strikes against US
Dempsey ‘6

Raising the Stakes: The Nuclear Dimension of the Terrorist Threat. The threat that terrorist hubs based in failed states pose to the United States and to its allies escalates dramatically if those hubs can obtain access to nuclear weapons. The risk that such weapons will find their way into terrorist hands is increasing significantly as a result of three interrelated factors. The end of the Cold War has witnessed an alarming erosion of control and security of Russian nuclear technology and weaponry. It has also witnessed increasing nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states. The circumstances surrounding that proliferation—primarily its clandestine and covert nature—make it far more likely for nuclear weapons to find their way from state proliferators into the hands of terrorist groups. The problematic issue of accounting for and controlling Soviet-era nuclear weapons and technology has been explored thoroughly by Jessica Stern in her 1999 study of terrorism and WMD. Stern described a Soviet-era military that was melting down, unpaid, and rife with corruption. Loss of accountability for fissionable materials, poor controls on the technology of nuclear weapons production, 17 and poor supervision of Russia’s militarized scientific community characterized the post-Cold War Russian nuclear sector. Lapses may have even included loss of operational nuclear devices.46 More recent reporting on the situation is hardly more encouraging. A survey in 2002 of 602 Russian scientists working in the Russian WMD sector revealed that roughly 20 percent of the Russian scientists interviewed expressed a willingness to work for nations identified as WMD proliferators: Iran, North Korea or Syria.47 Most recently, Busch and Holmes have catalogued the efforts of rogue states and of Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons capability from the inadequately controlled Russian nuclear sector, and have identified the human element of that sector as being especially vulnerable.48 When viewed in combination with the growing influence and reach of Russian organized crime, the lack of security in the Russian weaponized nuclear technology sector represents a significant risk of nuclear capability finding its way into the hands of terrorist hubs. Exacerbating this risk are the efforts of non-nuclear states that are seeking to develop a nuclear strike capability. While North Korea frequently is cited as the best example of this sort of nuclear proliferation, in the context of terrorist access to WMD, Iran may prove to be far more dangerous. The clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program is reportedly well-advanced. A recent study of the Iranian nuclear program published by the U.S. Army War College considers Iranian fielding of nuclear weapons to be inevitable and estimates the time frame for such a fielding to be 12 to 48 months.49 Given Iran’s well-established relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon and its increasingly problematic, even hostile, relationship with the United States, the Iranian nuclear weapons program would seem to offer a tempting opportunity to Al Qaeda elements seeking clandestine access to nuclear technology. Even if the Iranian leadership does not regard sharing nuclear secrets with terrorist groups as a wise policy, elements within the Iranian government or participants in its nuclear weapons program may be willing to do so for their own reasons. The nature of clandestine nuclear weapons programs makes them especially vulnerable to compromise, as the Pakistani experience has demonstrated. The clandestine nuclear weapons program directed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan on behalf of the Pakistani government exemplifies the 18 risks inherent in such secret undertakings. As the details of Khan’s nuclear weapons operation have emerged, it has become increasingly evident that he exercised little control over the elements of his network operating outside of Pakistan. His non-Pakistani partners in acquiring nuclear technology appear to have been motivated almost entirely by money, and Khan himself seems to have operated with minimal oversight from the Pakistani government.50 Under such circumstances, the risk that critical nuclear technology will be diverted to groups like Al Qaeda is particularly high, especially when those groups have access to significant financial resources, and program participants are able to profit from diversion with little chance of detection by either the proliferating state or by opponents of that proliferation. While both hubs and nodes exist in failed state terrorist networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, only the hubs present a threat of genuinely serious proportions to U.S. interests. Escalating nuclear proliferation offers terrorist hubs sheltering in failed states the opportunity to translate funding into weapons access. If those hubs are successful in maintaining even a tenuous connection through their virtual network to terrorist nodes existing within the United States or the territory of its allies, or in other areas of vital U.S. interest, then the risk posed by terrorist groups operating from failed states becomes real and immediate. The recent attacks by terrorist nodes in London, Cairo, and Madrid suggest that such is the case. Developing the nexus between nuclear weapons acquisition, delivery to a local terrorist node, and employment in a terrorist attack probably will require significant resources and considerable time. Evolved terrorist hubs operating in failed states like Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Somalia may have both. Identifying those hubs, locating their members, and entering the failed state in which they are located to apprehend or destroy them will be a complex and difficult task.
Extinction

Ayson 10, Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war. As unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time, the reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.
AT Egypt-Israel War

No Egypt-Israel war – economics, deterrence, and credibility.


Hana Levi Julian reported Wednesday of the word on the Egyptian street favoring an end to the peace agreement with Israel; the folk of the Arab Spring. While that is obviously true, there is more to international relations than vox populi, especially in a country like Egypt that has yet to find its way to anything resembling democracy. I certainly don’t disagree with anything Julian wrote, but rather come to add some additional ideas to the mix. The polls not withstanding, hating Israel doesn’t make Egypt any more prepared for war than she was yesterday. Actively breaking the conditions of the peace treaty with Israel could cost Egypt billions in U.S. aid, wrecking the fragile Egyptian economy. Let’s not forget what fuels this peace. Israel pays Egypt well for the gas and oil it receives. Gaza will not pay or be able to pay. Hatred of Israel is not likely to win over the wallet. Or will it? After all this is the Middle East. The United Nations is not “fair and balanced” like a U.S. cable news network claims to be. Yet it would not be simple to abrogate an internationally brokered treaty that has within it embodied several UN Security Council resolutions. Condemnation might not be universal, but there would likely be some negative repercussions for Egypt in that august forum. Egypt has lost every war it has fought and not only with Israel. No one wants war, but it is certain that the Egyptian military will consider well the consequences of war with Israel. In the past, Egypt has only made war with Israel when supported by other allies. Jordan is entirely unlikely to do anything. Syria, Egypt’s strongest ally is in disarray, and Iraq is out of the picture, at least for the time being. Libya has her own confusion. Iran? The Saudis? Both unlikely partners. Hezbollah may be the strongest power in Lebanon, but would they risk it all to support Egypt in a war? Hamas is even less of a factor. Right now, Egypt is disorganized. It may be quite useful to create a semblance of unity by utilizing hatred of Israel. They can all safely agree. Someone once said, “All of diplomacy comes down to how many divisions do you have and how many are you willing to lose?” Keeping tabs on Egyptian public opinion is of great importance, but a war is unlikely at this time.

Despite increased tensions, the costs of war still outweigh any benefits for Egypt.


Tension between Egypt and Israel mounted in recent weeks as young revolutionaries in Cairo, apparently freed from a military regime which fostered amicable ties with the Jewish state, demanded retribution when several Egyptian security personnel were killed near the border with Gaza. Relations between the two neighbors have cooled since longtime president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign this February. A resumption of hostilities after more than thirty years of peace seems highly unlikely though. The unrest began exactly a week ago when seven Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed in a coordinated terrorist strike against southern Israel. Many more were wounded on a bus in the tourist resort of Eilat. The attackers had presumably tunneled from Gaza to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula where they set up firing positions. When they fled, Israeli troops pursued them. What happened next varies with the account. In the process of killing the Palestinian militants, an Israeli helicopter or plane killed between three and six Egyptian soldiers or police. And Egyptians did not like that one bit. Egypt’s government lodged a formal protest with Israel over the killings, demanding an investigation. It said that it would recall its ambassador from Israel unless it received an apology. The next day, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak apologized and promised an investigation along with a joint inquiry with Egypt into the deaths of the soldiers. Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, also expressed regret. Words were not enough for Egypt’s youth however. Thousands of protesters gathered outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo, calling for the expulsion of the envoy. The Jerusalem Post has blamed Egypt for not securing the Sinai, claiming that asking Israel to apologize for accidentally killing Egyptian soldiers in the way of terrorists is unfair. After all, the natural gas pipeline that runs from the Sinai to Israel and Jordan has been attacked by unidentified militants five times since the start of the Egyptian revolution. The newspaper has pointed out that the terrorists, which Israel insists came from Gaza, could have come through the smuggling tunnels that connect the isolated Palestinian strip to Egypt and “must have had logistic support from one or more extremist organizations active in Sinai.” They had to obtain vehicles, food and water as well as to set up observation points on the road to Eilat which they intended to attack. Nevertheless, Egyptians who might otherwise oppose their military interim
government were quick to agree with it when it blamed Israel entirely for the fatalities on Egypt’s side. It is natural for them to react as such, not only because as nationalists, they mourn Egyptian deaths more than those of foreigners, but also because Egyptian politicians fell over themselves to condemn the killings as murders. Amr Moussa, former head of the Arab League and a presidential frontrunner, was one of the first to speak out after the incident. "The blood of martyrs shed while performing their duties will not go in vain," he commented. Israel must realize that the day when Egypt’s sons are killed without an appropriate and strong reaction are over. The Freedom and Justice Party, founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the revolution, described the killings as nothing short of a “Zionist assault against Egyptian soldiers.” A joint statement released by thirteen different political parties this weekend characterized the episode as “an example of Israel’s arrogance and racism supported by America.” After Barak and Peres had both expressed their sympathies, a high ranking member of the National Association for Change, chaired by Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, called their apologies “inappropriate and insufficient” before suggesting that the Camp David Accords, which ended several decades of conflict between Egypt and Israel, should be amended or scrapped. The deputy head of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood said much the same. Given these reactions, it's little surprise that thousands of Egyptians found their way to the Israeli embassy in Cairo last week. Others demonstrated outside the home of the ambassador which was surrounded by Egyptian security forces. Young Egyptians also hacked Israeli websites, including that of the prime minister. In these times of tension, Israel’s government has acted pragmatically. While rockets from Gaza struck Israeli targets and Israeli airstrikes pounded Gaza, the cabinet voted against a repetition of the horrendous assault on Gaza of late 2008. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Barak both argued that now was not the time for an all out war on the territory. Among other considerations was the fear of deepening resentment among ordinary Egyptians. Was the killing an accident? Most likely. Israel has no reason to antagonize Egypt. President Peres felt the need to express regret for the incident after the defense minister had already done so, saying that “the peace with Egypt is strategic; both we and the Egyptians have a supreme interest in preventing terrorism from running amok.” The Netanyahu Government confirmed as much in its cabinet decision. Moreover, as Linda Heard points out in Arab News, the contrast between the swift apology to Egypt and the curt nod to Turkey after Israel’s killing of nine activists on the Mavi Marmara flotilla last year is telling. Israel has a vital interest in maintaining its “friendship” with Egypt, however precarious. Try telling that to angry Egyptian youth. The young revolutionaries hold significant power in Egypt at the moment. If enough of them demand some form of conflict with Israel, it is possible that a newly elected civilian government will give in. Recent opinion polls imply that a majority of Egyptians favor rescinding the three decade old peace treaty with Israel. That doesn’t mean they want war though and the military is unlikely to push for it. Since it will probably retain considerable authority after parliamentary and presidential elections this autumn, whatever some overzealous young people are calling for, an armed confrontation seems far from imminent— especially as the military has little incentive to give up the $2 billion in yearly aid it receives from the United States. Although the young remain riled and future accidents or aggression could lead to attacks on the Israeli embassy or even the storming of its border with Egypt, it remains highly improbable that both nations would enter into a state of war any time soon.
Predictions good on balance for Egypt political forecasting

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When Worldview covered Egypt in autumn 2009, the article successfully identified the stability of the authoritarian regime as a key risk to an otherwise attractive investment option. It erred in that it expected the current turmoil to begin following Hosni Mubarak’s death or other succession struggle, but other events, including global food and energy inflation, as well as a successful revolution in neighboring Tunisia, have brought these pressures to a head even sooner than expected. It is important to remember that political forecasting is inherently uncertain because of the large number of frequently unquantifiable and often unobservable variables that act and interact in nonlinear ways.

However, it is a mistake to assume that because political analysis is uncertain it is therefore useless. Political and social processes still have logic and patterns that can help us think through the consequences of surprising events better than if we simply gave up because of their inherent uncertainties. Clearer thinking and a clearer understanding of scenarios can turn into investment advantages though readier adjustments to macro opportunities and more adaptive risk management.
No link and relations resilient

**POMED Notes: “Ten Years after 9/11: Managing U.S.-Saudi Relations”,**

Mustafa Alani began by stressing that **U.S.-Saudi relations are as strong and as important as ever, with serious cooperation focused on counterterrorism.** He recounted Saudi Arabia's actions that demonstrated their commitment to fighting terror, and explained that combating terrorism should be treated separately from other matters that involve the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Alani also asserted that Islam has an inextricably political nature, and that Shiite terrorism is often ignored or overlooked. In response to a question about the role of **the Muslim Brotherhood** in Egypt's future, he suggested that they will focus on winning parliamentary power rather than the presidency, and that **Saudi Arabia is committed to the political transition in Egypt.**

Gregory Gause conveyed that **the bilateral relationship remains unbroken**, and that the **disagreements between the two states do not overshadow the common interests.** On the other hand, he pointed out that the **events of the Arab Spring may strain relations**, since the United States and Saudi Arabia have seemingly disparate views regarding democratization. Additionally, he views sectarianism (Sunni vs. Shia) as a potential Saudi “trump card” as they deal with their frustrations containing Iran. He stated that **Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable dealing with Iran’s competing influence** in the region and hope for a solution to the “Iran problem...without any blowback.” Christopher Boucek agreed with the other panelists, saying “**little has changed**” in U.S.-Saudi relations since 9/11, and that it remains the best security relationship for the United States. In addition, **each country must be able reconcile their common interests with their differing world views.**

Security outweighs tit-for-tat disputes

Paul **Mutter**, graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, “Saudi Arabia: Rolling Back the Arab Spring”, June 29, http://www.fpif.org/articles/saudi_arabia_rolling_back_the_arab_spring

**The U.S. -trained Facilities Security Force**, created solely to protect Saudi oilfields, **represents the key pillar of the relationship:** protection of U.S. oil interests in exchange for defending the Kingdom against any threats — democratic, terrorist or otherwise. “**For more than 60 years, Saudi Arabia has been bound by an unwritten bargain: oil for security,**” writes Nawaf Obaid. “**Riyadh has often protested but ultimately acquiesced to what it saw as misguided U.S. policies.**” This business, in the form of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, is **booming.**

**No Saudi prolif – decades away from even having the capacity**

**Hoodbhoy**, professor of physics at Quaid-i-Azaam University in Islamabad, interviewed by Jess Hill, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7/1/2011

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a professor of physics at Quaid-i-Azaam University in Islamabad, and a strong advocate of nuclear non-proliferation. He spoke to Jess Hill from Islamabad. **PERVEZ HOODBHOY: Saudi Arabia doesn’t have the technological capacity, and in particular the highly skilled technicians, engineers and scientists who would be required to start a nuclear program**, whether that be nuclear-power generation or making the bomb itself. So, obviously, they would look for
expatriates and they would try to get them from all over the world, they could try and get people from people from ex-Soviet Union countries, you would get Russians, and more than anybody else, they would try to get Pakistanis, because Pakistan has a fair amount of experience in dealing with nuclear issues. It has a nuclear-power program, but it's got even more expertise in terms of the bomb. JESS HILL: Now there was a report a few years ago, I think in 2003, that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had entered a kind of pact for cheap oil on Pakistan's side and for nuclear weapons to the Saudis. **Is there any evidence to suggest that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan already have an agreement like this?** PERVEZ HOODBHOY: **None at all. I don't believe that any kind of formal agreement exists.** It may well be that there's a wink and a nod here and there, but that's it. Now when Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998 it was subject to sanctions and the Saudi help, in terms of the oil given to Pakistan, was key in helping Pakistan survive those days. Now Saudi Arabia may have hinted at that time that it too would like nuclear weapons but then, given how closely aligned it is to the United States, I don't think that there was any kind of formal agreement at that time either. JESS HILL: Now you say that Saudi Arabia may turn to Pakistan for expertise; is there any likelihood that Saudi Arabia could go to Pakistan for a fully finished nuclear weapon? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: **No, that certainly is not the way that they would go about it.** JESS HILL: Now Saudi Arabia's also a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; what legal and political problems would it face if it went ahead with publicly pursuing a nuclear weapon? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: I don't think the NPT would be any kind of a barrier in terms of getting nuclear power plants, and once you get nuclear power plants you are well ahead in the quest for the bomb. After all let's remember that Iran, too, is a member of the NPT and yet it does seem to be pursuing enrichment and, well, at some point, it may even want reprocessing. JESS HILL: What do you think is the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will acquire nuclear weapons? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: **I don't see there's any immediate possibility of Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons.** Certainly not going to be able to buy them off the shelf from Pakistan or from any other country, however, what it is seeking to put into motion is a process which at the end of a decade, or maybe two decades, could result in a capacity to make the bomb.
AT Solvency

US democracy promotion strengthens radicals and kills U.S. global credibility.

While democratic reforms in the Middle East should be applauded, Professor Tamara Sonn's letter to President Obama requesting that the President "publicly acknowledge those reforms will not be advanced by Mubarak or any of his adjutants" is short sighted and harmful to democratic reforms in the region and US Foreign Policy worldwide. For the United States to publicly support the reformers would cause an immediate loss of credibility for what began as a purely Egyptian/Middle Eastern movement and have it appear as if the reformers were influenced by the West. Any hint of Western influence would not only vilify the reformers in the eyes of those who distrust the United States, but also serve as a platform to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood and solidify President Mubarak as a counter to a mob who is now supported (and incited) by the West. Additionally, while Washington accurately believes that Mubarak's time has come and it is in Egypt's best interest for him to depart, these are conversations that need to be handled through diplomatic channels and behind closed doors. We must not forget that even though Mubarak is a dictator, he has been an ally of the United States and a source of stability in a region where instability has global repercussions. It is not wise diplomacy to publicly call for the ouster of a leader who has been a steadfast ally for thirty years. A much better option is to do what President Obama has been doing, which is publicly state that a country can and should choose its own course and its own future, while privately putting pressure on Mubarak to resign.

Egypt will say no – aid lacks credibility and is viewed as too Western

The Egyptian authorities are reportedly incensed that democracy assistance is being made directly available to civil society, human rights and other pro-democracy groups, denying the authorities a right of veto. But civil society groups are more concerned that the current transition process will prolong instability, damage the economy and allow unrepresentative parties to draft a new constitution “in accordance with their own narrow interests.” Senior government officials cautioned non-governmental organizations that accepting U.S. funds undermined Egypt’s security, raising concerns that the authorities are continuing the Mubarak regime’s strategy of denying space and resources to democratic forces. “We’re still ruled by the Mubarak regime without Mubarak,” according to Negad el-Borai, who heads a rule of law and human rights group. “Even though there has been a change at a certain level of the system, the system is still there,” said a U.S. official. Some leftist and Islamist groups are vehemently opposed to U.S. and other Western funding, viewing assistance as external interference in Egypt’s Internal affairs, while others are understandably protective of the Jasmine Revolution’s home-grown character. “We don’t want the American’s money now and we don’t need it to have democracy,” one activist told Bikya Masr. “For all our problems, this is our country and as the world saw, we can take care of ourselves,” another said.

Democracy assistance gets coopted and misdirected
Perhaps in order to ease tension with the Egyptian government, the Obama Administration has reduced funding for U.S.-based NGOs operating in Egypt while increasing funding for state-approved and unregistered Egyptian NGOs (see table below). Since FY2009, the Administration has used other State Department aid accounts, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), to support Egyptian and international NGOs. In October 2009, USAID’s Inspector General issued an audit of the agency’s democracy and governance activities in Egypt. Among other findings, the audit concluded that: The impact of USAID/Egypt’s democracy and governance activities has been limited based on the programs reviewed. In published reports, independent nongovernmental organizations ranked Egypt unfavorably in indexes of media freedom, corruption, civil liberties, political rights and democracy. Egypt’s ranking remained unchanged or declined for the past 2 years, and the impact of USAID/Egypt’s democracy and governance programs was unnoticeable in indexes (sic) describing the country’s democratic environment. The Government of Egypt signed a bilateral agreement to support democracy and governance activities (page 5), but it has shown reluctance to support many of USAID’s democracy and governance programs and has impeded implementers’ activities. Despite the spirit with which the U.S. Congress espoused the civil society direct grants program, the Government of Egypt’s lack of cooperation hindered implementers’ efforts to begin projects and activities through delays and cancellations.

Egypt says no – ties to Mubarak and questionable motives.


After activists complained that seeking loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank compromised the country’s sovereignty, Egypt backed off seeking loans from them. For decades, foreign aid that Egypt received from the U.S. and elsewhere has come with conditions regarding how much money is spent. Many Egyptians interpret the conditions of its foreign aid as making the country beholden to western interests. Former President Hosni Mubarak’s regime received more than $50 billion from the U.S. during his three decade reign and Egyptian revolutionaries want to shed the “puppet state” stigma that engulfed them under Mubarak’s dictatorial rule. Under Mubarak’s dictatorship, money received from the U.S. assured under Mubarak’s dictatorship, money received from the U.S. assured

urban economic development is needed. Riots and protests have taken a toll in Egypt’s economy which has crashed its stock market, scared off investors, resulted in bank closures that lasted for weeks, and virtually crippled tourism. Egyptian finance officials are trying to find ways to fix Egypt’s economy that don’t involve foreign aid to cover a reported $28.5 billion deficit. While breaking itself off from western aid, Egyptians are reportedly strengthening ties with Persian Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which gave Egypt a conditional-free gift of $500 million. Alliances like this are growing in the wake of the Arab Spring protests (link: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/29/116747/egypt-rejection-of-us-aid-a-sign.html). The U.S. has been criticized for being slow to support the Arab Spring protests. In spite of struggling to recover, polls are showing that an overwhelming majority of Egypt’s population rejects foreign aid, especially from the U.S. (link: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/29/116747/egypt-rejection-of-us-aid-a-sign.html). According to the McClatchy report, a Gallup poll found that 75 percent of Egyptians oppose U.S. aid to political groups, and 68 percent think the United States will try to exert direct influence over Egypt's political future. In fact, both U.S. and Egyptian officials say Egypt's government is hesitant to receive American technical assistance or election observers for its upcoming vote and the anti-aid strain is permeating almost everything in Egypt’s political scene. U.S. interference in their country’s politics and the slow pace of the process towards democracy aren’t the only things frustrating Egyptians. Frustrations at the slow pace of change and the slow pace of trials for the policemen and officials accused of killing and ordering the killing of their relatives since Egypt’s revolution have resulted in more riots and clashes in Cairo’s Tahrir Square between Egyptian security forces and more than 5,000 protesters. More than 590 were injured according to witnesses and medical officials (link: http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/06/29). The clashes began when police tried to clear a sit-in at the state-TV building, which included families of those killed during Egypt’s revolution earlier this year. Police showed up and attacked the families outside the Balloon Theatre in Agouza where a planned memorial
service for the families was taking place and the clash ultimately spilled into other parts of the city. According to witnesses, the protest gained momentum and made its way into Tahrir Square, and ultimately to the interior ministry. Protestors were chanting "Down with the military junta." Egyptians have such a conscious disdain for America's lavish support of Mubarak's dictatorship for the past 30 years and many elements of Mubarak's regime are still present in the governing authorities (link: http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2011/06/14/egypt-rejects-u-s-democracy-funding/). U.S. intervention in Egypt's internal affairs would ensure that they remain in place. Is Egypt's rejection of U.S. aid a sign of things to come?

Egypt won't cooperate – they’re concerned with national sovereignty

But the recent announcement that USAID would re-allocate 40 percent of its post-25 January US$155 million budget for Egypt to democracy and governance programs provoked a critical response from the government in Cairo and from local political actors who charged the US with violating national sovereignty and interfering in domestic political affairs. "There is a difference between your development partners extending a helping hand and beginning to interfere in what is essentially national affairs," said Abdel Malek. "USAID in particular crossed that line."

Egypt rejects outside democracy funding

The April 6 movement has had contacts with U.S. organizations but denies taking aid. Ali Selmi, deputy prime minister for political affairs, said Monday that the government "rejects any outside funding for Egyptian movements under the guise of supporting democracy." Nongovernmental groups are increasingly fearful of accepting help from abroad, said Fady Phillip, a member of the Maspero Youth Movement. "It’s become part of the culture. The army is creating this hypersensitivity, and no one wants to be accused of being a spy." The finger-pointing is especially provocative at a time when conspiracy theories claim that the U.S., Israel and other foreign forces are seeking to hijack the revolution.

Top military officials won’t allow a transition.

A transition to a full-blown democracy may seem too risky for a military leadership that doesn't want to see precipitous change. Both Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Egypt's Defense Minister and the man at the head of the ruling Supreme Council, and Lieut. General Sami Hafez Enan, military chief of staff, are vestiges of the old regime. "Tantawi is as conservative as Mubarak, and he doesn't believe in economic or structural change," says Gerges. "He doesn't believe that Egyptians are ready for democracy." It remains to be seen whether the Egyptians who overthrew Mubarak will accept the terms for a political transition outlined by the military. Newspaper publisher Hisham Kassem believes that the army will be true to its word, if not exactly true to the spirit of the democratic rebellion. "We will see a transition to democracy this year. But it will take five to 10 years before we see a democratically elected civilian government command the military."
SCAF military control is inevitable, they hold their position above all else.


SCAF = Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

Many of the iconic images from Egypt’s revolution depict the Egyptian military supporting the uprising in Tahrir Square. As soldiers joined demonstrators and allowed them to scrawl “Mubarak Leave” on the sides of their tanks, the protesters became convinced that the military would protect the revolution and move Egypt toward democracy. The Egyptian army’s top commanders pledged to do just that. The day after Hosni Mubarak fell, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military body now governing the country, vowed to “ensure a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows an elected civilian authority to take charge of governing the country.” Yet the SCAF's attempts to curtail dissent and the democratic process have fueled doubts about its true intentions. Will the military fulfill its promise to support democracy? Or will it seek to replace Mubarak’s rule with its own or that of a friendly autocrat? Thus far, the evidence suggests that the SCAF does not want to continue ruling the country after Egypt’s parliamentary elections this fall, nor does it want to return the country to a single-party system. But that should provide little comfort to those hoping to see Egypt become a full democracy, in which the military is subordinate to civilian rule. Above all, the generals are determined to preserve stability and protect their privileged position. They recognize that ruling the country directly threatens their position by potentially provoking instability, exposing them to public criticism, and dividing their ranks. And they want to avoid being blamed for Egypt’s growing economic and social problems, such as double-digit inflation and unemployment, continued labor unrest, and a rise in crime. As a result, the SCAF is eager to hand power over to an elected government — but only to preserve its power and perks, not out of some deep-seated belief in democracy. Indeed, the SCAF's endorsement of democracy has been tepid at best. The generals have tried 7,000 people, including bloggers, journalists, and protesters, in closed military trials since the revolution. In May, General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of the SCAF, said that the military should be granted “some kind of insurance” under Egypt’s new constitution “so that it is not under the whim of a president,” and he insisted that the military not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In July, the military announced that it would adopt guidelines governing the drafting of the constitution, proposals for which may give it the legal basis to intervene in Egyptian politics under a broad array of circumstances, including to protect the secular nature of the state. The generals, then, seem to be seeking not a genuinely open and representative political system for Egypt but rather one that will allow them to retain the final say over the country’s foreign policy and avoid civilian oversight. The elected government, in their vision, would carry the burden of day-to-day rule — and bear the brunt of any public displeasure.

Backlash kills terror co-op and turns case


Mubarak, after all, was a friend—a brutal, corrupt and despotic friend, but a friend nonetheless. His regime was as pro-American as is conceivable for Egypt. Any replacement government that reflected the will of the Egyptian people would keep far more distance from Washington, even if it were stable and not dominated by Islamists. Military cooperation would be one of the first areas to suffer. Egypt has long offered the United States access to the region in a crisis, overflight rights, and other support, including Egyptian troops participating in international coalitions. U.S.-led military operations, however, are viewed with suspicion at best, and a democratic Egyptian regime would shy away from any open support. Counterterrorism would also suffer, though here there is good as well as bad news, as I discussed in my posting earlier this week on Al Qaeda and Egypt. Put simply, a new government would, and should, purge its security services, but these are the same services that also help the United States combat Al Qaeda. A new government also would be reluctant to be a home for U.S. renditions and otherwise assist the nastier side of U.S. counterterrorism. However, Al Qaeda too
would suffer. It loathes Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which despite being Islamist (or, in reality, because it is Islamist) is seen as a sellout and turncoat. Bin Laden should worry that the peaceful nature of the protests and their success so far are telling proof that violence is not always the handmaiden of change. **Israel is the stickiest issue. Even a Muslim Brotherhood government would be unlikely to abrogate the peace treaty, but that good news should not disguise the risks to the Jewish state. Egypt will no longer be a voice pushing Palestinians to make compromises in the name of peace or helping legitimate any concessions they do make.** Egypt also would be unlikely to continue the blockade of Gaza, making it easier for Hamas to smuggle goods into the Strip and acquire weapons—permissiveness that would anger Israel and ratchet up tension.

**Backlash jacks US interests and turns case**


Yet the United States’ capacity to advance democratization in Egypt remains limited. To begin with, U.S. strategic interests could interfere with hopes for reform. **The United States works closely with Egypt to preserve regional security, relying on safe passage through the Suez Canal and over Egyptian skies to conduct military actions in the Middle East and beyond.** Securing this cooperation with Egypt requires maintaining good relations with the SCAF, **which would not appreciate U.S. pressure to democratize.** Even if the United States were to vigorously campaign for democracy, it would still have limited power to shape events on the ground given the weakness of liberal democratic parties in the country, the reverence for the military in Egyptian society, and popular distrust of U.S. intentions. **Even the $1.3 billion in security assistance buys little clout, since the generals view it as a reward for maintaining peace with Israel, an attitude that the United States can do little to change.**

**Egypt is falling apart – you can’t solve it**

**Stephens 11**

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203499704576622800107490180.html

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What is true is that **Egypt is in the early stages of** Thomas Hobbes’s bellum omnium contra omnes, the **war of all against all.** Gone is Mr. Sharaf’s narrative, a popular staple when Hosni Mubarak was still in power, of a united Egyptian nation undercut by the sinister meddling of outside forces. **Gone as well is the Arab Spring narrative of tech-savvy, pro-democracy protesters, standing tall and proud against the dinosaur Mubarak regime.** **Gone even is the narrative of the liberal secularists versus the Muslim Brotherhood.** Instead, **picture Egypt as a vacant lot in which a dozen or so combustible elements—a leaking oil can here; some dry wood over there; patches of desiccated grass—sit in varying degrees of proximity to one another, while the boys who play in the lot light cigarettes.** Chances are, **Something will catch fire.** Chances are that if something does, **all of it will.** Consider what happened on Sunday. A Coptic group called the Maspero Youth Union—an outspoken movement with an uneasy relationship with the Coptic religious establishment—had decided to march on the headquarters of Egyptian state television, partly in protest of a mob attack (unhindered and possibly abetted by local authorities) on a church in Aswan, but also against the army for conspicuously failing to protect Coptic interests since the revolution. Sectarian violence flares on the streets of Cairo. What followed were a series of escalations: stones thrown between the protesters and Muslim onlookers; the army’s use of tear gas and armored vehicles to disperse—and run over—the protesters; an allegation, made by a presenter on state TV, that the protesters had attacked the soldiers; another allegation, made on a Muslim religious channel, that the protesters had burned a Quran, leading in turn to an attempted attack on Cairo’s historic Coptic hospital. Meanwhile, Cairo buzzes with word that soldiers have deliberately disobeyed the instructions of their officers by opening fire on the Copts. A clip on YouTube now making the rounds has one soldier boasting that he “shot a Copt in the chest.” For that, a man in the crowd approvingly replies, “By God you are a man!” Taken together, **the sequence of**
events captures the broader collapse of authority throughout Egypt. Timid regional officials who will not stand up to Islamist mobs. Furious Coptic youth who no longer accept the cautious dictation of their elders. Conscript soldiers not afraid to disobey their orders. A "free" media that traffics in incitement—including a bogus claim from the Arab News Agency that Hillary Clinton called for U.S. troops to be deployed to Egypt to protect the Copts. And that’s not the half of it. The Sinai is becoming another version of Yemen, an ungovernable staging ground for terrorism and sabotage. The economy has registered two consecutive quarters of sharply negative growth. Army chief Mohamad Hussein Tantawi, supposedly the guarantor of Egypt’s international commitments, only came to the rescue of the besieged Israeli Embassy after a direct appeal from President Obama. The so-called democratic coalition consists of 27 separate parties—plus the Muslim Brotherhood. There are estimates that 100,000 Copts have fled Egypt since the February revolution; the number is probably exaggerated, but the trend line is clear.

Elections will fail, causing the transition to go down
El Amrani 11
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/508978
Issandr El Amrani is a writer on Middle Eastern affairs. He blogs at www.arabist.net. His column appears every Tuesday.

In comparison, the way the Egyptian elections have been handled is a disaster. The authorities repeatedly ignored the desire of the vast majority of political forces for a fully proportional, list-based system. They finally offered an agreement on a system that was two-thirds list-based and one-third single-winner-based, only two months before the poll, which was only reluctantly accepted by parties. The final delimitation of districts was still uncertain as candidate registration opened, making the parties’ electoral planning difficult, to say the least. Moreover, the SCAF has continued the Mubarak-era policy of opposing foreign monitoring missions, despite this being a widespread practice around the world. In Tunisia, thousands of international monitors did not undermine national sovereignty; they added to the credibility of a well-run process. The concession made in Egypt to the Carter Center and other missions to allow "observers" rather than "monitors" is simply not good enough; it is only by beginning their work long before the actual poll is held and having unfettered access to the organizing agencies and every step of the voting process that monitoring agencies can truly certify the legitimacy of an election. It does not help that the international community currently seems to be placing more emphasis on the elections happening then on them being credible. Finally, the general atmosphere as the election approaches has not been one of confidence and optimism. The SCAF, through bad decisions and indecision, as well incidents involving the military, such as the events of 9 October at Maspero, has been a terrible manager of Egypt’s transition. Not only has the Emergency Law been maintained on dubious grounds (do you really need extraordinary legislation to be able to prosecute looters and carjackers?) but military trials have increased exponentially, while abuses by military police remain uninvestigated. A crackdown on freedom of speech is ongoing, both against mainstream media and individual activists. On the political front, the SCAF has undermined the cabinet’s independence and authority and chosen to approach political forces in a haphazard, divide-and-rule style. There is every reason to fear that both voter turn-out and voter confidence in Egypt will suffer from the opaque, confusing election process and the general climate of insecurity. No wonder many Egyptians are now so depressed. Seeing Tunisia’s success will only add to this glum feeling. It's not clear that a reset button can be pressed, as desirable as this may be. The SCAF is not about to abandon power, or even appoint a more independent government. Political forces are invested in the coming elections and the clout they think they will obtain through them, even though the parliament will, in fact, have no executive power and the country will continue to be ruled by the army. It may be impossible to start over, with a national unity government composed of independent politicians rather than malleable technocrats, and the postponement of elections to allow time for the electoral process itself to be more credible.
Iran DA

Aff saps focus from pressuring Iran to prevent nukes

The simple fact that senior U.S. officials, from the president on down, were fixated on Egypt over the past two weeks meant that they were not focused on the urgent need to compel Iran to change policy on its nuclear program. When this reality is combined with statements by various U.S. and allied officials that the timeline for Iranian nuclear progress has been pushed back, Iranians might conclude that the United States is either distracted or complacent in its campaign to force a change in Iranian nuclear policy. That would be a dangerous situation. Vigilance is in order. We should not rule out the idea that Iran may misread the situation and opt to seek a speedier breakout, expand its capabilities in new and dangerous ways, or attempt to exert its influence elsewhere in the region by pursuing some new form of provocative behavior. Some in Tehran may even believe the moment is ripe for deploying fifth-columnists and political saboteurs with the goal of toppling regimes they consider weak and unstable.

Iran sees the plan as a threat to the regime
Thaler, Senior Defense Research Analyst – RAND, 9

Aside from the role of pragmatism and the drive for regional preeminence, it is important to understand the dynamics of Iranian threat perception. Iranians have a strong tendency, which is deeply rooted in their political culture and history, to view external events as having internal reverberations. Highlighting this, political scientist Marvin Zonis identified four characteristics of the prerevolutionary leadership: political cynicism, personal mistrust, interpersonal exploitation, and manifest insecurity. While a fear of outside plots is inherent in most revolutionary regimes, Zonis has argued that this suspicion is especially pronounced in Iran. This is partly due to the very real conspiracy by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service in 1953 to overthrow Iran’s first elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and reinstall the Shah. Today, the Iranian leadership appears hypersensitive to U.S. associations with oppositionists, attaching conspiratorial significance to the continued presence of the Mujahidin-e Khalq (MeK) at the U.S.-monitored Camp Ashraf in Iraq and the appearance on the U.S.-sponsored Voice of America of Abdulmalik Riga, the head of a Baluchi militant group active in Iran’s underdeveloped province of Sistan-va Baluchestan. The most-recent salient examples of this blurring of internal and external threats include ethnic activism against the regime, threats to Iran’s claim to Shi’ite theological supremacy, and the degradation of the citizenry’s revolutionary ardor due to U.S. “psychological warfare” or attempts to inspire a velvet revolution.

Causes a domestic crackdown – Iran reacts proportionally to increased democracy aid
Thaler, Senior Defense Research Analyst – RAND, 9
Incremental reform solves Iranian democracy now – new crackdown crushes the Green Movement

Posch, Senior Research Fellow – European Union Institute for Security Studies, Ph.D. Iranian History – Bamberg University, ‘10

To sum up, with the Persian new year 1389 (started 21 March 2010) the Green Movement lives through a new transformation. It has held the ground on the level of its leadership, broadened its message and constituencies towards the working class and the lower bureaucracy notably in the education system, gets moral and publicity-wise support from the expatriate community and remains and successfully claims its right of interpreting the Khomeinist ideology, which they are adamant to marry with democracy. The fact that Iran’s Green Struggle remains within the ideological boundaries of the Islamic Republic does not belittle their democratic credentials.

As a matter of fact, if the Green Struggle continues and it is able to strengthen its organisation, it may well develop into a mass based political party similar to Europe’s Social and Christian Democratic parties.145 Like them the Green Struggle unifies many diverse constituencies reaching from working class to bourgeois from secularist to the religiously inspired around the core values of social justice and democracy. Thus the loose alliance of Iran’s reformist parties and civil society groups could mature towards some kind of an “Islamic social democratic” model, which would be politically left of say Turkey’s conservative AKP model. Such a development would fit perfectly to Mir-Hoseyn Musavi’s personal development. As prime minister he was a staunch left wing Islamist who managed Iran’s war time economy with a coupon system and cracked down on domestic resistance. In the course of time he developed towards someone who is critical of handing out subsidies and promotes democratic values such as the freedom of speech. His development was typical for his generation and proves nothing less than the political maturisation of Iran’s aging revolutionaries.

The Green Struggle’s sheer existence has been successful enough to check the influence of extremists in the regime and to prevent a coup d’État towards an utopian model of Islamic Governance. Thanks to the Green Struggle, the extremists around president Ahmadinezhad failed to impose their own ideological-political vision upon the Islamic Republic of Iran.

True, they were and still are strong enough to side-line almost every political force that would disagree with their agenda and they successfully cracked down on reformist party structures, renown intellectuals and on some formerly influential reformist politicians like former vice president Ali Abtahi. But this is far less than they had hoped for. Hence one should understand the on-going violence, executions and purges at the universities as an outburst of extremist anger and
fear rather than strategically executed violence. Even if, to quote just one example, the Mesbahi network would get hold of some chairs at the university by purging scholars, they would have to face the reality that another election is possible and their gains may not be irreversible. Thus holding the ground was the biggest achievement of Green Struggle until now. Yet the struggle is far from over and a major showdown is expected for June 2010.

5.1 The Final Countdown – Kind of ...

In the run-up to the expected June 2010 showdown the situation is as follows:

a) reconciliation efforts between reformists and moderate Principalists are underway; the most promising arena of this is the parliament, the most unlikely arena is a direct embrace between Musavi and luminaries within the Principalist camp;
b) problems of mediation are evident, in fact the Supreme Leader’s authority has certainly taken blows because his decision in June 2009 to stop the protests per ukas so to speak went nowhere and other institutions seemed biased;
c) ideological confrontation underpinned with personal animosities will continue to play an important role as it affects important protagonists of the regime;
d) securitisation of the system is on-going but the Iranian situation is still very different from the one prevailing in many Arab countries where the laws of exception are rather the rule than the exception;
e) the debate on politics and ideology is still very limited and has not changed in the last decade, hence the confrontation between supporters of an Islamist authoritarian Islamic Republic and those who prefer a democratic-Islamic version, will not abate, regardless of how this crisis will be overcome.

The Green Struggle on the other hand, has decided to stage mass demonstrations in June for a major showdown on the streets. Its demands are clear but it is also clear that they are unacceptable for the government. In principle the following scenarios are possible: a crackdown, a no-show of protesters and finally a big and peaceful rally without interference of the authorities.

Crackdown:

If indeed a crackdown takes place and hopes are dashed once again, the Green Struggle might suffer and perhaps dissolve along its social fissures. This would be only a short sighted victory for the regime as it could have several consequences:

- the remaining reformists would be embittered and a vast part of Iran’s Islamist spectrum would be further alienated.
- those groups among young Iranians who once again gave Iran’s “democracy with chador” a chance, could look for a democracy unveiled, i.e. become secularists; some might even engage in anti-system radicalism, perhaps joining the few newly emerged violent groups;

Successful transition key to stop Iranian power projection

Berman, vice president – American Foreign Policy Council, “10
(Ilan, “How to Support the Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Middle East Quarterly Spring, p. 53-61)

Today, Iranian politics are dominated by a deep divide. On one side is Iran’s repressive theocratic regime—a clerical junta that ranks as the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism and which is hell-bent on acquiring a nuclear capability. On the other are the people of Iran—a vibrant constituency that holds the future of the country in its hands. The course of their confrontation will determine the nature of the Iranian state and its place in the world for years to come.

For the United States and its allies, this struggle carries enormous consequences. The emergence of a more accountable, pluralistic regime in Tehran would lay the foundation for the historic rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. As it adapts its Iran policy, the White House should make every effort to support the forces of pluralism there in order to make such an outcome more likely.

Turns the whole aff

As it struggles to recalibrate its Iran policy, the administration should pay attention to the risk of an unexpected escalation toward war, which would badly harm U.S. efforts to consolidate a new regional order. In tinderbox conditions, local incidents, such as the killing of an Iranian in Bahrain or a rocket hitting Israel from Lebanon, could lead to sudden and rapid conflagration that could draw in multiple parties. Iran might seek to capitalize on a perceived window of opportunity through aggressive action, or simply push too far. Particular attention should be given to Israel’s northern border with Hezbollah, the divided island nation of Bahrain and a collapsing Yemen as three flashpoints where simmering tensions could explode into broader regional war. The regional upheavals have clearly increased Israeli security concerns, which could lead to its lashing out – whether at Gaza, Hezbollah or Iran itself – to address these perceived threats. Saudi concerns about Iran are also more intense than usual, and developments on the ground in Bahrain could trigger direct Iranian-Saudi conflict. Iran may test the extent to which these developments have constrained its rivals, and take provocative steps that trigger unexpected responses. Hezbollah’s confidence and growing military arsenal combined with Israel’s concerns about the shifting balance of power could combine to produce sudden and game-changing war.
Democratic Egypt is an existential threat to Saudi – the plan would murder relations
Dreyfuss, foreign policy writer – The Nation, 2/13/’11

Not surprisingly, many American media reports have focused on the impact of the revolution in Egypt on Israel, whose security policy is centered on the three-decade-old peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. But the country that really ought to be worried is Saudi Arabia. Throughout the entire period of Egypt’s uprising, Saudi Arabia disparaged the rebels, backed ex-President Mubarak, and called for “stability.” No wonder. For Saudi Arabia, a reborn Egypt is their worst nightmare. Think of it like this: imagine Saudi Arabia as a wealthy, gated community, whose lavish homes are built behind stone walls, with swimming pools and tennis courts. But next door—right next door, just outside the gates—is Egypt, a vast and sprawling slum, whose residents jealously catch glimpses of the kleptocrats next door as they board jets for Dubai and the French Riviera. Now you understand why Saudi Arabia might be worried. But Egypt, the new Egypt, might turn out to be angry at Saudi Arabia, because of the kingdom’s unabashed support for the fallen Mubarak. And an angry Egypt might help—overtly, covertly or just by example—to undermine the stability of the Saudi royal family. Consider some history.
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Yes Iran Aggression

Iran becomes emboldened in times of economic crisis

Green and Schrage ‘9 – Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University, and CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative’s Office (Michael J and Steven P, 3/26. State Department and Ways & Means Committee, “It’s Not Just the Economy,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/KC26Dk01.html)

Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system.
Iran isn’t a threat

Luttwak 7. [Edward, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/7 “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine]

Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran’s warships, despite the fact that most are over 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts, and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of “death to America” invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran’s added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched. As for the claim that the “Iranians” are united in patriotic support for the nuclear programme, no such nationality even exists. Out of Iran’s population of 70m or so, 51 per cent are ethnically Persian, 24 per cent are Turks (“Azeris” is the regime’s term), with other minorities comprising the remaining quarter. Many of Iran’s 16-17m Turks are in revolt against Persian cultural imperialism; its 5-6m Kurds have started a serious insurgency; the Arab minority detonates bombs in Ahvaz; and Baluch tribesmen attack gendarmes and revolutionary guards. If some 40 per cent of the British population were engaged in separatist struggles of varying intensity, nobody would claim that it was firmly united around the London government. On top of this, many of the Persian majority oppose the theocratic regime, either because they have become post-Islamic in reaction to its many prohibitions, or because they are Sufis, whom the regime now persecutes almost as much as the small Baha’i minority. So let us have no more reports from Tehran stressing the country’s national unity. Persian nationalism is a minority position in a country where half the population is not even Persian. In our times, multinational states either decentralise or break up more or less violently; Iran is not decentralising, so its future seems highly predictable, while in the present not much cohesion under attack is to be expected.

Iran is a purely defensive state-


Iran can rightly be viewed as a status quo state. Despite the early revolutionary rhetoric and the occasional polemic today, Iran’s actual behavior matches that of a status quo state. Iran’s only open military conflict since the revolution was its eight year war with Iraq, which Iraq began with its invasion of Iran in 1980. Further, Iran’s geography gives it great strategic depth, allowing it to take the time required to analyze threats thoroughly before counter attacking, since any invader must traverse a long distance before threatening any of Iran’s major cities. 46 Although a ballistic missile threat renders this point moot, Iran’s previous conduct hints that the Islamic Republic, overall, considers itself a status quo power with a defensive mindset. In its
only war, it was a defensive force, having suffered an invasion from a foreign power (status quo). Iran has implemented a rigid, centralized command and control regimen for its chemical weapons that demonstrates no real-time urgency, suggesting a dependence on conventional defenses to hold off attackers until the supreme leader can authorize the use of chemical munitions.

Iran is rational and sacrifices ideology- history proves

Sadr '5 (THE IMPACT OF IRAN'S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL Ehsaneh I Sadr. Middle East Policy. Washington: Summer 2005. Vol. 12, Iss. 2; pg. 58, 15 pgsMs. Sadr is a graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.

A second reason given for MAD's irrelevance in the Iranian context is that Iran, as an ideologically driven state, might be willing to tolerate enormous costs including its own annihilation - for the pleasure of destroying the Jewish state. Indeed, the most pessimistic analyses suggest that the primary driver of Iran's nuclear quest is its plan to actually use the weapons it acquires against "infidels" such as Israel and the United States. A recent report by a group of Israeli defense experts, for example, describes Iran as a "suicide nation" willing to risk its own survival so long as Israel is eliminated in the process.41 These pessimistic analyses are generally supported by reference to incendiary statements made by Iranian leaders that indicate a blind hatred for and desire to inflict pain upon and possibly use nuclear weapons against the state of Israel. However, while "Death to Israel" continues to be a popular refrain (especially on Jerusalem Day, the official anti-Israel holiday), threats to actually use nuclear weapons against the Jewish state are extremely difficult to find. In the only instance I have found, former president Rafsanjani stated at a Jerusalem Day rally that "if one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with [nuclear] weapons, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it [the use of a nuclear weapon] will only harm the Islamic world."42 Even here, however, the threat is not direct and, in the context of the speech as a whole, is aimed less at the Jewish people (with whom Rafsanjani expresses some sympathy for their manipulation by imperialists and colonialists) than the United States. Furthermore, there is evidence that Iran is prepared to live with a two-state solution if a peace accord is successful. Most recently, a conservative member of Parliament (formerly an official in the Foreign Ministry) said that the destruction of Israel "is not an official policy" and that "Iran would adopt new policies" once a peace settlement is agreed to by Palestinian leaders.43 Altogether, however, the public statements of a country's leaders are likely to be a misleading predictor of their future behavior. Both international strategic and domestic political incentives exist for concealing or trumping up a regime's nuclear capabilities and intentions. Past behavior, rather than statements, is a more appropriate guide. In the Iranian case, we might usefully ask what the regime's past behavior indicates as to its willingness to tolerate pain in order to achieve ideological objectives. There are, in fact, many signs that realpolitik has overcome Islamic ideology as the primary driver of Iran's foreign policy. Over the past decade, Iran has closed its eyes to Chinese and Russian mistreatment of their Muslim minorities, publicly renounced Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie, normalized diplomatic relations with the Gulf states, stated its willingness to live with a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and even cooperated with the Great Satan in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having so often sacrificed Islamic ideology for comparatively small political and material gains, it seems reasonable to assume that the Iranian regime would do so again if the stakes were as high as nuclear warfare.
AT Iran Attacks – No Capability

Iran’s not a threat

Nader and Dobbins 1/5

In these circumstances, it is important to realistically judge the nature and extent of the Iranian threat. For all its bluster, the Iranian regime is more vulnerable than at any time in its 32-year history. Internally, Iran is constrained by deep political divisions, civil strife and a woeful economy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has directly challenged the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while Khamenei has spoken of eliminating the presidency. The life of the ordinary Iranian becomes more precarious every day, with rising unemployment, inflation, state repression, and the country’s growing international isolation. The regime has maintained a superficial sense of stability through repression. Legislative elections are scheduled for early March. Leaders of the reformist Green movement are threatening to boycott the ballot, but there will still be a closely fought contest between the more religious and secularist wings of the regime. Both this election and the presidential vote next year could well become occasions for public demonstrations of the sort that threatened the regime three years ago and have since toppled several Middle East governments. Iran is on the brink of losing its only real ally, Syria, as President Bashar-al-Assad looks as if he could be the next Arab dictator to fall. Tightening international sanctions are slowing Iran’s nuclear program while limiting its ability to project power. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s principal regional rival, is leading the other Gulf states in an ever more explicit anti-Iranian coalition. The United States is strengthening its military and political ties with several of these states. Iran’s leaders have watched U.S. forces topple Saddam Hussein and the Taliban with relative ease and NATO help do the same with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya: Iran’s antiquated conventional forces are no match for the U.S. military. And the Iranian regime believes that the United States remains committed to a policy of regime change, even though Washington might not presently have the appetite for a new military intervention.

Iranian prolific has been delayed indefinitely – even if they acquire uranium they can’t create a credible arsenal.


An article in the Wall Street Journal by Max Boot outlines the various covert activities that have contributed to delaying Iran’s nuclear proliferation. Boot, details a computer virus, Stuxnet, which infected computers used to control Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Bushehr. Prior to the release of Stuxnet, Israel forecasted that Iran would be a nuclear threat in 2011, however Moshe Yaalon, a former Israeli military chief of staff said, “as a result of the recent setbacks, Iran will not go nuclear until 2014 at least.” “Stuxnet is the start of a new era,” says Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the U.S. National Security Agency in a Newsweek article. “Stuxnet is the most sophisticated computer worm ever detected and analyzed, one targeting hardware as well as software, and a paradigm of covert cyberweapons to come. It’s the first time we’ve actually seen a weapon created by a state to achieve a goal that you would otherwise have used multiple cruise missiles to achieve.” Boot supports Newsweek’s argument by stating that it appears that “Stuxnet has managed to delay the Iranian nuclear program as long as Israeli air strikes might have, while avoiding any of the obvious blowback.” Boot further highlights that in addition to Stuxnet, other covert actions have been undertaken regarding Iranian nuclear scientists. In November, for example, mysterious men on motorbikes attached magnetic mines to cars being driven by Majid Shahriari and Fereydoon Abbasi, both of whom are said to have worked in the Iranian nuclear program. The former was killed, the latter wounded. Iran’s leaders have blamed these attacks on Israel and the United States according to Boot. Newsweek stated, “What we can deduce from the limited evidence that has emerged so far, according to former White House counterterrorism and cyberwarfare adviser Richard Clarke, is that at least two countries conducted operations against Iran simultaneously and not necessarily in close coordination. One likely carried out the hits; the other created and somehow infiltrated the highly sophisticated Stuxnet worm into computers of the Iranian nuclear program. In an interview, Clarke, who now runs a security-consulting business, strongly suggested Israel and the United States are the likely sources of the attacks. Other analysts suggest that France, Britain, and especially Germany, home of Siemens, which made the software and some of the hardware attacked by the Stuxnet worm, might also be involved. (A spokesman for Siemens says the company no longer does business with Iran.)” While Stuxnet and other covert actions have stalled Iran’s nuclear program, its recent talks with Zimbabwe to acquire its uranium supply poses a new obstacle. Iran acquired most of its
uranium from South Africa, but its stocks are now running low, according to an article in the Telegraph. The Zimbawemetro pointed out that, “Iran’s uranium stockpile is 30 years old, dating to the early 1980s, when South Africa sold it about 531 tons of yellowcake, the powder produced from raw uranium dug from the ground that is enriched to create nuclear-reactor fuel (or, potentially, bomb material). Of that supply, the country has only “a relatively small stock” left.

Despite its image as a looming superpower, which revolutionary Iran has sought for years to cultivate, its actual policy reveals a deep recognition of its weakness as a representative of the Shi’ites, who constitute a 10% minority in a Sunni Muslim region. Historically persecuted over centuries, the Shi’ites developed various means of survival, including taqiya – the Shi’ite principle of caution, as expressed in willingness to hide one’s Shi’ite affiliation in order to survive under a hostile Sunni rule – and passivity, reflected in the use of diplomacy alongside indirect intimidation, terrorism, etc. The ideological change pioneered by the founder of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini – who transformed the passive perception characteristic of the of the Shi’a (which was based on the legend of the martyrdom of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala) into an active perception of martyrdom (shahada)[26] – is not being carried out by Iran. Tehran is refraining from sending Iranian nationals to carry out martyrdom operations, despite its years-long glorification of this principle. It is also not sending Iranians to Gaza, either on aid missions or to carry out suicide attacks – and despite the fact that regime-sponsored organizations are recruiting volunteers for such efforts. Moreover, it appears that the Shi’ite regime in Iran is utilizing the legend of Hussein’s martyrdom solely for propaganda purposes, in order to glorify its own might and intimidate the Sunni and Western world. Such intimidation is in keeping with Shi’ite tradition, as a way to conceal Tehran’s unwillingness to take overt military action against external challenges. Conclusion: Tehran’s defeat in the Bahrain crisis reflects characteristic Shi’ite restraint, stemming from recognition of its own weakness in the face of the vast Sunni majority. The decade during which Iran successfully expanded its strength and power exponentially via threats and creating an image of superpower military strength has collapsed in the Bahrain crisis; Iran is now revealed as a paper tiger that will refrain from any violent conflict. When it came to the crunch, it became clear that the most that Iran could do was threaten to use terrorism or to subvert the Shi’ite citizens of other countries – in keeping with customary Shi’ite behavior – and these threats were not even implemented. It can be assumed that the Sunni camp, headed by Saudi Arabia, is fully aware of the political and military significance of Iran’s weakness and its unwillingness to initiate face-to-face conflict. This will have ramifications on both the regional and the global levels. In addition to having its weakness exposed by the Bahrain situation, Tehran has also taken several further hits to its prestige and geopolitical status. These include: the popular uprisings in Syria against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, weakening the Tehran-Damascus axis, post-revolutionary Egypt’s refusal to renew relations with Iran; and the fact that the E.U. was capable of uniting and leading a military attack against the regime of Libyan leader Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi as well as its refusal to renew the nuclear negotiations with Tehran based on Iran’s demands. All this, added to the serious internal rift between Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his long-time ally Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have today left the Iranian regime in clearly reduced circumstances.

Iran won’t be militarily aggressive—no capability

There is little evidence to support Washington’s warnings of aggressive Iranian designs in the Persian Gulf, either. Iran has not threatened—nor does it have any reason for provoking—a
confrontation over sea lanes, as several U.S. analysts have feared. Iran is at least as reliant as its Arab neighbors on unrestricted navigation, so if it closed the Straits of Hormuz, Iran would be primarily hurting itself. With few pipelines servicing its southern oil fields, Iran is far more dependent on tanker shipping than any other country on the Persian Gulf coast. Iran has dramatically reduced its military spending due to chronic economic problems. Indeed, in constant dollars, Iranian military spending is barely one-third what it was during the 1980s, when Washington was clandestinely sending arms to the Islamic Republic. Mirroring increased Iranian procurement of sophisticated missiles, the Arab sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf have similar missile capabilities, serving (along with the U.S. Navy) as an effective deterrent force, much more likely to do so on its own rather than relinquish control over such sensitive weapons.
AT Iran/Saudi War

No Saudi/Iran war:
A. Instability sparks cooperation.

The result is that Iran’s Arab neighbors, particularly the smaller GCC states, have pursued a mixed approach toward Tehran that incorporates some elements of accommodation and engagement, regardless of warnings from Riyadh and Washington. And indeed, even the Saudis themselves have adopted such an approach, the regional shakeup in the aftermath of the Iraq War has not fundamentally altered the Saudis’ rapprochement with Tehran, which dates to the mid-1990s. When necessary, the two states have shown the propensity for pragmatic cooperation in specific geographic areas and on issues where their interests intersect—even if, in other areas, there is concurrently open rivalry. As one analyst of Saudi Arabia argues, the United States may want the Saudis to head an anti-Iranian alliance, but they will not do this, preferring to act as mediators instead. Ahmadinejad’s invitation and attendance at the December 2007 GCC summit was a particularly public expression of the mixed approach toward Iran among the Arab Gulf states and underscores the obstacles U.S. attempts to solidify an anti-Iranian stance among Iran’s neighbors face.

B. US deters Iran and they don’t see chance of success

But Iran will not go so far as to engage in confrontation with the Saudi troops, says Nader Habibi, economics professor at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University in Waltham, Mass. “My feeling is that Iran is unlikely to start a military confrontation over Bahrain because Saudi Arabia enjoys the support of the United States,” he says. “The Shiites are a majority but they have little chance of removing the Sunni king from power because of the Saudi support for Bahrain’s monarchy.” “A lot of promises floating around the GCC”

No escalation and proxy wars are inevitable.

In the years immediately following its attack on Iraq, the U.S. tried to cobble together a coalition of ‘moderate' Sunni states to contain Iran's growing influence in the region. Israel could not obviously be a part of this grouping but it fully supported the effort. During the visits by this writer to the countries in the region, it was made clear to him that Iraq’s neighbours would not remain silent and inactive if the Sunnis there came under serious danger. The situation did not escalate to that level; neither of the regional powers wanted to risk war. The interesting point is that it is Iran, the lone Shia superpower which does not have the economic clout of Saudi Arabia, which has adopted an aggressive posture whereas the Sunni states seem to be on the defensive. Iran feels isolated, encircled and threatened by hostile American forces as well as by what it might perceive as antagonistic Sunni states. It is this which perhaps makes the Iranian regime more motivated and forceful in its diplomacy and actions. The feeble attempts by the Americans to discourage Saudi Arabia from sending its troops into Bahrain not only did not succeed but also led the Saudis to the conclusion that they must be on their own when it came to defending their regime and checking Iran’s growing influence. If Bahrain’s Shias succeed in gaining a share in
the power structure, the Saudis will feel truly threatened, given that its Shia community, accounting for about 10 per cent of the population, is concentrated in its eastern territory where its oil assets are located. Any prospect of Iranian influence on the mainland of Saudi Arabia will be a nightmare to its ruling dynasty. It is perhaps too late to soften the Shia-Sunni, Iran-Saudi tensions. Even if the Sunni-ruled states satisfy the demands of their Shia populations to some extent, Iran will continue to press home the advantage that has come its way recently, consolidate and build on it. The Americans will certainly not watch this game passively.
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No Iraq war


Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, **there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved.** The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else’s fight.
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Rapid development of democratic governance in Libya is the only way to stave off waves of instability and civil war

ICG 11, international crisis group – independent non-profit NGO, “holding libya together: security challenges after qadhafi”,

As the recent upsurge of violence dramatically illustrates, the militias that were decisive in ousting Qadhafi’s regime are becoming a significant problem now that it is gone. Their number is a mystery: 100 according to some; three times that others say. Over 125,000 Libyans are said to be armed. The groups do not see themselves as serving a central authority; they have separate procedures to register members and weapons, arrest and detain suspects; they repeatedly have clashed. Rebuilding Libya requires addressing their fate, yet haste would be as perilous as apathy. The uprising was highly decentralised; although they recognise it, the local military and civilian councils are sceptical of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the largely self-appointed body leading the transition. They feel they need weapons to defend their interests and address their security fears. A top-down disarmament and demobilisation effort by an executive lacking legitimacy would backfire. For now the NTC should work with local authorities and militias – and encourage them to work with each other – to agree on operational standards and pave the way for restructured police, military and civilian institutions. Qadhafi centralised power without building a central state. His successors must do the reverse. A dual legacy burdens Libya’s new authorities. The first was bequeathed by Qadhafi in the form of a regime centred on himself and his family; that played neighbourhoods and groups against one another; failed to develop genuine national institutions; and deliberately kept the national army weak to prevent the emergence of wouldbe challengers. The second legacy stems from the way in which he was toppled: through the piecemeal and variegated liberation of different parts of the country. A large number of local forces and militias volunteered to take part in this fight. After Qadhafi’s fall, all could legitimately claim to have sacrificed blood and treasure for the cause, and all could consider themselves national liberators. To much of the world, the NTC was the face of the uprising. It was formed early, spoke with authority and swiftly achieved broad international recognition. On the ground, the picture was different. The NTC was headquartered in the eastern city of Benghazi, a traditional base of antiregime activity that provided army defectors a relatively secure area of operations, particularly after NATO’s involvement. The eastern rebellion was built around a strong kernel of experienced opponents and commanders who found friendly territory in which to defect at relatively low cost and personal risk. But it could only encourage western cities and towns to rise up, not adequately support them. At key times, army components that defected, stuck on the eastern frontlines, by and large became passive observers of what occurred in the rest of the country. In the eyes of many, the rebel army looked increasingly like an eastern, not a truly national force. As for the NTC, focused on obtaining vital international support, it never fully led the uprising, nor could it establish a substantial physical presence in much of the rest of the country. In the west, rebels formed militias and military brigades that were essentially autonomous, self-armed and self-trained, benefiting in most instances from limited NTC and foreign government support. Some had a military background, but most were civilians – accountants, lawyers, students or labourers. When and where they prevailed, they assumed security and civilian responsibility under the authority of local military councils. As a result, most of the militias are geographically rooted, identified with specific neighbourhoods, towns and cities – such as Zintan and Misrata – rather than joined by ideology, tribal membership or ethnicity; they seldom possess a clear political agenda beyond securing their area. The situation in Tripoli was different and uniquely dangerous. There, victory over Qadhafi forces reflected the combined efforts of local residents and various militias from across the country. The outcome was a series of parallel, at times uncoordinated chains of command. The presence of multiple militias has led to armed clashes as they overlap and compete for power.

The NTC’s desire to bring the militias under central control is wholly understandable; to build a stable Libya, it also is necessary. But obstacles are great. By now, they have developed vested interests they will be loath to relinquish. They also have become increasingly entrenched. Militias mimic the organisation of a regular military and enjoy parallel chains of command, they have separate weapons and vehicle registration procedures; supply identification cards; conduct investigations; issue warrants; arrest and detain suspects; and conduct security operations,
Sometimes at substantial cost to communities subject to discrimination and collective punishment. They also have advantages that the NTC and the National Army lack, notably superior local knowledge and connections, relatively strong leaderships and revolutionary legitimacy. In contrast, the NTC has had to struggle with internal divisions, a credibility deficit and questions surrounding its effectiveness. It has had to deal with ministries still in the process of reorganisation and whose employees – most of them former regime holdovers – have yet to cast off the ingrained habit of referring any decision to the ministerial level. But the heart of the matter is political. The security landscape’s fragmentation – and militias’ unwillingness to give up arms – reflects distrust and uncertainty regarding who has the legitimacy to lead during the transition. While the NTC and reconstituted National Army can point out they were among the first to rebel or defect and were crucial in obtaining international support, others see things differently. Some considered them too eastern-dominated and blamed them for playing a marginal role in liberating the west. Civilians who took up arms and who had been powerless or persecuted under Qadhafi resent ex-senior officials who defected from the army and members of the regime’s elite who shifted allegiances and now purport to rule. Although they are represented on the council, many Islamists consider the NTC overly secular and out of touch with ordinary Libyans. Above all else, militias – notably those in Tripoli, Zintan and Misrata – have their own narrative to justify their legitimacy, that they spearheaded the revolution in the west, did the most to free the capital or suffered most from Qadhafi’s repression. Formation of a new cabinet was supposed to curb militia-militia violence as well as defiance of the National Army; it has done nothing of the kind. Instead, violence in the capital – if anything has escalated, with armed clashes occurring almost nightly. Regional suspicion of the central authority remains high as does disagreement over which of the many new revolutionary groups and personalities ought to be entrusted with power. The problem posed by militias is intimately related to deeper, longer-term structural issues: Qadhafi’s neglect of the army along with other institutions; regional friction and societal divisions (between regions, between Islami-steady and secularist-leaning camps, as well as between representatives of the old and new orders); the uprising’s geographically uneven and uncoordinated development; the surplus of weapons and deficit in trust; the absence of a strong, fully representative and effective executive authority; and widespread feeling among many armed fighters that the existing national army lacks both relevance and legitimacy. Until a more legitimate governing body is formed – which likely means until elections are held – and until more credible national institutions are developed, notably in the areas of defence, policing and vital service delivery, Libyans are likely to be suspicious of the political process, while insisting on both retaining their weapons and preserving the current structure of irregular armed brigades. To try to force a different outcome would be to play with fire, and with poor odds. But that does not mean nothing can be done. Some of the most worrying features of the security patchwork should be addressed cooperatively between the NTC and local military as well as civilian councils. At the top of the list should be developing and enforcing clear standards to prevent abuses of detainees or discrimination against entire communities, the uncontrolled possession, display or use especially of heavy weapons and inter-militia clashes. The NTC also should begin working on longer-term steps to demobilise the militias and reintegrate their fighters in coordination with local actors. This will require restructuring the police and military, but also providing economic opportunities for former fighters – vocational training, jobs as well as basic social services – which in turn will require meeting minimum expectations of good government. Even as it takes a relatively hands-off approach, the international community has much to offer in this respect – and Libyans appear eager for such help. Ultimately, successfully dealing with the proliferation of militias will entail a delicate balancing act: central authorities must take action, but not at the expense of local counterparts; disarmament and demobilisation should proceed deliberately, but neither too quickly nor too abruptly; and international players should weigh the need not to overly interfere in Libya’s affairs against the obligation not to become overly complacent about its promising but still fragile future.

US needs to take the lead on Libyan reconstruction—that rebuilds US image throughout the region—ceding leadership to others undermines good will. Paul Wolfowitz 11, former United States Ambassador to Indonesia, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, President of the World Bank, and former dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
But the failure of the U.S. to support the opposition more strongly in other ways was a costly mistake. The delay in recognizing the National Transitional Council, the continuing delays in getting them access to frozen assets, and the refusal to provide arms made the conflict longer and bloodier, deprived the country of some of its bravest potential leaders, and reduced America’s ability to secure the Gadhafi regime’s surface-to-air missiles, now a major concern. Worst of all, having ceded leadership to others, the U.S. is less able to support those who share its values. The U.S. missed a rare opportunity to play a leading role in support of a cause that was widely admired in Libya and throughout the Arab world.

President Nicolas Sarkozy received. Instead she was asked why the U.S. hadn’t done more. As one student said, “Many people feel that the United States has taken a back seat. That mistake should not be repeated now.” Forty-two years of despotism have left Libya with virtually no functioning institutions, a poorly educated population, and no civil society. The violence of the rebellion has created new motives for revenge and put weapons in the hands of thousands. It was Gadhafi, not NATO, who broke Libya, and NATO doesn’t own Libya. For the first time in 42 years, the courageous Libyan people own it. But they face formidable challenges. Libya’s most urgent need is to bring its many armed groups into an organized security force and to secure their enormous weapon supplies. This is a task best achieved not by force but with money, to pay the new security forces and to buy back weapons. And it could also provide jobs for dangerously unemployed armed men. The Libyans have money, but much of it is still frozen in accounts around the world. The U.S. should get them much more rapid access to their own funds, if necessary by advancing loans against still-frozen assets. Washington should also establish a security assistance program to help train and organize the new Libyan forces. Another urgent need is to reimburse the U.S. for the cost of this humanitarian assistance. A third important initiative would be to encourage Libya to manage its oil revenues so as to avoid the “oil curse” that has damaged so many countries, particularly Libya. The experience of Norway and Alaska, which have given their people a direct stake in their oil revenues, could show Libyans how the country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people. That would also provide a safeguard against a future ruler gaining too much power. Finally, if Libyans want it, they should decide freely and democratically how their country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people. That would also provide a safeguard against a future ruler gaining too much power. Finally, if Libyans want it, they should decide freely and democratically how their country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people. That would also provide a safeguard against a future ruler gaining too much power. Finally, if Libyans want it, they should decide freely and democratically how their country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people. That would also provide a safeguard against a future ruler gaining too much power. Finally, if Libyans want it, they should decide freely and democratically how their country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people. That would also provide a safeguard against a future ruler gaining too much power. 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Finally, if Libyans want it, they should decide freely and democratically how their country’s wealth can be shared more fairly among all the people.
West's ability to play a constructive role in determining the shape of the new Arab world. If post-Gadhafi Libya does not become a nation with generally democratic, largely pluralistic and fairly liberal standards, the West's intervention will have been a failure. And America will have sent its clearest sign yet that it is impotent to influence the course of events in the Middle East.

The impression that America has become irrelevant is already taking hold in the region. In a recent interview with the Lebanese television network ANB, a leading Palestinian official dismissively declared that Washington "does not play a role any more in the Middle East." The intervention in Libya, ironically, did little to counteract that image. Washington seemed halfhearted in its participation, and the fight against Gadhafi seemed more difficult than it should have been, considering the magnitude of forces arrayed against the regime. The lingering stalemate made the mighty military forces of NATO seem less than awe-inducing. Now that the revolution has finally reached Tripoli, Washington has the crucial task of steering the emerging government in a direction that is consistent with Western values and interests. If the West and its ideological allies in what we have called the Libyan opposition succeed, they could have an impact that goes beyond the future of Libya and perceptions of the U.S., inspiring and influencing the course of events in other Arab countries.

The task ahead is not easy. The scrappy band of revolutionaries who took on Gadhafi and his mercenaries espouse a wide assortment of ideologies, backgrounds and even ethnicities, bound together by their common goal of ending a four-decade-old dictatorship. Beyond ending Gadhafi’s rule, however, they don’t all share a vision of what Libya should become. The American ideal -- a functioning, inclusive democracy with secular rule of law and an impartial judiciary -- has strong proponents within the National Transitional Council (NTC), the governing entity established by the rebel forces. But some of the rebels adhere to sharply different ideologies. The many exiled Libyans who returned to their country to fight Gadhafi after years in the West have brought with them a deep familiarity with American and European-style democracy, and that is precisely what many of them would like to build. The NTC is headed by Mahmoud Jibril, who studied political science at the University of Pittsburgh. Jibril and the NTC have repeatedly made a commitment to democracy, as they have lobbied the West to free Libyan assets and help the rebels achieve victory. The council is on record with its goal of bringing free elections, pluralism and human rights to the country. One can make the cynical case that anti-Gadhafi Libyans who disagreed with those progressive views knew they should hold their cards close to their vest in order to secure the aid needed to overthrow Gadhafi. But there is no question that many in the NTC hold genuinely democratic ideals. Ramadan Ben Amer, an engineer who also studied in the U.S., leads the recently formed New Libya Party (NLP), which calls itself the country’s first political party. The NLP, he says, aims to create a democracy in the image of the American system, with three co-equal branches of government. But the rebels who fought Gadhafi also include conservative tribal members, some of whom may seek revenge more than inclusion, as well as committed jihadists, activist Berbers and others. In addition, the intense regional rivalries between the Tripoli-centered west and the Bengazi-centered east add to the complications of creating a political system on a level field. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had tried to overthrow Gadhafi since its establishment in 1995, includes members who are highly experienced and deeply devoted to their Islamist cause. Documents seized by U.S. forces in Sinjar, Iraq, list scores of Libyans fighting with al-Qaida in Iraq. The LIFG, officially a member of al-Qaida, aims for the adoption of Islamic law and the reinstatement of a Muslim caliphate. Another Libyan group that has played a prominent role in the uprising is the Amazigh, the Berbers. Long oppressed by Gadhafi, Libya’s Berbers speak a different language and have a distinct culture shared with Berbers in neighboring Morocco. Libya’s social structure is built on tribalism and regionalism. Tribes inspire a loyalty deeper than does the state. The Gadhafi regime favored certain clans at the expense of others and brutalized those who dared to challenge it. As a result, tribal conflict could easily erupt. Tribal attacks have already occurred, for example, in Berber-majority areas liberated from Gadhafi rule, where houses of the members of other tribes have been burned and their occupants have fled. The largest tribe is the Warfalla, once allied with Gadhafi but also the first to join the opposition. The Gadhafi tribe, to which Gadhafi belongs, is small but has enjoyed enormous privilege. It is also the most likely to suffer revenge attacks and become the focus of civil conflict. Similarly, the al-Awaqir played a prominent role in the fallen regime and could also be targeted in revenge attacks. The second largest tribe is the Magarïa, which had a few years ago was also loyal to Gadhafi. The convicted -- and later freed -- Lockerbie bomber, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, is a member. And yet, Libya is a country with a small population. Washington, its NATO allies and their friends in the Libyan opposition have had five months to plan for this moment. They have had time to build ties to each other. After playing a negligible role during the Arab uprisings, Western strategists now have the opportunity to show that the U.S. and the West are still major players on the global arena. And in doing so they can help the Arab people build a new system that is consistent with freedom and democracy, not to mention friendly to the West.
Libya's challenges are immense, but Washington can take steps to facilitate the transition while ensuring that U.S. interests are not sidelined by other actors. On Monday, the prime minister of Libya's National Transition Council (NTC), Muhammad Librili, handed off power to a new interim leader, Abdul Rahim al-Keib. That same day, intense fighting broke out between militias from Zintan and the NTC's Tripoli Brigade at the capital's central hospital, with antiaircraft guns brought to bear. As the outgoing prime minister soberly warned, Libya has entered "a political battle" in which "the rules of the game are not clearly defined." At this moment of flux, the United States can help smooth the country's hazardous transition by helping Libyans build good governance and political capacity, treating more of the wounded, and playing a more assertive role, rather than allowing other actors to negatively influence events on the ground. Zones of Control The NTC's authority is limited apart from Benghazi (where it has based its headquarters) and the western and eastern borders (where it enforces visa requirements at crossings controlled by young, barely uniformed rebels). For example, in response to Muammar Qadhafi's execution -- which itself underscored a lack of widespread NTC control -- the council declared, "Whoever is responsible for that will be judged and given a fair trial." Yet according to the rebel who reportedly pulled Qadhafi from his hiding place, the council's forces "won't come near us," even though the identities of the Misratah natives who killed Qadhafi is widely known. More broadly, Libya's urban centers are controlled by a variety of groups. In Benghazi, the police and the Benghazi Protection Brigade have secured the city, giving it a semblance of normalcy. Yet in Tripoli, numerous militias direct traffic in the capital and maintain loose control of the neighborhoods. Although the NTC has blessed the Tripoli Military Council (TMC) with securing the city, tensions persist between the two. The TMC consists of several Islamist brigades reportedly totaling 8,000-10,000 fighters, led by the controversial Abdul Hakim Belhaj, a veteran of the Afghan jihad. In addition, local rebels and the Tripoli Revolutionists Council compete with both the NTC and TMC. The Revolutionists Council is led by Abdullah Ahmed Naker, an Islamist who claims to represent seventy-three factions comprising some 20,000 fighters. Meanwhile, the territory between Tripoli and Benghazi resembles the Wild West. The Misratah district. Young fighters can be seen clogging Misratah's main thoroughway with ad hoc military parades while tanks aimlessly roam the town, ripping up asphalt amid continued sounds of celebratory gunfire. According to Antar Abdul Salaam al-Beiri, commander of the 300-strong group Amir Katibat Misratah, there are around 200 brigades in the district ranging from 100 to 500 fighters each, totaling approximately 25,000 armed rebels. Although the Misratah Military Council claims control over the area, there is no true authority. On October 28, the NTC announced a "turn in your weapons for cash" day, but few rebels participated: al-Beiri has made clear that he and other commanders will not hand over their arms until after a legitimate government is formed and elections are held, even if this means waiting a year. Gulf of Sirte. Qadhafi's birthplace of Sirte has been completely destroyed; even two weeks after its capture, it remains a ghost town with the lingering smell of death. Towns loyal to Qadhafi, the rebels, or a mix of the two dot the coastline between Sirte and Benghazi. Outstanding Security Concerns Remnants of Qadhafi's arsenal, along with a deluge of weapons from outside the country, continue to threaten stability. Despite NTC attempts to secure loose weapons, journalists reporting from south of Sirte have described "SCUD missiles and chemical weapons spread throughout the desert." Qadhafi's forces, in a rush to strip off their uniforms and melt back into the population, have hastily abandoned many bases, leaving artillery for the taking. In addition, Western diplomats are concerned over attempts by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to establish a "green belt" across southern Libya. AQIM is profiting from Tuareg tribal distrust of the rebels, the absence of authority in the south, and the availability of weapons, especially shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles that can take down commercial airliners and which have apparently been found on al-Qaeda fighters in Algeria and Chad. Meanwhile, many rebels and other Libyans are currently serving in security roles on a volunteer basis "out of national duty," though some may receive a small stipend from the NTC. Commander al-Beiri stated that his fighters "would be willing to work without pay for a long time." Yet some diplomats worry that once the euphoria subsides and Libya's economic situation settles in, the many easy-to-assemble checkpoints currently manned by untrained rebels may be used to facilitate theft -- or, worse, to control areas for self-serving purposes and exclude tribal foes. Reintegrating the rebels into society is unlikely absent political and economic progress. Future Fault Lines Although Libyans were unified in their hatred of Qadhafi, the old and new tensions coming into play since his death may divide them once again. Libya's preexisting fault lines include tribal, ethnic (Arab versus Berber), and geographic (east versus west) fissures. And new concerns have emerged over potential reprisals. For example, the 75,000 Sirte residents who fled during the revolution are now...
returning to an inhospitable city. One resident warned, "The people of Sirte are Bedouins, and the Bedouin man does not forget to avenge injustice...We will not forget what happened in Sirte." Moreover, the rebels are still holding some 7,000 prisoners of war. And in Misratah, rebel forces recently shot, arrested, beat, and detained unarmed displaced residents of the nearby pro-regime town of Toarag. In addition, **Libya’s Islamists are armed and assertive in seeking the political power denied them under Qadhafi.** One leading Islamist rebel stated that his forces "must have a political role in the coming stage," even as an unnamed NTC official warned that "a growing Islamic influence in Tripoli could lead to a political and military breakdown." Meanwhile, Islamists in Tripoli have threatened to kill journalists affiliated with the newly founded liberal newspaper Arous al-Bahr, which has criticized followers of TMC leader Belhaj. At the same time, NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil has warned of "a stolen revolution." Recommendations for U.S. Policy **Libyans are desperate for normalcy after forty-two years of eccentric revolution and international isolation.** They strongly believe that Qadhafi intentionally avoided investing in the country's infrastructure and education system, and therefore have high expectations that Libya will benefit from joining the international community. Accompanying this post-revolution euphoria is widespread goodwill toward those involved in the NATO operation, as well as a desire for continued cooperation. **This represents an opportunity for the United States.** Yet talk of a Qatari-led international coalition in Libya following the end of NATO's mandate and recent U.S. overtures could point to one weakness of "leading from behind." The $135 million in pledged U.S. nonmilitary assistance has been dedicated to locating weapons stockpiles and treating Libya's war wounded. The latter issue is so pressing that the NTC has already sacked a temporary minister who apparently did not address it sufficiently; in addition, the council created a new Ministry of Martyrs and Wounded.

**Directly providing more treatment assistance would win considerable goodwill for the United States.** Additional assistance -- technical rather than financial -- should be dedicated to developing good governance and political capacity, the necessary prerequisites for unifying Libya's rebels into national military and security institutions. After stability sets in, Washington should also encourage the establishment of high-quality educational institutions, much like the new Turkish and U.S. educational facilities in Iraq. **Leaving the task of rebuilding the country to other actors would represent a loss of U.S. influence on the ground.** Qatar, which recently revealed that it had "hundreds" of representatives "in every region" of Libya, assertively seeks to play a role in the revolution's outcome. This could be problematic given Qatar's support for Islamists such as Belhaj and Ali Salabi (an influential cleric who previously lived in exile in the emirate), as well as other actors who have openly opposed the NTC and favor an Islamic state over a democratic state with Islamic values.

**US expertise is key in the short term**
Andrew Engel 11, research assistant at the Washington Institute, “Challenges Facing the Libyan Government”, 12-25-11

*Escalating militia clashes and protests are challenging the legitimacy of Libya's interim government at a crucial period of transition* from the chaos of the post-Muammar Qadhafi phase to that of statebuilding. **Yet the National Transition Council (NTC) can successfully execute the last seven months of its statebuilding mandate before elections are held, as long as the government gets access to Libya's frozen assets, some of which were released last week.** Foreign expertise, particularly U.S. experience, should also help Libya’s interim prime minister, Abdul Rahim al-Keib, has charted a bold course. Choosing neophyte candidates over those with experience, he has formed a government of technocrats drawn from across Libya, a country where east-west tension runs deep. He also resisted the urge to nominate to his cabinet powerful Islamists from the Tripoli Military Council (TMC) or the Tripoli Revolutionists Council (TRC), even though these entities had pressed hard for portfolios, particularly in the Defense and Interior ministries. For Keib, delaying the announcement of the new government paid off: The arrest of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi on November 19 by fighters of the Zintan Military Council enabled the prime minister to nominate the group's leader, Usama al-Juwaili - hitherto not considered a candidate - for minister of defense. In addition, Misratah security chief Fawzi Abdulal was named minister of interior in recognition of his city's role in the revolution. **Both the TMC and TRC have grudgingly accepted these nominations. Others**
however, feeling excluded, have protested. The first to do so were Libya's Amazigh (Berbers) - in particular, the Benghazibased Awagi and Maghariba tribes - and outgoing NTC officials such as former oil and finance minister Ali al-Tarbuni, who decried the government as "an unelected elite." On Monday, December 12, protestors gathered in Benghazi to voice their objections to the government, demanding for the first time the resignation of NTC president Mustafa Abdul Jalil, among others, and a cleansing of all former Qadhafi-era officials, to be replaced by "the people." Protests have reportedly spread to Misratah and Darnah. Libya's militias Both Libyans and the international community will watch events in Tripoli to gauge whether Libya can demobilize its militias. In response to increasing tensions, Tripoli’s eleven military councils have set up checkpoints to prevent the flow of weapons into the capital. The Tripoli Local Council (TLC) gave nonlocal militias until December 20 (December 31, by some accounts) to disband. Yet the deadline is likely to be unmet. Certain military commanders from Misratah and Zintan - cities that field some of the most powerful militias operating in Tripoli - have agreed to comply, in principle, while TRC head Abdullah Ahmed Naker said, "We accept the decision to disarm the militias, but we would like to know how the weapons will be handed over." The growing frequency of clashes between militias underlines the importance of achieving visible progress in the demobilization effort. On December 10, at a Tripoli International Airport checkpoint, Zintani fighters opened fire on a convoy carrying Khalifah Haftar, acting chief of staff for the Libyan National Army; Haftar alleged on December 17 that his son, a national army volunteer, is being held captive by rebels at the airport. Alarmingly, on December 12, fighters from Zintan, including Naker, engaged in "anti-Qadhafi operations" against the al-Mashashia tribe in Wamis, in what was most likely a reprise attack emerging from tribal tensions.

Islamists Prefer Stability - for Now. Libya's Islamists, possibly under the influence of Islamist victories in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, may see that working with the emerging state is more advantageous than working against it. TMC head Abdul Hakim Belhaj has said he would set up a political party and that his fighters would transfer their fealty to the NTC, although he has not specified when this would happen. He has also discussed amalgamating his forces into the state's apparatus and "preparing for the future political project," albeit, again, without providing details. Naker, in addition, may seek near-term accommodation with the NTC. Meanwhile, in Benghazi on November 17, the Muslim Brotherhood convened its first public conference in Libya, selecting a new shura council and secretary-general, Bashir al-Kabti, who lived for thirty-three years in the United States. Kabti called for "establishing a modern, contemporary state, a state of institutions and laws." The Brotherhood will not establish a local political party but is encouraging all its members "to participate with other patriots in forming a nationalistic party with an Islamic character," ensuring representation across political parties. Kabti stressed that founding a state "comes before founding a party. Political participation will come at a later stage." On November 28, under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs - the only cabinet-level agency led by an Islamist - some 250 religious figures met in Tripoli for the first time since Qadhafi's fall. The clerics expressed their fears that tribal and regional tensions could affect security and encouraged the new government to collect weapons and form a national army - while also demanding a constitution based on Islamic law. Salim Jabar, an imam from Benghazi, said, "We need to focus on reconciliation and on building a new state for Libya." Broader Security Concerns. Remnants of the old regime, described by former NTC prime minister Mahmoud Jibril on November 17 as being "very capable of fomenting every kind of instability," threatened to exploit the sectarian clashes that shook al-Mayāa the previous weekend. Despite numerous threats leveled by Qadhafi loyalists, the arrest of Saif al-Islam delivered a massive blow to hangers-on from the old regime. On November 29, investigators from Zintan said that Saif has been very forthcoming in providing vital information on remaining Qadhafi loyalists as well as Libya's missing assets. As for loose weapons, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, stated publicly, "Our acquisition of Libyan armaments" was "an absolutely natural thing." More recently, on December 6, senior al-Qaeda fighter Abu Yahya al-Libi urged Libyans to hold on to their weapons. Libya's Next Steps. In response to increasing domestic pressure, the interim government has proposed the "decentralization of government work." In such an arrangement, Benghazī will become Libya's economic capital, hosting the ministries of Economy and Oil; Misratah will receive the Ministry of Finance; Darnah will get the Ministry of Culture; and fifty local councils will be granted their own budgets. To address concerns related to militias, NTC president Jalil has promised a "security structure for the army and an established police and border guards in no more than a hundred days." For his part, Interior Minister Fawzi Abdulaziz is planning to put 25,000 rebels on payroll and to form an integrated force. Training and job opportunities will be provided for those who wish to return to civilian life.

Defusing popular discontent and unifying military command are two critical steps through which the government must fulfill its statebuilding mandate. Longer-term issues include reconciliation, reconstruction, and political capacity building before elections. To take these first steps, Libya needs immediate funds and accompanying expertise. Because oil production is currently at one-third of prerevolution levels and may not return to former levels until the interim government's mandate ends in mid-2012, the only recourse for funds is from Libya's frozen assets. Although Libya is still under UN Security Council Chapter XII sanctions that have frozen an estimated $150 billion, the UN's release on December 16 of more than $40 billion and the subsequent U.S. release of $30 billion will test the new government's competence in governing and building patronage networks. Because Libya's disparate actors recognize that only the government has access to Libya's purse strings, its elevated holdings should result in increased legitimacy, at least in the short term. The interim government is set to release a budget by the end of the month, a good starting point for establishing sound financial management, accountability, and the vetting Libya's ambitious economic program of
decentralization. The country's remaining frozen assets can be used to reward good governance. The extent to which Libya's assets are still allocated overseas remains unclear and will require close cooperation among the United States, Europe, and regional states. Lastly, while it is important that the U.S. government support the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which just extended its mandate for another three months, steps other than releasing assets need to be taken more quickly. For example, the U.S. government could increase its diplomatic presence in Tripoli, assist in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to manage Libya's newly recovered assets, or communicate lessons learned from the integration of Iraqi militias into the new Iraqi Security Forces and from the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to the interim government. Such steps are meant not just for Libya's sake but also to provide competition with other countries operating unilaterally outside the UN framework.
The United States federal government should ask Qatar to provide support for transparent democratic governance in Libya.

Qatar says yes and solves
Ulrichsen, 11
(4/12, research fellow at the London School of Economics & Author of The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/qatar-and-arab-spring)

In recent weeks, the Gulf state of Qatar has emerged as a leading advocate of international intervention on the side of the anti-Gaddafi rebels in Libya. It organised the politically-crucial Arab support for the No-Fly Zone, was one of the first countries to recognise the Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) in Benghazi, and offered to market oil on behalf of the ITNC. Simultaneously, Qatar-based Al Jazeera played an instrumental role in shaping popular perceptions through its blanket television coverage of the conflict. Similarly high-profile statements of support for the opposition to dictatorial tyranny in Yemen have reinforced Qatar’s burgeoning regional and international profile. Yet a brutal and ongoing crackdown on pro-democracy activists is taking place just 25 miles off its western shore, in neighbouring Bahrain. There, the Gulf Cooperation Council (of which Qatar is a member) has intervened to protect the Al-Khalifa family against an escalating social movement threatening its authoritarian rule. Why has Qatar experienced such a different trajectory to much of the rest of the Arab world in recent months? What explains its recent actions, and how might it emerge from the Arab Spring? A rising power On 2 December 2010, the stunning decision to award the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar set the capstone on its rapid rise as a small state with global ambition. In little more than a decade, this country of 1.7 million people (once described by the Lonely Planet travel guide as ‘possibly the most boring place on Earth’) has been transformed into a sophisticated urban metropolis. Futuristic architecture and a skyline worthy of Manhattan coexist alongside world-class museums and hubs of cutting-edge research and development. Education City hosts branch campuses from six leading US universities and the top French HEC Paris business school, with University College London (UCL) joining them in autumn 2011. Meanwhile, the Doha Debates have gained a worldwide reputation for critical discussion of controversial regional issues. Together with high-profile announcements such as the sponsorship tie-up between the Qatar Foundation and Barcelona football club and the hosting of major international sporting events such as the Women’s Tennis Association season-ending championships, these initiatives have put Qatar well and truly in the international limelight. They represent a potent form of country branding encapsulated in the World Cup bidding slogan: ‘Expect Amazing.’ In a region where competition – particularly with Abu Dhabi and Dubai – for the biggest and the best is intense and often megalomaniacal, the successful bid surpassed any previous achievement and catapulted Qatar to world attention. Another element of Qatar’s growing reach was its growing reputation for diplomatic mediation in conflict-afflicted areas. Officials scored a big success in 2008 with the Doha agreement that reached a
political solution that averted the threat of civil strife in Lebanon. Since then, Qatari diplomacy has been at work in Yemen (where they negotiated a short-lived ceasefire between Houthi rebels and government forces in 2007-8), Djibouti and Eritrea (mediating the border dispute between them), and has hosted intermittent peace talks between the Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur. Although never quite repeating their 2008 breakthrough in Lebanon (which has since fallen apart), Qatar has steadily built a reputation for mediation and gained a perception as a (relatively) honest broker. Underpinning Qatar’s rise is the production and export of oil and – more significantly – liquefied natural gas (LNG). Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas field in the world and began to exploit its share of the North Field (the Iranian portion is named South Pars) in the 1990s. Exports of LNG began in 1997, and by 2006 the country was the largest exporter of natural gas in the world. Much of the gas is locked into long-term agreements with leading industrialised and emerging economies around the world, ranging from the US and the UK to South Korea, Japan and China. These agreements form a web of interdependencies giving powerful international partners a direct stake in a stable Qatar. So, too, does the hosting of the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the generously-funded bases that serve as logistics hubs, command and basing centres, and pre-positioning facilities for US operations in Afghanistan and (formerly) Iraq. According to leaked US diplomatic cables, Qatar contributes 60% of the upkeep costs of the main Al-Udeid airbase, seen by some as the price (worth paying) of maintaining US troops as the ultimate guarantor of Qatari security. Freedom of manoeuvre The fortuitous combination of immense natural resources and a tiny citizen population gives the Qatari leadership great leeway in formulating domestic and foreign policy. Only about 220,000 people hold Qatari citizenship and in 2008 the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated the GDP per capita per citizen to be an astonishing $448,246. This level of extreme wealth provides insulation from the social and economic discontent that has built up elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. For Qatari nationals, the state is a distributor of wealth, whether through public sector employment, grants of land or the provision of subsidised goods and services. This is not atypical for citizens in other Gulf States, but in the Qatari case the revenues are, seemingly, limitless, in stark contrast to the tensions that have built up in Bahrain, Oman and parts of Saudi Arabia where models of wealth distribution are fraying under the strain of rapid population growth. Extreme wealth has led to political apathy and a stifling of aspirations for democratic participation. After seizing power from his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, the Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, instigated a process of cautious top-down reforms. These included the introduction of elections to a Central Municipal Council (1999) and a new constitution (2003), but announced elections to a unicameral parliament (initially scheduled for 2004) have been indefinitely delayed. Interestingly, these reforms did not come in response to any significant internal pressures or calls for change. This contrasted with an otherwise-similar trajectory in Bahrain, where another new ruler also sought to impose his stamp on domestic affairs by introducing constitutional and legislative changes in the late-1990s. Last month, Asda’a Burson-Marsteller, a Dubai-based public relations company, published the results of its third annual Arab Youth Survey. It found that the proportion of respondents in Qatar who ranked democracy as important had fallen from 68% in 2008 to just 33% in 2010. Two-thirds of respondents placed greater importance on stability and living in a safe neighbourhood. This remarkable drop demonstrated the premium placed on a strong economy intermixed with feelings of national
pride following the success of the World Cup bid. Qatari citizens simply have too much to lose by rocking the boat and disrupting the status quo while the 1.5 million expatriate labourers remain disempowered and unable to mobilise without sanction. The winds of change blasting so forcefully through the region (including oil-rich Abu Dhabi which saw an increase from 58% to 75% of respondents ranking democracy as important) have instead passed Qatar by. Qatari officials can thus react to the Arab Spring with expressions of declaratory and material support for opposition movements that are unlikely to rebound domestically. Moreover, such support plays into Qatari efforts to be taken credibly as a responsible international actor and boost still further its reputation for diplomacy and mediation. The same may be said of Al Jazeera English, whose no-holds barred coverage of the civil uprisings in Egypt and Libya amounted to a CNN-style ‘Gulf War’ breakthrough in western markets. Its Arabic-language coverage, by contrast, has veered from the comprehensive (in Egypt, Libya and Yemen) to the mild (Syria, Bahrain). This has prompted accusations of unevenness and inconsistency, providing succour to sceptics who suspect a guiding hand lies behind editorial decisions; certainly, Bahrain hits uncomfortably close to home, both in terms of physical proximity and its involvement of a fellow Gulf ruling family. Instead, it is in Libya and Yemen that Qatari officials have greatest freedom of action, as opposing Gaddafi and Saleh does not raise awkward questions of regime type. Moreover, the bloodshed unleashed by both flailing regimes represents a safe target on which to make a high-visibility stand against tyranny, enabling Qatar to align its support for the protection of human rights and democratic expression in a manner that resonates powerfully with the (western-led) international community. Thus, the Qatari Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, was instrumental in rallying GCC and Arab League around the idea of a No-Fly Zone in Libya and recognition of the ITNC, stating that “Qatar will participate in military action because we believe there must be Arab states undertaking this action, because the situation is intolerable.” The dispatch of four Mirage-2000 fighters to Crete gave the military operations the crucial Arab support needed to overcome nagging western doubts about the campaign.

The power vacuum left by a limited US role has allowed Qatar to seize leadership and bolster their regional credibility
Economist, 11/5
(The rise of Qatar: Pygmy with the punch of a giant,
http://www.economist.com/node/21536659)

In any event, Qatar punches far above its weight: witness its recent proclaimed triumph in Libya. Its muscle, in the form of weapons, cash, fuel, airlift, six fighter-bombers, 100-plus field advisers and vigorous diplomacy, bolstered NATO’s bombers and drones and—more than any other Arab country—helped oust Colonel Qaddafi, even as Al Jazeera’s relentless coverage speeded his messy slide to extinction. While cheerleading the Arab spring, Qatar has interposed itself, with mixed diplomatic success, in conflicts as far away as Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Its sheikhs sit on an array of big European boards and own choice chunks of London. Their spreading portfolios embrace Chinese refineries, French fashion houses and Spanish football teams. In 2022 Qatar will host football’s World Cup. Such clout carries a cost in
controversy. Critics sniff that the global shopping sprees of institutions such as the ruling Thani family’s investment arm, Qatar Holdings, along with the Qatar Investment Authority, a sovereign-wealth fund worth $70 billion, are a crude attempt to buy influence. Chastened dictators obviously resent what they see as Al Jazeera’s meddling, whereas leftists, citing the presence of a giant American airbase just outside Doha, charge Qatar with being Washington’s cat’s paw. Arab liberals, meanwhile, look at the generous air time which Al Jazeera gives to Islamists and at the Qatars’ enthusiasm for radical Islamist groups such as Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon, and conclude that the emirate is promoting not popular revolution but a fundamentalist power grab. Such doubts have long lingered, stoked in part by the innovation, when Al Jazeera was launched in 1996, of airing religious voices at a time when stodgily secular state monopolies filled Arab airwaves. But the charges grew more pointed during Libya’s seven-month conflict. The way much of Qatar’s aid seemed to end up in the hands of a closely knit coterie of Islamist radicals, boosting armed Islamist factions, rang alarm bells not just in neighbouring capitals and in the West but in Libya too. Last month Ali Tarhouni, the liberal oil and finance minister in Libya’s ruling national council, issued a rebuke. “Anyone who wishes to come to our house should knock on the front door first,” he said, in a thinly veiled warning to Qatar to stop favouring ambitious Islamists at the expense of the shaky central government. But there may be simpler reasons for Qatar’s sudden enthusiasm for a far-off war. Opportunism, in a word, is what has guided policy, along with heaps of cash and ambition mixed with a mild appetite for risk that stands in contrast to other more shy-mannered Gulf potentates. The quiet protection of America’s heavy bootprint also lent encouragement. It helps, too, that even for an untrammeled if benign autocracy, Qatar’s command structure is slim. Only three people really count: the emir, his cousin the long-serving and dynamic prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, who also runs foreign policy and holds vast business interests, and, increasingly, Crown Prince Tamim, the Sandhurst-trained army chief. A score of intimates, drawn largely from two clans aside from the Thanis, runs nearly everything else. Such corporate streamlining has allowed Qatar to put its assets into action swiftly and efficiently, at a time when other regional actors, including America, have grown increasingly hesitant. “If there wasn’t a power vacuum across the region, Qatar would never have got away with it,” says a young Qatari businessman, referring to the Libyan adventure. A foreign diplomat adds that countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which might in the past have blocked a Gulf upstart from flaunting such ambition, no longer have the will to try. Moreover, Qatar’s big role in Libya has been a useful training ground for Crown Prince Tamim, who is being groomed to rule. His popularity with the army, whose pay for officers was more than doubled as a reward in September, has soared on the back of such a success.

That’s key to gas contracts---solves war with Iran

IHT 12-5, International Herald Tribune 12/5/2011
[“Qatar has world in its sights for power projects,” Nexis]

Involvement in international L.N.G. ventures would be less risky than undertaking new projects in Qatar and creating a gas glut that would depress prices. But analysts say one big impetus for Qatar to expand abroad rather than expand locally by removing the North Field ban may be its desire to placate Iran. Tehran has struggled
to tap its side of the reservoir because of a shortage of technology brought about by ever-tightening international sanctions over its nuclear program. Qatar and Iran have "straws in the same gas field, but only Qatar is sucking," said Eckart Woertz, a visiting fellow at Princeton University. "It must be a worry for the Iranians that Qatar has built the largest L.N.G. plants on the planet when their side of the field is still not developed." The fact that relations between Shiite Muslim Iran and the Sunni Muslim Gulf states are on edge does not help. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have hinted of Iranian involvement in Shiite protests on their home turf this year, a charge Iran has denied. The Gulf region is not immune to the flaring of conflicts over energy resources. Saddam Hussein used the pretext of Kuwait siphoning of Iraqi oil from a disputed field to invade the Gulf state in 1990. Qatar, though, has managed to maintain good relations with Iran, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was expected to attend a meeting of the gas forum in November, though in the end he did not. Peace with Iran is also necessary to maintain the safety of Qatari L.N.G. tankers traversing the Strait of Hormuz, the world's most vital energy channel. Most recently, Qatar's political involvement in Libya, where it helped arm the rebels and even marketed oil produced in areas held by the rebels, has led to speculation that Qatar is interested in being more than just a peacemaker. "Certainly playing a wider political role internationally has been important for Qatar," Mr. Lee said. "How much is that driven by the commercial consideration and how much it is driven by broader political concerns within Qatar is unclear." He added: "There is a lot of good feeling in the new government circle in Libya toward Qatar and that may well translate into upstream contracts" and some kind of marketing relationship with Libya.

Triggers escalating mid-east war


But in terms of what the experts consider the greatest potential conflict in the region — the rivalry between the Gulf states and Tehran — the GCC's gloves really came off on Sunday. Following a late-night meeting of foreign ministers in Riyadh, the GCC blasted Iran's "flagrant interference" in the region and blamed Iran for actively destabilizing and "violating the sovereignty" of their countries. The meeting came after the Iranian government's foreign-affairs and security committee said Thursday that Saudi Arabia, the GCC's most populous member, "should know it's better not to play with fire in the sensitive region of the Persian Gulf." That only slightly veiled threat was not taken lightly by the GCC, now fresh off two recent military maneuvers and possibly banking on long-standing military ties with the U.S.

What has ensued from these back-and-forth barbs has been a full-on verbal battle that has brought in the ongoing conflicts in Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait as well as threats of diplomatic action and fears of sectarian war. In its statement, the GCC "severely condemned Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Bahrain, which is in violation of international pacts." The bloc also criticized "the blatant Iranian interference in [GCC member] Kuwait through planting spy cells on its territory," in reference to a Kuwait court case last week in which two Iranians and a Kuwaiti were sentenced to death for their roles in an alleged Iranian spy network. The two countries recalled their ambassadors and expelled diplomats. (See "Desert Storm's Surreal Final Days.")

The GCC said Iran's "playing with fire" salvo had the potential to "fuel sectarianism" between the region's Shiite and Sunni, and the meeting "condemned the baseless accusations by the Iranian parliament regarding Saudi Arabia and considers it a hostile stand and provocative interference." The statement concluded with a call for Tehran to "stop these hostile policies and respect the rules of good neighborliness ... so as to preserve the security and stability in this region, which is key for the entire world."

It took only hours for Iran to respond; its Foreign Ministry said Sunday that the tension between Tehran and the GCC was the result of "Western and Zionist conspiracy" aimed at "sowing discord between Islamic countries." "We advise regional governments to heed the demands of their people in order to stop such conspiracies," Ramin Mehmanparast, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, told reporters, while insisting unity among Muslims was the key issue for Iran. The vitriol remains at the diplomatic level. Even so, the tone of the GCC's rebuttal to Iran has raised the standard for defiance. The verbal standoff between a reinvigorated GCC and a typically bellicose Tehran is best described as a regional war of words — at least for now.
Instability is inevitable

Wolff 11, University of Birmingham International Security Professor, 9-2-11

[Stefan, A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts and in post-conflict reconstruction in deeply divided and war-torn societies. Wolff is a member of the Governing Council of the European Centre for Minority Issues and an International Associate at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-determination at Princeton University. He has held visiting professorships at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, the University of Sofia, the University of Bucharest, the University of Skopje, the University of Belgrade, Humboldt University Berlin, Free University Berlin, and St. Petersburg State University. In 2006, Wolff served as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the UK Defence Academy. He holds a Masters Degree from Magdalene College, Cambridge, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. “Post-conflict reconstruction in Libya: possibilities and probabilities”, http://www.stefanwolff.com/media/post-conflict-reconstruction-in-libya]

In my own view, there are many pitfalls ahead for Libya, including many beyond the control of the incoming transitional government and the international community. And even those where events can be shaped by skillful local leaders and effective diplomacy, the challenges are significant.

The first of these challenges relates to establishing institutions that can enable an effective political process in Libya in which the National Transitional Council (NTC) can get the country functioning again. This requires the NTC to extend control across Libya and to defeat or at least containing the resistance that the old regime is still offering. While this may take some more time, establishing security, law and order, especially in the crucial urban areas where the majority of the population is concentrated and which have seen the heaviest fighting is a task at which the NTC is already working, and with some success at that. As the NTC begins to run a new government, it also needs to maintain as much political consensus among its different factions as possible and to retain broad regional and international support, particularly to get access to Libyan assets abroad and tap into the current international goodwill to address immediate humanitarian needs and the longer-term reconstruction task. In this short list of essential tasks, many uncertainties are hidden (and not so hidden).
Rival factions scuttle effective transition

**Wolff 11, University of Birmingham International Security Professor, 9-2-11**

[Stefan, A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts and in post-conflict reconstruction in deeply divided and war-torn societies. Wolff is a member of the Governing Council of the European Centre for Minority Issues and an International Associate at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-determination at Princeton University. He has held visiting professorships at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, the University of Sofia, the University of Bucharest, the University of Skopje, the University of Belgrade, Humboldt University Berlin, Free University Berlin, and St. Petersburg State University. In 2006, Wolff served as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the UK Defence Academy. He holds a Masters Degree from Magdalene College, Cambridge, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. "Post-conflict reconstruction in Libya: possibilities and probabilities", http://www.stefanwolff.com/media/post-conflict-reconstruction-in-libya]

Whether such a vicious circle will indeed follow, depends on not only how effectively the NTC can assert control as a government but also on how much the different factions can keep their own supporters in check. Managing relations within the NTC and between the NTC and Libyan population constitutes another challenge. Rival factions and their leaders will all claim their rewards and posts for supporting the revolution, and they will need to demonstrate to their followers that their sacrifices were worth it. At the same time, the message of reconciliation with former supporters of the regime that the NTC has repeatedly emphasised is clearly right and important, but it will be difficult to translate into a concrete reality if fighting continues, news of regime atrocities keep emerging, and peace dividends remain a promise only. In other words, leaders and followers alike will need to sense that they are better off not only without Gaddafi but also by refraining from seeking to resolve disputes by violence rather than politics, even if that means uncomfortable concessions and compromises.

Plan causes backlash and transition failure

**Lacher ’11** (German Institute for International and Security Affairs Middle East and Africa Division Associate, 8-29-11) [Wolfram, "The International Role in Post-Qadhafi Libya? Withdraw", http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/international-role-post-qadhafi-libya-withdraw]

Planning is ongoing in Western capitals for a prominent international role in the state-building process that is to follow the demise of Qadhafi’s regime. But neither an international police force nor a UN-led state-building mission would help Libya master the daunting challenges to come. The most important task for external players now is to disengage from Libya, to ensure that the difficult process ahead is untainted by foreign interference. As Libya enters the post-Qadhafi era, there is an acute sense of the challenges facing the National Transitional Council (NTC): ending the conflict, avoiding a vacuum of power, establishing security and stabilizing the dire humanitarian situation. Parallel to addressing these immediate challenges, the NTC needs to initiate a transition that aims at nothing less than building a new state from scratch. For this transition to succeed, the NTC will have to accommodate a wide range of political players into the transitional process, contain the inevitable power struggles this entails, and bring under central control the multiple armed groups that led the revolution. Each stage of the process involves significant risks, such as a possible spiral of revenge killings; internecine conflict among the revolutionary forces, or the emergence of an insurgency backed by the former regime’s constituencies. To help the NTC weather these challenges, external players have come up with a range of proposals. Backed by the United States, the UN has been planning for an international police force, whose deployment Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon plans to urgently recommend to the UN Security Council this week. The EU aims to support security-sector reform. China and Russia are calling for a leading UN role in helping stabilize Libya. South Africa continues to insist on internationally mediated talks for the purpose of forming an inclusive new government. Although the approaches vary, all key players

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**AT Solvency**

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**Plan causes backlash and transition failure**

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**Rival factions scuttle effective transition**

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**Wolff 11, University of Birmingham International Security Professor, 9-2-11**

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agree on a major international role in stabilization and state building in Libya. But the international community would be better advised to avoid exerting direct influence over the process ahead. Overt external involvement would risk undermining the domestic legitimacy that is crucial to the state-building process. Libyans are deeply suspicious of external interests in the country, and such suspicion is likely to persist despite the fact that the NATO intervention was central to the success of the revolution. Accordingly, the idea of an international police force has already been rejected by the NTC’s head, Mustafa Abdeljelil, and other NTC representatives. This rejection should end the planning for any presence of international police forces. It may take time for the NTC to establish order across the country. But even if it fails in this task and the situation deteriorates, deploying international forces would be the wrong approach. Such a step would be rejected by many players inside Libya and could thereby divide the coalition leading the transition. Its negative consequences would far outweigh its benefits. Much of the same goes for a prominent international role in other aspects of post-Qadhafi state-building. Security-sector reform is urgently needed, but the issues at stake are highly political: which forces are integrated into the security apparatus and which ones are demobilized; who answers to whom. External involvement in such a process could discredit it, or risk tilting the domestic balance of power. The coalition of forces that carried the revolution is fragmented and lacks a clear leadership. Demands for external assistance by one group could be rejected by others, and international involvement could easily become a dividing factor among the revolutionaries. The NTC and any transitional government emerging from it will need to be far more broadly representative than the council was during its Benghazi days, and forming a coalition that can manage the transition will present a major test for the NTC. But external players should avoid trying to influence the post-conflict political settlement. For external actors, insisting on the accommodation of former regime constituencies is as misguided as backing a prominent role for those figures who led the NTC until the fall of Tripoli and are perceived as allies in Western capitals. The next phase is likely to see many changes in the composition of the political leadership, but negotiating these changes is a domestic matter. This doesn’t mean that external players shouldn’t urge the NTC to keep to its plan for a transitional process that includes elections and the drafting of a new constitution, to run this process in as transparent and inclusive a way as possible, and to rein in any transgressions by armed groups supporting the revolution. But the international community should realize that its influence in post-Qadhafi Libya will be limited. Once the immediate humanitarian challenges have been overcome, Libya will not be in need of foreign assistance. As soon as the NTC can access frozen Libyan funds abroad and ramp up oil production, the future government will be financially and politically independent. The government will be in a position to accept the external advice it wants and buy itself the assistance it needs. It should be granted this independence as quickly as possible, meaning that sanctions should be lifted and frozen assets returned. External players can offer advice and technical assistance, but they should refrain from seeking to directly influence the political process to come. Disengaging from Libya will be a challenge for the external players who have been so directly involved until now. The states that led the intervention have developed a sense of responsibility for the future course of events in Libya, as well as an expectation that they should get a return on their investment in the revolution. Others will seek to regain a foot in the door by playing a prominent role in the international effort to stabilize Libya and support the establishment of a new state. But they should now focus on ending the overt external involvement in Libya as quickly as possible, and handing over full responsibility for the process ahead to the Libyans.
No Impact

No spillover

Walt 11, professor of international relations at Harvard University, (Stephen, "Why the Libyan revolution may not matter very much," 2011, walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/23/why_the_libyan_revolution_may_not_matter_very_much

All eyes have been riveted on the endgame in Libya, and I'm as guilty as anyone in that regard. Qaddafi was hard to ignore because his behavior was often peculiar and because he caused a lot of trouble over 40 years of rule. A violent uprising in which NATO has backed one side is bound to command a lot of attention too, and it's only natural for us to spend time trying to figure out what implications, if any, this will have for the broader process of political change that is taking place in the Arab world. Add it all up, and it's hardly a surprise that events in Tripoli have dominated the headlines and taken up a lot of megabytes and pixels here at FP.

Nonetheless, I feel compelled to remind everybody that Libya is not in fact a very important country. It has a very small population (less than 6.5 million, which means that New York mayor Michael Bloomberg governs more people than Qaddafi ever did). Libya does have a lot of oil, but it's not a market-setting swing producer like Saudi Arabia or a major natural gas supplier like Russia. Libya has little industrial capacity or scientific/technological expertise, its military capabilities were always third-rate, and even its nuclear research programs never came anywhere near producing an actual weapon. And Qaddafi's incomprehensible ideology won few, if any converts, apart from those who had little choice but to pretend to embrace it.

Instead, Libya under Qaddafi was mostly significant as a sometime sponsor of terrorism and for Brother Muammar's own bizarre behavior. He was a troublemaker, to be sure, but fortunately he lacked the capability to cause as much trouble as he might have liked.

It is heartwarming to see the rebels triumph, and let's by all means hope that they defy expectations and manage to build a new and reliably democratic Libyan state. But in the larger scheme of the world this revolt is a pretty minor event.

In the long term, more good would probably come from 1) getting the United States and Eurozone economies restarted (which would have lots of positive secondary effects), 2) preventing an intense security competition between the United States and China, 3) finding some way to reduce U.S.-Iranian tensions, 4) settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 5) ensuring that democracy takes firm root in Egypt, or 6) preventing more bloodbaths in South Asia (just to name a few).

I don't mean to be a killjoy here, and nothing I've just said diminishes the achievement of the courageous Libyans who have fought to regain control over their own country and their own lives. But their success won't help us make progress on a lot of other big issues in world politics, and we ought to keep that in mind too.
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US-Saudi Relations Key

Saudi relations are key to contain terrorism.
Estes 11
Ron Estes, served 25 years as an operations officer in the CIA clandestine service. Six of those years were in Middle East operations, December 26, 2011. “Guest column: U.S. cannot afford to lose its Arab allies,” http://staugustine.com/opinions/2011-12-25/guest-column-us-cannot-afford-lose-its-arab-allies#.Tvia8tQV2rk

As Saudi Arabia goes, so goes the Arab world. So, to the Israelis, Obama has proved he is in their pocket. What about the Republicans? Gingrich called the Palestinians an “invented people,” and endorsed Israeli settlement construction. Romney declared his first foreign visit as president would be to Israel. What could be the consequences for the U.S. if its unfettered support for Israel costs the cooperation of our Arab allies? U.S. Arab allies, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (the UAE) are on the front lines of the war on radical Islamic terrorism, and the U.S. could not hope to win that war without their intelligence support. Israel plays no role in the war on international terrorism. Saudi Arabia (SA) is the most deadly Al Qaeda enemy in the Middle East, and therefore one of the U.S.’s most effective counter-terrorist partners. Last year, Saudi Arabia arrested 113 Al Qaeda militants including suicide bombers. The Interior Minister, announced SA has indicted 991 Al Qaeda members since 2003. Several months ago SA announced it had killed 15 Al Qaeda members during a 4-day period. When Saudi Arabia is able to identify, arrest and kill Al Qaeda members, it’s because Saudi intelligence has penetrated Al Qaeda and collects information on their identities and plans. The valuable intelligence the Saudis collect is shared with the CIA.

Healthy relations prevent attacks.

This is one of the better relationships in the world on counterterrorism. The cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is strong and on the issue of terrorism the Saudis and Americans basically see eye to eye. There is also a regular exchange of information to help both countries prevent attacks. This was not the case for the first few years after 9/11, as Saudi Arabia did not fully appreciate the problem. But when violence started in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the relationship with the United States on terrorism improved markedly and quickly grew strong. Now there are programs to improve the security of Saudi’s energy infrastructure, training, officials share databases, photos, fingerprints, etc., and there is a great deal of cooperation on Yemen where there are Saudis hiding out and operating with AQAP. The relationship today shows how two governments can cooperate. If every country was willing to cooperate like Saudi Arabia, the world would be a much safer place. There are two things that are needed to fight terrorism—political will and capacity. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated both. Other countries haven’t. Saudi Arabia recognized that it was at risk of terrorism and then focused a great deal of attention on the problem.
No Prolif Impact

No Saudi prolif – not capable, destabilizing, controversial, weakens the kingdom, commitment to economy, NPT, official opposition


It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. King Abdullah’s comments should not be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. With oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would be more likely to weaken the kingdom than strengthen it. The kingdom has committed itself to an industrialization and economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and materials. Becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil. Their often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an internationally supervised region free of all weapons of mass destruction.
 Cooperation with Saudi Arabia kills solvency - perception
James Gundun is a political scientist and counterinsurgency analyst, editor of The Trench, “Yemen’s Revolution Is Non-Negotiable”, The Trench, May 13, 2011,

If President Barack Obama and his national security team truly back Saleh’s exit, they need to find an alternative to the GCC’s escape vehicle. Yet the Obama administration doesn’t sincerely wish to force Saleh’s exit. His fair-weather allegiance hasn’t provided enough motivation to reform U.S. policy, nor has his ongoing crackdown. After Wednesday’s bloodshed, the White House once again deferred to the State Department in supporting the GCC’s proposal. This is not what the streets want to hear when Yemen’s Defense Ministry is telling security forces, “not to hesitate to maintain security and stability in the country with any means.” On Friday, Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) responded by urging, “their brothers, particularly in the Gulf Countries Council and the countries around the world, that staying silent about the crimes that the regime is practicing against the peaceful revolutionary people allows Saleh’s regime to commit more of them.” Even the JMP, itself toying with political suicide, has declared the GCC’s proposal “dead.” The GCC is scheduled to regroup next week in order to make a new push, and some officials and pundits are advising the Obama administration to assume a leading role. However Washington is already driving the GCC, albeit from the back-seat with Riyadh. These capitals control the wheel. Yemen isn’t even a GCC member. The real problem is Washington’s support for the GCC proposal, which protesters will never accept. They’ve already planned “Resolution Week,” during which “the countdown for the fall of the regime will start.” A march on the fortified presidential palace is being seriously considered. The emirates and kingdoms of the GCC are the enemy of any revolution, warned Abdulrahman Abdullah al Kamadi, a demonstrator who has been camped out in the square for over two months. “They cannot even admit what is going on here. This is not a political crisis: this is a revolution.” Whether going by GCC or CCYRC time, Washington has at least another week to do the right thing in Yemen, both strategically and morally. President Obama, who hasn’t touched Yemen since a March 18th statement, must personally intervene. cut U.S. aid to Saleh and pull out of the GCC’s shadow. At the same time, the White House must devote its full attention towards the street coalitions and craft a proposal representative of Yemen’s entire spectrum. Contrary to supporting the youth, these coalitions deplore the fact that they’ve been shut out. Current U.S. policy feeds into the narrative of Saudi Arabia’s counter-revolution. Osama bin Laden’s ultimate grievance remains the Kingdom’s totalitarian grip on the Arab world. Washington must isolate Saudi Arabia instead of following its path of destruction. America could deal a huge blow to al-Qaeda in Yemen, a true decapitating strike with minimal blow-back. All Obama has to do is support the revolution - unconditionally.
PKT Sells Nukes to SA

Pakistan won’t sell nukes to the Saudis – high risk, no off-the-books prolif, no secret deal, Pakistani domestic concerns, no value


But times have changed and Pakistan is less likely now to undertake such a risky venture as helping Saudi Arabia develop nuclear weapons. The A.Q. Khan network of off-the-books proliferation, which supplied Libya and other countries, has been exposed and dismantled. And Pakistan is in such a state of upheaval that it seems unlikely that anyone would be willing or able to authorize such a deal. Some U.S. government officials believe that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have an understanding by which Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities would be made available on demand to Saudi Arabia if the Saudis found themselves in extremis, a guarantee purchased, in effect, by Saudi funding of Pakistan’s nuclear program. No known evidence supports this theory, and some experts openly discount it. Among them is Gary Samore, a long-time student of Saudi Arabian security policy who is now the senior arms control and nonproliferation specialist at the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration. “I don’t believe there’s a deal that the Saudis already paid and could take delivery on demand and if I were the Saudis I wouldn’t trust the Pakistanis to deliver on such a deal,” Samore said. “There’s no doubt the Saudis have delivered a lot of money to Pakistan, and some went to support the nuclear weapons program, but I don’t believe any such quid pro quo exists. What would be more likely would be that Pakistan would [again] station troops on Saudi soil, and those could include nuclear-armed forces.” These could be attack aircraft carrying bombs, missile squadrons deploying nuclear-tipped warheads, or ground troops, such as Pakistan previously sent to Saudi Arabia, now equipped with tactical — as opposed to strategic — nuclear weapons. But the purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is to deter India. Against which potential foe of Saudi Arabia would Pakistan put its own interests at risk by deploying nuclear weapons in the Arabian Peninsula? The Pakistanis know as well as anyone that the principal threats to the security and stability of Saudi Arabia come from the turmoil among its neighbors, and against those threats nuclear weapons have no value. They might actually stir up more trouble than they would alleviate.
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Saudi Arabiia is supporting autocratic transitions in Syria – US intervention collapses relations

Downing 6/2 (Brian M Downing, Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, 6/2/11, "Pakistan marches to Saudi tune ", http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF03Ak02.html) jl

The Saudis are gravely alarmed over the Arab Spring and outraged that the US pressed for president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to step down. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a program of supporting authoritarian rule in Syria, Yemen, and most notably Bahrain, where Saudi troops brutally suppressed calls for reform. The Saudis see autocracy as an appropriate and religiously sanctioned form of government and one essential to their security. The US has intermittently seen autocracy as unjust but now sees it as an outmoded and doddering institution foredoomed to fall throughout the region. The Saudis warned the US not to oust Saddam as it would bring to power a Shi’ite majority beholden to Iran. Iraq’s new army, now rid of its Sunni commanders, will be predominantly Shi’ite and allied with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - a partnership that goes back to the insurgency against the US and even to the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Indeed, the Saudis fear that Iran is directing a Shi’ite resurgence across the region and will soon brandish nuclear weapons. Exasperated with the US, Saudi Arabia is building ties with Sunni states and peoples - increasingly by hiring their soldiers.
AT Iran Influence

Assad will stay in power, but even if he doesn’t, Iran influence inevitable


So far only one major Iranian voice has dared to question the Iranian regime’s support of Assad. Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib, a member of the Assembly of Experts and a spiritual guide for Shiite Muslims, questioned Tehran’s strategy during his weekly Koran interpretation session at the Qoba mosque in Shiraz on June 23. He emphasized that Iran’s resources should be saved for Iranians and asked, “Where should the public wealth that could make this country one of the best in the world be spent? Should it be sent to Syria, so they can oppress the people?” Iran’s other major regional allies — Turkey and Hamas — have also been hesitant to follow Iran’s lead. Iran values the improvement in its ties with Turkey that came with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rise to power and wants Ankara to serve as a buttress to Iran’s regional strategy, and even as an interlocutor with the United States. But as Erdogan became more critical of Assad this summer, Tehran soured on the relationship. Iranian officials even openly blamed Erdogan for the unrest, and promised consequences should he not recant. Similarly, over the last two months, Hamas officials refused to hold rallies in the Gaza Strip in support of Assad. According to officials, Tehran has since cut off funding to Hamas.

Assad’s chances of staying in power are greater than were those of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. He may be forced to make some concessions to the protestors, but he still wields too much power to be removed from office completely. To date, there have been no significant defections within the Alawite-controlled military which is key to his survival, and the Iranian-trained and supplied security forces have prevented the protests from reaching the levels of those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In Iran’s view, much like the Tehran spring, the struggle for Syria is one of regime survival. Even if Assad should eventually fall, Iran will not stand idly by; Tehran will surely try to influence any successive government.
AT Iran Advantage

Democratic Syria won’t abandon Iran
Leverett(s) 11, 9-1
Flynt Leverett, directs the Iran Project at the New America Foundation, former Director of Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council and CIA Senior Analyst, and Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis, and Senior Research Fellow at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, 9-1-2011, “Iran And Syria: America’s Middle East Pundits Get It Wrong Again,” http://www.raceforiran.com/iran-and-syria-america%E2%80%99s-middle-east-pundits-get-it-wrong-again

Second, while most Iranian policymakers and foreign policy elites would almost certainly prefer to see Assad remain in office, **it is wrong to assume that Tehran has no options or is even a net “loser” if the current Syrian government is replaced. A post-Assad government, if it is even minimally representative of its people, is going to pursue an independent foreign policy. It will not be enamored of the prospect of strategic cooperation with the United States, and may be less inclined than the Assad regime (under both Bashar and his father, the late Hafiz al-Assad) to keep Syria’s southern border with Israel “stable”. Tehran can work with that.**

Syria won’t be pro-western –
Larison 11
Daniel, Ph.D. graduate from the University of Chicago.

**Syria’s regime is the one Tehran-aligned government that is facing the most significant challenge from popular uprisings, which is one reason why it has become the new focus of Western attention. Everyone constantly emphasizes the importance of the Assad regime for the Syrian-Iranian alliance, but I have not yet seen much evidence that the Syrian opposition objects to the alliance or that a post-Assad Syria ‘would abandon it. The connection is “unnatural” in some respects, but one might say the same of many strange alliances in history that have come into existence because of perceived or real strategic needs (e.g., tsarist Russia and republican France; Catholic France and the Ottoman Empire; France and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War, etc.). It is true that Iran has not been a driver of events, but a beneficiary of them, and it is also true that the connection between Syria and Iran is defined by their common adversaries more than anything else that the two states may have in common. To argue that a post-Assad Syria would be less closely aligned with Iran is to assume that a post-Assad government would want to have a more neutral or even pro-Western alignment instead. It isn’t entirely clear why any Syrian government would want to move away from Iran at a time when Turkey and Egypt are cultivating closer ties to varying degrees.**
AT Solvency

Syria opposes US intervention – perceives it as imperialism

Doyle 6-14-11 ("Why foreign intervention is not welcome in Syria,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/14/syria-intervention-west)

To intervene or not to intervene? Having watched the Assad regime kill more than 1,400 Syrians, arrest tens of thousands, use helicopter gunships and tanks on its own population, reportedly abuse and kill children, many are asking why, if action was deemed necessary for Libya, it is not for Syria. The Syrian regime has behaved little better than its Gaddafi counterpart and yet the west does not know what to do to, how to do it and with whom, and above all has not been invited to intervene. There is a famous Syrian proverb: "The ziban (rye grass) of your own country is better than the wheat of the stranger." In other words, Syrians may prefer the worst of the regime to the best foreigners would offer. For all the daily brutality, there seems to be little appetite to open the doors for foreign action. Syrians are well versed in the history of foreign occupation and interference. The French colonial period saw their country fragmented, one piece carved off for Lebanon, Alexandretta given away to Turkey and the setting up of quasi-independent areas for the Alawis and the Druzes. Syrians also tend to be unimpressed by Nato’s actions in Libya. They have generally supported their regime's foreign policy but despaired of it domestically. For these reasons, Syrian opponents of the regime are intensely nervous of collaborating with external actors. Very few opponents of the regime have called for the UN to take action. A leading Syrian writer and former political prisoner, Louay Hussein, told me from Damascus: "We have to distinguish between foreign intervention and foreign pressure. We oppose foreign intervention but we would like to have foreign pressure based on support for human rights, not the support of a particular party against the other according to their own self-interest."
overthrow the Assads, they need a safe alternative. They are not going to embrace -- not to mention fund -- a leaderless bunch of young activists who want to smash everything that smells of Baathist privilege, corruption, and cronyism. After all, who are the CEOs of Syria's crony capitalism if not the business elites of Aleppo and Damascus? Only five weeks ago, the head of Aleppo's Chamber of Commerce, Faris Al-Shibli, decried the return of socialist and communist ideas among the opposition. He warned: We do not want this opposition to be molded by the left, which will be accompanied by lectures, theorizing and calumny for society and the economy. Steps to bring about reconciliation must be taken with the other sectors of civil society, particularly with national capital. Syria's capitalists are not suicidal. They fear having their property expropriated twice in 50 years. Furthermore, they have become inextricably linked with the regime over the last 40 years, according to a number of analysts. Washington would be wiser to allow Syria to fill its own power vacuum. Once a united leadership emerges in Syria, it will be able to win the confidence of the majority and topple the regime on its own. There are dangers to short-circuiting that painful process. Washington should not be in a hurry to help the Syrian revolution, the U.S. could be creating a Frankenstein. If the opposition doesn't have time to produce a leadership that emerges organically out of struggle, Syria may never unite. The U.S. may cause more destruction and death, not less. To be truly successful, the opposition must come together under one set of leaders who win the confidence of the people by their intelligence, canniness, and most importantly, by their success. As Haytham al-Maleh, a respected elder statesman of Syria's human rights leaders, said in urging Syrians to eschew foreign intervention: "If we want to own Syria after the revolution, we must win this struggle on our own."
Syria’s regime of keeping the monitors on a short leash as it presses on with its lethal crackdown on dissent. Arab League chief Nabil Al Arabi admitted ‘there are still snipers and gunfire’ even as he defended the mission, saying it had secured the release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of tanks from cities. The Local Coordination Committees, which organise the protests, denounced the Arab League over the mission’s failings. ‘We want to tell Nabil Al Arabi that the lack of professionalism of the observers and non-compliance with their arrival times in specific places have left many people killed,’ they said in a statement. It further claimed the observers were being hampered by the regime.

Unification impossible – no leadership, US aid just causes backlash


Given the lack of a recognized leadership, different Syrian groups -- mainly based in the diaspora -- have been jockeying to assert themselves. Most recently, on Aug. 29 young dissidents speaking on behalf of a revolutionary youth group inside Syria named a 94-person council to represent the Syrian opposition. At a news conference in Ankara, Turkey, Syrian dissident Zyaeddin Dolmus announced that the respected Paris-based academic Burhan Ghalioun would head the so-called Syrian National Council, which would also comprise the crème de la crème of Syria’s traditional opposition. Dolmus said the council would include many of the traditional opposition figures based in Damascus, such as former parliamentarian Riad Seif, activist Suhair Atassi, and economist Aref Dalila.

"Delays [in forming a council] return our people to bloodshed,” he said at the news conference, which was broadcast by Al Jazeera. But no sooner had the council been announced than it started to unravel! When contacted by the media, Ghalioun and the others quickly distanced themselves from the announcement, claiming they had no prior knowledge of it, according to reports in the Arabic press. Later, Ghalioun denied any association with the group on his Facebook page. One Washington-based Syrian activist, Mohammad al-Abdallah -- whose father, Ali al-Abdallah was named to the council -- dismissed it as a joke. Others said it was an attempt by young revolutionaries, upset over the lack of progress, to put forward a wish list of opposition members. U.S.-based Syrian activist Yaser Tabbara, who had helped organize a gathering of anti-government Syrians a week before in Istanbul, called it "an earnest attempt by youth to reach out and demand that we move faster than we have been." According to Tabbara, the Istanbul conference that concluded on Aug. 23, was motivated by a similar sense of urgency. "It has been five months since the uprising started, and we don’t yet have a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Assad and his cohorts for their massacres," said Tabbara. "Part of the reason is that some in the international community, like India, Brazil, and South Africa, do not see a viable alternative to this regime.”

The four-day Istanbul gathering, according to organizers, sought to unite all the efforts of previous opposition efforts under one banner. Few of the groups or individuals from previous opposition gatherings attended the meeting, however. Members representing a consultative committee that emerged from a June opposition gathering in Antalya withdrew at the last minute, claiming, according to Reuters, that it "did not build on earlier efforts to unite the opposition." The conference was further handicapped by the perception that it was held under an American umbrella. Its organizers included members of a grassroots community group based in Illinois, the Syrian American Council. Although dismaying the opposition’s divisions and sniping are hardly surprising. Most activists grew up under the Assad family’s authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology. The opposition includes Arab nationalists and liberals with little trust for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose supporters were accused of dominating the first Istanbul conference organized in July by a leading human rights lawyer, Haitham al-Maleh. The many Kurdish parties that have participated have also been unhappy with some dissidents’ attempts to define a future Syria as "Arab." Most are also highly suspicious of the West and any support it might offer. The other challenge has been linking the diaspora opposition, which has been leading lobbying efforts abroad, with the political activists inside Syria. Although the diaspora has contacts among the traditional Syrian opposition based in Damascus, such as writers Michel Kilo and Louay Hussein, it has struggled to familiarize itself with the young activists who have led the protest movement. These protesters, who have organized themselves into local coordination committees, have largely remained anonymous to avoid arrest.

Can’t solve – threshold for solvency is too high.

AMEC 12. [Afro-Middle East Centre, “Unraveling the Syrian Crisis” – AMEC: established in 98, ‘aims to foster, produce and disseminate the highest quality of research on the Middle East,’ The Centre’s staff and research associates are sought after by the media to provide commentary and analysis on issues relating to the Middle East, the Islamic world and Africa. They have been interviewed by or have provided expert analysis to BBC, Al-Jazeera, the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s television and radio channels, SABC News International, Channel Africa, eTV and eTV News Channel, CNBC Africa, various other television and radio channels]
Despite all kinds of movement, diplomatic activity and internal unrest in Syria, there is not much likelihood that entrenched positions – within and without the country – will change soon, if it continues along the current trajectory, the Syrian crisis will be a protracted one, and talk of either overthrowing the regime or of returning the country to calm within the next few months are fanciful.

A situation is developing within Syria of extreme polarisation, with sectarianism rife and violence becoming an accepted option for many. Faced with such a scenario, there seems to be little potential for a breakthrough in the crisis. Any breakthrough will be dependent on certain conditions: • Acceptance by all sides that the only possible way forward is dialogue and negotiating Syria out of its crisis. Some opposition groups – especially the SNC – reject dialogue with the regime. In a similar vein the regime rejects the idea of talking to the SNC. Such hard-line positions will sink the country further into a morass rather than extricate it from the situation. 

• An understanding that, at the very least, such dialogue will result – immediately – in political pluralism, greater exercise of freedoms by the population and civil society, and greater control over the work of the security forces. • An acceptance that a precondition for future movement will entail the end of one-party rule.

Turn – U.S. action on Syria dooms solvency: prevents organic leadership and allows Assad to target key organizers

Landis 11 [Joshua, August 9 “Syrians must win the revolution on their own”, director of the Center for Middle East Studies and associate professor at the University of Oklahoma - http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/09/syrians_must_win_the_revolution_on_th eir_own

A growing chorus of policy experts in Washington are calling for the United States to get serious about Syria. They want Washington to take charge of regime change, hastening the downfall of the Assad government. This is bad advice. The U.S. should not try to hit the fast-forward button on the process of revolutionary change overtaking Syria. It will end in tears, and Syria will end up a mess. The three greatest national leaders of the Middle East – Ataturk, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, and David Ben-Gurion – emerged as successful leaders because they won their struggle on the battlefield and did so alone, without the help of an imperial power. Building national unity is a long a painful process. It cannot be given as a gift. Syrians must win their own revolution. Syria's opposition does not have leaders. Rami Nakhle, a spokesman for the Local Coordination Committees, the most well known of the groups opposing the regime, told Deborah Amos of NPR, "There is no national leadership, even behind the scenes." This is a virtue and intentional. Nakhle explained: "We are doing our best not really to have leaders." Why? Because "the Syrian regime has targeted anyone who is seen as an organizer of the protests." That is the practical reason. A second reason is that Syrians don't want leaders. "Everybody really feels anger towards leadership and authority on them," says Nakhle. Wissam Tarif, a leading Syrian opposition member, reassures us that a new leadership for Syria will eventually emerge. It will emerge out of battle. It will emerge from the street. He explains, "There is an internal process, a process that is taking place in the street, which we will have to wait to see what happens there," he said. "No one can control that. The real show is taking place on the ground with the protesters. And they will decide. No one else." But the Syrian opposition's lack of leaders has many U.S. policymakers scared. They don't want to bring down the regime before there is some structure or leadership to take its place. Syria's silent majority is worried about a power vacuum developing in Syria as well. Iraq is fresh in everyone's minds, not least for American policy planners. The quick toppling of the Iraqi regime brought militias and civil war. Much of Iraq that Saddam Hussein had failed to destroy was brought down by the warring militias and criminal gangs that took the army's place. Most devastating was the flight of Iraq's upper and middle classes.
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US must take the lead charge—otherwise can’t solve


"The United States and the international community have to stop delegating the lead role in mediation to Saudi Arabia and the GCC," Marc Lynch, director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University, told the BBC last week. "I think it's time for the United States and the UN and the international community to step in much more forcefully and insist on a transition." Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project and correspondent for TheAtlantic.com, told me he agrees that the U.S. should be getting out front. "I think that Obama needs to be vocal, insistent, consistent, and on Arabic TV stations condemning Saleh's behavior, his regime, and the massacres," he wrote in an email. "And I think Obama needs to be calling for his resignation and for the creation of a constitutional convention that includes [the various and divided political and tribal] groups." Because the U.S. is still indirectly financing some of the elite Yemeni military units now cracking down on protesters, launching drone strikes in Yemen’s south, and working through the GCC, the United States may not have enough credibility within Yemen to write its own proposal. Even with the aid of an international body like the UN, the window of opportunity to bring all the different actors in Yemen to the same table may be closing.
Yemen opposition likes the plan


The Yemeni opposition is aware of Western concerns that AQAP will have a chance to flourish in a post-Saleh environment. They have therefore made every effort to reassure the United States that they would also cooperate extensively with the West and Saudi Arabia to address the AQAP menace. Additionally, the oppositionists claim that the Saleh regime has allowed recent AQAP advances in southern Yemen as a way of scaring the West with the prospect that Yemen will become a terrorist haven without him. There are nevertheless some problems with such a ploy. While the Saleh regime may use every opportunity to assert its commitment to counterterrorism, its current priority is to maintain itself in power, and it is therefore unwilling to use its best military units to offer significant opposition to AQAP. Saleh’s elite counterterrorism units remain in Sana’a and are not being deployed to the south as part of this pattern. Moreover, the escape of up to 62 AQAP terrorists from a prison in the southern city of Mukalla on June 22 was yet a further indication that the Sana’a regime is too absorbed in its own problems to do much to contain AQAP.32

They want our aid – increased AQAP capacity proves


Yemen is seeking greater international assistance to fund and train more of its law-enforcement organizations to help battle al Qaeda and other security problems, Yemeni Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi said. Since last year, Yemen has accepted only a limited U.S. role in the battle to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni branch of the global terror group. The affiliate has shown increasing capability to plan and launch complex international terror attacks, including last year’s Christmas Day attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound jet and an attempt earlier this year to ship parcel bombs to the U.S. But, citing local sensitivities, the Yemenis have taken pains to keep U.S.-led military operations and intelligence gathering on its soil secret. At the same time, Yemeni officials have been reluctant to expand a U.S. presence on the ground. That’s despite a growing urgency about the need to ramp up the offensive against the group. Underscoring the political sensitivities in Yemen, a diplomatic cable leaked recently by WikiLeaks described how Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh told U.S. officials he would continue to deny the U.S. role in the battle al Qaeda. Underscoring the political sensitivities in Yemen, a diplomatic cable leaked recently by WikiLeaks described how Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh told U.S. officials he would continue to deny the U.S. role in the battle al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But he said international funding and training, now focused solely on select counter-terror units, would be welcomed by local police forces too. “Police are the front lines of any long-term security strategy. You can’t fight, bring law and order, unless you [have a presence] in the remote settlements and communities where [insurgents] are located,” Mr. Qirbi said. Yemen is discussing with U.S., European and Arab officials a package of security and development assistance for the impoverished and rugged Middle Eastern country ahead of a multilateral donors conference scheduled for February. The Riyadh meeting reflects the growing threat that both Western and Arab states see from Yemen, where the weak central government is facing two internal insurgencies as well as the al Qaeda threat. Al Qaeda has raised its long-standing profile in the country’s southern provinces in the past five years, a period during which Mr. Saleh has struggled to exert his government’s control over those areas. At the Riyadh conference, Yemen will be lobbying for a wide range of economic development and education funding. A Yemeni official familiar with donor discussions said discussions are already under way with U.S. officials about police training, although no details have been hashed out about which nation would do the training or fund the initiative.
The plan is popular in Congress – inaction draws backlash


The American delegation’s visit came shortly after discussions by the American Congress about the situation in Yemen which was described as “worrying”. The congress, in its recommendations presented to Obama, revealed that a wave of political, economic and security crises are afflicting Yemen and these could turn the country into a “failed state”. It went on to say that this could provide the suitable lands for Al-Qaeda Organization to establish its bases there to attack foreign interests in Gulf countries and dominate the Horn of Africa. The Congress advised Obama to quickly activate the cooperation with the Yemeni government and to raise the ceiling of the financial support meant for terrorism-fighting efforts and development support, together with closely observing the current situation in Yemen. The members stressed that any inaction by the American side could lead to empowering the terrorist groups in Yemen and Somalia. In its document number [S8857-S8858-S8859-S8860] as well as the appendix number [S8980-S8981] issue no. (121-122), the congress discussed the situation in Yemen and noted that it is not time yet to issue an official declaration that Yemen is a “failed state” upon which a direct American and international intervention can be projected – including operations by NATO inside Yemeni lands. The Yemeni regime, according to the document, can be described as “weak” and this requires increasing the financial and development support for the Yemeni government, with keeping eye on the situation in the country. The same document insinuated it is likely that Al-Qaeda has worked during the last few months to spread into desert areas – where Yemen’s oil and gas exist – as well as the coastline areas on the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean which overlook the trade routes and the movement of international warships and frigates. American, French, British, Chinese and South Korean oil and gas companies exist in Yemen’s desert areas and this means that Al-Qaeda movements will pose direct threats to foreign interests. The congress also revealed that several documented political, security and economic reports obtained through official visits by CIA and the American National Security Department came all up with one result about the situation in Yemen; the country is turning into second a Afghanistan. Moreover, The Congress praised the excellent role played by Obama administration as they concentrate on the rising threats in Yemen through visits paid by several American officials, the last of which was made last July by General David Petraeus and shortly after he assumed the post of the Central Leadership. CIA Deputy Director Mr. Stephen R. Kappes’s, who met with Saleh early this year, mentioned in his report that the security situation in Yemen is alarming. The same was reported by the Director of the American National Department Dennis Blaire. The document hinted that Blaire was the source that had leaked information to New York Times about the disintegration of Al-Qaeda structure in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Blaire told the paper on condition of anonymity that the then situation of Pakistan would force Al-Qaeda elements and leaders to leave Pakistani areas for Yemen, taking advantage of Yemeni government’s weakness where they can establish terrorist networks and recruitment camps and finance groups. In addition, the document pointed out that Saleh managed to make a balance between all political forces, military officials, political elite, and extreme Islamists to frame a coalition to help the stability of its rule. It continued that the Yemeni regime resorted to paying huge sums of money to influential personalities and tribal sheikhs as well as paying bribes for influential leaders in some political parties to stabilize and continue his rule. If such influential tribal or political personalities refuse to cooperate, the regime resorts to using force against them through military threats or the authority of intelligence apparatuses. Again, the document asserted that the Al-Qaeda Organization’s military operations have confused the weak regime which has been in power for the last 30 years whose policy is based on balancing between the tribal and political forces, maintaining the last effects of the regime were successful in reaching an agreement with Al-Qaeda veterans which states something like, “we will leave you alone provided that you do not make any attacks inside the country”. The Congress advised the American Administration to quickly give hand to the Yemeni government’s apparatuses which has been overburdened by the rising calls for secession in south Yemen and renewed war in the north as well as ailing economy and depleting oil reservoirs.

Zero backlash to the plan- massively popular

CSM ‘11 (Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer, Christian Science Monitor, “US covert attacks in Yemen: A better template for the war on terror?”, June 15, 2011, LEQ)

The new campaign follows US concerns about a fortified Al Qaeda in conflict-torn Yemen. It’s very likely a harbinger of things to come, some national security experts say, Yemen’s political turmoil is stoking US concerns about a fortified Al Qaeda and prompting the Central Intelligence Agency to jump in with unmanned drones to target Islamist extremists. The new campaign relies on special operations and unmanned surveillance and attack - but no boots on the ground. It’s very likely a harbinger of things to come, some national security experts say. "What this basically says is, we’re not going to do counterinsurgency anymore; from now on it’s counterterrorism," says Lawrence Korb, a former Pentagon official now at the Center for American Progress in Washington. "The focus is back on Al Qaeda." Consensus in Washington on Al Qaeda remaining a threat may explain why President Obama faces virtually no opposition to what amounts to a covert war in Yemen, even as
he battles in Congress over the US military engagement in Libya. The focus by US intelligence, which CIA Director Leon Panetta announced in broad-brush fashion at a Senate hearing earlier this month, resembles a CIA campaign in Pakistan’s tribal regions, particularly in the use of drones. As in Pakistan, where the objective is to thwart extremists who cross over to attack in neighboring Afghanistan, the Yemen campaign also has a regional aspect. With Yemen’s Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), particularly active in the country’s south, the United States wants to head off any alliance between Yemen’s extremists and those operating in Somalia across the Gulf of Aden – a crucial global energy transport route. “Our approach has been to develop operations in all of these areas [Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa] that will contain Al Qaeda and go after them so they have no place to escape,” Mr. Panetta told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 9. US counterterrorism officials acknowledge that links already exist between AQAP and Al Shabab, the Somali Islamist organization with ties to Al Qaeda. One US goal, according to the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator, Daniel Benjamin, is to stop Yemen’s instability and deteriorated governmental authority from allowing AQAP and Al Shabab to strengthen their ties. Still, Yemen remains America’s No. 1 terrorism concern – something US officials have said for months. In recent comments to Washington journalists, Benjamin said it is a “safe assumption” that AQAP still holds the top-threat slot, based on what the US knows to be the organization’s “relentless desire to carry out a terrorist attack.” AQAP has a few unsuccessful terrorist attacks under its belt – notably the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day in 2009, as well as the foiled operation last year to strike US destinations with package bombs. One of the organization’s lead figures, the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, calls for attacks on US interests in his public pronouncements. (The US has him in its sights: A drone attack in Yemen, carried out last month before the CIA campaign, was aimed at Mr. Awlaki but missed.) Some US officials are trying to play down the prospects for a total breakdown in Yemen that could leave it a failed state ripe for AQAP’s picking. In a June 13 interview with the Associated Press, outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he saw glimmers of hope that Yemenis can avoid a total collapse and overcome their political divisions – in particular if beleaguered President Ali Abdullah Saleh remains out of the country in Saudi Arabia. “I don’t think you’ll see a full-blown war there,” Secretary Gates said. “With Saleh being in Saudi Arabia, maybe something can be worked out to bring this to a close.” The alternative is an open door to AQAP. “If Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula were to take control in Yemen, that would give them a base for causing a lot of problems in the region and for targeting us,” says Mr. Korb of the Center for American Progress. It’s very likely the prospects of an emboldened AQAP that explain why the plans for a stepped-up covert operation in Yemen raised nary a protest from an increasingly war-weary Congress, if anything, the same president being pilloried by both the right and left in Congress for sending the US military into Libya is receiving kudos for sharpening the US fight in Yemen. Yemen is beginning to be a safe haven for Al Qaeda, and the president is having drone attacks. ” says Sen. Lindsey Graham (R) of South Carolina in remarks Wednesday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Announcing his plans to offer a Senate resolution authorizing Mr. Obama to use military force in Yemen, Senator Graham added, “I don’t think we [in Congress] should be on the sidelines. I think we should support the president.” What further explains the different responses on Libya and Yemen? “Vital interests, or perhaps better said, direct threat,” says James Lindsay, senior vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “What you’re seeing on Libya is the conviction on the part of critics that Libya wasn’t attacking us - that there are no terrorists there targeting us,” he says. “But in Yemen, you have Al Qaeda operatives engaged in planning attacks on the US, so the argument is, better to take the fight to them rather than wait for them to attack us or our overseas interests.” Some in Congress may feel they have already authorized the president to undertake the kind of operations that Obama is expanding in Yemen. “If you go back to the first congressional resolution after the 9/11 attacks, it authorizes whatever actions necessary to defeat the terrorists who would attack us,” says Korb. “Those terrorists are exactly who we are going after in Yemen,” he adds, “while people are saying Libya has nothing to do with Al Qaeda.” At least not right now. But if anything might reverse the mounting opposition in Congress (and among the public) to the military intervention in Libya, it would be evidence of Al Qaeda gaining a foothold in the North African country in a post-Muammar Qaddafi era, some experts say. “If Qaddafi’s fall were to lead to a destabilized Libya that ended up fertile ground for Al Qaeda operatives,” says Lindsay, “then I think the concerns about Libya would suddenly be quite different.”

Plan would be spun as necessary to defeat Al Qaeda – no opposition– just a win


Al Qaeda’s central leadership and affiliates in Yemen and Somalia are increasingly strengthening their ties and have even discussed efforts to attack U.S. interests, U.S. officials say. Mr. Hoekstra said he was particularly concerned about communications between al Qaeda in Yemen and Shabaab in Somalia. “We get indications their goals are more in alignment in terms of attacking American and western interests and doing it in Europe and the [U.S.] homeland,” he said. This increasing alignment has
spawned a debate within the administration over whether to try to replicate the type of drone campaign the CIA has mounted with success in Pakistan. The CIA has rapidly stepped up its drone hits in Pakistan under the Obama administration and is now conducting strikes at an average rate of two or three a week—which amount to about 50 so far this year. Since the beginning of the Obama administration the strikes have killed at least 650 militants, according to a U.S. official. Earlier this year, a U.S. counterterrorism official said around 20 noncombatants have been killed in the CIA campaign in Pakistan, and the number isn't believed to have grown much since then.

Such a move would likely find bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. Mr. Hoekstra said he would support a more aggressive effort, like that in Yemen. "The more pressure we can keep putting on al Qaeda, whether it's in Yemen, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, the better off we will be," he said. "If they asked for the funds, Congress would provide them with it." Rep. Adam Smith, a Washington Democrat who serves both on the House intelligence and armed services committees, also said it would be helpful to take similar measures in Yemen. "The intelligence community, broadly speaking will need to increase its focus on Yemen," he said, adding that the efforts needed aren't just CIA operations but also counterterrorism efforts of other agencies, including the U.S. military. Giving the CIA greater control of counterterrorism efforts in Yemen could run into resistance from some in the Pentagon who feel a sense of ownership of a campaign against extremists that began last year.
Civil Law Enforcement Mechanism (Terror + Multilat Adv)

Only law enforcement solves- studies and experts agree that law enforcement is key to short and long term success against AQAP


If the Yemeni terror threat had not already caught the attention of the American public, it did on 29 October 2010. After hours of confused media speculation, US and UK authorities revealed that they had uncovered several bombs which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had successfully smuggled on to both cargo and passenger planes.1 But even before the so-called Halloween Package Incident many in the US government, including the CIA, had characterised AQAP as the world’s most dangerous terror organisation.2 Today, the Obama Administration regards AQAP as ‘the most operationally active node of the al-Qaeda network,’ surpassing even its AfPak cousin.3 Although the revolutionary spirit of the Arab Spring has given hope to reform movements throughout Yemen, it appears to have also strengthened the hand of AQAP. In the words of prominent American-born AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki, ‘our mujahidin brothers … will get a chance to breathe again after three decades of suffocation.’4 Faced with massive demonstrations, President Ali Abdullah Saleh diverted much of his US-trained counterterrorism force away from their battle with AQAP. Correspondingly, the organisation has stepped up its attacks against government forces throughout the south.5 In Abyan province – a traditional stronghold for AQAP – reports have surfaced that the group has seized control of the city of Jaar as well as a nearby government ammunition depot.6 According to an article by the Yemen Times, an independent, widely-circulated Yemeni newspaper, AQAP also captured Abyan’s presidential palace and a local radio station, emboldening the organisation to declare Abyan as an Islamic emirate. The group used the radio station to provide a preview of its vision for Yemen, broadcasting statements urging women to ‘stay home and go out only when it is extremely necessary,’ and to only leave their home when accompanied by a male relative.7 Absent an effective US counterterrorism strategy to address AQAP’s increasing power, their violence could once again reach American or European shores. The current political turmoil has only accentuated many of the difficulties which have plagued US counterterrorism policy. First, the Yemeni government has not traditionally viewed AQAP as a major threat to its regime. Instead, it has faced major secessionist movements in both the south and north of the country.8 The central government has channelled most of its resources towards quelling these more widespread insurgencies rather than fighting AQAP. Similarly, the protests have also distracted the government from its counterterrorism mission. The period of political instability that will almost surely grip Yemen over the coming months will probably continue to encourage Yemen’s leadership to consider AQAP as a secondary priority. Despite the fact that Saleh has used the spectre of civil war as a ploy to end the protest movements, his point remains valid. Any post-Saleh government will face a significant challenge in keeping the country from plunging into a bloody conflict. Many of Yemen’s political parties, tribes, and leaders may have united against Saleh in the short term, but the absence of a common enemy, political opportunism mixed with underlying tribal, sectarian, and ideological tensions will probably destroy the broad coalition. Preventing these inevitable disagreements from boiling over into open warfare will require any government’s close attention, probably at the expense of a concerted anti-AQAP campaign. Yet even when the government may possess the motivation to act, it often lacks the capability. AQAP has become strongest in the more rural, tribal regions where the government has little or no control.9 In these locations, the central government has not been able to deliver civil projects or rule of law. A dynamic unlikely to change during a time of political flux. Instead, the people rely on their tribal leadership to provide them with basic necessities and guidance. While the regime may rule these territories in name, the tribes rule in practice. As a result, Yemen has become a classic terror “safe haven.” Failed states theoretically offer four major advantages to terrorist organisations: 1. The ability to acquire large amounts of territory for training, arms depots, or communications;10 2. A lawless environment conducive to smuggling and other illicit activities that fund the organisation; 11 3. A large pool of recruits and supporters; 12 4. Protection from foreign reprisals due to the state’s retention of outward sovereignty.13 AQAP has exploited all of these benefits. Its territorial control has enabled it to run training camps, stash weapons, and even assemble a formidable propaganda apparatus.14 Although it has successfully recruited foreigners into the organisation, it remains primarily a Saudi/Yemeni led group which draws most of its foot-soldiers from disaffected tribesman.15 It then uses these recruits to conduct illicit drug trafficking, border smuggling, and money laundering.16 And yet, due to issues of Yemeni sovereignty and potential public backlash, the US has an extremely limited list of potential responses.17 Therefore, the challenge for the US is to rob AQAP of the first three benefits without running afoot of problems associated with the fourth. While it may not seem as quick or gratifying as other CT instruments, diplomacy must provide the basis for future US CT policy in Yemen. Diplomacy ‘touches at least as many aspects of counterterrorism as does any other instrument,’18 and has been responsible for almost every major international CT success in the past few years.19 A diplomacy-centric approach offers several benefits. Increased US military presence, whether through airstrikes or troops, could enrage the anti-US population and actually contribute to AQAP’s popularity. Drone and cruise missile attacks in December 2009, which caused several civilian casualties without seriously degrading AQAP’s leadership, have become a widely cited example of the backlash that a military-centric US policy could unleash.20 Additionally, since AQAP features a heavy Saudi component and often targets the Saudi regime, the group necessitates a regional approach. Saudi Arabia must play a key role, especially with respect to the porous border. Yet to mobilise the Saudis, US diplomats will need to broker deals and assuage any Yemeni concerns about infringements on their sovereignty. Without diplomacy and international cooperation in Yemen, US CT efforts will produce negligible long-term results. Within a diplomatic context, the US should employ three primary techniques aimed at AQAP’s demise: strengthening Yemen’s civil law enforcement capacity, assisting civil development that targets the most
afflicted tribal regions, and enhancing intelligence cooperation with local Arab partners. This comprehensive strategy will significantly degrade AQAP’s operational capability by removing the organization’s key safe havens while simultaneously identifying both specific and general threats against US interests. Additionally, diplomatic and intelligence efforts will help the US understand Yemen’s domestic power structure, and thus identify the individuals with which the US should cooperate. Like most terror organisations, AQAP exists in the hazy netherworld between criminal and conventional threats. It has the ability to mass fires, conduct ambushes, and target major infrastructure, yet it does not operate like a conventional military. Unlike US forces, the group does not utilise massive convoys or supply chains to sustain itself. Instead, it relies on the vast Yemeni black market to funnel illicit weapons, drugs, and money to its various elements. This criminal-logical nexus means that many of the agencies which can help disrupt AQAP activities come from the law-enforcement community. In fact, organisations like AQAP specifically structure themselves to counter traditional military strengths. While the group boasts an experienced cadre of leaders, it survives as a highly compartmentalised and decentralised organisation.21 This structure allows it to withstand losses and ensures secrecy if the government captures some of its members.22 As a result, massive military incursions or occupations would have little effect on AQAP. The group would simply continue to operate in the shadows, using the presence of foreign troops or overaggressive government forces to inflame public opinion. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that studies have shown law enforcement – not military force – is the single most potent factor in the demise of terror groups. According to a RAND survey of 648 terror groups between 1968-2006 forty percent of terror groups were ended due to the actions of local law-enforcement agencies, while only seven percent ended due to military action.23 The difference between the strategies lies in which organisations take the lead against the threat, and, at times, the techniques those agencies use. “Policing” uses internal security and intelligence organisations to track, penetrate, and then eliminate the group’s members, while military force includes offensive action ranging from commando raids to carpet bombings.24 Recent experiences support the study’s conclusions. In Afghanistan, senior US leaders have stated that the country’s future depends more closely on the training of the Afghan police than the Afghan military.25 The same dynamic exists in Yemen. In an appeal to direct more international funding towards local police units, then-Yemeni Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi said, Police are the front lines of any long-term security strategy. You can’t fight, bring law and order, unless you [have a presence] in the remote settlements and communities where [insurgents] are located.”26 These units – not elite special operations “hunter-killer teams” – provide the daily barriers to the lawlessness and criminal activity which provides freedom of manoeuvre for AQAP. The shortfalls of military force apply to any government engaged in the fight – even Yemen’s. Prior Yemeni military efforts have only created disillusionment within its population. Even before the rise of the protest movements, Anwar al-Awlaki’s videos cited repressive Yemeni military responses in the southern provinces as part of his recruitment effort.27 Any strategy shift that heavily relies on a broad military offensive would enhance the resonance of such messages. AQAP does not enjoy widespread popularity in Yemen; US policy should keep it that way. An approach that bolsters the rule of law and secures Yemeni borders would produce markedly better results than wholesale military assistance and aggressive offensive action. The February 2006 prison escape of several key AQAP leaders highlights the need for a more competent civilian security force.28 After the break-out, AQAP essentially resurrected itself from the ashes after having become almost non-existent. Neither Apache gunships nor Abrams tanks could have prevented the prison break. If the police and prison system had well-trained advisors, a major setback could have been avoided. Instead, years’ worth of work vanished in one day. Partnerships based on the improvement of basic law-enforcement capability will provide the long-term Yemeni capacity needed to thwart AQAP, even though those partnerships will probably not yield the more publicly identifiable “success” that airstrikes would. To create an effective Yemeni security apparatus, the US must utilise groups which have significant law enforcement experience. Organisations like the FBI, DEA, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and the State Department’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) could lend decades’ worth of insights in support of this effort. In some cases these organisations have already provided assistance. But to manage the increasing aid money flowing into Yemen, law-enforcement agencies operating under the direction of the State Department should receive the primary role for training Yemeni forces, not the military. If DoD, DHS, and State do not coordinate their strategy, the training effort will likely end up wasted. The military, and specifically the US Army Special Forces – which have a history of training foreign militaries in a low-profile capacity – has an important role to play in Yemen. But law-enforcement agencies which truly understand policing operations should take the lead, with military or intelligence experts providing cultural, regional and international expertise.

Only US action solves – key to reverse Anti-Americanism, critical to defeating AQAP
If the United States adopts a new approach to Yemen following President Saleh’s departure that signals a strong commitment to the interests of the Yemeni people, the fight against AQAP will become significantly easier. It will also have the added effect of improving the image of the United States within Yemen. While security-focused approaches will continue, and will most likely expand, a long-term strategy that creates a broadly capable and legitimate government that serves the people will greatly diminish the pools of discontent that al-Qaeda capitalizes on for support. While many of the approaches advocated by this article will, of necessity, put U.S. personnel in harms way, the threat al-Qaeda poses to the United States requires a deepening of our engagement with the population, not a retreat behind concrete walls in Sana’a. President Saleh’s departure from Yemen will provide a unique moment for U.S. policymakers to re-orient the United States’ approach to the Yemeni people and to provide a greater balance between kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The stronger the relationship between the Yemeni people and the United States, the less likely al-Qaeda will have a safe haven within which to launch attacks against the United States.

US law enforcement training is essential to information exchange- this is the only way to prevent terrorism

In the international effort to combat terrorism, it has become utterly clear, despite the claims of some in the Bush Administration and its more hard-line supporters, that the United States derives far more benefit from engagement with multilateral organizations and other partners than by going it alone. Counterterrorism cooperation means that other nations can help shoulder the burden of providing capacity building and training assistance, especially in regions where Washington lacks access and leverage. More work needs to be done in the new Administration to stimulate the exchange of information on terrorists with both trusted and non-traditional allies and raise US and global security standards for travel and border crossings through extensive international cooperation. Multilateral engagement also provides opportunities not only to foster (or rekindle) bilateral relationships with traditional and non-traditional partner countries to combat terrorism, but to raise common awareness of the threat and build the trust necessary for sharing information to prevent and detect terrorist acts. To the extent that America’s security against terrorism is interwoven with that of other countries, the new Administration must work with them to identify and fund counterterrorism priorities in every corner of the world. While some countries and regions have the capacity to identify and implement their counterterrorism priorities, many others still do not. This conclusion was echoed by the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, which noted that while substantial progress has been made in many countries, a lack of technical capacity still inhibits the ability of many countries to comply fully with their counterterrorism-related obligations. 1 In fact, lack of capacity is a problem in a number of the countries and regions identified by the 9/11 Commission as likely bases of operation for some of the most dangerous international terrorist networks. 2 Traditionally, Washington has been the world’s top provider of technical assistance and resources to improve the counterterrorism capacities of developing countries. After 9/11, the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency all significantly increased their counterterrorism assistance programs. More recently, however, inflation adjusted funding for many of these programs has flattened out. 3 These assistance-related resources represent a minuscule amount of the money allocated to the effort against terrorism, but in many developing countries they are of critical importance and must be maintained and enhanced. Airport and maritime security and foreign law enforcement capabilities are among the priority programs that need more robust funding. Law enforcement programs, for example, help train intelligence, police, and judicial personnel in developing countries where terrorists have taken
By providing more funding for such programs, Washington would not only increase the ability of host countries to contribute to the worldwide effort against terrorism, but also enable those governments to better protect US commercial and security interests, as well as Americans who travel or live abroad. Such programs also enable law enforcement officials here and abroad to cooperate on the implementation of strict anti-terrorism laws, to adapt to changing conditions as terrorists alter their tactics, and to track the activity of terrorist networks to thwart attacks in the planning stage before they can be executed. The cooperation between US, British, and Pakistani law enforcement officials that foiled a terrorist conspiracy to blow up as many as ten transatlantic flights bound for American cities in August 2006 is a case in point. The new Administration must ensure that these funding priorities are recognized and approved by Congress. A better protection of the nation’s infrastructure must also be a goal of the new Administration. Soft targets like electric grids and reservoirs are vital to our national security, public order, and national economy. In the United States today, some 85 percent of this infrastructure is in private hands. The new Administration will need to do a better job at reaching out to the private sector in getting their cooperation in protecting this infrastructure from being attacked. Furthermore, given the number of multinational companies and the global nature of the economy, it is not enough for the Department of Homeland Security and its Western European counterparts to energize and coordinate their respective national efforts to protect critical infrastructure. An attack on such infrastructure almost anywhere around the globe could have devastating ripples into the United States.

That information exchange mechanism is essential to succeeding against Al Qaeda


Intelligence is the first line of defense against terrorism. It can guide law-enforcement activities, focus covert action, and define the scope of U.S. military operations. The globalization of the war on terror strengthens warning capabilities by uniting a multinational network of intelligence agencies. Through various political, economic, and military means, the United States has assembled a global coalition to confront terrorism. In the October 2005 National Intelligence Strategy, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte calls for the U.S. intelligence community to “establish new and strengthen existing intelligence relationships.” But the new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates challenges such as ensuring the confidentiality of widely disseminated classified information, overcoming sensitivities regarding intelligence sources and methods, and maintaining counterintelligence vigilance. Foreign liaison agreements and interagency intelligence relationships have been an important tool of U.S. national power since at least the early twentieth century. The United States has long maintained intelligence partnerships based on common security interests, and today, these are vital in almost every counterterrorism operation (arrest, interrogation, or kill). The United States simply does not have the resources or expertise to fight itself a long, complex war waged by terrorists with a global reach; a coalition offers the means to manage the “paradox of plenty” that the information revolution created.

This is particularly true in Yemen – current US efforts will only succeed with information exchange

Barfi ’10 Barak Barfi is an independent analyst who has worked with ABC News affiliates in the Middle East, “How attacking AQAP influenced its strategy”, 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Yemen_AQAP/EN/

AQAP’s ability to survive the American-Yemeni campaign stems from a number of factors. Chief among them is the poor intelligence guiding the counterterrorism strategy. The Yemeni military is severely restricted in its ability to operate in the tribal areas east of Sana’a where AQAP has established strongholds. These provinces are hostile to the central regime, thus making it very difficult for security services to develop intelligence sources there. AQAP’s combat strategies have also impeded the regime’s efforts by targeting intelligence personnel investigating it. Since March 2007, AQAP has killed several officers in Marib, striking fear in the security services and deterring officials from scrutinising its activities. The Yemeni armed forces are poorly trained and ill-equipped to carry out counterterrorism operations. The inability to develop solid intelligence about AQAP and its activities has had a deleterious effect on missions conducted in these regions, leading to operational failures. After the Americans fired cruise missiles at a house in Shabwa last December, the Yemeni regime boasted that
the attack killed a number of senior AQAP leaders. But the truth belied their optimistic claims—only one mid-ranking official and a number of minor foot soldiers died. The story was much the same in May when the Americans bombed a suspected AQAP safehouse in Marib. Rather than taking out militants, the strike killed a senior provincial official governor who was negotiating the surrender of AQAP cadres. The dismal state of the Yemeni military equally contributes to its inability to clamp down on AQAP. The armed forces are poorly trained and ill-equipped to carry out counterterrorism operations. Their forays into the tribal areas to apprehend al-Qa’ida members have often ended miserably. In December 2001, military units attacked a village outside of Marib, seeking to arrest AQAP’s leader. But instead, 23 soldiers were captured by tribesmen. In December 2001, military units backed by helicopters and tanks attacked a village outside of Marib, seeking to arrest the organisation’s leader. But instead of detaining him, 23 soldiers were captured by tribesmen protecting their turf. In July 2009, the army again sent troops into Marib to apprehend AQAP members. This time, it lost seven soldiers and five tanks while capturing no al-Qa’ida cadres. These intelligence shortcomings and military deficiencies have severely hampered American-Yemeni efforts to crush the organisation. If Washington intends to expand its use of drones and step up targeted assassinations in Yemen as recent news reports indicate, it needs to first focus on the underlying factors which have frustrated its current strategy. To do so, America need to concentrate less on increasing firepower and more on cultivating manpower in the form of competent military allies and reliable local intelligence assets.

Our approach in Yemen is the litmus-test of future counter-terrorism strategy – the time is right for a strategy shift


Debates over the legality of pursuing AQAP in Yemen through drones and SOF create unnecessary seams in our nation’s fight against a seamless terror threat. The threat environment we face today predicates the further synchronization of the military and intelligence community. This evolution in the operational environment demands that the authorities under Title 10 (legal basis for the military services and the department of defense) and Title 50 (procedures for covert actions) be equally synchronized and coordinated. The many corridors inside the Beltway must not stymie operational performance in the field. The U.S. State Department officially designated AQAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2010 and most of AQAP’s leaders are no longer in the U.S. The many corridors inside the Beltway must not stymie operational performance in the field. The U.S. State Department officially designated AQAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2010 and most of AQAP’s leaders are no longer in the U.S. Executive Order. Under this legal designation, the U.S. should use all available assets to eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP. Conclusion Increased use of drone and SOF strike missions is not without risks – yet the ratio of possible risks to potential benefits is far better than any other viable option. Leaning forward and seizing this window of opportunity with such a policy will provide the U.S. time to develop a strong, long-term relationship with Yemen’s successor government that addresses the persistent threat of AQAP and jihadi radicalization in the country. Pursuing this approach will also provide the U.S. an additional litmus test for creating a new long-run counterterrorism strategy in a post-biden world. However, the present window of opportunity will close quickly – the U.S. must act now to prevent an inevitable attack from AQAP.

Yemen will be the model going forward – experts agree


At stake is the stability of a troubled, poverty-stricken nation struggling to thwart al-Qa’ida-linked terrorists who are growing stronger and are increasingly targeting the U.S. and other Western interests. “Yemen is the model for how we’re going to conduct counterterrorism in the future,” said Rick Nelson, a counterterrorism expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It is not going to be large-scale intervention as it was under the Bush administration and not because it is or isn’t working but because it’s economically unfeasible” to wage expensive wars. The U.S. has placed unprecedented priority on Yemen. As State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin Wednesday, describing a two-pronged program to root out terrorists while also targeting the “incubators for extremism” – such as poverty, weak governance and corruption. Speaking at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Benjamin said the U.S. is on track to provide as much as $300 million in military, humanitarian and development this year.
About half of that is for military equipment and training. He said the president has so far ruled out active U.S. military intervention in Yemen, and instead wants to focus on building that government’s capacity to deal with its own social and security problems. The terror threat from Yemen has escalated in the past 18 months, with estimates that about 300 al-Qaida members or cells are operating there. The gravity of the situation deepened after the failed Christmas Day Detroit airliner attack last year was linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen. Yemen is also the base of U.S.-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is believed to have helped inspire the airline plot and other attacks in the U.S. The administration has the fugitive al-Awlaki on a kill or capture list. The U.S. military training in Yemen, said one senior defense official, is aimed at fixing shortfalls in the Yemeni military’s aviation, intelligence and tactical operations. And there also is training for the maintenance of aircraft and other systems. Several U.S. and Yemeni officials spoke on condition of anonymity to describe the U.S. training effort, which is rarely discussed in public because of its politically sensitive nature. In general, the U.S. trainers never appear in public. The U.S. special operations forces are believed to be concentrated in a mountainous area in western San’a, the capital. Yemeni counterterrorism troops and British special operations trainers are participating with the U.S. trainers. Yemeni authorities have been careful not to discuss the U.S. presence. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh said during a Ramadan sermon last month that Yemen does not accept the presence of foreign troops in its territory. However, he admitted in March that there are American trainers in Yemen. “There is no American presence on Yemen’s land and seas,” he said. “There is U.S.-Yemeni cooperation in counterterrorism, in training. And mission numbers no more than 40-50 people.” Saleh is concerned about his delicate alliance with the hardline groups and tribes that are most threatened by U.S. operations. And Yemeni media have accused the weak central government of giving up its sovereignty by allowing foreign troops to use Yemen as a battlefield against al-Qaida. The careful growth of training by special forces in Yemen mirrors a slow expansion of a Pentagon counterterror training program in Pakistan, which officials say serves as a workable road map for building U.S. military relationships with government forces in terrorist strongholds. The U.S. instruction of Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps not only enhances the capabilities of the nation’s security forces, but also makes it easier for American commanders to gather intelligence, establish contact with local populations and move more freely in the country. U.S. trainers in Pakistan operate mainly in two training centers along the Afghan border. But their proximity to terror strongholds can also be a drawback. Earlier this year, three of the trainers were killed and two others wounded by a roadside bomb. Experts on the Gulf region warn that military aid must be supplemented with economic, development and governance support. Too much emphasis on defense programs could make Yemen more militaristic, fuel military recruiting and provide resources for the government’s internal struggles against Shiite Hawthi rebels in the north and a secessionist threat in the south, said Christopher Boucek, a Yemen expert at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “If we just focus on the military and security for them to become more lethal, it’s not going to improve the country’s security; it will only fuel recruitment and grievances,” Boucek said. Boucek, who was in Yemen earlier this year, said the increased military training force is more visible there now. And that growth has come as the country has transformed from being a place for terrorists to hide out or train to a place where militants can participate in jihad. “More people are going there, they are more lethal and dangerous, and there is room for it to grow,” he said. U.S. training efforts in Yemen are part of a multi-pronged counterterrorism campaign that over the past year has included surveillance and intelligence sharing, along with several targeted cruise missile strikes directed at al-Qaida leaders. More than 40 people were killed in December by air raids targeting al-Qaida leaders. Yemenis have reported sightings of unmanned aircraft hovering over the provinces of Shabwa and Marib, known as hideouts for al-Qaida militants. Recently, U.S. officials have said they are looking at using armed predator drones to hunt down and kill al-Qaida leaders operating out of safe havens in Yemen’s ungoverned regions. But such operations would be done only with the acceptance of Yemeni leaders, officials said. The Pentagon has pledged $150 million in military assistance to Yemen this year for helicopters, planes and other equipment. A senior Yemeni official said the government is looking most for a sense of commitment from the United States that does not ebb and flow as terror incidents with a Yemen tie occur.

A new focus on law enforcement cooperation is critical to successful international cooperation

Boyle and Scmid ‘09 (A Global Compact for Counter-Terrorism: Towards a Robust Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Regime Dr. Michael J. Boyle and Professor Alex P. Scmid Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence University of St. Andrews Sponsor ed by the The New Ideas Fund, 2009)

One of the greatest challenges currently facing the United States concerns how it should establish and manage global cooperation for key counter-terrorism goals. Over the last eight years, the threat of international terrorism – particularly from groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates – has fundamentally altered the strategic environment in which the U.S. operates. No longer only facing a world of competing states with rival interests, the U.S. now faces a perilous threat from a sub-state actor which has proven its ability to strike both within the continental United States and within the territory of key U.S. allies. Modern international terrorism has proven itself to be a global phenomenon, as the key ingredients of terrorist events – operatives, materials, and financing – are rarely confined within the border of a single sovereign state. It is then increasingly apparent that the response to modern terrorism must also be international in its scale and scope. The end of the Bush Administration poses an opportunity to rethink U.S. counter-terrorism policies, with an eye towards re-tailoring those policies to boost international cooperation for key counter-terrorism goals. The nature of a threat situation deepened after the failed Christmas Day Detroit airliner attack last year was linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen. Yemen is also the base of U.S.-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is believed to have helped inspire the airline plot and other attacks in the U.S. The administration has the fugitive al-Awlaki on a kill or capture list. The U.S. military training in Yemen, said one senior defense official, is aimed at fixing shortfalls in the Yemeni military’s aviation, intelligence and tactical operations. And there also is training for the maintenance of aircraft and other systems. 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The question it faces is not about the need for additional cooperation, but about the proper modality for achieving it. Should the U.S. attempt to institutionalize its counter-terrorism efforts at the regional or even global level? If so, how should these institutions be created? What scope should they have? During the Cold War, when the U.S. faced an ideological threat from the Soviet Union, it constructed a dense network of alliances and institutions (such as NATO) to counter the threat. A number of influential voices have called on the United States to heed these lessons today.3 Yet the practical benefits of turning the battle against international terrorism to global or regional institutions remain in doubt. Institutions can be unwieldy and ineffective; moreover, intelligence and security agencies are reluctant to surrender any control over the counter-terrorism to bodies such as the European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN), in part because they wish to preserve their national prerogative. Extant attempts to engage in counter-terrorism work at the regional and global and have so far failed to live up to expectations. The purpose of this chapter is to examine what insights regime theory might have for creating and sustaining counter-terrorism cooperation at the regional and global level. Its argument is that paying due attention to the insights of regime theory may allow the U.S. to achieve the benefits of global and regional counter-terrorism cooperation, whilst escaping the costs and complications that have bedevilled counter-terrorism cooperation thus far.

**This shift is critical to larger multilateral cooperation – there is a unique spillover effect**

Boyle and Scmid ’9 (A Global Compact for Counter-Terrorism: Towards a Robust Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Regime Dr. Michael J. Boyle and Professor Alex P. Schmid Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence University of St. Andrews Sponsored by The New Ideas Fund, 2009)

The war on terror has failed to become the dominant frame for American foreign policy, in part because these criticisms unsettled even steadfast American allies, almost all of whom have quietly walked away from the language. More pressingly, the language of war militarized the response to terrorism, which particularly alienated key European partners whose historical experience of terrorism had led them to believe that it was a primarily law enforcement and intelligence problem. Within a few years, even allies such as Britain were walking away from the concept of a “war on terror,” in part because few, if any, believed that it was a war that could be won in any conventional sense.32 This set the stage for a gradual unravelling of the America’s alliance structure, as American unilateralism pushed away even key European partners and left the United States more isolated than it was before the events of September 11th. The Limits of Unilateralism From its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to its insistence on attacking Iraq without consent for the reservations of allies, the most distinguishing feature of the first term of the Bush Administration was its unilateralism. This approach – which puts primacy on American freedom of action and dismisses the concerns of other states as either irrelevant or secondary – has been the most criticized feature of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. There are a number of substantial critiques of unilateralism, as being either morally problematic or politically dubious, which we will not cover in depth here.33 What is less remarked upon has been the costs of unilateralism for cooperation on counterterrorism. The unilateral style of the Bush Administration made it difficult, if not impossible, for some even friendly governments to say yes to the United States. This was obvious even in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. In 2002, between 60-70% of the population of the four most powerful European states (Britain, France, Germany and Italy) supported the war on terror, but at the same time substantial portions of the population of each state did not believe that the U.S. paid due attention to their key allies.34 Even at a time of great sympathy for the United States, the perceived unilateralism acted as a check on the extent to which these states could cooperate with the United States. Even though the Bush Administration shifted to a more cooperative approach during its second term in office, the perception of unilateralism remained and gradually eroded support for the war on terror. Only five years later, the Pew Global Attitudes survey revealed drops in support for the war on terror of nearly 25% in France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and other important allies.35 While public support does not immediately affect or translate into government policy, the public shifts in attitudes against the United States constricted the level of cooperation that partner states could offer in their dealings with the United States, even while they remained formally on good terms with the United States. The Bush Administration’s unilateralism had another effect which undermined cooperation with other great powers, especially Russia and China, and acted as a brake on cooperation with states such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Manichean language of good and evil employed by the Bush Administration, and the presumption that unilateral action could reshape the international system and make other states come along to America’s point of view, even grudgingly, contributed to global insecurity. It inadvertently increased the number of states who feared that they might be a future object of U.S. power. This translated into greater concern over relative gains in security cooperation. In a world in which U.S. power is widely trusted to be directed towards more or less benign purposes, the problem of relative gains in security cooperation would be difficult but manageable. But in a world where unilateralism has had a corrosive effect on the perception of American goodwill, and in which states fear that unchecked American power is a threat to world peace, concerns over relative gains will become more acute. The counter-balancing effects of American unilateralism would render even modest attempts at cooperation over security matters more difficult than it would have otherwise been.
Only multilateral cooperation prevents great power wars that make extinction inevitable

Gwynne Dyer, former senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 12/30/2004, The End of War, The Toronto Star, p. lexis

The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses.
Key to Al Qaeda

Yemen is the key linchpin of global Al Qaeda—they’re key to funding, recruiting, training, deployment, and are the refuge of last resort.

Scheuer 8 [Michael Scheuer is a former CIA intelligence officer, American blogger, historian, foreign policy critic, and political analyst. He is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, “Yemen’s Role in al-Qaeda’s Strategy”, Terrorism Focus Volume: 5 Issue: 5, February 7, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4708&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=246&no_cache=1]

Osama bin Laden has always had a very soft spot in his heart for Yemen, saying that it is "one of the best Arab and Muslim countries in terms of its adherence to tradition and the faith ... [its] topography is mountainous, and its people are tribal and armed, and allow one to breathe clean air unblemished by humiliation." Yemen is, of course, also the site of his family's origin and he has often praised the Kindah tribe of which his family is part. The bin Ladens hail from the village of al-Rubat in the Hadramaut region, and Osama took his fourth wife from there. Bin Laden also has referred often to the religious importance of Yemen, noting the Prophet Muhammad's high regard for Yemen because of its quick adoption of Islam after the faith’s founding and because he believed that from Yemen "would come 12,000 [fighters] who would support God and His Prophet, and they are among the best of us" (al-Islah, September 2, 1996). Abundant Manpower But affection is always overruled by the requirements of war-fighting in bin Laden’s mentality and Yemen has long figured prominently in the conduct of the defensive jihad in terms of manpower and geographic importance. Yemenis, for example, have had significant representation in al-Qaeda since its founding. Tariq al-Fahdli, from southern Yemen, fought alongside bin Laden against the Soviets and was on Yemeni President Salih’s senior council; Nasir Ahmad Nasir al-Bahri (Abu Jandal), who was the longtime chief of his bodyguard unit, is also from Yemen (al-Quds al-Arabi, August 3, 2004). After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, moreover, bin Laden and several of his colleagues sent guns, money and Arab veterans of Afghanistan into Yemen to fight alongside the Salih-led insurgents that eventually defeated the communist regime of southern Yemen to reunify the country in 1990 (al-Qatan al-Arabi, December 27, 1996). Al-Qaeda’s first anti-U.S. attack—against U.S. troops on the way to Somalia—was conducted in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992. More recently, 80 percent of those involved in the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole were Saudis of Yemeni origin. The members of the al-Qaeda cell that the FBI dismantled in Lackawanna, New York in 2002 were all Yemenis. Furthermore, a significant number of the non-Iraqi mujahideen fighting U.S. forces in Iraq are Yemenis. Indeed, in late 2007 the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, called specifically on the Yemeni Islamists to provide more fighters to support the Iraqi mujahideen. On November 29, 2007, al-Qaeda’s chief in Yemen, Nasir al-Wihayshi (aka Abu Basir), publicly answered that he would immediately send more fighters. “Oh Abu Hamzah, here we come, oh, Iraq, here we come,” Abu Basir pledged (Message from the Amir of al-Qaeda in Yemen to Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, November 29, 2007).

Lasting Geographic Importance Beyond “the extended manpower fighting for God in happy Yemen,” bin Laden and al-Qaeda have always valued what they refer to as “the strategic depth” that Yemen affords (al-Islah, September 2, 1996; al-Quds al-Arabi, March 9, 1994). While bin Laden and his organization were based in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, for example, they established a sort of “naval bridge” that permitted the flow of guns and fighters between Yemen and Port Sudan in support of Hasan al-Turabi’s Islamism movement in Khartoum. In the other direction, bin Laden sent al-Qaeda operatives from Port Sudan to Yemen and from there infiltrated them into Saudi Arabia across the imperfectly guarded Saudi-Yemeni border as well as into Oman. In Yemen, bin Laden also cultivated ties with President Salih and prominent Islamist shaykh—the including Shaykh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, head of the Yemen Reform Party—and by doing so facilitated the growth of substantial al-Qaeda infrastructure across the country. Al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen also brought it into closer contact with the Egyptian Islamist groups based there: the Gama’a al-Islamiyah and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter of which later united with al-Qaeda. Finally, al-Qaeda has found that some of its Yemeni members are of great assistance in inserting al-Qaeda operatives into the states of East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, because of the Yemeni diaspora that was established centuries ago in those regions by Yemeni sailors and commercial traders. Operational Key and Base of Last Resort For al-Qaeda, Yemen provides a pivotal, central base that links its theaters of operation in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Africa and the Far East, it also provides a base for training Yemeni fighters and for the rest and refit of fighters from multiple Islamists groups after their tours in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Today, it appears to be an especially important safe haven for Somali Islamist fighters and the leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts who fled their country after the late-2006 invasion of Ethiopian forces. Some of these Somali fighters—after having regrouped and rearmed—have returned to Mogadishu from Yemen and are contributing to the growth of the Islamist insurgency there (Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 2007). Al-Qaeda’s organization in Yemen seems to have stabilized after the period of turmoil and governmental suppression that followed the November 2002 death of its leader Abu Ali Harithi. Under the above-mentioned Abu Basir—who escaped from a Yemeni prison in early 2006—al-Qaeda in Yemen clearly has found its legs and is becoming more active (Yemen Times, July 5, 2007). In late June 2007, for example, Abu Basir issued a warning that al-Qaeda would attack in Yemen if its members were not released from prison; on July 4, 2007, al-Qaeda attacked, using a suicide car bomb to kill seven Spanish tourists at an ancient pagan temple east of San'a (al-Jazeera, July 3, 2007). Then, on January 13, the Yemen wing again warned that it would attack if the Salih regime did not release imprisoned al-
Al-Qaeda members; on January 19 al-Qaeda killed two Belgian tourists and their drivers in the Hadramaut area (Reuters, January 26). Abu Basir’s organization is thus showing some of the same sophistication demonstrated by al-Qaeda groups elsewhere: targeting the tourism industry that earns the country foreign exchange; establishing credibility by making threats and then making good on them; and improving intra-Yemen and international communications by using the Internet. In regard to the latter, al-Qaeda in Yemen published the first issue of its Internet journal Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battles) on January 13 (memriwmp.org, January 16). Attacks by al-Qaeda in Yemen are likely to continue at a level that does not lead to an all-out confrontation with Salih’s regime. In all likelihood, al-Qaeda intends to cause just enough sporadic damage to persuade Salih’s regime that it is best to curtail its efforts to destroy al-Qaeda and to allow the group to operate relatively freely in and from Yemen as long as no major attacks are staged in the country. Indeed, such a modus vivendi may be in the works as San’a’s officials have experimented with putting imprisoned Islamists through a reeducation process that shows them the error of their ways and then releases them on the promise of good behavior (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 21, 2006). This almost certainly equates to a license for the militants to do what they want, where they want, as long as it is not in Yemen. Possibly signaling a growing rapprochement between Salih and the militants, al-Qaeda in Yemen spokesman Ahmad Mansur recently claimed that the government had solicited al-Qaeda’s support in fighting Shiite rebels in the north in return for “easing the persecution of our members” (al-Wasat, January 31). Finally, Yemen has long been regarded by Western and Muslim commentators as a possible refuge-of-last-resort if bin Laden ever has to flee South Asia—bin Laden also has stated such a possibility—and for this reason al-Qaeda must seek to maintain a viable presence in the country. Al-Qaeda in Yemen is particularly strong in the governorates of Marib and Hadramaut—the attacks described above and others have occurred there—and both share a remote, mountainous topography that is much like that of Afghanistan. The two provinces also are inhabited by a welter of deeply conservative Islamic tribes—Marib alone has four powerful tribes with over 70 clans. As in Afghanistan, the mores of these Yemeni tribes cause their members to “think they must do their duty to protect those who are in need for protection whatever they have done. This feeling becomes even stronger if those who need protection are religious people, because the tribesmen here are greatly affected by religious discourse.”

The safe haven is essential to a large-scale attack

Arkedis ’9 (Jim Arkedis is the director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007. “Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven”, Foreign Policy, October 23, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full) Although the group has been significantly weakened since late 2001, the only chance al Qaeda has of rebuilding its capability to conduct a large-scale terrorist operation against the United States is under the Taliban’s umbrella of protection. Objections like Haass’s are rooted in the following arguments: that terrorists don’t need physical space because they can plot online; that the London and Madrid bombings prove deadly attacks can be planned in restrictive, Western, urban locations under the noses of local security services; and that denying terrorists one safe haven will simply compel them to move to another lawless region. I spent five years as a counterterrorism analyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11. The above arguments may have merit in a piecemeal or abstract sense, but fall apart in the specific case of what we all dread: a large-scale, al Qaeda operation aimed at the United States. It is certainly true, for example, that terrorist groups can accomplish much online. Individuals can maintain contact with groups via chat rooms, money can be transferred over the Web (if done with extreme caution), and plotters can download items like instruction manuals for bomb-making, photographs of potential targets, and even blueprints for particular buildings. But all the e-mail accounts, chat rooms, and social media available will never account for the human touch. There is simply no substitute for the trust and confidence built by physically meeting, jointly conceiving, and then training together for a large-scale, complex operation on the other side of the world. As the 9/11 plot developed, mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) put the future operatives through a series of training courses along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Courses included physical fitness, firearms, close combat, Western culture, and English language. The 9/11 Commission report notes the extreme physical and mental demands KSM put on the participants— even if the operation didn’t require extensive firearms usage, KSM would have wanted the operatives to be proficient under intense pressure, should the need arise. Juxtapose that with an online learning environment. While you can no doubt learn some amazing things from online courses, it is far preferable to have a dedicated professor physically present to supervise students and monitor their progress. Or think of it another way: You wouldn’t want the U.S. Marine Corps to send recruits into battle without training under a drill instructor, would you? KSM was somewhere between a professor and a sergeant. Second, critics argue that the Madrid bombings of 2004 (which killed 191) as well those in London a year later (which killed 56) were largely -- though not entirely -- conceived, prepared, and executed within their respective countries, thus obviating the need for a safe haven. True enough. However, unlike 9/11 (which killed nearly 3,000), those plots’ successes were possible due to their simple concept and small scale. In both cities, the playbook was essentially the same: Four to eight individuals had to find a safe house, download bomb-making instructions, purchase explosive agents, assemble the devices, and deliver charges to the attack points. Without trivializing the tragic loss of life in the European attacks, building those explosive devices was akin to conducting a difficult high-school chemistry experiment. On that scale, 9/11 was like constructing a nuclear warhead. In every sense, it was a grander vision, involving 20 highly skilled operatives infiltrating four national landmarks with enough know-how, preparation, and contingency plans to be success. In one instance, KSM taught the 9/11 operatives to shoot a rifle from the back of a moving motorcycle, just in case. You can’t do that in someone’s bedroom—you need space, time, and the ability to work without worrying that the cops are listening in. The final argument is that denying al Qaeda a safe haven is an exercise in futility: Drive Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan and he’d relocate to some place like Sudan, southern Algeria, Somalia, or other swaths of ungoverned territory. However, this logic makes two faulty assumptions: that al Qaeda is mobile, and that the group’s international
affiliates would automatically roll out the red carpet for the jihadi refugees. Neither is true. Bin Laden and his senior and mid level cadre are well-known to intelligence services the world over. Any attempt to travel, let alone cross an international border (save Afghanistan-Pakistan) would fail somewhere between "utterly unthinkable" and "highly risky." Moving would further require massive reorientation of al Qaeda's financial operations and smuggling networks. Nor would bin Laden's senior leaders be automatically welcomed abroad in areas their regional partners control. Though al Qaeda has established "franchise affiliates" in places like North Africa and Southeast Asia, relationships between al Qaeda's leadership and its regional nodes are extraordinarily complex. Groups like the North African affiliate "al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) are happy to co-opt the al Qaeda "brand" for recruiting and financial reasons, but they don't necessarily share the al Qaeda senior leadership's ideological goals. AQIM is much more focused on attacking the Algerian government or foreign entities within the country, having not displayed much capability or desire for grandiose international operations. And last, recruits come to North Africa more often through independent networks in Europe, not camps along the Durand Line. Think of the relationship like the one you have your in-laws: You might share a name, but you probably don't want them coming to visit for three full weeks. Regional leaders aren't terribly loyal to senior leadership, either. Take Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of the group's Iraq affiliate. He was summoned to bin Laden's side numerous times in an attempt to exert control as the Iraqi commander's tactics grew more grotesque and questionable. Zarqawi declined, not wanting to risk travel or accept instruction from bin Laden. In the end, a safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is as good as it gets for al Qaeda's chances to launch a large-scale attack against the United States. Certainly, smaller, less complex attacks could be planned without "Afghan real estate," but any such plot's death toll and long-term effect on American society will be far more limited. Unfortunately, that's a risk President Barack Obama has to accept -- no amount of intelligence or counterterrorism operations can provide 100 percent security. But to avoid the Big One, the U.S. president's best bet is to deny al Qaeda the only physical space it can access.

Yemen is key to global base operations- they will launch international attacks


In recent days, international attention has refocused on the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Yemen. The claim of responsibility for the attack on Northwest flight 253 on December 25 by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has underscored the fact that Yemen's problems will not stay in Yemen. In the absence of immediate and sustained attention by the international community, Yemen may be overwhelmed by a unique convergence of crises. While some observers feared this would come in several years, it is increasingly apparent that failure may come sooner than previously expected. Yemen has frequently been described as a failing state -- and with good reason. Civil war, terrorism, a deepening secessionist movement and economic and demographic trends threaten to overpower the Yemeni government, provide a breeding ground for terrorists and destabilize the region. Yemen has often teetered on the brink of collapse, but it has never faced so many interconnected challenges at one time. At the heart of the country's problems is a looming economic crisis. Oil is the source of nearly 80 percent of government revenue, and it is quickly running out. There are few viable options for a sustainable post-oil economy, and Yemen is already the poorest country in the Arab world with an unemployment rate conservatively estimated at 35 percent. Yemen's pending economic collapse has been greatly accelerated by the civil war in Saada. Government forces have been unable to decisively put down the rebels in the north of the country, and there is no military solution to the conflict. The toll in Saada has been severe, with extensive damage to infrastructure and an estimated 175,000 internally displaced people. The conflict's strain on the Yemeni army has led to questions about the military's ability to simultaneously engage in other operations, including counterterrorism. The government is spending foreign currency reserves at an alarming rate, recently estimated at more than $200 million per month. Spending on the war will create a major budget deficit next year. Every dollar spent on the civil war is a dollar not spent on addressing the underlying causes of instability in Yemen. Yemen also is facing a growing secessionist movement in the south of the country. When the war in Saada subsides, it is feared that the secessionist movement will...
again flare up. The government does not control the entire territory of Yemen, and the emergence of additional areas outside of the capital of Sanaa’s control will create more under-governed spaces that can be exploited by terrorist movements. For the past year, there have been growing indications that al Qaeda is regrouping in Yemen and preparing to strike Western and other targets. Recent counterterrorism measures in Saudi Arabia have forced extremists to seek refuge elsewhere, and analysts have observed a steady flow of extremists relocating to Yemen’s under-governed areas. In spring 2008, al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia were encouraged by local Saudi al Qaeda commanders to escape to Yemen, and by January 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni al Qaeda affiliates merged. A video announcing the establishment of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula featured two Saudis previously released from the U.S. military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba – both assumed leadership positions in the newly formed organization. Mohammed al-Awfi subsequently surrendered to Saudi authorities and Said al-Shihri reportedly escaped a recent counterterrorism strike that preceded the Northwest bombing. The emergence of the regional al Qaeda group marks a major deterioration of security in Yemen. As recent events have highlighted, Yemen is becoming a base for al Qaeda to mount operations not only inside the country but also across the Arabian Peninsula and internationally. In August 2009, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula nearly assassinated Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the Saudi counterterrorism chief, in an attack that was eerily similar to the Christmas Day Northwest bomb attack. Following the attack on Prince Mohammed, it boasted of its new bomb technology and threatened to use its new ‘undetectable substance’ again. And in mid-October, several Saudis were killed trying to cross into Saudi Arabia, including the brother of deputy commander Said al-Shihri. According to local press reports, the two were attempting to smuggle several suicide vests into Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was allegedly bolstered by the relocation of al Qaeda operatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan this summer. Media reports quoted intelligence sources saying that fighters fleeing from South Asia were seeking safe havens in Yemen and Somalia. Any single event -- or more likely a confluence of worst-case events beyond the ability of the Yemeni government to control -- could lead to a further erosion of central government authority in Yemen and destabilization of the region. As the central government’s authority and legitimacy continue to deteriorate, there will be more opportunities for extremists directed or inspired by al Qaeda to regroup, organize, train and launch operations against U.S. and allied targets throughout the Gulf region and globally.
Saudi Relations DA (Links)

Aff kills U.S.-Saudi relations – they hate Yemen transition – it challenges the MONARCHY MODEL


It will be difficult to balance Saudi interests with Yemeni demands. Some of Riyadh's principal Yemeni clients, such as General Ali Muhsin (one of Saleh's relatives who recently joined the opposition) and the Ahmar sheikhs, are unacceptable to the majority of Yemenis. Not only are they perceived to be deeply complicit in Saleh's corrupt and authoritarian system but they would also not allow for the emergence of a political order that is democratic, accountable, and representative. Most worrying for Riyadh, such a state could very well be less amenable to Saudi influence in Yemen and would put forward a successful model for republican rule in a region dominated by monarchies. The Muslim Brotherhood has played an important role in the demonstrations and enjoys legitimacy among Yemen's opposition. Some observers have attributed the discipline and nonviolent tactics of the youth in the street to the Brotherhood's effective leadership. It is unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia will want someone like Sheikh al-Zindani, a Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood leader, in a prominent position. From Riyadh's perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood -- whether in Yemen or elsewhere -- has proven unreliable and is a potential challenger of the Islamic legitimacy of the Saudi regime. Like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, the demonstrators who have taken to the streets in Yemen over the past months want a new political order, not more of the same. They want a transitional government of national unity, composed of technocrats, that will function until new parliamentary and presidential elections can be held. This, in effect, means the establishment of a democratic order -- an outcome that Riyadh, for ideological and practical reasons, will be reluctant to midwife. This leaves Saudi Arabia caught between two contradictory policy imperatives: maintaining its influence in Yemen and rendering the country sufficiently stable so as not to pose a threat. In Yemen, Riyadh is confronted with difficult choices and no easy solutions.

Saudi Arabia wants Yemen broken.


Many think that Saudi Arabia, with its historical proprietary stance towards their country, will try to manipulate any change in the political settlement. There is much speculation about the kind of trade-offs that Riyadh will be looking for in return for supporting a new leader and bankrolling the collapsing economy, and a lingering conviction that Saudi Arabia wants a weak, unstable Yemen that is easy to control.

Saudi Arabia shreds relations with America – the plan signals U.S. political values trump Saudi security interests.

Vali Nasr, Tufts, May 23, 2011. “Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring?”
In his speech last week on the Middle East, President Barack Obama left little doubt that America stands with the people of the region in their demand for change. This puts the U.S. on a collision course with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has emerged as the leader of a new rejectionist front that is determined to defeat popular demand for reform. One would have expected Iran to lead such a front, but instead it is America’s closest Arab ally in the region that is seeking to defeat our policy. Though the president made no mention of Saudi Arabia in his speech, in the near term, dealing with the kingdom is the biggest challenge facing the U.S. in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is only happy if they pull the strings


As for Yemen, the monarchy’s many years of involvement in the affairs of its poorer neighbor yielded great results—both President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his main rival Sadiq Al-Ahmar are loyal to Saudi Arabia and have been on its payroll for decades. Meanwhile, the leaders of the uprising have been sidelined and left with nothing more than giving speeches at rapidly shrinking rallies. Some might believe—erroneously—that the United States is taking the lead in Yemen. U.S. officials may get photo ops with Yemeni leaders, but these leaders dance to Saudi music alone. The reason is simple: the Saudis pay for those who obey them and complicate things for those who defy them.
No Maritime Attacks – AQAP doesn’t have the capability and structural barriers prevent

Merchant ships using a vital trade route off Yemen’s coast are unlikely to face major disruptions even if the country slides into civil war as militant groups lack the capability to regularly attack vessels. World powers have been pressing President Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign a Gulf-mediated deal to end his three-decade rule and stem spreading chaos in unstable Yemen, a haven for al Qaeda and neighbour to the world’s biggest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia. At stake is the Bab al-Mandab gateway off Yemen’s coast, through which more than 3 million barrels of oil are shipped daily to Europe, the United States and Asia. “In theory, should the regime collapse, security in the region could very well spiral downward," J. Peter Pham of U.S. think tank the Atlantic Council said. "Yemen has a long 1,900-km (1,181-mile) coastline fronting both the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea." Militants have launched successful maritime attacks in the area before. An al Qaeda suicide bombing killed 17 sailors on the U.S. warship Cole in Aden's port in 2000. Two years later, al Qaeda hit a French tanker in the Gulf of Aden, south of Bab al-Mandab. Al Qaeda also plotted to hijack or sink oil tankers last year, U.S. officials said last month, based on intelligence found in Osama bin Laden's Pakistan compound. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based wing of the militant group, is seen by analysts as one of the main groups that could target shipping in strategic sea lane. Yet while the risks would rise if Yemen collapsed, analysts played down the likelihood of an upswing in major AQAP attacks. “It is unlikely that AQAP would be able to gain enough of a foothold to really impact upon the Bab al-Mandab, despite past statements indicating they would aim to disrupt the strait,” said Alan Fraser, Middle East analyst with security firm AKE. “Sporadic maritime attacks are a possibility. However, as was shown by the attack on the Japanese tanker near the Strait of Hormuz in July 2010, these are logistically hard to carry out so the threat would be unlikely to escalate beyond a sporadic threat." One seaman was hurt in the Japanese tanker attack and there was no oil spill or disruption to shipping, suggesting that the way modern vessels are built minimises the risk of major damage. With international naval warships now operating an anti-piracy sea corridor that passes by Yemen, maritime analysts say AQAP could also find it harder to operate without detection. John Dalby, with maritime security specialists MRM, said that to mount a maritime attack, AQAP would need to "marshal resources, hardware and personnel somewhere on the coastline." “It’s to be hoped that such a move would be detected by the intelligence community and in real time by the naval and military assets stationed there,” he said. Peter Hinchliffe with the International Chamber of Shipping, said there appeared to be a will “to maintain the current level of warships to protect shipping." PIRATE RISK Turmoil in Yemen could embolden the Islamic al Shabaab group, which analysts say has ties with AQAP and operates in nearby Somalia, to try and launch attacks. "While there is no evidence that AQAP and its Somali friends possess the weapons and boats necessary to shut down the strait, this does not mean that they do not have the capability to disrupt navigation through this vital sea lane," said Pham. Maritime specialists said it was difficult to blow up or sink a tanker as they are built with a large number of separate cargo tanks, making the hull able to withstand a lot of damage. Trying to attack a moving tanker can also be made difficult. "A tanker can deflect small boats if it knows they are approaching, by altering course to create a wash effect. So attacks can be planned, but to carry them out you need people who are doing and have a good degree of luck," a shipping source said. "As all large tankers are now built with a double hull, or skin, around the cargo tanks, any attack would need to penetrate both hulls. These have a gap of around 3.5 metres between them. Sinking such a ship would be very difficult." Despite fears that Somali pirates, who have been operating along the Yemeni coastline, could also try to exploit the turmoil, analysts say it is unlikely they would link up with militant groups because they have different objectives. “Even if AQAP takes over large swathes of Yemen along with rebel tribesmen, we don't anticipate Somali pirates and Islamist terrorists creating some new alliance from hell,” said Michael Frodl, with Washington-based C-Level Maritime Risks and an adviser to Lloyd’s of London underwriters. Their interests are still very different Pirates won’t help terrorists blow up ships as long as they can still hijack them and fetch fat ransoms."

Yemen not a pirate hub
NATO said it had ships in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden since March 2009 and the presence of NATO warships and other nations' navies had resulted in a significant reduction in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden over the past two years. "We are not complacent and understand there is still much work to be done," a NATO spokeswoman said. "As Yemen forms the northern coast of the Gulf of Aden and is only 200 miles from Somalia, it is feasible that the pirates could use Yemen ports for supplies. However, we have no evidence to suggest that this is happening. Similarly with Socotra, there is no evidence to suggest it is used as a pirate hub." Yemen, the Arab world’s poorest country, has been paralysed by six months of mass protests against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s three-decade rule. After surviving an assassination attempt last month, Saleh went to Saudi Arabia for treatment. The Arabian Peninsula country has descended into violence with militants suspected of ties to al Qaeda seizing two cities. "In the 1990s, before there was much by way of Somali piracy, the real threat in the region was from Yemeni pirates," the Atlantic Council’s Pham said. "While they were largely put out of business by more aggressive Somali pirates as well as government action, in the absence of the latter, the threat could re-emerge as well." Alan Fraser, Middle East analyst with security firm AKE, said it was unlikely that Somali pirates would have any real interest in carrying out major activities on Yemen’s mainland even if the situation deteriorated. "Tribal codes and religious values are more conservative in Yemen than in Somalia so piracy is not likely to take off in the same way," he said.

No risk they take over

In another bold attack in June that Yemen blamed on al Qaeda, gunmen killed 11 people at the southern regional headquarters of a Yemeni intelligence agency in Aden, the deadliest attack in Yemen since the Cole bombing. But the group’s call earlier this year for a blockade of Bab al-Mandab to cut off U.S. shipments to Israel does not mean al Qaeda is capable of such an operation, said Jim Cameron, senior analyst at Stirling Assynt. "It’s certainly a real threat although I think it’s probably more an aspiration rather than a capability at the moment." In addition, it would not be easy to completely close off the 22-km (14-mile) strait, experts say. "The strait is wide and the currents are strong and complex, so it would be difficult to actually block it in a physical sense," said Roy Facey, port adviser to the Port of Aden. A Yemen coastguard base to support maritime interventions, and the ability of Yemeni forces to control any high land overlooking the strait gives me a lot of confidence that the threats we hear of would be very difficult to implement. But calls to close Bab al-Mandab still impact sentiment in the region’s shipping industry, reeling from pirate attacks, said Hisham al-Saqaf, general manager of shipping and marine services firm Gulf Agency Company (GAC) Yemen. "I don’t know how they would do it but of course this is a threat and ship owners take these things seriously," he said.
Impact – Yemen Collapse Causes Saudi Collapse

Collapse of Yemen would destroy Saudi Arabia due to instability and refugee flow-they are linked


The future of Yemen is inextricably linked to the stability and security of Saudi Arabia. With key figures in Yemen defecting to the opposition and violence between the Saleh regime and anti-government forces escalating, Saudi Arabia faces a major challenge in managing its policy toward Yemen due to its own internal divides as well as the rapidly deteriorating conditions in its neighbor to the south. Like other regional powers, Saudi Arabia is scrambling to assess, manage and, if possible, contain the rapid rate of political change in the region, especially in Yemen. Unlike other countries, however, Saudi Arabia’s future is intimately linked with that of Yemen, a situation that poses a potential danger to the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has historically had a hand in the internal affairs of Yemen, and a policy of buying influence among the tribal powers, as well as lesser figures, has long formed the backbone of Saudi foreign policy in Yemen. Following an appeal by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Saudi government finds itself acting as the mediator between the Saleh regime and opposition forces. Despite the complex and at times contentious relationship between Saleh and Saudi Arabia, the Saudis cannot afford the departure of Saleh and the chaos that would undoubtedly result in Yemen. Additionally, Saudi fears of the Houthi movement along its border with northwest Yemen and the possibility of the Houthis consolidating their power in the region through the fall of Saleh provide even more incentive to the Saudis to take an active role in Yemen’s political crisis. Introduction The founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn-Saud (1876-1953) is purported to have said on his deathbed, “the good or evil for us will come from Yemen.” [1] The quote, regardless of its authenticity, accurately reflects the great importance and potential danger that Yemen poses to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a long and complex history of involvement in Yemeni politics and this is unlikely to change. The future of Yemen, whatever that may bring, is intimately linked with that of Saudi Arabia and its influence in the country. Faced with an ever increasing number of defections from his government and the military, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh called on Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal to mediate between his government and the anti-government protesters. On March 21, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr al-Qiribi, was dispatched to Riyadh with a letter from Saleh (Asharq al-Awsat, March 21). This came after Yemen’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia joined many of his colleagues around the world and defected to the protesters. Publicly, Saudi officials have maintained the line that the crisis in Yemen is an internal matter. However, behind the scenes, the Saudi government is deeply involved in negotiations with Yemen’s tribal, political, and military leaders over the future of the regime and the country. An Unruly Neighbor Relations between the al-Saud dynasty and Yemen began with an al-Saud led attack on the Zaidi Imamate in 1803 that ended in Saudi forces pushing into parts of the Tihama region along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Saudi expansion on was brought to an end in 1818 when forces under Egyptian Viceroy Muhammad Ali Pasha reestablished nominal Ottoman control over the Hijaz and parts of Yemen. However, in 1926, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud established a protectorate over the region of Asir along the Red Sea coast. Asir was once part of “Greater Yemen” which included parts of what are now the Saudi provinces of Asir, Jizan, and Najran. In 1932, Imam Yahya of Yemen moved his forces into the border region of Najran, but Saudi forces countered two years later with a major offensive that drove Yahya’s forces out of the region. The defeat led to the Treaty of Taif in which Imam Yahya recognized Saudi claims to Asir, Najran and Jizan. [2] For roughly the next 30 years, Yemeni-Saudi relations were largely free of the upheaval that characterized much of the first three decades of the 20th century. In 1962, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, who had just claimed the title of Imam upon the death of his father Imam Ahmad, was overthrown by a military coup backed by the Arab nationalist regime of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Imam al-Badr and other princes from the Hamid al-Din family retreated to the mountains of northern Yemen and marshaled their forces to fight the Egyptian backed Republican forces. Yemen quickly
became the stage for a proxy war between Nasser’s Egypt and the monarchist al-Saud regime, which feared Nasser’s Arab nationalistic rhetoric and expansionist agenda. More than 50,000 Egyptian troops were deployed to Yemen to help fight the Saudi-backed Royalists. The Republican coup against al-Badr almost, albeit indirectly, led to the collapse of the House of Saud. Reform minded factions within the Saudi royal family supported some of the republican/nationalist ideals and wavered in their support for the Royalists, who sought the restoration of the imamate. Most importantly, elements within the Saudi military supported the idea of republican/nationalist influenced reforms. The political upheaval in Yemen led to a dramatic reshuffling of the government in Saudi Arabia. The conservative faction within the Saudi royal family that supported the status quo sidelined the reformers and cautiously supported the Royalists with arms and money. The hard fought civil war in Yemen began to wind down in 1967 but was not officially concluded until 1970. The Saudis were forced to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and began providing financial support to the new state while maintaining its long standing political and financial ties to many of Yemen’s most important tribal figures – notably the al-Ahmar family which heads the Hashid tribal confederation. In south Yemen, what became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) gained its independence from Great Britain in 1967. The move in south Yemen towards Marxist/Leninist ideologies presented even more of a problem for the conservative monarchist government of Saudi Arabia. Until Yemen’s unification in 1990, Saudi foreign policy in Yemen was largely three pronged: contain and counter the threat of the expansionist PDRY, keep reform-minded leaders in the YAR in check and thwart efforts aimed at unification of the two countries. Saudi efforts to influence policy and events in the PDRY were largely failures, but it was far more successful at exerting influence in the YAR. Saudi involvement in the downfall of both YAR President Abdul Rahman al-Iyani (1967-74) and his successor Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi (assassinated in 1977) is widely suspected by many Yemenis and scholars. Al-Hamdi remains a popular figure in Yemen and a few posters with his portrait pasted on them have been carried by anti-government protesters in Sana’a. Though unsupported by evidence, the popular belief in Yemen is that the Saudis played a part in al-Hamdi’s assassination. This belief was reiterated by a few of the protesters camped out near Sana’a university when asked by Jamestown about their views on Saudi Arabia. Saudi relations with President Ali Abdullah Saleh are complex to say the least. Saleh has proven to be as adept at managing the Saudis as he has at his tribes and tribal leaders. Shortly after taking power, he moved to counter the Saudi stranglehold on his arms supply by signing a $600 million arms deal with the Soviets, despite the fact that they were also backing his enemies in the PDRY. At the same time, Saleh maintained his reliance on the tribal system in north Yemen and did not act overtly to strengthen the central government to the disadvantage of the tribes. This pleased the Saudis since they pleased sway over the tribal leaders. Yemeni-Saudi relations deteriorated markedly in the run up to the first Gulf War (1990-91), Yemen, which held a seat on the UN Security Council, failed to vote in favor of authorizing military action against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This miscalculation on the part of Saleh and his advisors cost Yemen dearly in both economic and political terms. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries canceled the work visas of over a million Yemenis. The loss of income from remittances dealt the Yemeni economy a blow it never really recovered from. After September 11 and the advent of the “War on Terror,” Saudi Arabia and the United States dramatically increased aid to Yemen. The threat of Yemen becoming a base from which Salafi inspired militants could launch attacks into Saudi Arabia, motivated Saudi officials to adopt a more proactive and overt foreign policy. Buying influence Saudi Arabia has long pursued a policy that aims to secure influence by paying “salaries” to many of Yemen’s most powerful figures within the government, the military and among the tribal leaders. The policy of buying influence has yielded mixed and admittedly unquantifiable results, but it forms the backbone of Saudi foreign policy in Yemen. However, it is not just tribal figures that receive Saudi money; it is likely that many ranking members of the Saudi regime receive “salaries” from Saudi Arabia. In a country that is as poor as Yemen, the money provided by Saudi Arabia, especially to lesser figures, is important and gives the Saudis considerably more influence than most other external powers. The Houthis Threat In 2009, the Yemeni military’s inability to put down or even contain the Houthis (Muslims who subscribe to a strident form of Zaidi Shi’ism) rebellion in the north forced Saudi Arabia to become directly involved in Yemen (see Terrorism Monitor, January 28, 2010). Saudi Arabia is historically cautious about deploying any of its military assets abroad. The 1934 war with Yemen and the two Gulf Wars were the only times in more than eighty years that it deployed troops in significant numbers outside its borders, though Saudi troops are currently deployed in Bahrain as part of a Gulf Cooperation Council force. Thus Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Houthi conflict, though still limited, denotes how seriously they take the threat posed by the Houthis. Saudi fears of the Houthi movement center on concerns about its own religious minorities in the provinces northwest Yemen, where the Houthis are based. The province of Najran in particular is home to a large population of Zaidis and Ismailis (another Shi’a sect). In 2000, Saudi Arabia was forced to put down an Ismaili revolt. Many of the residents in Najran are also ethnically Yemeni. The 2009-10 phase of the Houthi war left the Houthis in control of large parts of the Yemeni governorate of Sa’dah, which abuts the southern border of Saudi Arabia. The signs are that the Houthis and Houthis aligned groups are already taking advantage of the weakness of the Saleh regime by consolidating their hold on the region. In particular, reports indicate that they have taken complete control of the city of Sa’dah (Mareb Press, March 21; NewsYemen March 20). These events must have the Saudis deeply worried, although, given the poor performance of their forces against the Houthis in 2009-2010, it is unlikely that they will take any kind of overt action apart from continuing to try to shore up defenses and security along their southwestern border. Saving President Saleh? Saudi Arabia, like other regional powers, is scrambling to try to assess, manage, and, if possible, contain the rapid rate of political change in the region. Saudi Arabia’s management of its foreign policy in Yemen has been frustrated by its own internal divides. The Yemen portfolio, in theory, belongs to Crown Prince and Defense Minister Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud. However, he is ill and possibly incapacitated. Interior Minister Prince Nayef Abd al-Aziz al-Saud and his son Prince Muhammad bin Nayef seem to be the men who are really in charge of the portfolio but this remains unclear. Outwardly, Saudi Arabia has continued to pursue its usual conservative and cautious approach to foreign policy by largely refusing to comment on events in Yemen. However, subtle shifts are detectable. The Saudi supported satellite channel al-Arabiya, while largely ignoring the revolt in Bahrain, has been covering Yemen and has used introductions like “Change in Yemen.” Despite an at times contentious relationship with President Saleh, the Saudis cannot in anyway be happy about his likely departure and what this will mean for Yemen. Keeping Yemen weak and divided was very much an historical objective of Saudi foreign policy in Yemen, but the possibility of having a fragmented and chaotic Yemen as a neighbor at a time when Saudi Arabia is already facing its own set of problems likely means that Saudi Arabia is doing all it can to encourage stability and some kind of orderly transition that ensures roles for as many
members of the Saleh regime as possible. Conclusion One analyst recently speculated that if Yemen were to descend into civil war, a real possibility would be that as much as half of Yemen’s population of almost 24 million might try to seek shelter in Saudi Arabia. [3] Saudi Arabia could not begin to manage this. It largely failed to manage the refugee/ IDP crisis that arose from the 2009-10 war with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s cautious and almost always covert foreign policy of the past may well be replaced with one that is more overt. This kind of change would be replete with dangers. Saudi Arabia is not popular with large portions of the Yemeni populace. Its involvement in the 2009-10 war against the Houthis helped further erode Saudi popularity in the country. Yet the changes in Yemen could easily – and most likely will – affect the House of Saud. In this regard, the possibly prophetic last words of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud are certainly worth remembering.
Impact – Terror Causes Intervention, Collapse U.S. Heg

A successful terrorist attack would cause full scale US intervention in Yemen – that crushes hegemony

Terrill '11 [Dr. W. Andrew Terrill is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, “Preventing Yemen from Becoming Fallujah”, November 1, 2010, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preventing-Yemen-from-Becoming-Fallujah/2010/11/1]

In the rapidly mutating world of international terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has become one of the most serious threats facing the United States. The recent AQAP attempt to use parcel bombs against U.S.-bound aircraft is only the most recent manifestation of this problem. The Christmas 2009 attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in Detroit by a Nigerian radical trained by Yemeni terrorists was an earlier warning to the United States about the dangers of neglecting events in this country. Both of these near-catastrophic episodes underscored the necessity for serious U.S. efforts to support all reasonable endeavors to defeat this organization with an informed, careful, and meticulous strategy based on a comprehensive understanding of Yemen and the terrorists. This requirement may be especially clear when one considers the chain of events that could be set off: If AQAP is eventually able to implement a spectacular terrorist event, then AQAP leaders clearly intend the United States to intervene on this subject, and this passion goes far beyond al Qaeda sympathizers.

Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004, a cauldron of radicalism and anti-American hate. To head this off, AQAP's capacity for spectacular terrorist strikes must correspondingly be ended soon while the organization itself must eventually be destroyed. The enemy we are facing must therefore be carefully examined. A major reason that AQAP actions in Yemen are expanding involves the January 2009 merger of Yemen's al-Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula (AQSA) with the Saudi branch of al Qaeda under the original Saudi name of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. After a bitter struggle against Saudi military and police forces in the mid 2000s, Saudi radicals fled their home country and regrouped in Yemen on the understanding that al-Qaeda military operations against the Saudi government would continue from there. The merger of the two branches of al Qaeda led to a reinvigoration of the terrorist organization in Yemen, even while the movement accepted a weakened presence in Saudi Arabia (which they viewed as temporary). The merger also allowed Saudi radicals to use their strong fundraising skills to obtain significant additional resources for the new organization at levels that must have stunned the Yemeni members. As promised, the newly unified organization also continued to struggle against the Riyadh government from Yemen and in August 2009 they attempted to assassinate Prince Mohammad bin Nayef. Prince Mohammad is the son of the current Saudi Interior Minister and holds the key position of Director of Counterterrorism within the Ministry of Interior. The recent terrorism efforts against the United States are all the more serious considering that spectacular acts of terrorism against the West are only a secondary priority for AQAP—so far. Back home in Yemen, the organization is seeking to expand its influence in the Yemeni hinterland southeast of the capital of Saana. In some places, AQAP appears more like a full scale insurgent organization able to take and hold small towns until Yemeni military forces mass sufficient numbers of troops to oust them. Such actions appear faintly reminiscent of the actions of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004, although they are not yet anywhere near that scale. Another AQAP priority is to seize the leadership of the currently non-violent Southern Movement, which seeks to reestablish an independent Yemeni state in the south. The Southern Movement is currently repulsed by al Qaeda, but the terrorists are likely to continue their efforts to re-align the southerners to embrace a violent solution to their grievances. Despite these distractions, some of the AQAP leaders clearly maintain a special hatred of the United States and they will seek to strike again soon. Others will continue to emphasize gains within Yemen, but will no doubt seek to escalate strikes against the West if they are able to consolidate power within the Yemeni hinterland. New terrorism efforts against the United States are clearly coming. The only questions are when and with what levels of frequency and intensity. That leaves the questions of what to do and what not to do. The United States must not seek to Americanize the conflicts in Yemen, and should avoid sending major ground combat units there under almost all circumstances. However bad the situation may become in Yemen, Americanizing the war against AQAP can only make it dramatically worse. Yemeni public opposition to the presence of foreign ground troops with combat missions is almost universal, and it is possible that large elements of the Yemeni public would rise against their president and parliament if the government invited the United States to provide such forces. Certainly, the Yemeni clergy is particularly shrill on this subject, and this passion goes far beyond al Qaeda sympathizers.
AT Saudi Relations DA

Saudi Arabia would prefer a democratic Yemen

Few nations are more worried about the potential chaos in Yemen than Saudi Arabia. The conservative kingdom has resisted much of the change roiling the Arab world, but may make an exception if it means a more stable Yemen; Saudi Arabia is not a natural ally of the vanguard of Yemen’s political uprising. One prominent pro-democracy activist in Sana’a says Yemeni youth regard the kingdom with suspicion. Adel Abu Arrabei argues that because Saudi Arabia has no standards for a democratic and civil state, any meeting of the minds would be impossible. Added to that doubt is a widespread perception that President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been able to count on Saudi support. Tom Finn, a freelance journalist in Sana’a, said “One major reason that Yemen has been perhaps different from the other Arab Spring movements, especially from the longevity of the protest, is that I think Ali Abdullah Saleh is still somehow convinced that at least he has the backing of Saudi Arabia, which is also an incredibly strong regional power.” Throughout the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia showed a preference for the status quo, whether lending support for the now-ousted presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, or sending tanks to help Bahrain put down its popular uprising. But with Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors have taken a different approach. The Gulf Cooperation Council came up with a plan to ease President Saleh out of office, and provide a peaceful transfer of power. Mr. Saleh says he agrees to the plan in principal, but keeps finding a reason not to sign. Some observers believe that if Saudi Arabia was serious about removing the Yemeni leader, it missed a major opportunity. They argue that when Mr. Saleh went to Riyadh in June to recover from an assassination attempt, the Saudis should have made him stay. But the director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Stephen Steinbeiser says the legality of detaining Mr. Saleh was likely only part of the Saudis’ calculations to let him return late last month. “They probably felt that the president was really the only one who could quell growing violence, especially in the immediate days leading up to his return, and he still had the credibility of most people to broker a transition deal, whatever that might look like eventually,” he said. That GCC initiative could eventually undercut not only the suspicion of the student activists, but also a long standing argument about Saudi Arabia’s view of Yemen: that the kingdom never minded a bit of instability in its poorer neighbor, if only because it made manipulation easier. But any vulnerability of Yemen has turned to a liability. In recent years, when Saudi-based terrorists were pushed out and joined their Yemeni counterparts to form al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. Political analyst Steinbeiser says the attraction of a weak neighbor might have been appealing in the past. “At this point I think the Saudis realize there are bigger problems than having a very strong Yemen or something like that, if they see that as a problem. These problems of terrorism or fundamentalism are far more severe and perhaps far more imminent,” he said. Al-Qa’ida is not the only force that Saudi Arabia worries could exploit the unrest. Much has been written about Iran trying to gain a foothold on the Arabian peninsula. There are potential ties between Shi’ite Iran and related religious groups in Yemen, in particular the rebellious Houthis in the north. Several political observers in Yemen believe the threat is overblown, but should it come to pass, Steinbeiser says staunchly Sunni Saudi Arabia and others wouldn’t hesitate to act. “I think that the other Gulf countries would be very, very concerned about this and I think we would see them intervene, with Saudi Arabia’s full backing, to thwart any potential interference from Iran in Yemen if it were as overt as that,” he said. A democratic Yemen may not be the first choice of the absolute monarchy in Saudi Arabia, but to many Saudi eyes, some of the alternatives would be far worse.

Relations are tanking now, no link and Saudi Arabia likes the plan

Given the messy and deep-seated problems in Yemen, the United States must be realistic about what it can accomplish. With limited resources and an even more limited public appetite for additional foreign policy burdens at this time, the United States has to leverage the power and influence of regional actors, principally Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Although relations with the kingdom have grown increasingly contentious since the onset of the Arab Awakening, there is room for cooperation on Yemen. Much like the United States’ relationship with Mexico, Saudi Arabia views its neighbor to
the south as a source of instability and potential problem is for years to come. As great as the threat of an unstable Yemen is for the United States, it is even greater for Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom is still willing to hedge its bets, but there is a growing realization within Riyadh that despite Salih’s return he will never be able to reunite the country. The longer Salih remains president, the worse the situation in Yemen will become. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia broadly agree on the main problems: the lack of a political transition, the danger of AQAP, and the simmering threat of Yemen’s fragile economy.

US and Saudi cooperating on Yemen now- they’d like the plan
Sanaa 11 (Sanaa, “US, Saudi pressure may keep Yemen leader abroad”,
&featuredAll, August 9, 2011, LEQ)

SANAA, Yemen — The U.S. and Saudi Arabia pressured Yemen’s president to stay in Saudi Arabia after he was released from a lengthy hospital stay to treat wounds suffered in an assassination attempt, Yemeni officials said Monday. The officials, speaking to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject, said the U.S. and Saudi warned Ali Abdullah Saleh that his return to Yemen would likely spark a civil war. In Washington, U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said it was up to Saleh to decide whether to stay on in Saudi Arabia or return home and that a transition of power should begin immediately regardless of what Saleh decides to do. ‘All we can do is continue to press our belief that this transition needs to happen immediately and cannot wait until a decision is made about his (Saleh’s) future,’ he said. ‘So, what we’re working on, through our embassy and our ambassador, is trying to move the process forward now, rather than wait.’ The Yemeni officials said that even though Saleh has spent the last two months in a Saudi hospital, he continues to run the country with the help of his family and is in daily contact with tribal chiefs and army commanders. ‘The president reluctantly caved in to American and Saudi pressure to stay on in Saudi Arabia,’ said one official who is close to Saleh. ‘He will continue to listen to them until he makes a full recovery from his wounds and then decide what to do.’ In Washington, a U.S. official cast doubt on the idea of American pressure on Saleh to stay on in Riyadh after his release from the hospital on Sunday. ‘It is more likely that any persuasion used successfully with Saleh came from the Saudis,’ said the official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. Saudi Arabia is among Washington’s staunchest Arab allies and has cooperated with the United States on many aspects of Mideast policy.

Here’s ev-
Strobel ’11 (Warren P. Strobel, McClatchy News, “‘Arab spring' drives wedge between U.S., Saudi Arabia”,

WASHINGTON — The United States and Saudi Arabia — whose conflicted relationship has survived oil shocks, the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq — are drifting apart faster than at any time in recent history, according to diplomats, analysts and former U.S. officials. The breach, punctuated by a series of tense diplomatic incidents in the past two weeks, could have profound implications for the U.S. role in the Middle East, even as President Barack Obama juggles major Arab upheavals from Libya to Yemen. The Saudi monarchy, which itself has been loath to introduce democratic reforms, watched with deepening alarm as the White House backed Arab opposition movements and helped nudge from power former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, another long-time U.S. ally, according to U.S. and Arab officials. That alarm turned to horror when the Obama administration demanded that the Saudi-backed monarchy of Bahrain negotiate with protesters representing the country’s majority Shiite Muslim population. To Saudi Arabia’s Sunni rulers, Bahrain’s Shiites are a proxy for Shiite Iran, its historic adversary. “We’re not going to budge. We’re not going to accept a Shiite government in Bahrain,” said an Arab diplomat, who spoke frankly on condition he not be further identified. Saudi Arabia has registered its displeasure bluntly. Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were rebuffed when they sought to visit the kingdom this month. The official cover story was that aging King Abdullah was too ill to receive them. Ignoring U.S. pleas for restraint, a Saudi-led military force from the Gulf Cooperation Council, a grouping of six Arab Persian Gulf states, entered Bahrain
on March 14, helping its rulers squelch pro-democracy protests, at least for now. A White House statement issued the day before enraged the Saudis and Bahrainis further, the diplomat and others with knowledge of the situation said. The statement urged "our GCC partners to show restraint and respect the rights of the people of Bahrain, and to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it." In a speech Sunday in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to Washington, said the Gulf countries now must look after their own security — a role played exclusively by the United States since the 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran. "Why not seek to turn the GCC into a grouping like the European Union? Why not have one unified Gulf army? Why not have a nuclear deterrent with which to face Iran — should international efforts fail to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons — or Israeli nuclear capabilities?" Turki said, according to a translation of his remarks by the UAE's state-controlled Emirates News Agency. 

U.S. relations with the Saudis and other Gulf monarchies *are as bad as they were after the fall of the Shah,* said Gregory Gause, an expert on the region and political science professor at the University of Vermont. "The whole idea that Saudi Arabia still needs U.S. protection for anything ... we've already moved beyond that," the Arab diplomat said. He termed it "not necessarily a divorce, (but) a recalibration." *The Saudi embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.* Despite the falling out, experts say there are limits to the U.S.-Saudi disaffection, if only because both countries share a common interest in oil flows, confronting Iran and countering al Qaida and other violent Islamic extremist groups. Past efforts by the GCC countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman _to handle their own security have failed. In 1990, when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Saudis and Kuwaitis turned to the U.S. military to save them. "In the end I think geopolitics will push the U.S. and Saudi Arabia back together again," Gause said. "Iran is still out there." Still, the tensions have already had real impact. 

Saudi Arabia is moving on its own to secure its interests in neighboring Yemen, where Saudi-and-U.S.-backed President Ali Abdullah Saleh is barely clinging to power after weeks of protests. The United Arab Emirates had pledged military aircraft to support the no-fly zone over Libya. But it has reconsidered, and for now is offering only humanitarian assistance. U.S. officials acknowledge stark differences with the Saudis over Egypt and Bahrain. Washington does not see Iran's hand behind the protests in Bahrain, they said, nor does it view the entire region through the sectarian lens that the Gulf monarchies do. While tempers are said to have cooled over Bahrain — the Obama administration did not denounce the Saudi incursion or demand GCC troops withdraw — tensions seem certain to persist. 

**Saudi concerns about U.S. policy are deep-seated, dating to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which brought into being the first Shiite-led Arab nation in modern history.** In Lebanon, Washington has not been able to stop Iranian-backed Hezbollah from steadily expanding its political clout. *"The problem is, the Saudis and the Gulf states are terrified by change," said Ken Pollack, director of the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy.*


**Saudi Arabia, perpetually in fear of chaos and instability, is a leading force** in the counterrevolution against the Arab Spring. As a self-identified bulwark of stability and conservatism, Riyadh wants no change in the political structures or balance of power in the Middle East and is threatened by the potential emergence of representative forms of government in its neighbors. This policy has been strikingly evident in its dealings with Bahrain: in February, the Saudi royal family told the country's al-Khalifa dynasty to brook no compromise with the opposition and to crush the demonstrations. Riyadh sees the possibility of Bahrain's Shiite majority population taking power as a threat that could lead to Iranian dominance -- a prospect that is wholly unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. 

Yet in Yemen, **Saudi Arabia has gone from supporting the rule of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to essentially strong-arming him into coming to Riyadh** for medical treatment after a bomb attack at his presidential palace earlier this month. **In Saudi Arabia’s eyes, Saleh’s hold on power became increasingly weak and untenable after months of protests, and Riyadh realized he has become a threat to stability rather than a protector of it.** In Yemen, political actors are more numerous, autonomous, fractious, and militarized than they are in other countries on the Arabian Peninsula. **Yemen cannot be stabilized by the sorts of tactics that Riyadh has used elsewhere: a small show of force, the backing of one faction over another, the raising of the specters of sectarianism and Iran's nefarious hand, or simply throwing money at the problem.** **Bringing order to Yemen will require Saudi**
Arabia to find an acceptable alternative to Saleh -- a proposition that is easier said than done.

Saudi Arabia has historically tried to keep Yemen's central government weak and its political actors divided. The thought of a strong and united Yemen gives the Saudi royals pause: Yemen is the most populous country in the Arabian Peninsula, with 24 million people, a population that is heavily armed, tribal, and impoverished. To maintain its influence over the decades, Riyadh has cultivated discrete relationships with many of Yemen's political leaders (who serve in government) and tribal sheikhs (who form a counterweight to the central government). Riyadh has not hesitated to punish Sana'a whenever it has expressed an independent policy. For example, during the Gulf War, when Saleh sided with Iraq's Saddam Hussein against Kuwait and the Saudi-led coalition, Saudi Arabia expelled nearly a million Yemeni migrant workers and cut off official aid to Yemen. (It did not, however, end its handouts to Yemen's tribes.) This moment marked the beginning of the unraveling of Yemen's economy, which today is in tatters. A few years later, in 1994, during Yemen's civil war, Riyadh continued to punish Saleh by supporting the secessionist socialists in southern Yemen. The Saudi leadership was not bothered by the fact that, in Wahhabi eyes, the socialists were infidels, further underscoring the pragmatic and non-ideological nature of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. For decades, Saudi Arabia's policy toward Yemen was set by Crown Prince Sultan, the head of the Saudi "special committee," an administrative organization that managed the Kingdom's relationship with Yemen's political and tribal actors, including the disbursement of regular monetary payments to Yemen's most prominent leaders. But over the last few years, Prince Sultan's health has deteriorated (he suffers from dementia) and the special committee has effectively stopped functioning. Saudi Arabia's policy toward Yemen is allegedly now being managed by Prince Nayef, the Saudi Minister of the Interior, whose son, Prince Muhammad, is responsible for fighting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Prince Nayef has his favorite Yemeni players, including a number of Salafis and Islamists, as well as General Ali Muhsin, a relative of Saleh's and a contender to replace him in power. The Saudi leadership has strong connections with other factions in Yemen, such as Hamid and Sadiq al-Ahmar, the two brothers who lead the Hashid tribal confederation and who were engaged in open battle with Saleh's forces last week; tribal sheikhs from the Bakil confederation, the country's largest; and influential families and tribes from south Yemen. The Saudis clearly are not short of Yemeni clients who would want to rule the country. The trick, however, will be to find a person or a coalition leaders who can bring a modicum of stability and prove acceptable to the opposition forces. The anti-regime youth may have the greatest numbers in the streets, but they have no recognized leaders and no established links to Saudi Arabia. Saleh's fate was effectively sealed on May 22, when he refused -- for the third time -- to sign a Gulf Cooperation Council plan, supported by the Saudis, that would have allowed him to resign and obtain immunity from prosecution. Saleh then attacked his tribal rivals and was subsequently severely injured in the June 3 bomb attack, for which he sought treatment in Riyadh. (Although Germany and the United States have long been the preferred destinations of the Yemeni elite for medical treatment, Saleh does not fear criminal prosecution in Saudi Arabia as he does in those countries.) The central question now is whether the Saudis will allow him to return to Sana'a or offer him and his family asylum, most likely in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, which he cannot refuse. Yemen's fate hinges on this decision -- Saleh's return would very likely result in a civil war. This is unlikely, however. Influential members of the Saudi royal family know Saleh well and know that his return could be explosive, a scenario they want to avoid at all costs. One senior Saudi prince recently told me that Saleh was the root cause of Yemen's problems and described him as a "lying trickster" who could not be trusted to bring calm. If Saudi Arabia will not allow Saleh to return to Yemen, what sort of government will it work to establish in his place?
AT Saudi Relations Impact

Saudi strains don’t mean collapse – relations resilient

Writing in the UK’s Financial Times, Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer argues that the ‘Arab Spring’ has tested the US-Saudi Relationship. The Op-Ed, entitled “Washington’s stark choice: Democracy or Riyadh,” makes a bizarre conclusion with respect to the US-Saudi relationship: “...The signs are unmistakable that the Arab spring will make their relationship much less special in future.” The long history of the so-called “special relationship” and the strength of the relationship in nearly every other area would seem to suggest otherwise. Mr. Bremmer is correct in noting that the US-Saudi relationship is under some strain. He is also only the most recent voice in a chorus of publications that have noted this. Most recently, the New York Times’ David Sanger and Eric Schmitt wrote an article entitled “U.S.-Saudi Tensions Intensify With Mideast Turmoil,” which on the whole was fairly accurate in describing the divergence of interests on some current events, like Bahrain and Libya, in this, the most eventful few months in the region in decades. However there is a massive difference between short-term strains and long-term ones. The US-Saudi relationship, like all bilateral relations between friendly nations, has had its ups and downs. To argue that the current row over Bahrain’s protests amounts to a relationship-changing crisis is more than a stretch especially when considering the history of the so-called “special relationship.”

Historical observers of the relationship will note that there have been several points over which the two nations disagreed, often strongly and publicly with each other. So, if one puts the recent disagreements into the context of relationship’s history, including the 1970’s oil shock, the 9/11 attacks, and other events that had the potential to spoil bilateral ties, it is easy to be confident about the strength of US-Saudi relations despite some current disagreements. After all, the Kingdom is the United States’ strongest regional ally, and one of its most important trading partners because of, but also beyond, oil. US-Saudi trade figures have risen consistently in the last decade, and the Saudi economy continues to diversify and grow. Speaking about the US-Saudi commercial partnership at the 2010 US-Saudi Business Opportunities Forum in Chicago, Illinois, Commerce Secretary Gary Locke said: “We are fortunate that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have a strong foundation of trust and partnership to build on.” Today Saudi Arabia is taking unprecedented steps to expand and diversify its economy into knowledge based industries. American companies have the expertise and resources to help the Kingdom reach its ambitious development goals and the opportunities for commercial engagement and partnership are immense. When you look at the sum of these projects, you see a country that is demonstrating vision and a commitment to generational growth. So, what we have is a crystal clear example of win-win opportunities. Saudi Arabia is embarking on historic development projects and its government welcomes U.S. companies to help it succeed.”

Saudi Arabia and the United States also cooperate closely on counterterrorism and balancing external regional threats. It would even be reasonable to argue that the current “row” over the situation in Bahrain and Libya will actually strengthen US-Saudi ties in the long run. The reality about US foreign policy in the region, as we see in Libya and Bahrain, is that the United States wants a smaller footprint in regional affairs, for better or worse for their interests. Saudi Arabia’s desire to increase its influence in the region, especially as a long time US ally, is not necessarily a bad thing even if American policymakers disagree with some of their actions. It is also true that a strengthened GCC will rely less on US security in the long-run to counter regional existential threats from Iran and its allies, but once again, this is not a bad thing – and has been a long time coming for Saudi Arabia. The United States has been selling advanced weaponry and providing training to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for reasons more than private profit.
Finally, the greatest tangible evidence of a strong US-Saudi bond in the future is arguably not in cooperation on defense, security, terrorism, or even business and trade. It is in education. One of King Abdullah’s greatest legacies for the relationship and to his own people will be his commitment to forever changing Saudi Arabia’s education system, and part of that change has been the King Abdullah Scholarship Program. The program sends bright Saudi students abroad, and the number one destination for those students is the United States. These students not only learn about US culture and society to bring back to Saudi Arabia, they bring Saudi culture and society to the United States. They are, as Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir remarked, themselves ambassadors from the Kingdom to the American heartland. Addressing a large group of Saudi students in the United States last year, Al-Jubeir said, “I can say to you with all sincerity that your work in the United States and your presence, your very being, has helped strengthen the fruitful and cooperative relationship between the people of Saudi Arabia and the people of the United States.” Disagreements, large and small, are healthy occurrences in relationships. The US-Saudi relationship has faced more than its share of difficult problems covering the many decades of their alliance, and there is no question that some interests in the short-term of this period of great change may diverge. However, this relationship has overcome greater tests, and emerged stronger from each as a result. If history is any guide, current disagreements will be no different, and the so-called “special relationship”
AT Saudi Prolif

Saudi Arabia won’t proliferate – no indigenous capability, they couldn’t buy one, and a U.S. Security Guarantee would be effective

Posen, 2006


Saudi Arabia would face similar, though stronger temptations, than Egypt. Saudi Arabia is arguably the other “great power” of the Persian Gulf region, and thus a natural competitor with Iran. With the demise of Iraq, it is the undisputed leader of the Arab states in the Gulf, and thus a rival to an Iran trying to expand its sphere of influence. Due to their proximity, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable to one another’s conventional military power. Saudi Arabia likely views itself as the protector of Sunni Arabs from Shia Arabs, and from Shia Iran. Saudi Arabia does not, however, have a developed nuclear science and technology effort. And it does not have the other industrial capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. Saudi Arabia would thus take quite a long time to develop its own nuclear forces, and like Egypt, would be vulnerable in the interval. They would have to rely on an external guarantee, and the guarantor probably would not want to be a party to any nuclear program. With its wealth, however, it cannot be ruled out that the Saudis would simply try to buy nuclear weapons. They would need more than a few to compete with an Iranian program, and they would need delivery systems. Pakistan seems the only possible source, but it is under a great deal of scrutiny. Pakistan would face enormous pressure not to transfer complete weapons to another party. Finally, Saudi Arabia does have good reason to believe that outsiders are committed to its security. The United States and other great powers have extensive economic and military interests in maintaining Saudi security. The United States has demonstrated its commitment in many ways, including war. The Saudis are accustomed to security cooperation with the United States. A U.S. guarantee likely would prove the most attractive option for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia would rather rely on the American security guarantees than develop its own forces and it has no infrastructure so development would be slow.


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EU lead Solves best – they’ll coordinate roles with US and get them on board – solving perception of US support

Dergham, 11 (Raghida, Senior Diplomatic Correspondent @ Al Hayat, 7/22, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghida-dergham/the-european-role-and-the_b_907286.html)

The European Role and the Aspirations of the Arab People For Europe, both the declining U.S. interest in international affairs and the fact that Russia’s approach to international diplomacy has reverted to the Soviet mentality, represent an opportunity for the continent to play an exceptional and effective role, both internationally and regionally. In truth, the Middle East, the Gulf region and North Africa are all geographically proximate to Europe, in addition to being the theatre where many European strategic and economic interests come together. In the past few decades, the European role was merely that of a proxy, in the era of the American and Soviet superpowers during the Cold War, despite the historical relations between Europe and the Arab region, stretching from the Middle East to the Gulf and North Africa. However, this decade has seen a shift in the relations with Europe, with the wave of change that swiped the region with the beginning of the year. Yet the sovereign debt and Euro-zone crises have both held back the European Union, and brought many European countries into a shortfall of, or even to reneging on, the promises and pledges they had made. The idea of applying the principle of a Marshall Plan-like initiative, in order to ensure the success of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, has regressed, leaving only promises behind and an absence of the means to execute them. But the European interest in the events of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Iran and Lebanon, as well as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, has not regressed. On the contrary, every time the United States has lagged behind in Libya or in Syria for example, the European countries have helped resuscitate American interest, so that it may not fall into the slumber that usually comes when it fixates itself upon its domestic affairs, especially during an elections period. For instance, when the Obama Administration made a faux pas two weeks ago, which could have otherwise come at an exorbitant cost, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union – Catherine Ashton – took charge and succeeded at reversing a terrible draft statement by the Quartet on the Middle East. Further, Europe plays an equally important role in light of that played by Russia in the Security Council and at the regional level, providing, for example, absolute protection for the regimes in Tripoli, Damascus and Tehran, with total disregard for the demands of the people in those countries. China trails closely behind Russia on these issues, as it, too, pursues a policy of “obstruction”, which the Soviets had adopted under Communism, shackling the Security Council either by threatening to use veto powers to prevent the adoption of a resolution, or by threatening to use veto powers to prevent the adoption of a resolution. The importance of Europe’s role in light of such circumstances – be they the result of American, Russian or Chinese actions -- lies in preventing submission to the Russian tactic of “obstruction without explanation” (in fact, this tactic stems from a Russian feeling of superiority thanks to its veto powers, and to having the freedom to place national interests above the duties of the countries that have been given veto powers, namely giving priority to threats to international peace and security). The importance of the European role thus lies in either filling the vacuum or coordinating roles with the American ally in supporting fledgling Arab democracies. The importance of the European Union’s role also lies in seizing the opportunity of strategic partnerships with those actively shaping a brighter future for the Arabs. This is an opportunity that serves Europe’s interest for numerous reasons, and one that is accessible today for reasons connected not only to history and geography, but also to Europe’s role on the international scene, within the equation for the American-Russian-Chinese relations in the coming era. That does not mean that Europe ought to claim to replace the United States regionally or internationally, nor for the Obama Administration to take refuge in Europe’s role to avoid mending relations that are essential for the United States, or to continue hesitating over strategic issues. Cont….. The Europeans have begun invoking the language of President Bashar Al-Assad “stepping down”, and there are reports about back channels offering the president a safe exit and a dignified departure. The U.S. Administration insists that its overt position was expressed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, when she spoke last week of Assad losing the “legitimacy” to rule, and warned him of the consequences of assuming that he was indispensable. Any interpretation of what she said later in Istanbul as backtracking on the stance expressed in Washington is, according to the American assertion, mere speculation, and what is happening in reality is a stepping up of American, European, and Turkish pressures on the regime in Syria. What is happening behind the scenes includes precise and critical coordination between the US Administration, the Turkish government and the European Union, including conveying stern messages to the Syrian government. Turkey today is part of the partnership with the European Union and the United States on Syria, while the Arab League is excluding itself from the future and reiterating outdated expressions and stances that oppose people and defend regimes and their oppression. The new Secretary General of the Arab League Nabil El-Araby has done himself harm as he has done harm to the Arab people and to the Arab League, through his insistence on belonging to the past, while he himself has come to this post as a result of being revitalized by the Egyptian uprising for reform. There are perhaps today two major camps, one being the partnership between the Arab League, Russia and China in protecting the regimes from being held to account for oppressing their people; and the other being led, locally,
by Turkey in partnership with the European Union and the United States. The latter also includes partnership with the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that have understood the importance of listening to the people, and have also understood that stability has a new meaning after the eruption of the Arab uprising. Everything is temporary and provisional until the events in Syria unfold clearly. The panic of the leaders of the regime in Damascus is such that they have come up with the novelty of recognizing the Palestinian state, while the flames of protests are engulfing Syria’s cities. Meanwhile, in spite of all the weakness and disorder within the ranks of the Syrian opposition, its insistence on change and accountability is unwavering, as lives are put on the line in the battle for change and freedom.

Solves Best – Captures US signal and they’ll say yes – they specifically seek out project specific international funding


National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

If the German party stiftungen served as a model for all party foundations, so has the NED served as a model for the European and other umbrella democracy foundations that have emerged in the past decade. The NED, funded by a yearly Congressional appropriation (although it also receives and disburses earmarked funds for special projects), supports the work of four core institutes – two party institutes, NDI and IRI, both of which have very loose ties to their namesake parties, and ACILS and CIPE, which have ties to the AFL/CIO and American Chamber of Congress, respectively. The NED, which reserves half of its funding for discretionary grants to developing country organizations, also supports the Forum for Democratic Studies, the Journal of Democracy, and the World Movement for Democracy. With its four core institutes spanning the U.S. ideological spectrum, grant-making capacity, academic gravitas, and international networks, the NED is the undisputed leader in the democracy assistance world and has defined the field for most of the last two decades. The NED’s governance is multi-sectoral and multi-partisan with senior Democratic, Republican, business and labour leaders seeking and serving on its prestigious board of directors. All four core institutes are separately chartered, non-profit, private organizations that also seek and receive project specific funding. In most cases, project specific funding for the core institutes, often from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or from other national or multi-lateral funders like the UNDP, now surpasses NED core funding. Each core institute is required to submit proposals for NED funding, which is apportioned to each institute equally - half of the NED’s appropriation is reserved for discretionary activity while the other half is split equally among the four core members. The NED collaborates with the core institutes to write a yearly strategy document, which is then reviewed regularly by the board. The strategy paper plays some role in proposal selection and approval. Core institute proposals are reviewed by NED program staff and must be approved at quarterly meetings of the board of directors. Funding Funding for the NED is appropriated by Congress each year but has been steady at about $40 million USD per year. The NED also receives earmarked funding for special projects and recently received $5 million for projects in Muslim countries and $30 million to support political party, civil society, labour, and private sector development in Iraq.
Private Aid – Tax Credit

The United States federal government should extend a tax credit of 39 cents for every dollar invested by business, non-governmental organizations, and individuals that [do the aff]

Tax credits expand foreign aid and avoid corruption and bureaucracy

Werker, 7

While foreign aid works in some situations, it is beset by two huge problems. First, there is never enough money to go around. Last year, the United States provided $23 billion of development aid to foreign countries. This was more than any other donor, but it still resulted in very little for the billion people who live on less than one dollar per day. The second problem is that the money that does get distributed doesn't always reach the people who need it. As Jeffrey Sachs has noted, of every dollar given to Africa, only 44 cents is actually directed toward economic development. The rest goes to debt service, consultants and humanitarian emergencies. And after those expenses are subtracted, the money that remains is further reduced by mismanagement and corruption. A solution to both problems would be to give tax credits to American companies that invest in qualified developing countries. A similar program that focuses on domestic poverty has been a resounding success. In 2000, Congress created $6 billion of tax credits for businesses that invest in poor communities within the United States. The theory was that the cycles of poverty and joblessness in poor communities could be ended only by the development of local businesses, not by an aid check. Seven years later, so many businesses want to invest in poor areas that only a quarter of the companies that applied for tax credits in 2006 received them. Using the domestic program as a template, Congress should provide a 39-cent tax credit for every dollar of American investment in developing countries. If General Electric were to build a $100 million factory in Madagascar, its tax bill would be reduced by $39 million. The lost revenue to government coffers would be offset by reducing direct foreign aid by the same amount. The power of substituting tax credits for lump sums of cash is that while the latter would bring at most $39 million to Madagascar, the former results in a $100 million investment. For the exact same cost to the federal government, Madagascar receives far more resources. And by leveraging its foreign aid dollars, the United States is better off too, for reasons ranging from the creation of new markets to alleviating conditions that may aid terrorist recruitment. Using tax credits instead of traditional foreign aid also means that the money will be spent more prudently. Because for-profit companies are focused on the bottom line, these companies will by nature be more protective than government agencies of the money they invest in developing countries. Developing countries themselves clamor for more foreign investment as a way to generate real economic development. They set up export promotion agencies and offer their own tax breaks to foreign companies. With $100 million in foreign investment from American companies, government officials in Madagascar could spend their time tackling other domestic problems. Moving from inefficient direct aid to investment tax credits could lead to a fivefold increase in the capital that is deployed in developing countries. Of the $23 billion the United States currently spends on foreign aid, less than half reaches the ground. Providing $23 billion in tax credits, on the other hand, would lead to $59
billion of investment, if the domestic formula is applied abroad. Of course, the private sector is not always efficient, and not all of the money allocated to foreign aid should be converted to tax credits. But by involving the private sector, the United States could significantly increase the amount of money we spend in poor countries, without using any more taxpayer dollars. A program of tax credits for private investment in developing countries could be structured to reinforce goals other than economic growth. The tax credits could be awarded to countries that embrace "green" development or good governance, providing an extra incentive for countries to achieve these goals. Eligibility could be restricted to new investment that generates jobs and transfers know-how to the poorest countries that do not compete directly with American workers.
Private Aid – Tax Reform

The United States federal government should alter tax law for private foundations and individuals that contribute to organizations [doing the aff].
+ eliminate the prohibition against lobbying activities by private foundations
+ apply a charitable deduction for private contributions to organizations [doing the aff]

Removing tax exemption restrictions encourages a wave of private aid
Crimm, 3

The events of September 11 provided a compelling catalyst for the Bush administration to analyze this nation’s foreign policy by particularly focusing on our present lack of pecuniary support abroad for building social capital, fostering economic development, promoting social stewardship, and bolstering humanitarian projects. The administration and Congress might reverse this dearth of financial assistance by encouraging the global philanthropic participation of America’s citizens, residents, and entities through consistent, harmonious, and thoughtful tax policies and laws. Although a number of federal tax laws central to global philanthropy have positive objectives, their implementation in the context of international giving is problematic, as is demonstrated by the opinions of study participants. Congressional and administrative attention was not focused on international giving as these federal tax rules were put into place, and they now should be revisited with the interests of our country as a critical player in the globalized world in mind. Moreover, a special task force of the American Bar Association Section on Exempt Organizations, United States International Grant-Makers, and the Council on Foundations share the concern that our federal tax laws do not efficiently and effectively encourage global philanthropy.

n42 A. Charitable Contribution Deduction 1. Inconsistencies Although individuals and domestic corporations can make nondeductible charitable contributions directly to foreign charitable organizations, global philanthropy is likely stimulated by the charitable contribution deduction. n427 It is important, therefore, to consider whether the income, estate, and gift tax charitable contribution deduction statutes warrant modification. There are inconsistencies in the statutory requirements for entitlement to the charitable contribution deduction for income, estate, and gift tax purposes. n428 No geographic restrictions are imposed under the estate or gift tax provisions in order for a donor to claim a charitable contribution deduction. n429 As a result, citizens and resident aliens can freely transfer assets by inter vivos gift or bequest directly to foreign charitable organizations without incurring gift or inheritance taxes on such transfers. By comparison, for purposes of federal income taxation, section 170(c)(2) predicates deductibility of individuals’ donations on satisfaction of one geographic restriction and of corporations’ donations on compliance with two geographic restrictions. In the case of individuals, the income tax charitable contribution deduction is permitted if the donation is made to a nongovernmental incorporated or unincorporated entity legally formed in the United States, regardless of where that domestic entity uses the donated assets. n430 In the case of corporations, the income tax charitable contribution deduction is predicated not only on a donation to a nongovernmental domestically incorporated or unincorporated entity, but also on the donation’s use for charitable purposes in the United States if contributed to a domestic unincorporated entity. n431 These charitable contribution deduction statutes long pre-date the past several decades of expanded globalization. While the geographically unrestricted estate and gift tax charitable contribution deduction statutes do nothing to inhibit global philanthropy, the same cannot be said of the income tax charitable contribution deduction for individuals and corporations. The domestic legal formation requirement provides the United States government some means of control and direction over contributions as a quid pro quo for sacrificing income tax revenues, but as demonstrated by several bilateral income tax treaties, even the government has been willing to occasionally forego its ironclad sovereignty over this requirement. The additional domestic use limitation imposed by section [*139] 170(c)(2) with respect to corporate contributions to a domestic unincorporated entity is easily avoided by tax planning. For example, corporations can direct contributions to a domestic corporate charitable entity, which are unconstrained by the domestic use restriction, or corporate contributions to a domestic unincorporated entity subsequently can be regranted to another domestic public charity. Nonetheless, the domestic use limitation appears to have the virtuous gloss of protecting donated funds from potential misuse or misappropriation by entities not generally otherwise subjected to rigorous state regulatory controls. This appears appealingly commendable. The limitations may effectively result in corporate donations directed primarily to
incorporated entities regulated by state governments rather than to unincorporated organizations for which the abuse potential is greater because they generally are subject to less state regulation. The virtuous gloss dissolves, however, as a result of two considerations: first, the absence of the geographic use limitation from the income, estate, and gift tax charitable contribution deduction statutes applicable to individuals; and second, the donee organization's existing exposure to the regulatory and enforcement powers of the Service by virtue of the organization's section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. 2. Reformulation In light of the various inconsistencies, consideration should be given to reforming sections 170(c)(2), 2055, and 2522. One option would be to entirely expunge one or both of the domestic geographic limitations from section 170(c)(2). However, while other individuals may not agree, without an appropriate bilateral treaty where contracting states have specifically negotiated otherwise, I do not advocate permitting individuals or corporations to give tax-deductible charitable contributions directly to foreign organizations.\textsuperscript{432} Accordingly, I suggest that our income, estate, and gift tax rules uniformly apply a domestic legal formation requirement. I also believe that our bilateral treaties with Canada and Mexico should be revisited and that there should be more uniformity in their now\textsuperscript{[\*140]} diverse approaches to overriding the domestic formation provision of section 170(c)(2). Further, our tax treaties with politically supportive overseas allies, such as the United Kingdom, which do not now incorporate an override to the domestic formation provision of section 170(c)(2), should be reconsidered. On balance, I question the additive value of the geographic use limitation as it applies only to corporations contributing to unincorporated charitable organizations. The limitation's obstacle to global philanthropy can be, and in fact is, easily and legally circumvented. Nor does it serve as increased protection against the misuse or misappropriation of donated funds; the limitation's inclusion in section 170(c)(2) does not enhance the regulatory and enforcement powers that the Service can exercise over the section 501(c)(3) charitable entity. I would prefer the limitation purged from section 170(c)(2). In our globalized world of today, the geographic use limitation rule appears quite archaic. Nonetheless, if, after informed and thoughtful debate clearly focused on reasons for its retention in current section 170(c)(2), Congress affirmatively decides there are appropriate reasons to retain the geographic use limitation with respect to deductible contributions by corporations, it should consider whether the same reasoning, and thus the same geographic constraint, should be extended uniformly to the charitable contribution income, estate, and gift tax provisions applicable to individuals. In sum, any statutory or treaty modifications should attempt to balance considerations regarding protection of donor funds from misuse, the preservation of the federal tax base, and the encouragement of global philanthropy. B. Special Tax Rules Applicable to Private Foundations and Income Tax Withholding Rules 1. Shared Concerns Like the charitable contribution deduction statutes, sections 4942 and 4945, which pertain to private foundations, pre-date the recent era of world globalization. Nonetheless, there is a shared recognition that sections 4942 and 4945 today remain valuable tools in a quest to promote accountability and transparency of grant-making domestic private foundations and foreign grantees. Those statutes and the pertinent regulations impose due diligence inquiry and reporting requirements, many of which are standard good business practices for grant-makers. Notwithstanding the statutes' positive purposes, because Congress neither anticipated nor planned for the current state of world globalization when enacting sections 4942 and 4945, these statutes and their interpretive Treasury Regulations do not now promote efficient and effective direct global philanthropy. In fact, they apparently deter new and unsophisticated private foundations from engaging in direct global philanthropy. They also pose hurdles for established private foundations' direct international giving, even after compliance procedures and systems are in place. Regardless of the sophistication and compliance systems of the domestic funder, under the existing statutes direct global philanthropy to indigenous charitable groups and organizations created and operating in economically developing and politically repressed countries is particularly problematic. This is not the lone view of the author, supported only by participants in her empirical study; others concur.\textsuperscript{433} Their interest in this subject is one indicator of its current topicality and importance. The general shared view is that sections 4942 and 4945 and the relevant Treasury Regulations should be updated, simplified, and adapted to changed and changing circumstances of world globalization. An ABA Task Force of the Exempt Organization Committee of the Section of Taxation, composed of six experts in the area of tax-exempt law,\textsuperscript{434} advocated in its May, 2002 Gallagher-Ferguson White Paper, a draft report on "Revision and Simplification of Rules Applicable to Private Foundations,"\textsuperscript{435} that the tax rules impacting private foundations' international philanthropy be updated to make them more workable.\textsuperscript{436} The Gallagher-Ferguson White Paper, with which I concur, include the following five particularly relevant recommendations: (1) Private foundations' direct grants to foreign charitable organizations should be permitted under the control and discretion rules of Revenue Ruling 66-79 that currently apply to direct foreign grants from public charities.\textsuperscript{437} (2) The expenditure responsibility requirements should continue to apply to grants made to non-charitable foreign organizations, but the requirements should be eliminated where a private foundation makes a good faith determination that a foreign organization is charitable under its resident country laws and that it will spend the grant funds for charitable purposes consistent with the requirements imposed on domestic charitable section 501(c)(3) organizations. In the alternative, the expenditure responsibility rules should be restricted to requiring a grant agreement that incorporates
appropriate limitations on the grantee’s use of grant funds, but the rules should not require reporting except for purposes of section 4942 to have grants to nonpublic charities treated as qualifying distributions. (3) The three-year expenditure responsibility rule for grants to foreign grantees for endowment or capital purposes should be applied consistently to foreign grantees, and the grant should be deemed fully expended and further reporting unnecessary at the earlier of (a) three years from the date of the grant if the grant-making private foundation has no information that the grant is being used or has been used for other than intended purposes, or (b) when the grant becomes part of the principal of the foreign grantee's endowment fund, n438 or (c) if the grant is for capital equipment or building purposes, when the money has been spent for the intended purpose. n439

The prohibition against lobbying activities should be eliminated from the expenditure responsibility rules, and private foundations should be subject to the same substantiality requirements as public charities. n440 The Service position that foreign organizations cannot renounce their section 501(c)(3) status once the Service issues a determination letter should be eliminated. n441

Another group that has responded to the complexities and inefficiencies of our tax laws with affirmative action is the United States International Grantmakers (USIG), a working group of general counsels of domestic private foundations. As part of its effort to facilitate private foundations' knowledge of and compliance with relevant domestic and foreign laws and regulations, USIG formed an informational website accessible to domestic grant-makers and foreign grantees that contains relevant forms, such as an affidavit form for equivalency determination purposes. n442 To assist grant-makers in their initial evaluation of the charitable status of a foreign organization, the website also contains simple summaries of laws of foreign countries. The Council on Foundations also has taken a lead role in representing private foundations' interests and concerns. At various times over the past several years, John A. Edie, the Council's general counsel and senior vice president, requested that the Service provide clarifying guidance to grant-making domestic private foundations with respect to various Treasury Regulations and Service procedures. According to Rob Buchanan, Director, International Programs at the Council on Foundations, requests were made for clarifications of the Treasury Regulations regarding (1) the consequences of making a grant to a foreign grantee under the expenditure responsibility rules without undertaking or completing an equivalency determination, and (2) the longevity requirement for expenditure responsibility reports for grants for endowments and capital purposes. The desire for guidance on the income tax withholding rules also was expressed. To date, guidance in the form of a response letter (from Thomas J. Miller of the Service) has been issued only with respect to the first topic. n443 2. Reformation All of these shared concerns speak to reformation of Code chapter 42A, sections 4942 and 4945, and even of the recently adopted income tax withholding Treasury Regulations. In the best of all worlds, reconsideration of the entirety of chapter 42A with respect to its appropriateness in the global context should be undertaken. As the empirical study clearly suggests, numerous provisions within these statutes have a chilling effect on global philanthropy. Nonetheless, I...
foundations have been influential figures in promoting democracy abroad. It is now time for the U.S. government to encourage our philanthropic institutions to aid financially foreign NGOs that, through their own legislative activities, can be crucial in the development of the necessary conditions for, and attributes of, democracy in their respective countries. The current federal tax regime, however, deters U.S. philanthropies from making such financial commitments. That need not continue. The old justifications for the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) lobbying restrictions were formed in the preglobalization era.

The lobbying restrictions do not advance the complex democratization processes in foreign countries transitioning from oppressive or repressive governments. Moreover, there are venerable theoretical and practical political notions of democracy that suggest, and justify in the specific circumstances of global grant-making addressed in this Article, liberalization of the relevant I.R.C. lobbying restrictions. This Article thus urges reform of the I.R.C. provisions so that our domestic tax policy will better support our foreign policy in the twenty-first century. As the National Public Radio quotation at the beginning of this introduction indicates, foreign NGOs play crucial roles in democratization processes within their countries. n23 In this setting, U.S. philanthropic institutions - public charities and private foundations n24 - may be able to supplant or, in some circumstances, to complement or supplement U.S. governmental involvement in spreading democracies worldwide by granting financial support to foreign NGOs. Many did so during the twentieth century, sometimes at the tacit request, or at least with the understood consent, of the U.S. government. n25 Their outreach efforts and expenditures overseas advanced, n26 even as U.S. governmental nonmilitary financial aid abroad dramatically decreased from the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era. n27 Through delivery of services and financial aid, these philanthropic institutions supported many human rights and humanitarian causes, health and education initiatives, economic development programs, and other valuable foreign affair matters. These activities occurred within the constraints of the federal income tax laws, sometimes at great cost or difficulty to the philanthropic institutions. But now, in the twenty-first century, the United States must adopt tax laws that facilitate and encourage these institutions to contribute philanthropically to the renewed global democracy challenge facing our nation. n28 Previously, I have addressed the need for a cohesive global philanthropy policy, supported by tax laws and policies, in order to remove impediments on private foundations’ global philanthropy presented by special I.R.C. rules regarding “equivalency determination” and “expenditure responsibility.” n29 The focus of this Article is one additional aspect of our federal income tax laws that, according to private foundation officials, is important to America’s philanthropies’ global grant-making potential: the current I.R.C. lobbying restrictions on section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt domestic philanthropies. In 1934, Congress enacted these tax restrictions, after giving thought only to constraining domestic lobbying by philanthropic entities enjoying public subsidization from tax-exempt status. n31 Subsequently, in 1969 when it enacted section 4945, Congress effectively barred private foundations, a special category of section 501(c)(3) organizations, from expending funds for their own or a grantee’s lobbying activities (interchangeable referred to as “legislative activities”). n32 Again, Congress limited its deliberation of the I.R.C. lobbying restraints to domestic considerations despite its awareness that private foundations funded initiatives abroad. n33 Congress had an opportunity once again to consider foreign interests in 1976, when it enacted sections 501(h) and 4911 to provide most public charities a means of safely determining a limited, but permissible, level of expenditures for lobbying activities. Nonetheless, testimony and debate of the legislation focused exclusively on domestic considerations. It was the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) at the beginning of the postindustrial globalization era that clearly communicated its position that congressional lobbying constraints extend to legislative processes in foreign countries. n34 As a consequence of this mere administrative position, while the United States now endeavors to spread democracy abroad, our philanthropic institutions are impeded from fully supporting such democratization processes through grant-making to foreign NGOs that actively lobby in attempts to influence legislation in their countries. This Article urges reconsideration of these possibly outdated restrictions. In Part II, the Article addresses the roles of foreign NGOs and provides examples of foreign NGOs whose legislative activities contributed significantly to the democratization of South Africa and Kenya. Part III briefly discusses how the U.S. system of taxation embodies economic notions of democracy that would be furthered by [*996] reformation of the I.R.C. lobbying constraints. Part IV explains the historical justifications and the relevant current rules that restrict the lobbying expenditures by U.S. public charities and private foundations. While the I.R.C. lobbying restrictions have been justified on numerous historical grounds, most of these do not relate to the goal of advancing democracy abroad and consequently do not foster our global democracy policy. Part V explains why liberalization of the I.R.C. lobbying restrictions is important for global grant-making purposes. Thereafter, Part VI presents and reflects on several theoretical and practical political notions of democracy that suggest, and warrant, the recommended liberalization of the current lobbying restrictions as they now apply to U.S. philanthropies as grant-makers to foreign NGOs. Reformation would empower these foreign NGOs, through their own legislative activities, to contribute crucially to democratization, particularly in countries transitioning from
oppressive or repressive authoritarian regimes. Part VII presents some general thoughts on how we might proceed with modification of those restraints. The Conclusion suggests that current I.R.C. lobbying restrictions are too large a price to pay at a time when countries struggle to transform into democracies from authoritarian rule. Now is the time to consider the numerous relevant domestic and foreign interests in order to debate appropriate and effective alterations of these constraints. II. Roles of Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations The notion of a democratization paradigm places foreign NGOs into the context of a country transitioning from authoritarian rule to an emerging political democracy. Because authoritarian regimes are characteristically hostile to civil society institutions, n35 it is not until after authoritarian rule is replaced and democratization moves ahead that the political environment becomes sufficiently receptive for officials to tolerate and encourage the emergence, proliferation, and participation of foreign NGOs. A timely illustration is Iraq. n36 The media recently reported that Saddam Hussein prohibited NGOs during his regime. n37 Within fifteen months of his downfall, however, more [*597] than 1000 Iraqi NGOs existed within Iraq. n38 While Iraqi NGOs are the “best defense against the emergence of a new dictatorship,” their survival is uncertain. n39 The initial writing of this Article in summer 2004 preceded the departure from Iraq of the U.S.-led Provisional Authority and the assumption of power by a new Iraqi interim government whose ability to restrain insurgents and other antidemocratic forces and to move the country toward democratization was unclear. n40 Even now upon my final review of this Article just prior to the scheduled January 30, 2005, Iraqi elections, it appears that through violent actions deliberately intended for worldwide broadcast, antidemocratic forces heurly are attempting to return Iraq to some form of authoritarian rule. Nonetheless, there are some continuing signs of an Iraqi NGO community. As recently as December 8, 2004, the media reported that representatives of Iraqi NGOs have participated in a Czech-sponsored program designed to teach the Iraqis how to establish NGO structures, prepare projects, acquire financing, and work with the media. n41 Globalization n42 has fostered worldwide sharing of information, and consequently has broadened awareness of Iraq’s and other countries’ particular domestic problems. This has revealed a general, but not one definitive, pattern in foreign NGOs’ efforts during transformation to democracies. n43 Initially, foreign NGOs often focus locally, largely on providing direct service delivery of humanitarian aid, such as hunger relief and medical attention, denied to a populace under an autocratic regime. n44 Some organizations may push for better conditions for specific groups of citizens. n45 Only afterwards, as a more [*598] open political environment develops and the country moves from rehabilitation to reconstruction and then to redevelopment, do sustainable foreign NGOs truly proliferate. n46 Many foreign NGOs may concentrate on accomplishing their publicly beneficial missions through the direct delivery of services locally or more broadly. Other foreign NGOs, aware of the many critical matters in their countries, recognize that some problems can be resolved most effectively by other means. n47 These foreign NGOs structure their objectives and approaches to fully or partially focus on transforming governmental policies and laws. n48 They at least partly pursue their missions singularly or in coalitions through legislative activities by pressing for system-wide or a more directed alteration of laws on behalf of the collective public. n49 This Article focuses on the latter group of foreign NGOs, whose endeavors are crucial to the democratization processes, perhaps especially in the earliest phases of consolidation. n50 These crucial foreign NGOs often cannot rely on financial (and other) support from national, regional, or local resources. n51 Instead, they frequently must obtain aid from sources outside their own countries. With financial support from outside sources, foreign NGOs have proliferated in recent years and achieved significant and recognized successes. n52 Their numbers and achievements attest to their importance and legitimacy as service providers; as agents to mobilize resources; as advocates of issues of local, regional, and national interest; and as facilitators of reform and democratic development processes in many countries. n53 Two scholars’ testimonials capture their importance: “NGOs are the real DNA of democracy.” n54 The documented triumphs of foreign NGOs as facilitators of legislative and governmental policy changes in democratizing countries, especially emerging and developing countries, however, only rarely have been directly linked to funding from U.S. private foundations. n55 In those few reported instances, little detailed information is available. n56 As a result, by necessity, this Article is relatively general and conclusory. It is intended to highlight, and question the wisdom of, the existing I.R.C. lobbying restrictions, which were developed with only domestic considerations in mind, as [*600] they impact global grant-making to foreign NGOs whose own legislative activities can contribute to crucial democratization processes in their respective countries after the collapse of oppressive or repressive authoritarian regimes. n57 A few examples, however, indicate the potential importance and impact that could ensue from altering the existing tax constraints on legislative activities. One of the extremely small number of reported successful examples occurred during the 1980s in South Africa, then an oppressed nation, socially divided and economically unstable. n58 Only a very few NGOs critical of apartheid in South Africa existed prior to the 1980s. n59 They had been effectively “banned” as hostile to the apartheid governments of prime ministers H.F. Verwoerd and John Vorster. n60 The situation changed after Prime Minister P.W. Botha came to power. n61 Prime Minister Botha’s government did not financially or otherwise support NGOs, but he did allow them “to emerge, organize, and serve the disenfranchised and marginalized majority black population” in South Africa. n62 Thereafter, the antiapartheid South African NGOs sought and obtained direct financial support from abroad without South African governmental intervention. n63 With direct funding from Scandinavian countries, the European Union, and U.S. private foundations, n64 [*601] antiapartheid South African NGOs worked to weaken the apartheid political environment, establish universal suffrage, n65 modify governmental policies, strengthen democratic institutions, and repeal apartheid legislation. n66 The South African NGOs had identified democratic participation as critical to the economic development of South Africa and its black population. n67 During the transition from apartheid to democracy, South African NGOs engaged in lobbying efforts aimed at government officials, often at the provincial and local levels. n68 A signficantly large group of South African NGOs engaged predominantly in policymaking issues with governmental officials. n69 During the transition period, NGOs also worked with the government and political parties to establish new laws that would affect NGOs’ operations and funding, as well as their access to the government’s premier policymaking arm. n70 In sum, with direct funding from foreign sources, including U.S. foundations, n71 the South African NGOs engaged in legislative activities that helped democratize South Africa. The case of Kenyan NGOs provides another compelling example. In 1986, when Kenya was a one-party state, the government noted with consternation the third sector’s ability to set priorities divergent from those of the state. n72 Indeed, by 1990, the state passed legislation to [*602] control and restrict the nonprofit sector by
effectively subjecting it to administrative control. n73 Kenyan NGOs were incensed and coalesced in opposition. In an attempt to reverse the legislation, "undercurrents" recruited the direct assistance of local missions from such major donor countries as Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan, as well as multilateral bodies, to pressure or lobby the Kenyan government to repeal the legislation. n74 The Kenyan NGOs, however, dismissed as potentially too brazen the tactic of directly approaching these locally based foreign representatives. n75 Instead, the Kenyan NGOs contacted the Ford Foundation, USAID, n76 UNICEF, the United Nations Development Fund, the World Bank, and other philanthropies and agencies to solicit support. n77 With their intentional financial aid, n78 the Kenyan NGOs brought to bear sufficient pressure on the state, through "low profile lobbying" and other strategies, to have the offensive legislation substantially modified. n79 It is precisely these types of worthwhile, and frequently critical, endeavors that are instrumental in creating and advancing conditions for, and attributes of, a democracy, especially a democracy emerging and developing after a repressive or oppressive regime. These are the kinds of efforts, however, that frequently may be denied funding by U.S. section 501(c)(3) public charities and private foundations, largely as a result of the current I.R.C. lobbying restrictions. This Article, therefore, argues that we experiment by significantly modifying or [*603] eliminating these restrictions in order to encourage our philanthropic institutions to financially aid foreign NGOs in their participation in the democratizing legislative processes of their countries. We can only assume that, without the tax constraints, more foreign NGOs would be able to participate constructively in the transformation of their countries' laws and governmental policies. We should undertake the experiment now. The price to be paid domestically and abroad for not doing so far outweighs the risks of refraining from cautious experimentation.
Privatized aid fails and undermines US credibility
Dobransky, 11
(Adjunct Professor-Poli Sci-Cleveland State University,

The argument against privatized foreign aid is based mainly on finite resources and overall government control in the foreign policy arena. The U.S. government cannot afford to pay for more foreign aid organizations. There is too much bureaucracy as it is. There will be much redundancy regardless of claims. There will be a lot of inefficiency, costs, and over complexities. There will inevitably be people stepping on each other’s toes and there will be much political infighting. Sooner or later there will be winners and many sore losers. And, there could be substantial problems in terms of coordination, cohesive policy and leadership. There will be too much confusion, too many voices and no firm direction; all leading to a potential loss of U.S. credibility. There likely will be a greater loss of oversight capabilities with the many new private organizations, which will make it much harder to monitor and regulate, thus reducing their accountability to the American people. All the different groups will not be on the same page and there will be many more differing visions and operations. Moreover, private organizations do not have the bureaucratic connections that USAID and the MCC have, so they will be out of the loop with all the other U.S. government organizations, like the State Department, and many other domestic and foreign organizations. Privatized foreign aid is also relatively untried and untested. It may lead to many failures and serious circumstances. In addition, new private organizations cannot make up for decades of expertise and experience as a whole, even if they can draw in some skilled foreign aid personnel. And, there may not be enough qualified personnel for the private organization to hire, especially if there is more than one private organization that is created. Overall, privatization of foreign aid will produce major costs, political conflict and possibly chaos in the U.S. government and foreign aid establishment. Just witness the government’s experience with the contractor Blackwater (now, Xe).
Cooperation on civil society spills over

Twelve years ago, then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that the United States and India, the world’s biggest democracies, were “natural allies.” Parties in both countries routinely offer as a central rationale for the growing bilateral relationship precisely those values that trump differences in global outlook. And whereas during the Cold War the interests and values of India and the United States frequently pulled in opposite directions, today they reinforce each other in a number of areas. Democracy, an inherent strength of the Indian and American systems, infuses the bilateral relationship with its unique character and forms the bedrock on which countries can pursue shared interests. The United States and India should work together to spread the culture of democracy in lands where it does not yet exist. There are limits to values-based cooperation. The United States and India have genuine differences both on their approaches to the expansion of democracy and human rights and on the countries most suited for such support. These differences manifest themselves in policy disagreements about several of the countries in India’s neighborhood such as Pakistan and Burma. But our leaders should not allow occasional disagreements to preclude wider cooperation in support of the universal values that form the heart of the two democracies. Moreover, this cooperation should not be limited to the two governments; on the contrary, supporting democracy and human rights should involve the people of both countries. Support for democracy and human rights. India offers the world a unique perspective as a successful, diverse, non-Western democracy; perhaps for this reason Indian efforts to support democracy abroad have accelerated in recent years. India was one of 10 founding members of the Community of Democracies and a co-founder and contributor to the U.N. Democracy Fund. It has participated in the multilateral activities of the Center for Democratic Transitions, the Partnership for Democratic Governance and the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership. These activities and the resilience of India’s own political system demonstrate vividly that democracy is not a Western invention or an American export. Given the strength of Indo-U.S. people-to-people ties and the civic nature of democracy assistance, the two countries should channel much of their bilateral cooperation in this area through nongovernmental organizations. The two countries recently launched a women’s empowerment initiative that could be expanded beyond Afghanistan. In addition, India could consider establishing a nongovernmental organization that could work with American counterparts to support democracy abroad. At the intergovernmental level, the United States should seek to reinvigorate its cooperation with India in key multilateral forums, including the U.N. Democracy Fund and the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership. Development assistance. Long a recipient of foreign assistance, India has emerged as a donor in its own right. The United States should explore with India whether some of the dramatic reforms in U.S. foreign aid, such as channeling aid through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which enshrines commitments to democratic governance and economic and social development, could be coordinated with Indian aid programs. To begin, the two countries should choose one major development project and coordinate their aid, linking it to a domestic reform plan in the target nation. By doing so, both countries would have the opportunity to maximize the impact of their aid and to better promote reforms in recipient countries.

They’ll cooperate with us – strategic interests

Like the rest of the world, India has been closely watching the events unfolding in the Middle East, keenly attuned to the happenings in Egypt. In light of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, pundits across India are questioning whether similar protests can happen in India, where statistics of growth rate, inflation, and unemployment bear similarities. Regardless, most experts seem to agree that with its strong tradition of democracy and its openly vocal public, India is unlikely to go down the same path. Nonetheless, Egypt’s instability has policy implications for the world’s largest democracy. Ver Marwah of the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi suggests that one of the successes of Mubarak’s regime was its ability to keep the Muslim Brotherhood relatively inactive. While the Brotherhood has not been particularly aggressive to date in its enforcement of conservative Islamic principles, the space left from the removal of the Mubarak government could cause a more reactionary response. For India, there is a concern that a rise of...
fundamentalist tendencies emanating from Egypt could have resonance in politically volatile parts of India, such as Jammu and Kashmir. Many have remarked on India’s decided choice to stay silent in the early days of demonstrations, tempering its association with either side of the debate. External Affairs Minister SM Krishna stated that while the Indian government supported the Egyptian people’s right to democracy and freedom of press, the protests are a matter internal to the Egyptian nation. While India may lack the same political history with Egypt that the United States has, leaders of India and Egypt have always been close in contact, with frequent diplomatic meetings through their history. Mubarak most recently visited India in 2008, in the wake of increased Indian investment in Egypt. Economically, India has a vested interest in a stable Egypt. Economic issues, in fact, seem to be at the forefront of India’s concern when it comes to unrest in Egypt. Primarily, how will limited access to resources in Egypt, primarily oil, affect the economy of India, and already rising fuel prices? Commodity and fuel prices are likely to rise further due to the centrality of the Suez Canal as a trade route between the two countries. While not a vast contributor, remittance will play a small role in Egypt’s economic tie to India. Citigroup’s analysis of the effect of the protests on the Indian economy concluded that 48% of remittance to India comes from the Middle East (USD 26 billion). Of that, however, only USD 3.7 million comes from Egypt. Following Mubarak’s resignation from the Egyptian presidency and departure from Cairo on February 11, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been in touch with SM Krishna to discuss the role India can play in helping Egypt build its fledgling democracy. As former Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Pramit Pal Chaudhuri wrote yesterday in the Hindustan Times, "Encouraging engagement between Indian and Arab civil society—corporations, academics, media, and NGOs—should now be at the forefront of Indian diplomacy. Nothing resounds more in the Arab world today than the success of Indian democracy."

Strong relations solve inevitable Asian war
Richard L. Armitage et al 10, Deputy Secretary of State from March 2001 to February 2005, “Natural Allies”, October,

The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include: Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power. • Strengthening an open global trading system. • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms). • Countering terrorism and violent extremism. • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources. • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime. • Promoting democracy and human rights. • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. A strong U.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. The need for closer U.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.
Asian wars go nuclear

Landy, National Security Expert @ Knight Ridder, 3/10/'2K

( Jonathan, Knight Ridder, lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.

“Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources, indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Most likely escalation scenario

Dibb, Professor of Security Studies @ the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ‘1

(Paul, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_54/ai_75762211)

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s, in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia’s security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.
Crisis in Asia escalate – geography
Cimbala, 2008
Stephen Cimbala, Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, March 2008, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy, 27:2, informaworld
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use, fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may.

Indian relations key to central Asian stability
The other area where Indian military capability could be harnessed to facilitate American interests is in Central Asia. Indian interests there are driven by three factors: the need for energy resources and the potential of the Central Asian market; the attempt to counterbalance Chinese and Pakistani presence in the region; and the concern about radical Islam spreading from the region into India (especially Kashmir). India viewed with concern the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the subsequent destabilization of the region caused by that fundamentalist regime. It provided support to the Northern Alliance and, with the Taliban’s ouster, has sought to develop a presence in Central Asia. India has increased its cooperation with the Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, where it has reportedly established an air base.66 Such a base would not only permit military action against anti-government forces in Central Asia, but also serve to counter Pakistan’s efforts to establish “defense in depth” in the region. Like India, the Central Asian states are concerned about the growth of radical Islam and the threat it
poses to their regimes that, because they are post-Soviet in orientation, tend to be secular. It has also actively engaged the Karzai government and established a major diplomatic presence in Afghan cities and has reached an agreement to train the Afghan national army. Like most regional countries, India would like to prevent the reemergence of radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and therefore would be willing to help build the indigenous security capabilities of these countries. For a United States strapped for manpower, Indian security assistance especially would be welcome since it would further Washington’s own goal of checking conventional forces; thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons, or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the “arc of crisis” from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.

Extinction

Central Asia escalates – It’s a geopolitical hub

Arun Sahgal &, former Army officer who created the Office of Net Assessment in the Indian Joint Staff, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and ‘Distinguished Fellow’ School of Geo-Politics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Vinod Anand 10, postgraduate in defence and strategic studies and is an alumnus of Defence Services Staff College and College of Defence Management, “Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India”,


The geo-strategic salience of Central Asia today has been underscored by two main factors. First, Central Asia has become important because of the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, it has become a major transportation hub for gas and oil pipelines and multi-modal communication corridors connecting China, Russia, Europe, the Caucasus region, the Trans-Caspian region and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, whether it was Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union or even the present Central Asian regimes, there has always been a strategic ambition in the north to seek access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Thus Afghanistan, which links Central Asia and South Asia, is a strategic bridge of great geopolitical significance. Central Asia and South Asia are intimately connected not only geographically but also strategically. The Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have borders with Afghanistan, Iran lies to its west and Pakistan to the east and south. Therefore, the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan is enhanced even though it may not be an oil- or gas-rich country. With the control of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes between the Indian subcontinent and resource-rich Central Asia, as well as of a potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Thus, stability and peace in Afghanistan, and for that matter Pakistan, are a geostrategic imperative. Central Asia has never been a monolithic area and is undergoing a turbulent transitional process with a diverse range of ethnicities and fragmented societies throughout the region. These societal divisions and lack of political maturity compound the social, economic and political challenges. Security and economic issues are the two most important components of the Central Asian states’ engagement with outside powers. Among the states themselves there are elements of both cooperation and competition. Historical legacies, their geo-strategic locations, and above all their perceived national interests profoundly influence the political choices of Central Asian nations. The weaknesses of the new nations in Central Asia pave the way for outside powers to interfere in their internal affairs.
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Bader 10 (Max, Postdoctoral Researcher and Lecturer – Geschwister School Institute for Political Science, Against All Odds. Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine, p. 25)

Being not as visible and not as contested, **democracy assistance is on ‘the quiet side’ of the spectrum of democracy promotion strategies** (Carothers 2007: 10). **It is distinct** in at least two respects: first, it is invariably **implemented with the consent** of its recipients (Burnell 2000b: 4) and second, it is implemented **by specialized actors**, for whom democracy assistance is a prominent area of activity or an exclusive area of activity. These specialized actors include intergovernmental organizations, government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, of which many are at arm’s length of a government bureaucracy. Typically, not necessarily, the assistance is not-for-profit and supported by grants. Most democracy assistance is directed at one of three comprehensive areas: the electoral process, state institutions, and civil society (Carothers 1999: 88). Assistance to the electoral process can be divided into two types of assistance: assistance aimed at the conduct of free and fair elections, and assistance to political parties. As democracy assistance tout court, party assistance is implemented by specialized actors, which, in the case of party assistance, receive the bulk of their funding from the government while being formally autonomous. In contrast to some other forms of democracy assistance, party assistance is supposed to be only technical: providers of assistance are not allowed to hand out direct financial donations. Party assistance is related to, but separate from other types of democracy assistance, including electoral assistance and legislative strengthening, which are termed ‘indirect party aid’ by Carothers (2006a: 9062). Party assistance in the strict definition applied in this thesis is aimed at improving the performance of the primary representative and procedural functions of parties (cf. Bartolini and Mair 2001) and at creating a viable party system by working with several parties simultaneously. In addition to being distinct from other types of democracy assistance, it is also distinct from other forms of external influence on parties, such as for-profit consultancy and the inclusion in party internationals.

Obama won’t get involved in democracy assistance – no blame.

LAPPIN 10. [Richard, PhD candidate, Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the University of Leuven in Belgium, has participated in over a dozen democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, Carter Center, visiting scholar at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade under the JoinEU-SEE program, “Obama and Democracy Assistance: Challenges and Responses”, February 1 -- http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/2010/20100201-ccea.pdf]

**The commitment of the Obama administration to democracy assistance has become an issue of considerable debate.** Whilst his predecessor, President George W. Bush, **claimed it was America's mission** to promote democracy with the goal of 'ending tyranny in our world,' President Obama **has largely avoided the term**. Indeed, **Obama's Inaugural Address** and his first State of the Union speech made no explicit reference to democracy assistance, whilst his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, called for a **foreign policy that** promotes the 'three Ds' of defence, diplomacy, and development; a triumvirate conspicuous by **the absence of the D of democracy**. The delayed appointments of key democracy assistance officials—it took until July 7 before Obama nominated a candidate for Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—**further suggested that democracy assistance was not a high priority for the Obama administration.** However, rather than signalling a decline in America's commitment to democracy assistance, this article contends that such behaviour is indicative of a considered and astute response to overcoming the tarnished legacy of democracy assistance that Bush bequeathed to Obama. Moreover, it is a response which promises to deliver a more sophisticated and coherent brand of democracy assistance.

**Fiat means the plan is emergency spending --- this doesn’t trade-off**

Castle 1. (Representative, March 8, FDCH, Lexis)

Briefly, here is how the account would work: **Under current law, "emergency" spending is not subject to annual budget limits and deficit reduction requirements.** When a disaster strikes, **Congress simply appropriates emergency funds which are often not offset by other cuts, thereby adding to the debt and spending the surplus.** In addition, funds are often added for unrelated, non-emergency “pork-barrel” projects. This practice adds up to a significant amount of money each year, thus eroding the
discipline of this committee’s budget plan. According to the Congressional Research Service, the average cost of emergency appropriations bills from 1991 to 1999 was $9 billion a year (excluding the Persian Gulf War).
Neg
Democracy assistance causes huge fights
McLaughlin, contributing writer – The Washington Diplomat, 5/31/'11
(Seth, “Key Foreign Policy Players Try to Master Capitol Hill,” The Washington Diplomat)

But it's not just politicos in Washington and anxious Americans who are following the partisan showdown. The city's diplomats have been intently watching the congressional sparring as well. After all, strengthening economic ties with the world's largest economy is among every diplomat's top priorities. Whether it's development assistance or trade and investment, the state of the U.S. government checkbook matters not just to Americans, but to the world. However, after a decade of tax cuts coupled with two wars, a housing boom and bust and an economic recession, America's bloated and battered checkbook needs rebalancing. Both Republicans and Democrats agree that with a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion and climbing — along with a national debt of about $14.2 trillion — federal spending must be curbed. But by how much, from where and how fast, especially in the midst of a still fragile recovery and sagging unemployment, will be the talk of the town for months to come. Immediately after the dust settled over the budget for the 2011 fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, both sides set their sights on the 2012 numbers that will also decide the amount of money and manpower the United States releases across the globe. Though the State Department and foreign operations budget represent a sliver of total spending, most peg it at about 1 percent of more than $3.5 trillion federal budget. Money spent on diplomacy and development has become a convenient whipping post for voters and lawmakers searching for quick answers to the country's financial mess, but also wary of the fallout from reforming the real drivers of federal spending — popular entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, and spending on defense (also see “America's Foreign Affairs Budget Faces Congressional Chopping Block” in the March 2011 issue of The Washington Diplomat). Even if politicians are more willing to broach so-called third rail subjects like Medicare and Medicaid, the international affairs budget still faces the threat of significant cuts by lawmakers determined to show fiscal restraint across the board. A congressman would be hard pressed to take away grandmother's Medicare and justify giving more assistance to rebel fighters in Libya, for instance, even if the two cases aren't exactly correlated. Explaining fiscal nuance is not an easy sell. Politically speaking, it's simply easier for lawmakers to cut foreign aid than to go after programs that have a more noticeable effect on their constituents back in their home districts. But like entitlement programs, the Pentagon is where the actual spending — and by extension potential savings — is. In general, the budget for international affairs has amounted to about $50 billion annually in recent years while the Defense Department racks up roughly $700 billion a year, including most war expenditures. Yet both parties have only flirted with the idea of touching the Defense budget, which has become a sacred cow among lawmakers of all stripes. Public misperceptions also drive the political expediency. Americans think that 25 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign assistance, according to a recent poll by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes. The real amount? The total international affairs budget comes in at under 1.5 percent. But you can be sure both sides will be clawing over every scrap of that 1.5 percent. As it stands, the fiscal 2011 budget allocated $48.3 billion for State and foreign operations — an $8.4 billion reduction from the president's requested amount though it was on par with 2010 levels. As part of the $38 billion of cuts in the 2011 budget, about $500 million was carved out of the State Department's budget compared to last year, while U.S. payments to the United Nations will be decreased by $377 million. Pay for Foreign Service officers was also frozen, and USAID operating expenses were trimmed by $39 million.

Public Perception Of Foreign Aid Budget Makes It A Fight.
McLaughlin 11. [Seth, contributing writer, “Key Foreign Policy Players Try to Master Capitol Hill” The Washington Diplomat -- May]
Public misperceptions also drive the political expediency. Americans think that 25 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign assistance, according to a recent poll by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes. The real amount? The total international affairs budget comes in at under 1.5 percent. But you can be sure both sides will be clawing over every scrap of that 1.5 percent. As it stands, the fiscal 2011 budget allocated $48.3 billion for State and foreign operations — an $8.4 billion reduction from the president’s requested amount though it was on par with 2010 levels. As part of the $38 billion of cuts in the 2011 budget, about $500 million was carved out of the State Department’s budget compared to last year, while U.S. payments to the United Nations will be decreased by $377 million. Pay for Foreign Service officers was also frozen, and USAID operating expenses were trimmed by $39 million.
Plan ensures fights – spending cuts means no Congressional mood for Libyan reconstruction

Christian Science Monitor, 8-26-11
["What happens next in Libya? America’s five greatest concerns.; The push toward a post-Qaddafi regime in Libya is raising questions in Washington about how far a US commitment extends to ensuring a peaceful transition to democracy. The rationale for US and NATO engagement in Libya was to avoid a massacre of civilians in March. Now, as the civil war moves toward a resolution, the Obama administration and Congress appear to be taking a wait-and-see approach. But with an eye to lessons from regime change in Iraq, some lawmakers are urging steps now to help shape the transition in Libya, including some moves that put them at odds with the Obama administration. Here are five."]

With Congress committed to finding another $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction over the next 10 years, lawmakers are in no mood to support a big aid package for Libya. Nor is the Obama administration likely to request it. Congressional leaders say an oil-producing state ought to be able to meet its own needs, especially with some $110 billion in frozen assets worldwide expected to be released to a new regime. TNC leaders "have even talked to me about reimbursing the United States for its costs incurred in this conflict," said Sen. John McCain (R) of Arizona, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, on Fox News. "The humanitarian situation continues to be dire," said Undersecretary of State William Burns at a Libya Contact Group meeting in Istanbul on Thursday. "We must accelerate our help, including our efforts to unfreeze assets and make them available to the Libyan people, to whom they truly belong." Later on Thursday, the UN announced it would release $1.5 billion in frozen Libyan funds, provided they were used only for humanitarian and other civilian needs. The situation on the ground in Libya could prompt requests for more aid when Congress returns in September. "The big question is whether a Congress focused on spending cuts is willing to assist with the transition," says Cole Bockenfeld, director of advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy, a public interest group in Washington. If the Obama administration chooses to ask for aid, it will need to persuade Congress that "this is a vital national security interest for the US - and important for the Arab Spring to keep the momentum of its early democracies," he adds. "That's something the administration needs to sell the Congress."
Empirics Prove

New democracy aid ensures backlash — costs capital.
Emily Cadei, CQ Staff, Mon May 23, 11, “Obama Aid Initiative No Sure Thing”,
http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/cq/20110523/pl_cq_politics/politics000003874266
The Obama administration's proposed economic assistance for the Middle East and North Africa has a relatively modest price tag, but it could face serious resistance in Congress. In particular, President Obama's proposal for expanded American investment and commerce in the region, outlined in a speech last week, risks becoming bogged down in the sort of domestic political disputes that have stalled many other trade initiatives with the developing world in recent years. Obama, who will seek to rally U.S. allies to work with him on Middle East economic assistance during his European trip this week, called in his speech for the United States to "focus on trade, not just aid; and investment, not just assistance" for emerging democracies in Egypt and Tunisia, and possibly elsewhere depending on how uprisings in neighboring countries play out. Such an approach would cost much less than traditional development assistance -- among other things, it would marshal private sector resources and involve investments the government would likely recoup. That should help its viability in Congress, which has little appetite for expensive new foreign aid programs at the moment. "No one should expect this Congress to pass a Marshall Plan for the Middle East," Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said May 19, referring to the American aid program to Europe after World War II. In contrast to the administration's $2 billion Middle East proposal, the Marshall Plan, when adjusted for inflation, cost more than $100 billion. [For complete coverage of politics and policy, go to Yahoo! Politics] In a speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace, McCain said new members of Congress were elected to cut spending, not to increase foreign assistance. "If we are going to help countries like Tunisia and Egypt to grow their economies, we will need to be much more innovative." A Different Model for Aid Kay Granger, R-Texas, Chairwoman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds foreign aid, said Monday she does not approve of Obama's proposal because "we don't know" who will lead the new Egyptian government. Speaking at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual conference, Granger also said helping the Egyptian people directly, as opposed to the government, "is a very different situation" and indicated that she might be able to support such efforts. Sarah Margon, an expert on development and conflict at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank, said a Marshall Plan-like approach would be wrong for the Middle East from a development perspective, as well. Margon credited the president's proposal for breaking with the historical approach to foreign assistance in the region that has been "overly focused on military assistance, top-heavy," and "less flexible." The new economic assistance plan, if well executed, will be more sustainable than past Middle East aid, as well as less costly, she said. Elements of the approach the president is pushing include creation of enterprise funds to foster investment in local enterprise, lending or guaranteeing up to $1 billion in borrowing needed to finance infrastructure and support job creation through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and a $1 billion debt swap to help ease Egypt's bilateral debt of more than $3 billion. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass., Joseph I. Lieberman, I-Conn., and McCain introduced legislation in March to authorize the enterprise funds. Their bill (S 618) was marked up by the Foreign Relations panel May 17. McCain said last week he is also working with Kerry on an authorization bill for some of the other elements of Obama's proposal, including debt relief. The president also promised to launch a "comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa," with a goal of increasing trade with the region, promoting greater integration with U.S. and European markets and opening "the door for those countries who adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalization to construct a regional trade arrangement." McCain called for Congress to press forward on those initiatives, as well. "We should move urgently to begin negotiations on free-trade agreements with Egypt and Tunisia -- and to explore ideas for new free-trade areas in the Middle East and North Africa," he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, the top Republican on the Appropriations subcommittee that funds foreign assistance, also backs the administration's proposals. "If the president wants to assist Egypt and Tunisia, count me in. If he wants to create trading regimes with the Mideast, count me in," Graham said. Plenty of Skeptics But the administration proposal may be too ambitious in the current budgetary climate in the Senate and the House. Even before Obama laid out his plans, lawmakers questioned the idea of substantial debt relief to Egypt, given its cost and uncertainty about the future government in Cairo. "I don't know if a billion dollars is doable," Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pa., said when asked about the president's proposal, explaining that any significant new investment "is under a great deal of scrutiny" right now on Capitol Hill.
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AT Imperialism

Imperialism INEVITABLE – alt can’t solve
Kors ‘1 – Prof history @ U Penn (Summer 2001, Alan, American Foreign Relations, “America and the West: Triumph Without Self Belief”, pg. 348-349)

The view that Western civilization has ended has had various incarnations, with the most sensitive souls of many epochs imagining themselves to be the last bearers of the Western torch. One needs perspective in such things. The question, in many ways, was more compelling when Athens fell: when Christian Rome was sacked by barbarians: when the Norsemen ravaged settled Europe when feudal warlords reigned unchecked; when, at the end of the first millennium, all signs indicated a divine disfavor that seemed to presage the end of the world when the Black Death of the fourteenth century left, soul and society without mooring. Indeed, imagine the question posed to Catholic and Protestant apologists of the sixteenth century, viewing each other’s religion as the Antichrist and seeing Western Christendom rent first in two and then into a multitude of competing sects. How fragile, if not spent. The Nest seemed during, the religious civil wars culminating in the devastation of the Thirty Years’ War. There were lamentations in profusion during the Terror of the French Revolution and the decades of revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that followed, and again, with gravitas. There were the inward and outward sermons on the West uttered on the slaughterfields of World War 1, and at Auschwitz, and in the gulag. The West is resilient beyond all seeming possibility, and something gives it that resiliency. The West has survived its barbarians without and—more dreadful yet—its own barbaric offspring within. If it could outlast Attila the Hun and the armed ideologies of the Third Reich and Stalin’s Russia, it surely can outlast Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, and Michel Foucault. At each moment of seeming dissolution, there were diverse profound voices that compellingly analyzed the depths to which we had fallen: the almost infinite remove we were from any light: the loss of something that we never could recover—and yet the West survived. There was something about its mind and spirit. Greece fell, but its philosophers conquered the minds of the Romans who conquered its soil, and its conceptual categories still organize our understanding of reality and knowledge. Rome fell, but its language became the lingua franca and thus the definitional universe of Christendom, while its history became the great drama by which to understand the glory and the baseness of political life. The barbarian tribes believed that they had conquered Rome, but Rome in greater part had conquered them. Their descendants called their realm the Holy Roman Empire, terms that were not, until much later, bereft of meaning. When the Norsemen came, learning fled to monasteries, and that learning and even those monasteries eventually conquered the Norse, whose Norman descendants in Britain founded universities that live to this day. It is the last thing that any frightened monk taking desperate shelter in the eighth century ever could have imagined. The Thirty Years’ War seemed to sensitive and moral observers the end of civilization, but its battles are mostly forgotten, and what is it that remains of the seventeenth century? Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Bayle, Boyle, Fenelon, Harvey, Huyghens, Newton, Locke. Louis XIV is a tourist attraction at Versailles: his wars changed precious little. The conceptual revolution of the West, however, changed a great deal in that same century. It arose from the very dynamics of the West’s models of learning-disputation, accounting for appearances, refining inductive and deductive logic—now linked to expanded education and printing. What happened in the minds of the graduates of Europe’s Christian universities changed the human relationship to nature, to knowledge, to the rights of inquiry and conscience, and to political and economic life. The Christian West kept the traditions of the Greek mind alive, and thus, through its own debates, it overthrew the presumptive authority of the past in matters of natural knowledge and its application. The West believed that we were not cast fatally adrift in this world, but that we could learn new things and that we could alter the sorry scheme of experience closer to the heart’s desire for knowledge, order, and well-being. It was not Faust, who dreamed of occult knowledge that would make him a demigod, but Bacon, who commanded that knowledge proceed from humility and charity, who becarne the prophet of the great scientific revolution of the West. Louis XIV is a statue; Bacon is a living force wherever the West touches minds.
AT Orientalism

Blanket rejections of democracy assistance forecloses an opportunity to reorient the West’s understanding of the Middle East toward cooperative partnerships – the permutation solves the links

Sadiki 11 (Dr. Larbi, Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and author of Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004). "The mathematics of the Arab Spring,”
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/05/2011531132934920499.html, AD: 9/22/11) j

Egypt and Tunisia are now officially on the international donor community’s radar. The World Bank and the G8 are already planning different ways to sponsor the so-called Arab Spring. Many Arabs are speaking out against a possible Euro-US “hijacking” or "containment" of the regional movement through this type of "cheque book diplomacy". I will argue here that this position is not intellectually robust, and that the Arab Spring demands dialogue, not political and cultural protectionism. There is a moment of confidence across the Arab geography: Arabs can hold their own. This bodes well for recasting Arab-West relations, as it veers away from a return to hollow views of cultural and socio-political autarchy. Simply crying "US hands off the Arab Spring" is not the answer. From Zoellick to Cameron The British prime minister seems to be right on track for lending support aimed at democratic reconstruction in Egypt and Tunisia. Cameron has earmarked £110m ($180m) for development over the next four years, echoing the G8 outlook on the Arab uprisings. How exactly the money will be distributed and whether it will be spent on projects that support the rule of law, freedom of press and pluralism is missing from Cameron’s transcript. This new-found enthusiasm for spending generously on the Arab Spring - whether by Obama, Cameron or the "International Misery' Fund" - echoes the World Bank’s April message in support of the Arab Spring. World Bank President Robert Zoellick set the tone in favour of a participatory citizenry which will develop good governance - shorthand for the rhetoric of accountability, transparency and efficiency in the political economy of developing areas. The sub-text: Funds for what? There are opportunities, but also perils, in Western aid aimed at supporting the Arab uprisings. It depends on how you read between the lines - especially when the text articulates that aid donation is a function of realpolitik: the goal of which is to limit immigration and extremism. The EU has recently been called upon to "humanise" its immigration laws; addressing this as an area of non-monetary aid so that Arabs are able to access opportunities that Europeans may be willing to offer. As for fighting extremism, no-one is naive enough to believe that democracy alone will stamp out extremism. Likewise, aid aimed at fighting extremism can actually imperil institution-building and risk a return to mukhabarat ["secret police"] regimes that kill, imprison, torture and ignore the rule of law. This is a declarative objective of the Western financial charm offensive; such an attack was recently revealed by the G8 in Normandy. A confused agenda whose facade is "democracy promotion" - and its substance "fighting terrorism and immigration" - will fail to achieve attention as a recipient or a donor. It will obfuscate, rather than clarify, the role played by Western governments in the "Arab Spring". The mathematics of Arab democracy Aside from the British support pledged, there are additional billions that have had a Pavlovian effect on the Egyptian and Tunisian prime ministers, respectively, Essam Sharaf and Beji Caid el Sebsi. The aim is "good governance" without causing basket-case economies. Sharaf is seeking to offset the immense damage to the country’s tourism industry caused by the uprising, while el Sebsi has built a case based on refugee influx. Both are also scrambling for a cut of the four billion in aid and loans to be contributed by the US. Freer access to EU markets is another aim of both men. There is no shortage of EU cash, but the issue will be whether this will be "charitable" as the aid that was invested into eastern and central Asian democratic transitions via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In any case, there is still much to be revealed about the reins attached to these packages when they finally see the light of day. Zoellick’s cheque book is also on offer - and there are hints of billions in World Bank funds for the Arab Spring countries. More to the point, Zoellick’s rhetoric hints at creative methods that aim to fund community empowerment which would bypass the state and target the people directly through their communities instead. Whether the shareholders in the Bretton Woods financial system - US, China, Japan, and the EU - sharpen or blunt Zoellick’s creativity remains to be seen. Money, unfortunately, is not given to further only values (note the stress on values by Obama in his speech to the British parliament), but also to further the donors’ interests. Autonomy vs autarchy Two fundamental principles must be understood in order to grasp the mathematics of the Arab Spring. On the Arab side, return to autarchy is self-defeating. Pride and greatness have been returned to Arabness, and there is no longer any need to engage in autarchic brands of discourse. Autarchy has been the fundamental currency of dictators keen on excluding the Arab masses from the flow of ideas hostile to their own selfish rule. This has been done in the name of all kinds of ideologies. This is the moment for spreading cosmopolitanism of good governance, moral protest, anti-authoritarian resistance, and social justice. This is a
shared space - in which Arab narratives and struggles engage with like-minded currents transcending geography and time. "Hands off our Arab Spring"-type narratives ignore the global voices and ethical forces who are joining in this emancipatory moment being ushered in. So to recoil via autarchic propositions goes against the spirit of this movement. It is as if they are claiming that the Arab Spring has not recharged the batteries of self-confidence enough for Arab nations to engage the outside world with confidence, self-assertion and a greater capacity for self-representation. Autarchy only reinforces Orientalist narratives that have misrepresented Arabs for so long through images of invisibility, inferiority, and an incapacity to speak back. Conditionality in reverse Similarly, no patronage from the Western powers is needed. Arabs in Tunisia and Egypt have reclaimed - and in Libya, Syria and Yemen are in the process of reclaiming - the right to self-govern. Hence the current moment demands a transition from the idea of conditionality imposed by the donors to a new conditionality, in reverse, imposed by the recipients of the funds. That is, good governance must be thought of as a two-way street: where there are equal obligations on the donor and the recipient. The donor community has generally routed its own rules of good governance by plugging authoritarian rule into the global financial system by way of handouts, grants, and funds. These have typically had much to answer for in terms of reproduction of autocracy, corrupt regimes - the likes of which WikiLeaks has revealed Western governments' intimate knowledge of - and the procurement of technology of oppression that prolong dictatorship; Mubarak and Ali are but two examples of this. The injustice and irony in all of this is that debt incurred by non-representative regimes is still counted as legally binding, which shackles the oppressed citizenry to billions that are owed from morally questionable transactions organised by the very institutions that have preaching "good governance" since the early 1990s. Democratisation - from mathematics to morality - A return to ethical basics and conditionality is necessary, and can achieved by these means: Funds and grants are to be dispensed only to governments "of the people" - which means democratically elected governments, complete with a system of legitimate checks and balances. Right now, this excludes the transitional governments of Egypt and Tunisia. Both have presented cases for billions of dollars from the funds on offer by the West, however, neither is representative of the people. Technical aid, materials or training for the military, police or intelligence must be in accordance with the rules of upholding democratic rule and the principles of good governance - meaning that they are subject to transparency, and with full knowledge and approval of elected parliaments and other civic bodies and institutions. Aid, including that given to non-governmental organisations, must not limit the choice of recipients when it comes to choosing a developmental path. It must not be subject to the values and interests of the donors whose free market economies, in this instance, are very difficult to replicate in an Arab world - the goals of which include robust sustainable development solutions and distributive mechanisms aimed at equal opportunity, social justice, and poverty eradication. The bulk of aid must be geared towards addressing "the two Ds": i) democratic consolidation, with the root problem of youth disaffection, loss and disenfranchisement, and ii) distribution to deal with the acute problems of marginalisation - which is the root problem of youth disenfranchisement. Civic-capacity building must be factored into the process of aiding Arab democracy-building. And it must include the re-training of police forces and the dismantling of the apparata of oppression one by one. Police and intelligence forces have traditionally been the enemies of the Arab populace. This must change. Through conditionality in reverse, good governance becomes a mutually binding contract. It will ensure that Arab-Western political and economic engagement is underpinned by ethics of shared obligations and responsibility. By doing it this way, external finances will bring relief, goodwill, dialogue and friendship instead of burdening the Arab and Western worlds with fear, distrust and acrimony. The currency of freedom it still remains to be seen how, and even if, the masters of world finance put their money where their mouth is. In particular, for now, no dispensing of aid must proceed until elected representatives of the people - and independent civil society groups - are in a position to deliberate and reflect freely on the terms and plans of the aid to be given. The only given in this discussion is that the organisers of Tahrir Square and Habib Bourguiba Avenue have spoken in favour of dignity and freedom, which is the currency of the Arab Spring. There is no need to fear for these masses and their epic resistance against tyranny. It is a resource they can, if need be, also direct towards resisting financial hegemony. What is reassuring about the new-found morality of resistance is that it rejects autarchy. It speaks the lingua franca of freedom - which transcends geography, religion, nationality and ethnicity. It uses Western technological innovations for the purpose of self-empowerment.

Democracy assistance is effective – the K causes political atrophy

Youngs 11 (Richard, President, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, a think tank based in Madrid; Assistant Professor of Politics & International Studies at the University of Warwick, January 2011, "Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy
Democracy promotion has lost traction around the world. This atrophy has myriad causes and a range of consequences. One of its results is that calls have become more audible for a fundamental rethink of what type of ‘democracy’ should be supported in different regions. Many now chorus the view that the ‘democracy’ in ‘democracy promotion’ requires re-examination. Most critics of international policies berate Western governments for an inflexible and inappropriate adherence to a specific form of ‘liberal democracy’. They are right to take democracy promoters to task for the many unduly narrow ways in which they conceive political reform. But it is not convincing to argue that democracy promotion’s most serious problem today is its excessive adherence to a ‘liberal’ form of democracy. This critique fails to grasp the way in which democracy support policies have evolved and confuses what is entailed in meeting local demands for reform in nondemocratic states. The routine admonishments cast at Western governments under the now standard critique of liberal democracy do not weather the scrutiny of empirical evidence. They risk becoming widely accepted myths that have little grounding in reality. Democracy promoters do not overwhelmingly prioritise the procedural over the social and substantive elements of reform; they do not seek deliberately to hollow out the state; they do not conflate economic with political liberalisation; they are not brow-beaten into backing façade democracy by multinational companies; they are not fixated with elections; and they are not completely unreceptive to alternative forms of representation. The problem with democracy promotion lies not in its unbending and overly zealous imposition of liberal norms. Rather, its most serious pathology is governments’ failure to defend core liberal norms in a way that would allow local variations in and choices over democratic reform - along with genuine civic empowerment and emancipation - to flourish. Current criticisms of the democracy agenda risk pushing policy deliberations in exactly the opposite direction to their required improvement.

Their orientalism links are essentialist and prove it’s inevitable – we reverse the tragedy of past imperialism
Ahadi and Masazi 7/26/11
Mina Ahadi (short biography in German) was born in Iran in 1956. She started her political activities by setting up discussion clubs and performances when she was only 14. She was actively involved as a university student in the 1979 Iranian revolution. When the Islamic government gained power and Khomeini issued a fatwa for compulsory Islamic veiling, she organised meetings and demonstrations against the government. Mina Ahadi is the founder and coordinator of the International Committees against Execution and Stoning. Mina Ahadi has lived in Europe since 1990. Recently she has founded the Central Council of Ex-Muslims to expose Islamic laws and its affects on people. She is currently under police protection for her activities.

In reality, however, ‘doctrine’ alone was not the reason behind the brutal Islamic movement’s rise to political power. In Iran, for example, the rise of Islamism was aided by the US-led foreign policy of creating a green or Islamic belt around the then Soviet Union during the Cold War. At a conference in Guadeloupe, Western powers decided to back Islamism at the expense of a left-leaning revolution that was crushed in order for the Islamic Republic of Iran to establish itself. In fact, to secure power, the regime slaughtered an entire generation. As a result, we have witnessed the rise of the political Islamic movement for several
decades. At the same time, though, today, there are more fundamental political realities working against Islamism which must also be recognised. Calling it a ‘Black Spring’ does a great disservice to the revolutionary people of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya... who have risen against dictatorship – many of them US-backed. These immense human developments have had a positive effect on many things. Firstly, it has shown how it is still possible for people under the boot of dictatorship, Islamism and US-led militarism to come out on the streets and revolt and that in fact revolution is the most civilised form of resistance against oppression and violence. The Arab Spring has proven the anti-revolution and pro-status quo theoreticians and manufacturers of public opinion wrong. You can’t call it a Black Spring when youth have played a role in their future and people have freed themselves from captivity and put dictators on the run. Those of us who have battled against Islamism for decades know full well the role of Western foreign policy in encouraging this regressive movement and bringing it to centre stage. And we have also seen the many years of appeasement and cooperation with the Islamists at the expense of the people in the region.

Western governments continue to remain silent in the face of human rights catastrophes and to defend dialogue and cooperation with criminals. Another one of the obstacles in our struggle against Islamism has been the racist social policy of cultural relativism or multi-culturalism. According to this policy, the people are homogeneous, are all Muslims and therefore pro-Islamist; they only deserve the role of the Talibans and Ahmadinejads since ‘their culture’ is different from ‘ours,’ making it easy for governments to invest and make profits whilst ignoring the terrorism and heinous crimes against the people of the region (as long as it doesn’t go outside its sphere of influence). With the advent of the Arab Spring, multiculturalism and cultural relativism are dead. Today its proponents can no longer sell the lie that the youth and people in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Iran want Islam’s intervention in their lives. This is an important strike against Islamism. We wholeheartedly welcome this Spring. After all it proves what we have been saying all along. Islamism and dictatorship are not people’s culture and demands. It shows that the people in the region want to live 21st century lives and are willing to pour out onto the streets at great risk to themselves to fight for a new dawn. Whilst we must clearly stand vigilant against the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism, rather than dooming the revolutionary movements to failure, we must recognise and unequivocally defend them, help them expand and gain depth, and instead emphasise their modern and human dimensions which are diametrically opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism. We must help mobilise support and solidarity for a secular, modern and human Middle East and North Africa.

Alt doesn’t solve the case – democracy promotion is key – specific solvency should be preferred – selection-bias underpins their epistemology

Teitelbaum ’6 [Joshua Teitelbaum is Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, and Adjunct Senior Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern History, Bar Ilan University and Meir Litvak is Senior Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies, and Senior Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Teitelbaum began his studies at UCLA in 1976; Dr. Litvak began his at Tel Aviv University in 1980. In this article, they reflect on the influence of Said's Orientalism throughout their years of studying and teaching about Islam and the Middle East. March, 2006. “Students, Teachers, And Edward Said: Taking Stock Of Orientalism” online]

During the 1980s, Said's Orientalism critique became a nearly sacred doctrine in the American academy. Even so, the book engendered not a few criticisms which focused on three main issues: the validity of the main arguments raised by Said, primarily those related to the nature of Middle East studies as a research field; methodological problems; and the negative consequences of his arguments. It should be mentioned that among the critics were not only those his book attacked but also scholars praised by him, such as Maxime Rodinson and Albert Hourani, or researchers who presented different political opinions, among them even Arab intellectuals. This makes it harder to claim that the motive for criticism was merely of a personal or national sort. The critics did not deny that Western culture and scholarship in the past has included ethnocentric, racist, or anti-Islamic components, but argued that these had been greatly exaggerated, to the point of being made universal. Out of more than 60,000 works on the Middle East published in Europe and the United States, he chose only those needed in order to prove his case that there was a discourse which he termed Orientalism. In order to arrive at this conclusion he ignored much evidence critical to the historical documentation of research and literature, material which would have supported the opposite position. [19] His choices, as Kramer writes, rejected "all discrimination between genres and disregarded all extant hierarchies of knowledge." This was particularly true regarding Said's deliberate conflation of Middle Eastern studies as a research discipline and the popular, artistic, or literary perspective of the Orient. It also disregarded the key question of which were the field’s main texts and which were those purely on the margins. [20] This approach...
led Said to ignore several leading researchers who had a decisive influence on Middle Eastern studies. For example, there is his almost complete ignoring of Ignaz Goldziher’s work—which made an undeniable contribution to the study of Islam—since his persona contradicts Said’s claims. Said chose to attack Goldziher’s criticism of anthropomorphism in the Koran as supposed proof of his negative attitude toward Islam, while Goldziher himself felt great respect for Islam and had even attacked Ernest Renan for his racist conceptions. [21] Malcolm Kerr, for example, criticized Said’s ignorance of the role and importance of Arab-American Middle East researchers, who played an important role in the field and could not easily be labeled anti-Arab or anti-Islamic. Reina Lewis and Joan Miller argued that Said ignored women’s voices which, they maintained, contradicted the monolithically masculine representation which Said wished to present. [22] Said’s selectivity enabled him to paint scholarship of the Middle East as an essentialist, racist, and unchangeable phenomenon, whereas the evidence he ignored would have proven that the Western understanding and representation of the Middle East—especially of the Arabs and Islam—had become quite rich and multi-faceted over the years.

They can’t outweigh or turn the case—they’re correlation not causation.

Andrew J. Rotter, prof @ colgate. "Saidism without said: orientalism and US diplomatic history"

A third and yet more troubling problem for historians reading Orientalism is Said’s dubious epistemological relationship to matters of cause and effect. Discourse theory and postmodernism generally have shaken old certainties about history as a kind of science, a divining rod, which, properly wielded, will indicate the truth. In the postmodern universe, there is no truth, just self-serving “realities” promoted by regimes of power. “Reality is the creature of language,” and “Western Man a modern-day Gulliver, tied down with ideological ropes and incapable of transcendence because he can never get beyond the veil of language to the reality ‘out there,’” as three historians have summarized it. Following Nietzsche and Heidegger, postmodernists like Michel Foucault deny the linearity of the historical process; thus “causation should be pitched out.” For better or worse, most historians still believe that they are engaged in a search for reasons why things happened as they did. An event occurs, like the American Revolution. It is not, they say, a construct or a representation but a revolution, properly named. There are reasons why the revolution occurred, and even though historians might assign different weights to these reasons or argue over whether some of them mattered at all, they still believe that the causes of the revolution are knowable, that they preceded the act of revolution itself, and that they are important to understand. 6 7 One of the contributions of discourse theory has been to complicate—a virtue, in its own terms—comfortable assumptions about historical causation. But do the difficulties of ascribing cause make the effort itself a fool’s errand? Said seems unsure. At times, James Clifford has pointed out, Said “suggests that ‘authenticity,’ ‘experience,’ ‘reality,’ ‘presence,’ are mere rhetorical contrivances.” Elsewhere in Orientalism, he posits “an old-fashioned existential realism.” Sometimes, Orientalism “distorts, dominates, or ignores some real or authentic feature of the Orient”; sometimes, Said “denies the existence of any ‘real’ Orient.” There is, he asserts, a relationship between the discourse of Orientalism and the exercise of power by the West over the Mideast. The discourse, Said wrote, “is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in uneven exchange with various kinds of power,” including political, intellectual, cultural, and moral. Making allowances for lifting this quotation out of a longer passage, it is nevertheless reasonable to wonder about the agency of that word “produced.” Does Said mean to say, as his grammar suggests, that the discourse is “produced . . . with various kinds of power” rather than by power, or that the discourse has an independent source? Is discourse a dependent variable where power is concerned, providing a reservoir of culturally shaped images from which the powerful can draw to justify decisions made for reasons of perceived strategic or economic interest? 8 Said’s efforts to illuminate these connections are not always successful. Responding to Bernard Lewis’s attack on Orientalism, Said insisted that “there is a remarkable (but nonetheless intelligible) coincidence between the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France.” "Coincidence" is far from cause and effect. In Culture and Imperialism, where the relationship between discourse and power is the heart of the matter, Said admitted: "It is difficult to connect these different realms, to show the involvements of culture with expanding empires, to make observations about art that preserve its unique endowments and at the same time map its affiliations." Said’s subsequent use of language indicates the difficulty. His definition of imperialism includes not just the “practice” and “theory” of domination but also the "attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory"—a statement that calls to mind Mark Lilla’s comment that "postmodernism is long on attitude and short on argument." Said struggles to decide whether culture and politics are separate spheres in some ways connected or finally the same thing. Novels never "caused" imperialism, but reading Conrad’s Heart of Darkness "was part of the European effort to hold on to, think about, plan for Africa"; and, while no one would construe Moby Dick as "a mere literary decoration of events in the real world . . . the fact is that during the nineteenth century the United States did expand territorially, most often at the expense of native peoples, and in time came to gain hegemony over the North American continent and the territories and seas adjacent to it." That is a fact; what it has to do with Moby Dick is less clear. 8 9
Theories are useless in describing the Middle East- turns their Orientalism internal links


These theories are powerful totems—far more powerful than the realities of the Middle East, which are distant and remote from the American campus. In such a climate, there is a strong incentive to put theoretical commitments before empirical observation. Even though this has been the source of repeated error, breaking out of the circle involves professional risk of a high order. To put the Middle East before theorizing about the Middle East is to run the risk of being denounced as a disciplinary naïf or a “latent” orientalist. In striking contrast, there is no professional cost for substantive error in interpreting the actual Middle East. Indeed, leaders of the field do it all the time without any negative consequences. Yet the salvation of Middle Eastern studies lies precisely in looking past the rapid turnover of theories in the social sciences to the Middle East itself in all its theory-defying complexity. Certainly this must be the lesson of the debacles of the last twenty years, all of which originated precisely in the effort to slavishly apply irrelevant or faulty paradigms to the region. The academics are naturally reluctant to cast Middle Eastern studies as a spoiler of the social sciences, and it is always safer to take a seat in the chorus. But reducing the Middle East to a set of proofs will not only perpetuate the marginality of Middle Eastern studies. It will rob the field of its potential for contributing to the great debates, present and future, over the place of the Middle East in a globalized world.

Turn—Orientalism's flawed account empowers militants and fundamentalists.

Warraq 07 (Ibn, Founder of the Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Study and senior research fellow at the Center for Inquiry, "Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism" pg. 49-50)

For a number of years now, Islamologists have been aware of the disastrous effect of Said's Orientalism on their discipline. Professor Herbert Berg has complained that the latter's influence has resulted in "a fear of asking and answering potentially embarrassing questions—ones which might upset Muslim sensibilities."69 Professor Montgomery Watt, one of the most respected Western Islamologists of the last fifty years, takes Said to task for asserting that Sir Hamilton Gibb was wrong in saying that the master science of Islam was law and not theology. This, says Watt, "shows Said's ignorance of Islam." But Watt rather unfairly adds, "since he is from a Christian Arab background."70 Said is indeed ignorant of Islam, but surely not because he is a Christian, since Watt and Gibb themselves were devout Christians. Watt also decries Said's tendency to ascribe dubious motives to various writers, scholars, and statesmen such as Gibb and Lane, with Said committing doctrinal blunders such as not realizing that non-Muslims could not marry Muslim women.71 R. Stephen Humphreys found Said's book important in some ways because it showed how some Orientalists were indeed “trapped within a vision that portrayed Islam and the Middle East as in some way essentially different from 'the West.'” Nonetheless, "Edward Said's analysis of Orientalism is overdrawn and misleading in many ways, and purely as [a] piece of intellectual history, Orientalism is a seriously flawed book." Even more damning, Said's book actually discouraged, argues Humphreys, the very idea of modernization of Middle Eastern societies. "In an ironic way, it also emboldened the Islamic activists and militants who were then just beginning to enter the political arena. These could use Said to attack their opponents in the Middle East as slavish 'Westernists,' who were out of touch with the authentic culture and values of their own countries. Said's book has had less impact on the study of medieval Islamic history—partly because medievalists know how distorted his account of classical Western Orientalism really is."72
The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations—guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc.—are often used to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Naturally, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, such as “revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry fewer negative connotations than the term, “terrorism.” Terrorism or Revolutionary Violence? Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad) was Yasser Arafat’s deputy and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September. He was responsible for a number of lethal attacks, including the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In order to rationalize such actions, he used the tactic of confounding “terrorism” with “political violence,” stating, “By nature, and even on ideological grounds, I am firmly opposed to political murder, and more generally, to terrorism. Nevertheless, unlike many others, I do not confuse revolutionary violence with terrorism, or operations that constitute political acts with others that do not.”[4] Abu Iyad tries to present terrorism and political violence as two different and unconnected phenomena. The implication of this statement is that a political motive makes the activity respectable, and the end justifies the means. I will examine this point below. Terrorism or National Liberation? A rather widespread attempt to make all definitions of terrorism meaningless is to lump together terrorist activities and the struggle to achieve national liberation. Thus, for instance, the recurrently stated Syrian official position is that Syria does not assist terrorist organizations; rather, it supports national liberation movements. President Hafez el-Assad, in a November 1986 speech to the participants in the 21st Convention of Workers Unions in Syria, said the following: We have always opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing and a national struggle against occupation is another. We are against terrorism… Nevertheless, we support the struggle against occupation waged by national liberation movements.[5] The attempt to confound the concepts of “terrorism” and “national liberation” comes to the fore in various official pronouncements from the Arab world. For instance, the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait, at the beginning of 1987, stated in its resolutions that: The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from the legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values, and by international conventions.[6] The foreign and interior ministers of the Arab League reiterated this position at their April 1998 meeting in Cairo. In a document entitled “Arab Strategy in the Struggle against Terrorism,” they emphasized that belligerent activities aimed at “liberation and self determination” are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults.[7] Here again we notice an attempt to justify the “means” (terrorism) in terms of the “end” (national liberation). Regardless of the nature of the operation, when we speak of “liberation from the yoke of a foreign occupation” this will not be terrorism but a legitimate and justified activity. This is the source of the cliché, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which stresses that all depends on the perspective and the worldview of the one doing the defining. The former President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, made the following statement in April 1981, during the visit of the Libyan ruler, Muammar Qadafi: “Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as ‘terrorism.’”[8] Surprisingly, many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for “national liberation” would appear to be the positive and justified end of this sequence, whereas terrorism is the negative and odious one. It is impossible, according to this approach, for any organization to be both a terrorist group and a movement for national liberation at the same time. In failing to understand the difference between these two concepts, many have, in effect, been caught in a semantic trap laid by the terrorist organizations and their allies. They have attempted to contend with the clichés of national liberation by resorting to odd arguments, instead of stating that when a group or organization chooses terrorism as a means, the aim of their struggle cannot be to justify their actions (see below). Thus, for instance, Senator Jackson was quoted in Benyamin Netanyahu’s book Terrorism: How the West Can Win as saying, The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorists murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do . . . It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.[9] Professor Benzion Netanyahu also assumed, a priori, that freedom fighters are incapable of perpetrating terrorist acts: For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately attacked innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or passersby in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen to reside in the area of conflict or are merely associated ethnically or religiously with the people of that area… The conclusion we must draw from all this is evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement . . . [10] This approach strengthens the attempt by terrorist organizations to present terrorism and the struggle for liberation as two contradictory concepts.

AT Terror

Turn- glossing over terrorist as a threat causes the public to support them- hardline stances solve
Ganor ’1 (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “Defining Terrorism”, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm)
It thus plays into the terrorists’ hands by supporting their claim that, since they are struggling to remove someone they consider a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. The claim that a freedom fighter cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing is, of course, groundless. A terrorist organization can also be a movement of national liberation, and the concepts of “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” are not mutually contradictory. Targeting “the innocent”? Not only terrorists and their allies use the definition of terrorism to promote their own goals and needs. Politicians in countries affected by terrorism at times make political use of the definition of terrorism by attempting to emphasize its brutality. One of the prevalent ways of illustrating the cruelty and inhumanity of terrorists is to present them as harming “the innocent.” Thus, in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Binyamin Netanyahu states that terrorism is “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”[11] This definition was changed in Netanyahu’s third book, Fighting Terrorism, when the phrase “the innocent” was replaced by the term “civilians”: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”[12] “Innocent” (as opposed to “civilian”) is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terrorism. The use of the concept “innocent” in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the political game. The dilemma entailed by the use of the term “innocent” is amply illustrated in the following statement by Abu Iyad: As much as we repudiate any activity that endangers innocent lives, that is, against civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we feel no remorse concerning attacks against Israeli military and political elements that wage war against the Palestinian people . . . Israeli acts of vengeance usually result in high casualties among Palestinian civilians—particularly when the Israeli Air Force blindly and savagely bombs refugee camps—and it is only natural that we should respond in appropriate ways to deter the enemy from continuing its slaughter of innocent victims.”[13] Abu Iyad here clarifies that innocent victims are civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (implying that civilians in Israel, even children and old people, are not innocent), while he describes Palestinian civilians as innocent victims. Proposing a Definition of Terrorism The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed-upon foundation for academic research, as well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. The definition proposed here states that terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. Continues… This distinction between the target of the attack and its aims shows that the discrepancy between “terrorism” and “freedom fighting” is not a subjective difference reflecting the personal viewpoint of the definer. Rather it constitutes an essential difference, involving a clear distinction between the perpetrators’ aims and their mode of operation. As noted, an organization is defined as “terrorist” because of its mode of operation and its target of attack, whereas calling something a “struggle for liberation” has to do with the aim that the organization seeks to attain. Diagram 2 illustrates that non-conventional war (between a state and an organization), may include both terrorism and guerrilla activities on the background of different and unrelated aims. Hiding behind the guise of national liberation does not release terrorists from responsibility for their actions. Not only is it untrue that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” but it is also untrue that “the end justifies the means.” The end of national liberation may, in some cases, justify recourse to violence, in an attempt to solve the problem that led to the emergence of a particular organization in the first place. Nevertheless, the organization must still act according to the rules of war, directing its activities toward the conquest of military and security targets; in short, it must confine itself to guerrilla activities. When the organization breaks these rules and intentionally targets civilians, it becomes a terrorist organization, according to objective measures, and not according to the subjective perception of the definer. It may be difficult at times to determine whether the victim of an attack was indeed a civilian, or whether the attack was intentional. These cases could be placed under the rubric of a “gray area,” to be decided in line with the evidence and through the exercise of judicial discretion. The proposed definition may therefore be useful in the legal realm as a criterion for defining and categorizing the perpetrators’ activities. In any event, adopting the proposed definition of terrorism will considerably reduce the “gray area” to a few marginal cases. Defining States’ Involvement in Terrorism Continues… supporting terrorism – terrorist organizations often rely on the assistance of a sympathetic civilian population. An effective instrument in the limitation of terrorist activity is to undermine the ability of the organization to obtain support, assistance, and aid from this population. A definition of terrorism could be helpful here too by determining new rules of the game in both the local and the international sphere. Any organization contemplating the use of terrorism to attain its political aims will have to risk losing its legitimacy, even with the population that supports its aims. Public relations – a definition that separates terrorism out from other violent actions will enable the initiation of an international campaign designed to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist organizations, curtail support for them, and galvanize a united international front against them. In order to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist activity (usually stemming from the tendency of various countries to identify with some of the aims of terrorist organizations), terrorist activity must be distinguished from guerrilla activity, as two forms of violent struggle reflecting different levels of illegitimacy. The Attitude of Terrorist Organizations Toward the Definition The definition of terrorism does not require that the terrorist organizations themselves accept it as such. Nevertheless, reaching international agreement will be easier the more objective the definition, and the more the definition takes into account the demands and viewpoints of terrorist organizations and their supporters. The proposed definition, as noted, draws a distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare at both the conceptual and moral levels. If properly applied, it could challenge organizations that are presently involved in terrorism to abandon it so as to engage exclusively in guerrilla warfare. As noted, most organizations active today in the national and international arena engage in both terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare; after all, international convention makes no distinction between the two. Hence, there are no rules defining what is forbidden and what is allowed in non-conventional war, and equal punishments are imposed on both terrorists and guerrilla fighters. People perpetrating terrorist attacks or engaging in guerrilla warfare know they can expect the same punishment, whether they attack a military installation or take over a kindergarten. The terrorist attack may be more heavily censored because it involves children, but the legitimacy of these actions will be inferred from their political aims. In these circumstances, why not prefer a terrorist attack that will have far more impact, and will be easier to accomplish with much less risk? The international adoption of the proposed definition, with its distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare—and its concomitant separation from political aims—could motivate the perpetrators to reconsider their intentions, choosing military targets over civilian targets—guerrilla warfare over terrorism—both because of moral considerations and because of “cost-benefit”
considerations. The moral consideration – many terrorist organizations are troubled by the moral question bearing on their right to harm civilians, and this concern is reflected in their literature and in interviews with terrorists. Thus, for instance, an activist of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Walid Salam, argued in December 1996 that “among activists of the Popular Front, more and more are opposed to military activities against civilians, as the one near Ramallah on Wednesday. They do not say so publicly because of internal discipline and to preserve unity.” [27] We can also see something of this moral dilemma in Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the leader of Hamas: “According to our religion it is forbidden to kill a woman, a baby, or an old man, but when you kill my sister, and my daughter, and my son, it is my right to defend them.” [28] This concern might explain why, after attacks on civilian targets, organizations such as Hamas often make public statements proclaiming that they have attacked military targets. The moral dilemma does exist, and the opponents of terrorism must intensify it. When countries acknowledge the principle of relying on guerrilla warfare to attain legitimate political aims, and unite in their moral condemnation of terrorism, they increase the moral dilemma that is already prevalent in terrorist organizations. The utilitarian consideration – if the perpetrators know that attacking a kindergarten or other civilian target will never be acceptable; that these attacks will turn them into wanted and extraditable terrorists and will undermine the legitimacy of their political goals—and that, when apprehended, they will be punished much more harshly than would guerrilla fighters—they may think twice before choosing terrorism as their modus operandi. Adopting the proposed definition of terrorism, formulating rules of behavior, and setting appropriate punishments in line with the proposed definition will sharpen the “cost-benefit” considerations of terrorist organizations. One way of encouraging this trend among terrorist organizations is, as noted, to agree on different punishments for those convicted of terrorism and those convicted of guerrilla warfare. Thus, for instance, the possibility should be considered of bringing to criminal trial, under specific charges of terrorism, individuals involved in terrorist activities, while allotting prisoner of war status to those accused of involvement in guerrilla activities. The proposed definition of terrorism may indeed help in the struggle against terrorism at many and varied operative levels. An accepted definition, capable of serving as a basis for international counter-terrorist activity, could above all, bring terrorist organizations to reconsider their actions. They must face the question of whether they will persist in terrorist attacks and risk all that such persistence entails—loosing legitimacy, incurring harsh and specific punishments, facing a coordinated international opposition (including military activity), and suffering harm to sources of support and revenue. The international community must encourage the moral and utilitarian dilemmas of terrorist organizations, and establish a clear policy accompanied by adequate means of punishment on the basis of an accepted definition. Summary We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (between organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a code of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

Turn- paranoia good- allows us to anticipate and prevent danger


Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend
risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.

Empericism is good and true when it comes to terrorism

Horgan and Boyle '8 [John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle*** (1 International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA; “School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK), Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2008, “A case against ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’”]

Furthermore, we also realize the inherent challenge in attempting to be a disinterested observer of social phenomena (problems with this, as shall be shown, lie at the heart of some of the raison d’être for CTS) particularly in a field as contested as terrorism studies. Terrorism is a widely disputed social and political phenomenon and the very act of data collection — which includes, for example, discerning what events count and do not count as terrorism — cannot be considered entirely value free. The terrorism scholar can try to be as independently minded as possible and test for the robustness of findings based on different definition of the data, but the basic problem — that terrorism studies is ineluctably political — remains. In our view, this does not lead to an abandonment of empirical approaches to social and political inquiry. Instead, we believe that the empirical approach is a powerful and useful way to study terrorism, and that a key contribution of CTS can be to make empirical scholarship more self-aware and reflective in its practice. We do not believe that concepts without tight analytic boundaries — for example, the ‘state’ or ‘power’ — cannot be used in research, though they must be used with some care and self-awareness. As a matter of policy, neither of us believes that any form of intellectual enterprise should be discarded if it happens to run contrary to our interests or to challenge what we do. We welcome the contribution of CTS only if it helps to improve the analytic rigor of terrorism or open new avenues of research. We believe that — as Mao put it — that in academia it is always a good idea to let ‘a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend’. We say this as a prelude to qualifying the criticisms below, levelled at CTS (or at least its current incarnation) as a way of stimulating debate, not silencing it.

Predictions of terrorism are true- their critique replicates the logic preceding the attacks on Britain


Rather than accept the existence of a clear and present Islamist threat to western secularism and democracy after the 9/11 attacks, such critical thinking moved the discursive goal posts. Critical thinkers and opinionators argued instead that western governments deliberately exaggerated the threat to curtail legitimate dissent and civil liberties.46 In his bestselling book Dude, Where’s My Country? Michael Moore popularized this view, maintaining: ‘There is no terrorist threat. Why has our government gone to such absurd lengths to convince us our lives are in danger? The answer is nothing short of their feverish desire to rule the world, first by controlling us, and then, in turn, getting us to support their efforts to dominate the rest of the planet.’47 More measured academic commentary termed the propensity of liberal democratic governments to exaggerate the terrorist threat the ‘politics of fear’. Governments, they maintained, conjured the spectre of Islam and catastrophic terror attacks for illiberal purposes. The politics of fear persuaded the gullible masses to accept an illegitimate extension of state power under the rubric of counterterror policy. These measures eroded personal freedoms and restricted civil liberty. The UK government proposals to introduce identity cards, extend detention of terrorist suspects without trial and curtail expression of views calculated to inflame racial hatred crystallized the new authoritarianism. The politics of fear also facilitated a contentious foreign policy legitimating the 2003 invasion of Iraq, on the grounds of necessary pre-emptive military action against all potential sources of threat and instability.48 Critics thus maintained that ‘Islamist terror’ constituted an all-purpose political bogeyman. Media commentary reinforced the politics of fear hypothesis. ‘So, a climate of fear it is,’ declared Jackie Ashley in the Guardian in March 2004: ‘Everywhere you turn, there is another gray-faced public figure telling you that a major terrorist attack is coming … and there is nothing we can do except trust our leaders.’49 In a similar, but academic,
vein, security analyst Bill Durodié declared that ‘Insecurity is the key driving concept of our times. Politicians have pack aged themselves as risk managers’ in order to pacify ‘a demand from below for protection’.50 The BBC series The Power of Nightmares, screened in the United Kingdom in early 2005, encapsulated this critical understanding for a wider audience.51 Advertising the series, the BBC News website in April 2005 announced: ‘The Power of Nightmares explores how the idea that we are threatened by a hidden and organized network is an illusion. It is a myth that has spread unquestioned through politics, the security services and the international media.’ Pre-publicity presented the threat as a ‘fantasy’ which ‘politicians then found restored their power and authority in a disillusioned age’, and argued somewhat mysteriously. Those with the darkest fears became the most powerful.’52 If before 7/7 the politics of fear increasingly influenced mainstream media commentary, it also dominated UK and US campuses. The Guardian, sampling informed opinion prior to the screening of The Power of Nightmares, confi med the orthodoxy that the security bureaucracy and politicians constructed terrorism in order to pursue the politics of fear and repression.53 Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, observed that for governments the terror threat is of ‘absolute cosmic signifi cance’, legitimating an ‘anything goes’ attitude towards its defeat. For the historian Linda Colley, ‘States and their rulers expect to monopolise violence, and that is why they react so violently to terrorism.’ Given that there had been only one attack in Europe since 9/11, in Madrid in March 2003, Bill Durodié contended that the ‘reality [of the Al-Qaeda threat to the west] has been essentially a one-off ’.54 Nor was the evolving consensus confi ned to academic and media comment. Such views found support both among members of parliament and from common lawyers. In January 2005 Charles Kennedy, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third largest political party, asserted in his ‘New Year message’: A clear division is emerging in British politics: the politics of fear versus the politics of hope. Labour is counting on the politics of fear, ratcheting up talk of threat, crime and insecurity, while the Conservatives are re-working their populist scares about asylum and the European ‘menace’. Look at how Labour, with the support of the Conservatives, has undermined trust in the political process by its spin and reliance on external threats.55 Suspicion of a government policy based on the politics of fear similarly infl uenced legal decisions with respect to deportation or extradition orders for suspects wanted in third countries for terror-related off ences.56 More particularly, the law lords questioned the government’s authority to detain without trial non-British terror suspects resident in the UK, like Abu Qatada. In December 2004, the highest appellate court found Qatada’s detention illegal. One of the law lords, Lord Bingham, maintained that the government’s powers of detention ‘discriminate on the ground of nationality or immigration status’,57 while Lord Hoff man found that ‘The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’58 Those who criticized the government for its political exploitation of the threat, however, failed to recognize that their rejection of the politics of fear was also politically motivated. For the politics of fear itself resulted in highly politicized threat assessments couched in the language of balance, neutrality and concern for an abstract standard of law that transcended short-term political contingencies. Thus, in his judgment on the detention of non-UK citizens, Lord Hoff man argued that ‘fanatical groups’ ‘do not threaten the life of the nation’. He continued: ‘Terrorist crime, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.’59 Hoff man asserted as constitutional fact what could only be an expression of faith. In an analogous vein, the security analyst Bill Durodié discounted the pretensions of Islamism’s UK franchise. After the conviction of the Algerian Kamel Bourgass in 2005 for murder and conspiracy to commit a public nuisance using poisons and explosives, including ricin, Durodié dismissed Al-Qaeda as a ‘conspiracy of dunces’. Assessing the ‘sheer naivety and incompetence of all these so-called al-Qaeda operatives’ like Bourgass, Richard Reid, the ‘dim-witted shoe bomber who had trouble with matches’, and Sajid Badat, ‘the Gloucester loner who bottled out of emulating Reid’, Durodié asserted: ‘If that is the best of what the supposed massed ranks of al-Qaeda have to off er after three years [i.e. after 9/11] … we should have little to fear. But the media, politicians and the police have sought to portray the situation diff erently.’60 The London bombs disproved the politics of fear hypothesis and exposed the evaluations of law lords like Hoff man and security analysts like Durodié. The facts, expressed in the toll of civilian lives, demonstrated that the government’s perception had been more acute than that of its critics. But its detractors portrayed government attempts to counter the threat of terror and heighten the state of public vigilance as an insidious plot to undermine democratic values.61 As Frank Furedi observed, those who believed in the politics of fear met one conspiratorial claim—that the government was using the threat of Islamic terror to weaken basic freedoms—with a counterconspiracy—that there wasn’t much of a threat to begin with.62 Hence, the politics of fear determined its own preferred policy response, namely, the practice of complacency. Rather than engaging in a debate about the proportionality of response to a home-grown threat of Islamist terror, those who detected the politics of fear lurking behind every government pronouncement instead presented the security predicament in the very reductionist terms of which they accused those who claimed...
to be exaggerating the threat. In other words, the proponents of the politics of fear played the politics of fear themselves.63 Indeed, the thesis required fear—in this case, fear of a creeping authoritarian dystopia—to sustain it. In this way, a reasonable public policy concern about counterterrorist measures eroding established legal rights rapidly degenerated into a one-dimensional caricature of government policy not far removed from paranoid post-9/11 movies like V for Vendetta (2006). Furthermore, the wider commentariat’s acceptance of the politics of fear had far from trivial consequences. Mainstream politicians, the liberal press, television, academics and the courts gave it wide currency as a more objective response to the post-9/11 environment. Its premise, fear, discounted the threat and denigrated any serious attempt to evaluate the actual character and extent of the problem, asserting, without empirical basis, its more insightful assessment of the situation. Lord Walker, the single dissenting law lord in the 8 to 1 judgment in favour of Qatada in December 2004, expressed the inherent danger contained in this politics of complacency, well before the 7/7 attacks. Walker found that it is certainly not the court’s function to substitute for the British Government’s assessment any other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism. When a state is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the outset each of its chosen means of action with each of the safeguards.64 The politics of complacency, by contrast, denied the existence of a ‘public emergency’. To the extent that a threat existed, it was attributed largely to government exploitation and overreaction, which had constructed a Muslim out-group.65 Consequently, for the West, the Islamist threat was an ‘enemy of its own making’.66 The rhetoric in response to both the 7/7 attacks and the subsequent revelation of plots and conspiracies in London reflects a strategic misunderstanding that confuses limited tactical ability with limited political goals. The semantic laxity that informed discussion of the terrorist threat reinforced this misconception. Terrorism is a tactic practised as part of a strategy in war, but it is not a material phenomenon in itself. The lax terminology and distorted meanings attached to the phenomenon created the epistemological foundations of discourse failure. This failure enabled Islamist extremists to exploit the fault-lines in liberal, multicultural societies like Britain, which tolerated or ignored their evolving global campaign to engineer an apocalyptic confrontation with secular modernity. Prior to July 2005, the British authorities recognized only one theatre of the ‘war against terrorism’, which required confronting the Islamist threat externally. Yet since 9/11 Al-Qaeda has rapidly mutated, evolving via the Internet a largely home-grown jihadist strategy to infiltrate and attack the cosmopolitan western cityscape. A coherent response therefore demands the pursuit of a far more vigorous strategy at home. In particular, it requires abandoning the prevailing view that the domestic threat is best prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy. It demands instead a total strategy to deal with a totalizing threat. This means recognizing that there is an existential threat, unencumbered by the politics of fear, root causes and denial that for too long has impeded its effective prosecution. An adequate strategy requires, moreover, a multifaceted response that goes beyond law enforcement. This does not mean imposing arbitrary regimes of detention without trial. What it does require, however, is enhanced means of intelligence-gathering, both technical and human, together with a coherent set of government policies addressing education, welfare, asylum, immigration and culture in order to safeguard a sustainable civil association. The evidence demonstrates the existence of a physical threat, not merely the political fear of a threat. The implementation of a coherent set of social policies confronting the threat at home recognizes that securing state borders and maintaining internal stability is the first task of responsible government, responsible media and a responsible public education sector, both secondary and tertiary. For without the basis of security, necessarily premised upon the inculcation of a shared political culture, the conditions for political pluralism and liberal democracy gradually disappear. This requires a return to the Hobbesian verities of
society, which, despite the illusion of post-Cold War cosmopolitan multiculturalism and the elitist dream of a post-national constellation, represents the only secure basis for liberal democratic order.

There is no root cause of terrorism – that theory is a fallacy
Weiner ’88 [Justus R. Weiner, Director of the Division of American Law and former Assistant Professor of International Relations and Law at Boston University School of Law, “Terrorism: Israel’s Legal Responses”, 14 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 184, 1988]

Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and others theorize why terrorist acts are committed against Israeli targets. One popular theory is the “root cause” theory. This thesis claims that were it not for the frustration, deprivation, and misery of the Palestinian people, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not commit acts of terrorism. A typical intellectual argument excusing PLO terror reasons: “Shying away from analyzing the motives for terror, or the political, economic and historical environments that breed it, overlooks the often symbiotic relationship between a terrorist and the governments and policies he fights against.” Others go one step further and turn an explanation into a justification. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, argued: “The use of the pro-Israeli media of the word ‘terrorism’ does not intimidate us, especially when it is used by forces that have colonized peoples for hundreds of years, and accused freedom fighters of being ‘terrorists’ when they fought against occupation, terrorism and racial discrimination until they won their independence....” Regrettably, this justification has gained considerable support at the United Nations.-Benzion Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has written in response: The typical stratagem at the United Nations, for example, has been to justify terrorism by calling it a struggle for national liberation. This is perversely enough in itself, because terrorism is always unjustifiable, regardless of professed or real goals. But it is perverse in another way. For the real goals of terrorists are in practice related to their methods. History has repeatedly given us advance warning. Those who deliberately butcher women and children do not have liberation in mind. It is not only that the ends of terrorists do not justify the means that they chose. It is that the choice of means indicates what the true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, the terrorists are the forerunners of a new tyranny. It is instructive to note that the French Resistance did not resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, well within reach in occupied France. A few years later, in Algeria, the FLN showed no such restraint against French occupation. France, of course, is today a democracy. Algeria is nearly another of the despotisms where terrorists have come to power. Realistically, however, the “root cause” theory should be recognized as the root cause fallacy. This is because, on a global basis, there is scant evidence to support any direct correlation between those who have suffered and those who commit acts of terrorism. Indeed on both an individual and group level, many of those who have suffered most scrupulously avoid such acts. The PLO, by contrast, purports to represent the Palestinian people, a group with options for non-violent political action and resources including wealth and education. Yet the PLO deliberately engages in terrorist acts while eschewing all other means of political redress. Any Arab leader showing the slightest inclination towards accommodation with Israel has risked assassination. Thus, PLO terror should be recognized as a cause for, not the result of, Palestinian frustration, desperation, and misery.

The most comprehensive statistical studies prove this to be true
Stein ’7 [Zachary R. Stern, “The Face of Terrorism: Toward a Terrorist Profile” a study self-described here: This study focuses on a more important and substantial question than the definition of terrorism. It seeks to understand the root causes of terrorism or, at the very least, to dispel popular misconceptions about those causes. If optimists like President Bush are to be believed, reducing global poverty and increasing education levels will result in a decrease in global terrorism. This approach is based on the assumption that economic disadvantage and the inaccessibility or the denial of proper schooling creates fertile breeding grounds for terrorism. Equally unsatisfactory as an explanation, is the opposite hypothesis, exemplified by the work of Alan Krueger, that education and financial well-being actually help explain how and why terrorism is engendered. The assumptions of both sides are not borne out by the facts. They belie the complexity of the individuals and the collective histories that produce terrorists. Terrorists are deeply committed individuals, willing to risk imprisonment and death for their cause. This characteristic would indicate that ideology, and not demographic background, is the leading cause of terrorism. Since ideology and one’s commitment to it are by not easily quantifiable (nor has anyone attempted to quantify them, to date), this study will seek to disprove the demographic background argument by reviewing the relevant literature, and to further establish the point by analyzing individual terrorists’ backgrounds from a wide cross-section. It will also seek to provide some tentative answers to the question that captivates counter-terrorism experts, psychologists, and just about everyone who worries about terrorism: why does someone become a terrorist? This paper is organized as follows: first, a literature review of relevant subject material; second, a description of the methods used in this study; third, a description of the various data sources used in this study; fourth, regresional analysis of the data sources; fifth, non-regresional analysis and anecdotal cases from this study; sixth, and finally, conclusions of this study, Spring 2007]
With no root cause of terrorism readily identifiable, terrorism cannot be extinguished at its source, and individuals cannot be deterred from pursuing its means in the hope of securing their desired ends. This leaves strong intelligence as the best tool available to counterterrorism. While continuing with research into terrorist demographics and profiling, the majority of resources must be directed for the most effective counterterrorism strategy, and thus in many ways we must move away from a terrorist profile. Instead, terrorist organizations must be infiltrated, their leaders rounded up, and their cells broken.

The war on terror is over- their evidence is methodologically flawed because it fails to account for massive changes in terror strategy

Kayyem ’11 (“The War on Terror is Over” Op-Ed, Boston Globe September 10, 2011 Author: Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security What has replaced it is a way of thinking that is more honest, less ideological, and more effective

WHEN GOVERNOR Patrick came into office in 2007, he inherited a legacy of programs to protect a state that had suffered so gravely 10 years ago tomorrow. Since the week after 9/11, the Massachusetts National Guard had been protecting the perimeter of the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. That was understandable in those early months, even years, but the Guard remained six years later. No changes had been made, despite the growing recognition that the troops had been ably supplanted by legions of security personnel. Several months later, Massachusetts became the first state to withdraw its Guard from a nuclear facility. We shifted away from a strategy that looked tough and militaristic, but that clearly wasn't necessary. I say this as someone familiar with the deep political and even psychological obstacles to doing so, as I was the governor’s homeland security adviser. How could we withdraw the Guard without seeming soft, or weak? Other states quickly followed, as if they were waiting for the all-clear sign. It's not that the terrorist threat was over. Not at all. But there were other procedures — better communications, more aggressive intelligence sharing, increased lighting and surveillance on the streets — that we instituted instead of relying on a handful of overextended Guard members, rotating their way through 24/7 security. Now, on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, there has been much talk of how the war on terror, at home and abroad, has kept us safe. But there has been far less said about the constantly changing sources of that protection, and how far it has evolved from its militaristic roots. Ten years is a long time to fight any "war," but particularly one in which the enemy has changed so dramatically. And over that time, there has been a whole range of shifts across the nation that have been similar to the changes at Pilgrim. Unfortunately, there is a new narrative being written, or rewritten, by those who are inclined to hold onto the so-called war on terror. Defenders of the previous presidential administration — most notably former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former Vice President Dick Cheney, and Bush administration legal adviser John Yoo — would like to have everyone believe that their policies have been vindicated because the Obama administration has supposedly continued them. And some liberal critics of President Obama, who seem only too willing to attack him for doing more of the same (or worse) as a sort of "Bush lite," play into this narrative. This telling requires a sleight of hand and a lot of forgetfulness. It equates the Obama administration's use of the military through drone attacks and special operations as an extension of Bush's "war." But narrowly targeted military strategies to combat specific threats are not the same as the global war on terror that we lived under during the Bush administration. So, it’s time to set the record straight: The war on terror is over. To still call the effort to dismantle, kill, and disrupt Al Qaeda and its affiliates the war on terror is to treat the United States and its government as frozen in time. It assumes that there has been no learning, no growth, no recognition of mistakes, no priority shifts, no advancement in capabilities. It assumes time has stood still. The war on terror was an entire government ideology based on the belief that Islamic terrorism represented a unified and operationally centralized threat, demanding a predominantly military response with the president, as commander in chief, empowered to use any means necessary to defeat the enemy. The US government, under any administration, is going to need a variety of tools to use to combat that threat of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Nobody needs to make apologies for seeking the power necessary to preserve national security. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force, approved by Congress immediately after 9/11, gave President Bush, and future presidents, the legal authority to fight Al Qaeda...
with force. It remains the law today. But the war on terror was so much more. It was the "enhanced interrogation" of suspects, the insistence that allies be either with us or against us, the indiscriminate interviewing of Muslim communities, the registration of Arab immigrants, the military tribunals that adhered to standards unrecognized in military law, the use of Guantanamo Bay prison, the color-code alerts, the breathless press conferences about any new threats, the rejection of traditional laws of war, the dismissal of the Geneva Conventions, the secret wiretapping in violation of established law, and more. Thankfully, some of those policies were curbed by the end of the Bush administration, others waited for new leadership to set different terms. Military tribunals, as one example, still exist, but they are very different than the ones Bush ordered. When Obama came into office he worked with Congress, and issued executive orders, that brought these counterterrorism strategies under accepted and clearly delineated law. It has simply not been more of the same. The CIA's "black sites" — secret prisons in other countries — are closed. Enhanced interrogation is outlawed. The laws of war have been restored. Guantanamo remains open not because Obama wants it that way, but because Congress has barred the expenditure of funds to bring its prisoners to the United States for trial. Thus, to pretend that there has been no rejection of what came before — or what defined the "war" — is a mistake. It took court decisions, public opposition, congressional changes, new leaders within the Bush administration, and finally, a new president to end the war on terror as we knew it. And the effort was worth it. Because we got better. Over these 10 years, under both Bush and Obama, the US security apparatus became far more sophisticated. That is partly because the threat changed; it became more decentralized and disparate. We have adapted to that, certainly, by using military tactics to kill the leaders of Al Qaeda affiliates worldwide. But we have also become more focused, measuring success by effectiveness rather than sheer activity. Homeland security is, fundamentally, a bottom-up process. It begins with local officials who run police departments or emergency management divisions or public health facilities. It is overseen by mayors and governors. Change has come to them, too; the only sitting governor who was in power on 9/11 is Texas' Rick Perry. The job of the federal government is to help these state and local officials do their jobs. Policies that are "dual use" — that help the cop on the street in fighting crime as well as in countering terrorism, that train emergency managers to contend with a tower falling or Hurricane Irene — are the most sustainable and effective over the long-term. The color code warning system helped create a war-like climate — much like the nuclear countdown during the Cuban Missile Crisis — but left the people with no clarity about how to respond. And the public rightfully rejected it. More localized efforts to engage immigrant communities, or the extend the "see something, say something" campaigns, are good government in action. And they are especially necessary now, as we have reason to be concerned with radicalization in our own nation. None of these require military engagement or a war-like mindset. They are simply useful strategies, adapted by people across the ideological spectrum. When a Navy Seal team killed Osama bin Laden, I viewed the mission as an expression of smart counterterrorism — and smart counterterrorism allows room for effective military action. More military efforts will need to be utilized in the future. But we should not forget what the war on terror was and how much progress we have made in moving past it. What has replaced it is a way of thinking that is more honest, less ideological, and more effective. Surely not everything is perfect, but criticism is accepted and not ridiculed. Over the last few days, the American public has been warned that there is potentially a new terrorist threat. Local leaders in New York and Washington, D.C., have asked citizens to serve as force multipliers and be aware of their surroundings. There was little bravado involved, and no mass fear. We have, somehow, become a little matter of fact about this; we know the drill. It isn't that hard to let go of a war-like mindset. Indeed, we already have.
AT Security/Threat Construction
No Impact

No impact – threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

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Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism. War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.
The alt fails and **destroys minority rights** – sectarian violence causes **re-securitization**, according to Wæver, 1993: 26). In simple terms, the Copenhagen School defines societies as politically significant ethnic, national or religious groups – collectivities that can act alongside, in the language of the Copenhagen School, being a minority, and thus pursuing minority rights, is a matter of ‘societal security’. In the 1993 book Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Wæver et al., 1993), Barry Buzan’s (1991) previous five-dimensional approach to international security is reconceptualized. In addition to the five sectors of state security (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), a duality of state and societal security is also conceived: societal security concerns whatever threats bring the identity of such units into question.

For Buzan, **threats to societal identity can occur through the sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity**, which can include ‘forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community’ (Buzan, 1993: 43). In terms of defending societal identity, the Copenhagen School recognizes that **for threatened societies, one obvious response is to strengthen societal identity**. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce social cohesion and distinctiveness and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively (Wæver et al., 1993: 191). Wæver captures the dynamic neatly, commenting that culture can be defended ‘with culture’, adding that ‘if one’s identity seems threatened . . . the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy’ (Wæver, 1995: 68; my emphasis). Therefore, the likely response to such threats is either to safeguard the maintenance of, or to seek the restoration of, the means and practices that ensure the expression and continuity of group identity. When societal security concerns are considered within the subsequent securitization concept, the defence (maintenance/restoration) of societal identity is conceived as a discourse that is potentially available to a securitizing actor.
will thus display the language of existential threat presented in identity terms on behalf of a collectivity (society). Securitizing actors may speak of ‘security’ itself, or instead describe threats to the identity of the group through synonyms – for example, ‘die’, ‘perish’, ‘wither’, ‘weaken’, ‘waste’, ‘decline’, and so forth. Williams notes how ‘within the specific terms of security as a speech act . . . it is precisely under the condition of attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared’ and, if this is successful, ‘[the identity’s] negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed’ (Williams, 2003: 519). He continues: ‘A successful securitization of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision or declaration accepted by the relevant group’ (Williams, 2003: 520). Securitizing within the societal sector is therefore concerned with the defining of us and them, maintaining our identity as opposed to theirs. Thus, the language of societal security is the language of minority rights. As such, to desecuritize in the societal sector entails that the language of maintaining collective identity be effectively taken out of the discourse. In Huysmans’s deconstructivist strategy, the language of the collectivity, ‘migrants’, is replaced with the language of the individual, ‘migrant’. Thus, the potential fluidity of the individual migrant’s identity provides a possible escape route from the constraints of the us–them dichotomy. In the context of minority rights, however, the necessity on the part of the minority (and indeed also the majority) for group distinctiveness necessarily blocks this same way out: the language of the individual is subordinated to the language of the collective. In other words, how is it possible to desecuritize through identity deconstruction when both minorities and majorities often strive for the reification of distinct collectivities? To remove the language of security from the issue of minority rights, to shift from a position of societal security to one of societal asecurity, is in essence to stop talking about group distinctiveness. In this way, it signals the death of the collectivity, of the distinct minority. This point is similar to that made by so-called post-structural security studies (e.g., Campbell, 1992; Klein, 1994; Shapiro, 1997), where, in terms of the state, security is not so much a function of the unit as an assertion of itself: it is ‘discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1992) on the part of the state that are constitutive of the latter’s own identity. Commenting on David Campbell’s work, Steve Smith notes how, in this way, this identity is never fixed, and never final; it is always in the process of becoming and ‘should the state project of security be successful in terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. . . .’ Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success’ (Smith, 2000: 95). Equally, minority rights is ‘the process of becoming’, it is an ongoing project that enables the minority to reproduce its group distinctiveness. Should its project of societal security be successful, in the sense that collective identity is no longer something that needs to be maintained, then, again, the minority will cease to exist. To restate: the desecuritization of minority rights may thus be logically impossible. This, I acknowledge, is a very strong claim to make. And although it is a claim that I wish to stick to, I do so in the knowledge of a number of important contentions. A first is that I have chosen a particular understanding of desecuritization – a Huysmans-type strategy predicated on the deconstruction of identity. Again, this is true, which is why I now want to return to Kymlicka and to what may be described as a more objectivist desecuritizing approach. Although Kymlicka is relatively unsure as to how to proceed in terms of desecuritization, he does suggest that a first step must be to grapple with the issue of territorial (political) autonomy and (possible) secession. He notes how political autonomy for minority groups might be decoupled from secession: ‘to persuade [CEE] states to put [political autonomy] on the agenda, while agreeing . . . that secession cannot be a legitimate topic of public debate or political mobilization’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 46). But, as Kymlicka also points out, even with certain guarantees in place, CEE states have nonetheless been more than reluctant to consider claims for political autonomy, this stemming from the fear that political autonomy will naturally lead to stronger calls for secession. Kymlicka’s suggestion, though, is ‘just the opposite. I believe that democratic federalism reduces the likelihood of secession’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 49). And here it is worthwhile quoting Kymlicka at length: We need to challenge the assumption that eliminating secession from the political agenda should be the first goal of the state. We should try to show that secession is not necessarily a crisis against humanity, and that the goal of the democratic political system shouldn’t be to make it unthinkable. States and state borders are not sacred. The first goal of a state should be to promote democracy, human rights, justice and the wellbeing of citizens, not to somehow insist that every citizen views herself as bound to the existing state in ‘perpetuity’ – a goal that can only be achieved through undemocratic and unjust means in a multinational state. A state can only enjoy the benefits of democracy and federalism if every citizen views herself as bound to the existing state in ‘perpetuity’ and that the goal of the democratic political system shouldn’t be to make it unthinkable. States and state borders are not sacred. The first goal of a state should be to promote democracy, human rights, justice and the wellbeing of citizens, not to somehow insist that every citizen views herself as bound to the existing state in ‘perpetuity’ – a goal that can only be achieved through undemocratic and unjust means in a multinational state. A state can only enjoy the benefits of democracy and federalism if
perhaps is that the very possibility of political autonomy and secession will not only serve to reproduce the dichotomy between us and them, but will also potentially transform this dichotomy into one of friend–enemy. In other words, it threatens to (re)securitize the situation, not ‘normalize’ it. Conclusion: Towards the ‘Managing’ of Minority Rights? The assumption that more security is not always better has found a great deal of its expression in the context of migration. To frame the issue of migration in security terms is, as Huysmans describes, to see it as a ‘drama’, one ‘in which selves and others are constituted in a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion and in which this dialectic appears as a struggle for survival’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). As a security drama, there is always the risk of violence between the natives and the aliens, and ‘there are good arguments for saying that in the present western European context that risk is relatively high’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). The concept of desecuritization, where migration is moved from emergency politics to normal politics, where the migrant is taken out of the security drama, has thus far centred very much on the deconstruction of collective identities, where the label ‘migrant’ is subordinated to a plurality of other, more ‘everyday’ identity markers. In Central and Eastern Europe, the security drama has often been played out more in terms of minorities than in terms of migrants. But taking the minority out of the drama cannot always follow the same escape route as the migrant. Where minority rights are predicated on the maintenance of a distinct collectivity, other, everyday identity markers will remain subordinate to the ethnic/national. In these cases, therefore, a Huysmans-type deconstructivist strategy may well, as I have argued, be a logical impossibility. My conclusion in this respect thus points to the consideration of alternative ways of dealing with securitized issues: if minority rights cannot always be ‘transformed’, then perhaps they can be sometimes ‘managed’ instead. Thinking in these terms certainly reflects Wæver’s concerns with the strong self-reinforcing character of securitization in the societal sector, but does not necessarily lead to a Wæver-type conclusion that strategies should thereby be designed to ‘forestall’ emergency politics. Management in this sense is about ‘moderate’ (not excessive) securitization, about ‘sensible’ (not irrational) securitization. Where societal security dilemmas occur, management is about ‘mitigating’ or ‘ameliorating’ them, not transcending them.

As I alluded earlier in the article, managing the securitization of minority rights will not return the issue to normal politics in the Copenhagen School sense of it – that is to say, the situation will still be marked by the language of (societal) security. What management can do, however, is to ‘normalize’ minority rights in terms of seeking to regulate minority–majority relations through more liberal democratic forms. For such a strategy, there is the clear acceptance that both sides have genuine security concerns. As such, the strategy is to move the situation from a condition of insecurity (insufficient defence) to one of security (sufficient defence), and not from a condition of security to asecurity. The minority can feel secure when certain provisions/ legislations/mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically and also societally) within the existing framework of the state. Thus, and returning to Kymlicka, the institutionalizing of a federal state structure is desirable not because it makes the possibility of political autonomy and secession something normal, but because it provides the mechanisms through which the justification for emergency politics on both sides is reduced.
Perm

Solves best – management of threat construction moderates the security dilemma – maintains minority rights
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As Kymlicka (2002: 3–4) points out, although, as in Central and Eastern Europe, Western democracies have tried in the past to suppress substate nationalisms, since the 1970s in particular ‘there has been a dramatic reversal in the way Western countries deal with substate nationalisms’. The principle that national identities must be accommodated has been fully accepted, and this ‘accommodation has typically taken the form of . . . “multination federalism”; that is, creating a federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local majority, and so can exercise meaningful forms of self-government’. Indeed, Kymlicka (2002: 10–11) goes on to list five ways in which multination federalism has been successful: One, issues concerning competing national identities are handled with an almost complete absence of violence . . . by either the state or the minority. Two, ethnic politics operates under normal democratic procedures; in other words, a matter of ‘ballots not bullets’. Three, there has developed a firm respect for ‘individual civil and political rights’. Four, the adoption of multination federalism has in many cases also brought it economic prosperity. And, five, multination federalism has ‘promoted equality between majority and minority groups’. What is important here, however, is how exactly this was done. Was it through a reconstructive desecuritizing strategy? Or was it through the normalization of minority rights according to management strategies? My argument here is that management is the necessary precursor to any reconstruction of identities and must, therefore be considered the primary desecuritizing strategy. Manage First, Reconstruct Later! The desecuritization of minority rights is not logically impossible. But desecuritization depends on a strategy whereby the group nonetheless survives as a distinct entity. Thus, on the one hand, the deconstructivist strategy is inapplicable. On the other hand, though, the reconstructivist strategy is indeed potentially applicable. Still, set against this, what Jutila leaves unexplored are the conditions under which a reconstructivist strategy can be applied: ‘To change the story and obtain support for that new narrative can be hard – even practically impossible in the foreseeable future’ (Jutila, 2006: 181). Hard, yes, particularly in the context of Central and Eastern Europe, where the provision of minority rights is often framed as a matter of security. Practically impossible, in some cases perhaps, especially where there is a strong homogenizing project on the part of the state (majority group). But only even thinkable after the managing of minority rights. In my 2004 piece, I describe management as being about the moderate and ‘sensible’ securitization of minority rights; that is to say, minority rights is still seen by both parties, majority and minority, as a question of (societal) security, but measures are put in place that reduce, or even effectively rule out, the recourse to emergency politics. When the majority feels secure that the minority will work within the existing state framework, and when the existence of the minority is thereby also guaranteed, then ‘normal’ – or, as I alluded to earlier, ‘special’ (management) – politics will be the modus operandi. Thus, what I mean by the management of minority rights is, in effect, the application of multination federalism. The accommodation of minority identities has been accepted, and provisions/legislations/mechanisms have been put in place to institutionalize this accommodation. In part, then, Jutila and I are advocating the self-same thing: cultural and/or political autonomy as part of a federal structure. But, while Jutila is more concerned about the concomitant reconstruction of identities, my argument is rather that the reconstruction of group identities can only take place after a period within which such special politics have operated successfully. While it is not impossible that, in a situation of securitized minority rights (a condition of insecurity), majority and minority alike may choose to respond by reconstructing their identities in a mutually non-threatening way (security), it is, however, improbable. What is possible, even probable, however, is a response according to which a condition of ‘security’ is manifest instead – in other words, majority and minority identities continue to constitute an ‘us’/‘them’ dichotomy, but relations are managed in such a way that an escalation to ‘friend’/‘enemy’ is made unlikely. As such, it is not difficult to imagine that over time such a condition of security can create the necessary political space within which group identities are able to transform in the way that Jutila envisages. So, management first, reconstruction later. Even so, while not so difficult to imagine, practice has shown that reconstructing identities has been difficult to realize: multination federalism has its own problems. Again, Kymlicka (2002: 11) notes how, in most multinational federations,
relations between majority and minority are ‘hardly a model of robust or constructive intercultural exchange’, as many members of the minority group are at best ‘ignorant of, and indifferent to, the internal life of the minority groups, and vice versa’. Indeed, Steven Vertovec & Susanna Wessendorf (2005: 10–11) pointedly remark as to how ‘almost all discourses of multiculturalism entail a kind of “ethnisation”’, inasmuch as ‘multicultural policies may have the effect of putting ethnic minority populations into . . . “cultural conservation areas”’. In the end, therefore, multinational (multicultural) societies tend to reflect a ‘pool of bounded uni-cultures, forever divided into we’s and they’s’; they are ‘parallel societies’, or ‘two solitudes’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 13). And this brings me back to the very dangers I mentioned in my 2004 piece: that, in keeping with Huysmans’s warnings, any desecuritization strategy that maintains the ‘us’/’them’ dichotomy, although institutionalizing moderate and sensible securitization, still runs the risk of leading to a possible excessive and irrational resecuritization of the situation. As Kymlicka (2002: 11) notes, relations between majority and minority groups can often be characterized by ‘feelings of resentment and annoyance’. In Belgium, for example, although tensions between the Flemish and the Walloon communities have, up until now, gone no further than various forms of civil disobedience, the danger of escalation nonetheless remains. These are not propitious conditions for the reconstruction of group identities, despite multination federalism and despite the (successful) managing of minority rights. The successes and failures of multination federalism do not make the securitization of minority rights impossible according to a Jutila-type reconstructivist strategy. What they do show, however, is: first, that successful management of the situation is crucial in terms of creating those very conditions within which group identities may, after some time, be subject to the process of transformation – or, put slightly differently, handle a problem well enough for long enough and it may cease to be a problem at all; and, second, that desecuritizing strategies that necessarily leave in place the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ may well prove to be all too ineffective an approach. Jutila’s reconstructivist strategy certainly invites further thinking about the desecuritization of minority rights. But Jutila himself does not take this far enough. He, like me, brings with him a conception of group identity based predominantly on a distinct culture. And culture, in the minds of Vertovec & Wessendorf (2005: 11), is itself a problematic basis for the constitution of majority–minority relations: the understanding of ‘culture’ assumed and prescribed by many multicultural . . . policies and discourses is one that may distance . . . minorities as much or more than it actually seems to include them. ‘Culture’, in the sense entailed in many such measures, is presumed to be something forever distinguishing and separating . . . ethnic minorities from the rest of the society. So, what of the way forward? To dispense with a culture-based approach, but in doing so to also dispense with the fundamental premise of minority rights? Or, to maintain a concentration on ethnic and national identity, but to thereby also maintain a concentration on an alienating and potentially dangerous notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’? In the words of Vertovec & Wessendorf (2005: 11), it is indeed a ‘conundrum: basing participation [and] representation . . . on “culture” can stigmatise people, thereby maintaining or exacerbating conditions of exclusion; yet, ignoring “culture” . . . can (a) neglect legitimate special needs (based on particular values and practices), and (b) perpetuate patterns of discrimination and equality’. In the next section, I turn my attention briefly to those reactions to multiculturalism in a bid to find a route to a further, possible desecuritizing strategy.

Against Diversity? Those opposed to multination federalism see the promotion of group identities based on the maintenance of distinct culture and identity as contra to the notion of political community. For these ‘communitarians’,7 community entails unity via a common identity. And because multination federalism institutionalizes the very divisions that communitarians seek to do away with, naturally they are very much opposed to it. Its proponents argue that cultural division ‘disrupts national identity, breaks down a society’s sense of cohesion, [and] dissipates common values’. As such, communitarians talk about the need for integration by way of emphasizing a core set of national values over recognizing minority specificities (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2005: 13). In essence, such a strategy is one of assimilation. And besides the fact that many may reject such a project on ethical grounds, the more specific point here, as with a Huysmans-type deconstructivist strategy, is that group identity is fragmented, if not shattered, thus removing any cause for the provision of minority rights. So, whether Jutila’s reconstructivist strategy or my own management approach is adopted, the problem still remains. Our commitment to the preservation of a distinct identity on the part of the minority gives rise to cultural–autonomy/political-autonomy projects that solidify identity divisions. But, communitarians promote cultural unity in such a way that identity divisions are eradicated, thus necessarily leading to the death of the minority. Quite a problem indeed, although an answer may be found in the work of writers such as Bhikhu Parekh. In putting forward what he describes as ‘intercultural dialogue’, Parekh (2000) seeks to avoid the failures of existing multicultural approaches.

Parekh proceeds on the basis of the celebration of diversity may encourage difference, and with it segregation and possibly conflict. Thus, what he advocates is a type of multiculturalism in which everyone adheres to the laws and values of the nation-state, but where distinct forms of culture are nonetheless maintained. Such ‘interculturalism’ seems to manifest itself as a kind of mutual borrowing between culturally defined groups: I take something of yours, you take something of mine. In the end, we create something new for both us, but we both still retain enough of what makes us distinct. Such a process might also be referred to as ‘acculturation’ – a more benign form of assimilation, where members of one community adapt to (and are not forced to adopt) the culture of another. Parekh’s notion of interculturalism is also not without its problems. For example, as Dilek Cinar (2001) points out, within such an intercultural dialogue, all parties have to recognize each other as equal participants, while a successful outcome is also dependent on them having similar amounts of . . . economic and political power. This is rarely the case: invariably, the weaker, minority group will find itself having to borrow heavily from the stronger, majority group. And, all said and done, how far different to
assimilation is this? Nevertheless, what of its potential for an alternative desecuritizing strategy? That the different parties agree to a common set of values points towards the dissipation of those divisions that concern opponents of multiculturalism, while a mutual exchange of culture seems to indicate that important self-defining values nonetheless remain in place. Thus, and to echo Jutila at this point, the logical impossibility of desecuritization? No. The practical impossibility of it? Maybe. Management first, intercultural dialogue later! Concluding Thoughts Am I "writing security" into minority rights’, as Jutila (2006: 183) seems to think? I do argue, and will continue to argue, despite Jutila’s contentions, that a conception of minority rights predicated on the maintenance of a distinct culture and identity is necessarily a matter of societal security. But, I do not argue that all matters of societal security are, or will be, inevitably securitized. As I mentioned earlier, my approach in this respect lies in some as yet seemingly unexplored space between the Copenhagen School’s objectivist and constructivist formulations of societal security. Within this space, to desecuritize is not to return to normal politics but simply to undo the emergency politics of (societal) insecurity. Here, securitization is a special type of politics: a ‘managing securitization’, not a panicking securitization’ – theoretically a strange place to be, but one, nevertheless, that is supported empirically. Politicians, leaders, representatives of majorities and minorities alike, frequently approach minority rights as a societal security issue. However, they also frequently fall short of advocating emergency politics – ‘silence’, ‘secrecy’ and ‘suppression’ – as a way of dealing with the situation. Instead, as reflected in multination federalism, minority rights are framed as a politics that is ‘discussion’, ‘debate’ and ‘deliberation’, while at the same time also marked by notions of threat and defence. Although, yes, minority rights creates propitious conditions for (panicking, not managing) securitization, no, it does not determine it.
Discussions over democracy assistance are key to transforming policymaking away from knee-jerk reliance on military intervention


This more balanced, contextualized approach is needed to foster desirable changes and can draw on many available but underused carrots and sticks among the tools of diplomacy, development, and deterrence, as well as democracy assistance. This more measured approach rules out military intervention with the aim of imposing human rights ideals and democracy, in favor of containment. Instead, that immensely problematic act would be restricted to situations where there are clearly imminent security threats to other countries, impending domestic massacres, or massive devastating humanitarian emergencies—and even then only after robust diplomatic and other options have been exhausted that push the limits of multilateral action. Moreover, the latter circumstances may become rarer as resources are diverted from ever more sophisticated and costly military hardware to preventive strategies that are more cost effective. In sum, the risk of intrastate conflict needs to be approached in a more dispassionate, deliberate, contextualized, and multidimensional way that places a higher priority on the desire for improved livelihood and the need for security than on instant democracy. Unfortunately, however, such differentiated, multifaceted, non-heroic strategies have been little considered, because of the remarkable narrowness with which the question of America’s involvement in developing countries is still discussed. The post–Cold War international experience with Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and other troubled countries toward which military action was taken has sparked intense debate over the grounds on which intervention into a state’s affairs can be justified. The criteria for legitimate humanitarian intervention actually have been expanding, as in the notion of the “responsibility to protect.” But in this debate, “intervention” is still assumed to mean only through military force, as if the choice were simply military action or inaction. With the exception of the considerable attention focused on economic and diplomatic sanctions, the prevailing discourse of think tanks and policy institutes and in the U.S. Congress has failed utterly to bring into the discussion the wide range of peaceful, positive inducements that exist—and are quietly already being used, sometimes to good effect, in effecting peaceful change. Such peaceful interventions include conditional aid, “track-two diplomacy,” muscular mediation, human rights capacity building, political development programs, civil society training in nonviolent mobilization, and the setting of norms by regional institutions. Active consideration of these multiple peaceful means for achieving social and international change has been going on for years at organizations such as the United States Institute of Peace and, especially recently, among many UN agencies, the European Union, and multilateral and bilateral development agencies, including the World Bank. And yet, the elementary concepts and policy tools of such long-established fields as conflict resolution and negotiations, as well as the lesson learned from recent prevention and postconflict peacebuilding efforts, still seem to have had no impact on the thinking of high-level U.S. policymakers. In the absence of applying grounded country strategies, particular crises arise and are reacted to in reflexive, one-dimensional ways. When conflicts reach critical or more escalated and thus emotional stages of violence, a typical default response is to evoke high moral principles to back one’s cause. But when the outside parties, not only the protagonists and their respective supporters, view conflicts only as a clash of right versus wrong rather than as competing conceptions of rights under one order versus those under another in a larger global process of modernization, the erroneous assumption is easily made that the use of violence to resolve these conflicts is the only way, and thus inevitable and justified. The difference between

AT Discourse
violent and nonviolent ways to pursue conflicts becomes ignored or obscured. For example, recent commentators have confused the post9/11 U.S. priorities of antiterrorism and of vigorously transforming societies toward liberalism with the adoption by the United States of an overbearing imperial role, and of military force as the means to ensure peace, as if no peaceful means to promote democracy existed. 28 But this solely combative approach can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
AT Root Cause of War

No root cause of war

Cashman 2k (Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9)

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

More evidence

Moore 4 (Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore, “Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”. or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

Their root cause claims are backwards - war is the root cause of all oppression, not the other way around

Goldstein 2 Joshua S., Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland War and Gender , P. 412 2k2

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”. Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want
Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

 Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

Sharpe, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, ‘10

( Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth-century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies. In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English-speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But, from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also always in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post-metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower… Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would-be global, all-purpose existential and political Theory than for a multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single-handedly decipher all the complexity of socio-political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which, specifically, does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be sufficient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non-analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.
Empirics Good

Middle-East policy should be based off empirical, evidence-based debate – the alternative is politics being led by ideology and serial policy failure

Anderson 3 (Lisa, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, “Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict: Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, http://www.campuswatch.org/article/id/871, AD: 8/28/11) jl

Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.[20] Yet we have already seen how policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: “to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs.”[21] From the scholar’s perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that “we can and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals” nonetheless argued that “We should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens.”[22] Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us,

Our methodology is good – Evidence-based policy making is necessary to prevent political gridlock

Anderson 3 (Lisa, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, “Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict: Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, http://www.campuswatch.org/article/id/871, AD: 8/28/11) jl

In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about “sexed-up” intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa‘ida, we have been
living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable." In informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world. We, as the community of scientists and scholars devoted to the production and deployment of evidence, a project we sometimes call the search for truth, must remain faithful to that purpose even, perhaps especially, when policymakers seem distracted or uninterested. We must also make that evidence accessible. This neither requires nor excludes scholars, or their students, serving on the government payroll or endorsing a particular policy position. On the contrary, particularly in a democracy, the fulfillment of what we call "national security needs" is as much about meeting an obligation to contribute to the education of citizens--voters and taxpayers--as it is assessing or adopting particular policy stances. This we can do in the private and not-for-profit sectors, in think tanks and advocacy organizations, in the media and private businesses, in classrooms and research journals--wherever our work informs open and vigorous debates about the merits of policy perspectives and proposals--as well, of course, as in government. To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." Others will organize campus debates, seminars and demonstrations. Still others will simply equip their students with knowledge and insight enough to be better citizens of their county and the world, more knowledgeable, more critical, armed with better evidence and more refined analytical skills. To sustain the remarkable, and remarkably important--position we hold in society, as both scholars and citizens, we have two obligations. We must do what we do--proudly, confidently, and energetically. We must be constantly, restlessly open to new ideas, searching for new evidence, critical of received wisdom, old orthodoxies, and ancient bigotries, always creating and criticizing ourselves, each other and our world. This is the life of scholarship and we must embrace it for what it is and do it well. We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good, directly and indirectly. At the same time, we must be absolutely uncompromising in upholding the rights that permit us to fulfill that first responsibility: the rights to freedom of information, expression and association, in the United States and around the world, for ourselves and our colleagues. If MESA is to accomplish its purposes in this difficult time, we as an institution must devise ways to support and defend our members both individually and as a scholarly community. We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home. We cannot be idle when polltakers are roughed up or jailed because their findings are politically unpalatable, when students are told to report on faculty whose partisan commitments may be politically unpopular, when research is discredited not on its merits but by the sources of its funding, whether in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States. We need to say this, and to act on these principles, as loudly and as often as necessary. MESA's contributions to this effort will renew and revitalize the organization. This is not simply about MESA as an association, however, it is about our responsibilities as individuals as well. Whatever we each do, in our universities and colleges, in our local communities and in the Middle East itself, we must recognize that this is not a time to be intimidated or complacent--to be "discreet"--about infringements of the rights upon which we and our colleagues rely as scholars and as citizens, whether in the United States or in the Middle East itself. If we abdicate our responsibilities as citizens, we undermine our standing as scholars and teachers. We must not only advocate for our rights but we must also exercise them.
The role of the ballot is to simulate enactment of the plan. That's the most productive way to engage Mid East politics

Heydemann 2, director – Program on Philanthropy and Nonprofit Sector @ Social Science Research Council, frmr Prof Poli Sci – Columbia (Steve, "Defending the Discipline," Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 3, Muse)

Though Kramer's book is severely flawed, 2 the larger question remains: Is his diagnosis of the field accurate? Have we exaggerated the prospects for democratization and misread the state of politics in the Middle East? Are we guilty of uncritically applying inappropriate theories and methods? Have we neglected what really matters in pursuit of theoretical novelty? The straightforward answer is that these perceptions of the field are misguided. When it comes to the study of democratization and economic reform—especially the past 10 to 15 years' work on the political economy of regime formation and transition—the field has been largely right. The persistence of authoritarianism, not the inevitability of democracy, has been the principal focus of research. The overwhelming sentiment among researchers has been not uncritical optimism about prospects for democratization, but a cautious and critical skepticism, verging at times on frank pessimism. 3 Certainly, at the start of the 1990s scholars of the Middle East were anxious to explore the local effects of the changes then transforming the international system, including the possibility of political change from below, and with good reason. No one paying attention to events on the ground—the newfound interest among regimes circa 1990 in the rhetoric of pluralism, markets, and democracy; the growth of social movements around issues ranging from human rights to electoral reform to environmentalism; the increasingly visible signs of exhaustion among existing systems of rule—could have failed to note how the events of 1989 resonated across the Middle East, creating possibilities for change that had seemed quite remote only a few years earlier. Research on civil society, far less prominent in Middle East studies than in other fields, was one of several reactions to these new possibilities and helped turn the attention of researchers to modes of politics that previously had been neglected. 4 Nonetheless, from the early 1990s on, the main focus of research on the politics of reform in the Middle East has been to explain why reforms have been so limited; how authoritarian regimes have managed to exploit the rhetoric of reform to reconfigure and renew their political [End Page 103] power; why it is that in the Middle East vibrant civil societies coexist with durable authoritarian regimes, while elsewhere such civil societies have been central to democratic transitions; and how regimes in the Middle East have managed to separate economic and political reform, processes that have often been seen as interdependent. Research has centered on such notions as selective liberalization, defensive democratization, reform as a survival strategy, coalition management, and successful authoritarianism, and has explored whether the stability of authoritarianism can be taken as evidence of Middle Eastern exceptionalism. 5 In fact, the most recent wave of research is on failed liberalization, the reversal of reform, and the political openings that took place in a number of Middle Eastern states in the late 1980s and early 1990s were shut down by regimes that came to fear their consequences. Moreover, research on economic and political reform in the Middle East has clearly benefited from the use of comparative theories and methods by regional specialists. Given the interdependence of economic reform and democratization in much of the world, what accounts for the ability of regimes in the Middle East to liberalize their economies selectively without opening their political systems? Why has authoritarianism in the Middle East persisted despite the presence of virtually every factor that has been used to explain its collapse elsewhere, from failures of development to defeats in war? Since the massive use of coercion did not keep authoritarian regimes alive in Eastern Europe, Africa, or Latin America, how can we explain the persistence of such regimes in the Middle East simply by reference to their brutality? Does Tocqueville tell us anything relevant to this region? Does Islam make the Middle East exceptional, and if so, how? 6 How can we account for the absence or weakness of what might be called liberal Islam? These questions, which get to the fundamental core of what matters about Middle Eastern politics today, are well represented within Middle East studies. Yet they cannot be answered by looking at the Middle East in isolation. These questions require not simply introspection but critical engagement with the larger disciplines within which the applicable tools and methods are developed, challenged, and refined. Does such attention to theory lead the field down esoteric byways, detached from the concerns of policy makers? That research has an obligation to serve foreign policy goals is a dubious proposition, but interaction between research and policy on questions of reform is evident, even if the two often pull in different directions. On the one hand, U.S. policy favors stability in the short run, with little apparent regard for the longer-term costs of sustaining authoritarian regimes. Policy makers have tended to subordinate political reform to economic reform in the belief that markets will create the preconditions for political change—eventually. In other words, U.S. policy has evolved to favor markets now, democracy later. Academic specialists,
on the other hand—including some with high-level government experience—tend to be skeptical, if not critical of this approach, generally preferring more assertive U.S. support for democratization. Nonetheless, the feasibility of promoting markets without also seeking democracy—of supporting what has become a shift from populist to partially market-based forms of authoritarianism—is sadly consistent with the findings of the research literature. Moreover, this divergence between the policy and research communities is not an indicator of academic failure but a reflection of policy makers' neglect, whether intentional or not, of a research literature that has been largely accurate in assessing the rise and decline of political liberalization in the Middle East during the course of the 1990s.
**PIC out of “Assistance”**

The term assistance is mutually exclusive with a collaborative relationship – turns the case

McGinn, 4


The term “assistance” or “aid” generally refers to a one-directional transfer of knowledge, skills or resources, from one country to another. This kind of relationship is called cooperation: the country or agency providing the assistance “cooperates” with the country seeking to improve itself. The “aid” and technical assistance provided by these organizations is loaned, rather than given, with the intention of changing the recipient, with no change to the giver. This one-way relationship of assistance is justified by reference to the superior knowledge of the lending country. The political and economic power of the agency is used to impose their knowledge.

As we know, foreign aid has proven to be a slow and ineffective way of bringing about positive change, by any measure, in poor countries. The frequent failure of aid to achieve its stated objectives (Kemmyee & Fordboll 2002; Geffrey et al. 2002; Halten 1995; Hans 2003; Siverts Foundation for Sustainable Development 2004) is explained in at least three ways.

1) Recipient governments use aid to replace their own funds, rather than to increase total spending on education.
2) Projects financed by loans often have failed to yield good results and the loan's high direct costs have limited the ability of countries to pursue other, more important activities.
3) Both loans and assistance often have high opportunity costs. Reliance on external assistance has contributed to NGOs seeking to enhance institutional capacity rather than the improvement of education. This seems like an argument for self reliance, we will return to this point.

Most important, the one-way effect of aid has been a reduction of differences, in structures and policies, beliefs and customs, between participating countries. Over time, all the education systems of the world have come to look much like one another, in terms of curricular content, pedagogical processes, institutional structure, curricular content, levels of control, and management and governance. This standardization threatens a loss of cultural diversity, not only of education, but also of education systems. The critical factor here is the transfer of money, not the loan itself. Most new successful businesses borrowed money to begin operations. It is also not the transfer of information from the outside, as successful organizations constantly monitor what their competitors are doing, and review latest developments in public science and technology. What is at fault is the form of the relationship between lender and recipient, the way in which technical assistance is provided. **Collaboration**.

**The alternative is collaboration. Distinct from cooperation as assistance, collaboration requires a two-directional relationship. Both participants expect to benefit from the relationship; each gives freely but each receives.** What is received by each may be different but should be equal in importance to the recipient, or else the relationship is exploitative. In a collaborative relationship, participants hold mutual goals and share responsibilities, accountability for success, and rewards. Significantly, the benefit from collaboration increases as participants differ from each other, as they have something to exchange that the other participant does not have. **Collaboration enriches participants by complementarity, by providing greater diversity and complexity in their material goods, knowledge and culture.** Collaborative relationships necessarily involve more interactions than does mere transfer of resources. In order for the participants to help each other they must understand each other’s objectives and constraints, which requires some amount of intrusion into each other’s affairs. Collaborative relationships are therefore more difficult to sustain in the beginning (Eversole 2003), but the synergy they develop overwhelms misgivings about the costs of continuing (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2003).

Challenging the term is key

Raymond, 3

(Director of Policy Programs--New York Academy of Sciences, Foreign Affairs, March-April, Lexis)

This division between charity and investment bears further elaboration, because failure to make the distinction regularly muddies the waters of foreign assistance debates. Since the 1960s, foreign assistance has generally treated whole categories of nations and peoples as dependent. **Magnanimous "donors" give; vulnerable "recipients" receive.** The magnanimity of donors is questioned only in its quantity: Do donors give enough? Giving more is clearly more magnanimous than giving less, so giving more is meritorious and giving less is iniquitous. For their part, **recipients have been largely passive: they simply receive and become**
grateful. This is charity, and it has its place. The term "foreign assistance" itself reveals its underlying assumption: it is charity to foreigners. Recipients are residents of other nations, so from the point of view of the magnanimous donor, they are foreign. But the demographic and health changes in developing nations demand mutual investment, not charity. They call for collaboration among nations for whom there are no "foreigners." Rather, equal stakeholders need to agree on dismantling the critical barriers to economic progress, a course that would be mutually beneficial. All parties involved have joint capacity to tackle these challenges, and all parties should be ready to commit their own assets in relative proportion to their likely returns. "How much?" is no longer the standard by which resources must be judged. Increasing economic welfare, not piling on transfer payments, is the objective, and judgments on effectiveness must be made rigorously as the basis for continued investment.
Security/Orientalism
The 1AC invokes democracy as the solution to international crisis. This rhetorical construction of US unilateral assistance to alleviate democratic distemper in ***
necessitates war to preserve the ideal image of global democracy. The alternative is to
reject the rhetorical construction of the 1AC. Rhetorical examination is a prerequisite
to effective policy formulation.

Ivie 2005 – Professor and Chair in the Department of Communication and Culture at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana (Robert L., Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 1-5)

September 11, 2001, was a second day of infamy for Americans, or so it seemed, in which terror was visited upon a peaceful and unsuspecting people by the dastardly forces of tyranny. The United States was at war once again, more or less, with an axis of evil in defense of freedom and democracy. Sixty years earlier, Franklin Roosevelt’s heroic oratory following Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl Harbor had rallied the nation not only
to defeat the agents of treachery and their wicked coconspirators but also to crusade for an end to war by establishing an empire of democracy. From that moment of moral outrage to the present day of righteous fervor, America’s quest for invulnerability and a democratic peace has placed the nation under "the shadow of war," to borrow Michael Sherry’s felicitous phrase, its culture and institutions militarized, its foreign affairs intensified, and its passion for absolute security thwarted. Thus, a
cyclical drama of transgression, travail, and triumph has traumatized the nation from the beginning of the American century. Under the sign of great tragedy and in the image of heroic struggle, a beleaguered nation once again has been called upon by its president to defeat the horror of chaos and to secure the future of civilization, this time against the specter of global terrorism. The intersection of terror, democracy, and war is both strange and familiar territory for Americans to tread and conquer. They have defeated the threat of tyranny before, only to encounter it again in yet another virulent form. Danger is seemingly endemic to a demos—a democratic people and their leaders—forever besieged by demons from within as well as outside their polity. Thus, democracy is a troublesome term in the lexicon of American political culture. As a mark of national identity, it inspires greatness and suggests destiny but also stirs dread and loathing, fear and distrust, terror and counterterror. It is at once a powerful incentive for peace and a compelling motive for war, a reservoir of strength and a point of vulnerability. A dimension of the nation’s awesome might and a source of its chronic insecurities, Democracy in short, is a decidedly conflicted measure of American power or the failure thereof. Joseph Nye makes an important observation about the role of America's democratic "soft power" in meeting the challenges of our time at home and abroad. As a mode of enticement, and attraction, unlike military force and economic coercion, soft power shapes preferences to inspire imitation and sets political agendas to achieve consent. This kind of influence is derived from the way the nation expresses its cultural values and handles its domestic and foreign affairs by championing democracy, promoting peace, and cooperating with international institutions. In the global information age, the United States cannot afford to undermine its soft power, without eroding its standing and security in the world. International cooperation is required to assure continuing economic vitality, for example, and to address global problems such as terrorism effectively. Nevertheless, a parochial spirit of arrogant
and heavy-handed unilateralism has emerged at this critical moment, especially after the events of 9/11, to define U.S. interests narrowly with indifference to the opinions of others and renewed devotion to the exercise of hard power. The hubris of this new unilateralism has motivated the United States to violate civil liberties, reduce foreign aid, shun international treaties and conventions, and snub the United Nations just when "world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone" and will likely get themselves deeply into trouble if they alienate other nations by "in vesting in military power alone" while squandering the soft power of democratic values. 3 The paradox of American military and economic power as Nye observes is that the United States is too strong to be challenged by any other single state but not strong enough to solve global problems, such as terrorism, by itself. America’s security requires the help and respect of others. Accordingly, the exercise of soft power to enhance U.S. security necessitates a willingness to cooperate with other states and international organizations and thus to accept a reduced measure of direct control
over world affairs. In Nye's words, "We may have less control in the future, but we may find ourselves living in a world somewhat more congenial to our basic values of democracy free markets, and human rights." Hard power as the measure of American preeminence will prove increasingly illusionary in an information age of intense diversity and thick globalization that is changing the very meaning of control. "Fewer issues that we care about," Nye continues, "will prove susceptible to solution through our dominant military power." The irony of this paradox of power is that the United States must relinquish a degree of control in order to enhance its security. Yet, the irony itself is premised on an illusion of control, as if the United States can will its security unilaterally through military preeminence and economic hegemony. Americans cannot surrender a commanding global influence that is beyond their reach even as the world's sole superpower. They can only forfeit the illusion of control and place greater faith in the soft power of their democratic culture. That is the challenge facing an insecure nation at the peak of its power: will it entrust its future to strengthening democratic practices in the present or bet against the odds by trying to dominate the world? Affirming the soft power of democracy does not imply abandoning the hard power of military and economic strength, nor does it mean treating democracy as an excuse for world domination or as a pretext for perpetual war in a quixotic (or even cynical) quest for universal peace. The point is that the United States cannot rely solely on hard power to ensure its welfare, nor can it sustain an arrogant and alienating unilateralism that undermines its democratic credentials by attempting to force its will on a world in which power is increasingly complex and widely distributed, a world requiring better cooperation and greater capacity to cope with diversity. Enriching the nation's democratic culture is key to enhancing its well-being and security. Yet, democracy itself, as a troubled term in the lexicon of American political culture, is a source of chronic fear and national insecurity no less than a resource of domestic health and global influence. Tapping its full potential for adapting to the shifting challenges of a divisive and decentralized global order will require adjusting a severely conflicted attitude which consists of a strong positive regard for the promise of democratic rule that, in turn, is diminished by a deep and abiding apprehension over the threat of democratic distemper. The purpose of this book is to confront that very tension between democracy's perceived promise and peril. My argument is that contemporary threats and challenges facing the United States can be addressed more constructively in a robustly democratic idiom than by perpetuating the debilitating image of distempered democracy, that the nation's well-being, standing, and security can be enhanced by giving primacy to democratic practices and values instead of degraded by surrendering to the antagonistic impulses and aggressive policies emanating from a republic of fear, and that enriching democratic practice promotes a positive peace over giving the presumption to war. In order to develop a constructive critique of America's democratic deficit, I have adopted an overtly rhetorical perspective both for identifying the distinctly discursive dimension of the problem at hand and for advancing a corresponding corrective of enriching democratic culture and practice. From that perspective, I presume polities cannot choose between rhetoric and reality but instead must opt for more or less adequate interpretations of their multifaceted worlds, interpretations which necessarily are constructed rhetorically. Our choices are always between one kind of rhetoric and another. Symbolic action is inherent to the human condition. As symbol-using and symbol-misusing beings, we make sense of things and develop strategies of adaptation, both individually and collectively through language. Discourse constructs and reconstructs political realities as we know them within frameworks of interpretation. In Kenneth Burke's view, "Much that we take as observations about 'reality' may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms." Such is the rhetorical fabric of political motivation understood as collective attitudes or predispositions toward action of one sort or another. The more flexible these discursive constructions, or what Burke has called "terministic screens," the better they serve as "equipment for living," that is, as interpretive instruments for coping with the stresses and stains of a dynamic and complex world-a shrinking world in
which social divisions, cultural diversity, and other sources of difference are increasingly compressed in the global information age to the point of intensifying friction and igniting conflict. The more rigidly these "terministic incentives" are constructed, the more likely they are to exacerbate tension, foster alienation and hatred, and provoke violence. Thus, the central function of language, considered as symbolic action, is "attitudinal and hortatory" an instrument of political cooperation and competition." Pushed to the extreme, it yields untoward consequences, including guilt, hatred, fear, and "catharsis by scapegoat." Accordingly, a considerable source of America's chronically exaggerated fear of foreign and even domestic others, its disinclination toward international cooperation, its propensity for unilateralism, and its motivation for war can be attributed to the rhetorically rigid construction of a term central to the national identity. As that term, democracy is all too readily degraded into an object of anxiety and containment, especially when it is closely articulated with the language of disease and with other reified tropes of endangerment. Under this condition of rhetorical degradation, the thoroughly literalized and elaborated metaphor of distempered democracy manifests and reproduces a troublesome state of mind that, at its worst, reduces a powerful nation to an aggressive republic of fear. As such, the United States is strongly predisposed toward violence and deeply motivated to rationalize war as the work of peace. Managing this fear induced tension within the nation's democratic identity, where an otherwise abiding aspiration for peace conflicts with an immediate incitement to war, requires constant rhetorical work to keep from destabilizing the prevailing but problematic rationale for relying so heavily on America's righteous force to pursue an illusive state of security. Absent a strong accent on a flexible and robust conception of democratic practice, a rigid rhetoric of evil, such as that practiced by George W. Bush, stirs the nation into patriotic fits of belligerence. This is a rhetoric that promotes the mistaken promise of a universal peace in a mythical world made safe for democracy and that inhibits any serious reconfiguration of democracy itself into a figure of strength rather than a sign of danger. It is a rhetoric too little contested at the present moment of growing national hubris and diminishing tolerance in a decidedly conflicted and complex world. Thus, it is a rhetoric that requires critique in order to redirect its force toward an attitude more conducive to coping with the challenges of the global information age. The critique advanced throughout the pages of this book probes four interconnected points of tension in the problematic composition of democracy as a terministic incentive for war. One of those points is a restrictive conception of democratic deliberation that reflects and reinforces what might be called the nation's inclination toward demophobia. This idealization of deliberative democracy as a rational process best reserved for experts and privileged political leaders, a process easily degraded by the common people under the irrational influence of a demagogue, is elitist, culturally biased, and generally tone deaf to the challenges of pluralism and diversity. It is a discourse of rationality that masks its own rhetorical form and function and thereby impoverishes democratic culture, whereas a more rhetorically robust mode of political reasoning enriches public deliberation and democratic identity in a way that is responsive to a pluralistic polity and reduces exaggerated fears of foreign and domestic Others.
The aff’s epistemological approach toward democracy assistance asserts a militarized narrative that prevents effective questioning of failed past policies.


The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called by several names: the ‘saviour syndrome’, “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism58, “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion and fervour that often pathologize the other and valorize the Western interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the events of September 11th, the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are saturated with calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”, medical catastrophes and civil conflicts, he explains, have indeed been prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states and international organizations to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states and the UN the opportunity to put their liberal humanitarian policies into practice, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”.59 There are several repercussions of this myth, explains Debrix. First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content. Myth has thus becoming the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; that is, we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed.60 Additionally, this narrative reifies a victimology of the ‘Other’ and in fact capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”.61 The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”.62 Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used liberally and repeatedly as part of the common and often un-stated, assumptions that intervention by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, we in the West are continually told that Afghan women and men have now been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. If prospects look dim in the region, this
The affirmative progress narrative sanitizes colonial violence while undermining real liberation for people on the ground

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Autumn 2006 marked the fifth anniversary of a series of notable events in Afghanistan's recent history: the launch of a U.S.-led invasion of the country, the fall of the Taliban regime, and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—a government now staunchly allied with the United States and hailed by several international legal and political observers for initiating pro-democracy reforms.[1] While the deepening debacle in Iraq has assumed center-stage of American foreign policy spotlight in recent years—having increasingly overshadowed events in Afghanistan since the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in March 2003—the five-year benchmark in Afghanistan invites sincere reflection on the specific forms of progress achieved during an era of reconstruction that followed the ousting of the Taliban and formation of a new Afghan government. Several milestones come to mind. As the most recent example, on September 18, 2005, Afghanistan held its first parliamentary elections in over thirty years. Images of cheering Afghan men and women displaying ink-stained thumbs, or those still in line still anxious to cast their votes are the latest in a series of accolades the present U.S. administration has used to frame its post-September 11 intervention in Afghanistan as a campaign of liberation. Such views are evident in the names of official U.S. government projects in Afghanistan, from the military drive to oust the Taliban "Operation Enduring Freedom," to two recent USAID policy reports on reconstruction entitled "Freedom Arrives" and "Afghanistan Reborn."[2] In short, the ongoing narrative of liberation as generally presented in U.S. media seems to read as follows: before the American intervention, Afghanistan lay enveloped in medieval barbarism and the darkest of tyrannies. The moment of contact with Western civilization-initiated by the U.S. and British bombing campaign that began on October 7, 2001—was the enlivening moment that served as the necessary catalyst for progressive change. What follows is a story of upward bound, unfailing progress—beginning with the formation of a transitional government at Bonn in December of 2001, to the ratification of a new constitution and presidential elections in 2004, and most recently, country-wide parliamentary elections in September 2005. Freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, so the story goes on, are inevitable products of these auspicious political developments. This article seeks to evaluate this master narrative as it is often promoted in official speeches of both the U.S. and Afghan governments, by contextualizing claims of liberation in light of the colossal legal, political, and
humanitarian conflicts that survived—end were born after the overthrow of the Taliban in winter of 2001. I raise the following questions concerning accountability for ongoing human rights violations in particular: How has the reconstruction of Afghanistan fared in terms of establishing accountability for past war criminals and other human rights abusers? Has sufficient attention been accorded to transitional justice in reconstruction processes, or is accountability being treated as a sacrifice that the Afghan people must make for their country's stability? Finally, what can be done to improve the reconstruction of Afghanistan from humanitarian and transitional justice perspectives, including a more civilian-centered approach? When considering the disturbing trends of incorporating suspected war criminals into the government, the human toll of the ongoing U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan, and less tangibly, the imposition of law at the core of legal and judicial reform activism in Afghanistan, the prevalent narrative described above is an erroneous assessment of the harsh realities that exist on the ground in Afghanistan today. Furthermore, gross simplifications that focus on spectacular acts such as formal elections or new constitutions (the sixth in the country's history) actually impede efforts to build accountability for past and ongoing human rights violations in Afghanistan by painting a deceptively rosy picture for political purposes, covering up continuing abuses in the process. For example, while present U.S. administration officials persist in extolling the country as liberated, post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan has experienced the handover of power to repressive feudal lords in the provinces and widely-suspected war criminals in the Kabul-based government, all virtually immune from prosecution, with many of the latter appointed to key posts in President Karzai's cabinet or even running as full-fledged candidates in the recent parliamentary elections. This is in addition to the over 1400% surge in opium production since the overthrow of the Taliban-Afghanistan now provides 90% of the world's opium and in 2006 the country's opium harvest reached the highest levels ever recorded. These facts have led numerous analysts to conclude high levels of collusion exist between local traffickers, provincial officers, and central government administrators active in the lucrative trade, which the Taliban effectively banned in spring 2001. Perhaps most difficult to stomach of all, however, is the plague of violence targeting international aid workers and Afghan civilians cooperating with coalition forces for the new government. To the surprise of military analysts, the rate of attacks claimed by Taliban insurgents and sympathizers has not abated, and in 2006 it actually increased—last year bloodshed in Afghanistan returned to levels not seen since the fall of the Taliban in 2001—thus calling into question the accuracy of terms like "post-Taliban" in the first place. With these background facts in mind, this paper argues that since late 2001, the present U.S. Administration's triumphalist claims of liberating the Afghan people, establishing human rights, and promoting democracy for the first time in the country's history are gross exaggerations that cloak ominous trends of impunity in the country, concealing grave crises in Afghanistan's transition such as the short-shifting of accountability for past war crimes and ongoing government abuses in the name of political stability. Therefore, the master narrative of linear progress presented by U.S. spokespersons and in popular media coverage must be critically engaged and reassessed in order to more accurately reflect contemporary realities on the ground in Afghanistan and as the first step towards building accountability for on-going violence in the country. From this sociolegal perspective, some of the most pressing yet overlooked problems that warrant immediate attention by Afghan officials and international law and development advisors in Afghanistan are (1) the support of suspected war criminals in the current government, (2) human rights violations in the U.S.-led War on Terror, and less visibly, (3) the continued marginalization of indigenous law through transplanted law at the central government, the latter devices constituting the driving force behind recent legal reforms in Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban. By ignoring these unpleasant aspects of intervention, U.S. officials have framed a narrative substantially different than what common people are experiencing on the ground in Afghanistan. This disparity of stories leads to continuing support for errant policies on the part of the Afghan government and international aid agencies, and increased alienation amongst ordinary Afghans, who at the end of each day are not reaping the benefits of auspicious promises made by so many countries in 2001.

Democracy assistance creates an imperial relation to the Middle East that prevents indigenous democracy

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(David, “Imperial powers and democratic imaginations,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 8)

But how do these varied points relate to the question of imperial democracy? In the context of global politics the attempt to export and promote one vision of democracy as a unifying project across frontiers clashes with the logic of differences, but in a way that is deeply rooted in nationalist discourses. In the formulations developed by Laclau, Lefort and Mouffe there is an assumption that one is dealing with a territorially intact polity, that the conceptual terrain can be developed in accordance with a guiding assumption of territorial sovereignty. However, in the context of imperial powers one needs to remember that the autonomy of other democratic experiments has been terminated by interventions organised by Washington (eg Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, Nicaragua during the 1980s—see Slater, 2002). In this sense the internal tension between the logic of unity and the logic of difference has been overshadowed by an imperial logic of incursion followed by the imposition of a different set of political rules, in the example of the USA it can be suggested that there is a logic of democracy for export and a logic of terminating intervention for other democratic processes that have offered a different political pathway.
Furthermore, interventions which have led to the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, as in Iraq in 2003, ought not to lead us into forgetting the realities of Western support for military dictatorships in the global South throughout the 20th century. 12 Nor, as Callinicos (2003: 24) reminds us, should we turn a blind eye to the fact that there are contemporary examples of support for non-democratic regimes, as shown in the case of the Bush administration’s backing for the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, despite its numerous violations of human rights, and for Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan, which receives US support yet is scarcely to be considered a fully fledged democracy. The imperative to ‘democratise’, just as the injunction to ‘globalise’, creates, as Daimay (2005) suggests, an asymmetry between those announcing the imperative and those subjected to it, between those who ‘democratise’ and those who are ‘democratised’. Such an asymmetry has a long history. Jeffersonian notions of both an ‘empire of liberty’ and an ‘empire for liberty’ represented an initial framing of the conflicting juxtaposition of emerging American imperial power—expressed for instance in the phrase that the USA has a ‘hemisphere to its self’—with a benevolent belief in America’s mission to spread democracy and liberty to the rest of the world. This juxtaposition, which is also closely tied to the founding importance of the self-determination of peoples, is characterised by an inherent tension between anti-colonial sentiment and the projection of power over peoples of the Third World. Discourses of democracy are deployed in ways that are intended to transcend such dissonances and to justify the imperial relation, even though such a relation is frequently denied (for a critical review, see Cox, 2005). What is also significant in this context is the idea that democracy US-style is being called for, being invited by peoples yearning for freedom, so that more generally the imperative to be democratised, so that through a kind of cellular multiplication a US model can be gradually introduced; the owners will be the peoples of other cultures who will find ways of adapting the US template to their own circumstances. As it is expressed in the National Security Strategy for 2006, “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture’ (White House, 2006: 1). What is on offer here is a kind of ‘viral democracy’, whereby the politics of guidance is merged into a politics of benign adaptation. Nevertheless, at the same time, a specific form of democratic rule is being projected and alternative models that include a critique of US power and attempts to introduce connections with popular sovereignty and new forms of socialism are singled out for opprobrium. This is reflected in the commentary on Hugo Chavez—‘in Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region’ (White House, 2006: 15). This is despite the fact that the Venezuelan leader has won more elections in the past seven years than any other Latin American leader.

Liberal democracy promotion paints non-democratic states as ontological enemies – the dynamic between rogue and stable states defined by liberal values ensures intervention

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There are serious shortcomings and difficulties in the way liberal democracy promotion has developed, ones that extend well beyond the excesses of coercive democratization and the hubris of the Bush administration. Of particular significance is that these practices have essentially operated as part of a liberal movement away from the equality of states to a more hierarchical system, in which liberal democracies are identified as more legitimate. This is reflected in the way that contemporary democracy promotion practices are embedded within an ideational framework that judges states according to whether they are closer to, or further away from, the telos of liberal democracy. Furthermore, external actors that have reached this stage of liberal democracy identify themselves as having rights to intervene to help democracy elsewhere. With democracy promotion taken to be a “norm,” reflecting
the emerging “right” to democratic government in international law, states that oppose attempts by outsiders to influence the shape of domestic governance structures toward (liberal) democracy are at best tolerated, but increasingly identified as delinquent. Resistance to external actors intervening to support democracy is equated with the self-interest of a narrow ruling elite, historical backwardness, a failure in reason and understanding, or more often than not, a combination of these. Discounted are justifiable concerns over the fact that democracy promotion remains a largely Western-driven project, driven—at least in part—by self-interested motives that may not be compatible with the needs and desires of local communities. Indeed, given the readily admitted strategic purposes for promoting democracy abroad, it is hardly surprising that many states have reacted with skepticism or outright opposition to these policies. Yet non-liberal-democratic states chafing at the prospect of external interference are regarded not only as impeding democratization in that specific context, but also as threatening “to the new democratic consensus within the international system.” This is a reinforcement and extension of the logic of “rogue regimes”: states are threatening because of what they are, and not what they do. In this context, democracy promotion operates within and reinforces this new kind of liberal international hierarchy, one that denies the equality of states, as established liberal democratic states are self-anointed as the most legitimate members of the international community.
Their heg impact is a link- their scenario is created by pentagon planners to justify militarism- sparks more conflict

- Etta '8 (FORCEFUL ENGAGEMENT RETHINKING THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN US GLOBAL POLICY CARL CON ETTA PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES DECEMBER 2008)

But as the scale of "clear and present" dangers receded, the Pentagon refocused defense preparation and action on unknown and prospective threats. Emphasizing "uncertainty," planners relaxed their assumptions about America's future interests and about the identity of potential foes, their capabilities, and their objectives. Planners lowered the bar on the plausibility of threat scenarios, brought "worst case" possibilities to the fore, and boosted their estimates of what these might require of our armed forces. Paradoxically, as the scale and stakes of security challenges declined, the Pentagon adopted more ambitious military objectives, seeking to deploy force ever faster and win wars more quickly and in more than one theater simultaneously. One aim was to be prepared to deal quickly and decisively with a very broad range of possible "surprises". None of these were remotely as serious or immediate as the challenge that had once been posed by the Soviet bloc. And almost none involved attacks on the US homeland. But hedging against the whole set of them worldwide substantially boosted putative defense requirements. Unfortunately, rather than immunizing the United States against unpleasant surprises, the effort to defeat uncertainty only dissipated America's resources and attention. Thus, when Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States in 2001, they were still preoccupied with other concerns, Bioterrorism, missile defense, North Korea, and Chinese military power dominated security discourse in the months before 11 September. This effectively distracted from eight years of strategic warning-beginning with the 1993 World Trade Center attack—and eight months of more immediate warnings regarding Al Qaeda's interest in attacking the US homeland. A few years later, the armed forces were similarly unprepared for the eventuality of protracted counter-insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. These recent failures point to a simple truth: Attempts to hedge against uncertainty by preparing in all directions for all scenarios will leave a nation's defenses less sensitive to and prepared for what is actually emerging. In fact, the emphasis on "uncertainty" during the past decade has allowed each military service and branch to find some justification for continuing to do and buy what it has been doing and buying for years. Thus, despite years of talk about "transformation", the US military entered the new century looking not much different than it did in 1990, albeit smaller. It is hubris that leads policy makers and planners to think that America can decisively trump surprise and attain complete security. A better approach to managing uncertainty is to invest more in intelligence, improve America's capacity to quickly adapt its defenses to new circumstances as they arise, better protect those national assets that are most critical, and ensure that the nation has the fundamental strength to absorb unexpected blows and "bounce back"—as it did after Pearl Harbor. PREVENTION OR PROVOCATION? The post-Cold War focus on potential worst case scenarios also increased the attraction of "jumping the gun", that is, taking action early. "Acting early" can refer to several stratagems—preemption, prevention, or preclusion—each more risk-averse than the one preceding. Preemption involves taking action to spoil an attack that is in its preparatory stages. Prevention, by contrast, involves acting forcefully now against an adversary who officials believe will attempt a serious, unavoidable aggression at some point in future years. Preclusion goes a step further, seeking to remove the possibility of a future aggression even when this eventuality does not seem certain or undeterrible. To appreciate the difference among these stratagems, it helps to dissect the notion of "threat". A "real and present" threat of aggression minimally comprises a serious clash of interests and the intention, capability, and opportunity to do harm. When some of these elements are missing, there is still risk, but not an immediate threat of the type once posed by the Soviet Union. Even when all the constituent elements of "threat" converge to form a real and present danger, deterrence can One measure of stress on the US military is the percentage of personnel stationed and deployed overseas. Each bar reflects average percentages of total active-component US military for the period it represents. The "stationed overseas" category comprises personnel serving at semi-permanent bases and in routine, non-combat missions. For these units, many of the functions of everyday life and military support and training can be maintained. By contrast, the "deployed in foreign military operations" category comprises the percent of personnel who are engaged in temporary operations that involve combat or an immediate possibility of combat. The stress these operations place on troops and equipment is exceptional. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Congressional Research Service.
in check as it did during the Cold War while diplomacy and other instruments work to defuse it. But it is the risks inherent in this path that the United States is today less willing to bear—despite (or perhaps because of) its distinct military predominance. **Preventive and preclusive military operations** imply treating adversaries (or potential adversaries) who do not pose an imminent threat of attack as though they do. Such actions target not aggression, per se, nor even the imminent danger of aggression but, instead, the capability to aggress—be it existing, emergent, or suspected. Prevention and preclusion also can target actors who security officials believe are predisposed, due to the nature of their governments or belief systems, to do America significant harm at some point in the future, although they presently lack the capability. Successive US administrations have marked such recalcitrant state actors as "rogue states" or "axis of evil" states-designations that tend to invite efforts at regime change. Similarly, the failure of some nations and social movements to integrate with the sphere of market democracy is seen as posing a military security problem of growing significance. While the second Bush administration clearly crossed a threshold in attacking Iraq, the notion of applying US military power more proactively than during the Cold War was already well-established before George W. Bush took office. Key precursors and enablers of current policy ideas such as offensive counter-proliferation, the "rogue state doctrine", and regime change were already evident in US policy toward Iraq and elsewhere during the late 1990s. Some of these ideas may survive the Bush administration—although in transmuted form as part of the new enthusiasm for armed nation-building. Does prevention work? Our **recent experience shows that treating potential threats as though they are imminent ones can exacerbate tensions and precipitate the outcome that "prevention" is meant to preclude.** Thus, in addressing the nuclear programs of both North Korea and Iran, America's coercive efforts spurred, rather than retarded, undesirable behavior. In the Iraq case, too, a confrontational approach in the run-up to the 2003 war fed the regime's "bunker-mentality", making war more likely, not less. Generally, the declaration of "regime change" objectives and the frequent resort to saber-rattling undermine diplomacy and help to precipitate and harden anti-American attitudes and coalitions.

**Warnings of threats from warming cause military reactions that undermine other solutions and spark arms races and war-end in extinction**
- **Brzoska '8** (Michael Brzoska, Ph.D in political science and Diploma in Economics, director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg, “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008.

In the literature on securitization it is implied that **when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem** (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). **Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’** (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations—such as more use of arms, force and violence—will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. **A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War** (Guzzini 2004). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. **Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem.** The **portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict**
from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means to compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2 °C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment, 1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources. Secondly, the acceptance of the security consequences of climate change as an intractable problem could well reduce efforts to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts that will inevitably come with climate change. Climate change will have major consequences, particularly in countries where living conditions are already precarious (IPCC 2007, WBGU 2007). The consequences of climate change on some basic foundations of life, such as fresh water supplies, arable land and agricultural productivity in various parts of the world can already be roughly estimated for various global-warming scenarios. There are also more or less well founded predictions of the consequences of reduced availability of natural resources such as arable land and water on hunger and disease, even though such consequences are highly dependent on counter-measures and adaptation efforts in affected regions. There is no inevitability about these consequences. This is even more true for violent conflict of various types. The links between reductions in resource availability and violent conflict are complex. A deterioration in human security – threats to the ‘vital core of life’ (Commission on Human Security 2003, p. 4) does not necessarily imply an increase in violent conflict. To assume the opposite may lead to the neglect of opportunities for conflict resolution and the prevention of conflict from turning violent.
The impact is extinction


At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (Vanderlippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological” and cultural framework. It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades. But the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates. Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

Orientalism outweighs the aff on magnitude and probability


Wright looked at the relation between modern civilization and war in somewhat more detail, based on his own list of 278 modern wars from 1480 to 1941, plus 30 more ‘hostilities’ from 1945 to 1964. Modern war was not especially different from other civilized wars in its drives or motives of dominance, independence, and rivalry, but it was quite different in its geographical scope (the world) and in its technologies (from the hand gun to the atom bomb, from the printing press to the mass media). Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war... It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: ‘[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars’ (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: ‘World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force... Empires are primarily organizations of violence’ (pp. 965, 969). ‘The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all’ (p. 1190). This ‘disparity’ between states, not to mention the disparity
within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of ‘disparity between states’ created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that ‘Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase’ (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright’s estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused ‘only’ 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one’s benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It’s too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.
It's simple. And obvious. We find ourselves in the midst of the most rapid mass extinction in Earth's history; we have the power to all-but end life on Earth. We can do so with nuclear weapons, today, in Iran, or simply by turning the ignition switch on our automobiles and gliding over paved surfaces where nothing can live. A little more carbon dioxide, just a little, will tip the scale - unleashing our potential for matching the most mass extinction ever -- the one called The Great Dying. Science has given us until roughly 2012 to take radical action to change the course we're on. In the next six years, they tell us, we will determine the fate of the Earth. With the US and its white colonial puppet Israel on a nuclear collision course with Iran and Syria, we may have less time than that. 250 million years ago 95% of all species died. Only one large land animal was left. Carbon dioxide and methane -- the two most deadly of the greenhouse gases -- were responsible. We can do it again. We've followed the script, we know our lines, and we've reached the final scene. For that reason, this is a most exciting juncture for the Armageddon mongers among us. That's most of who believe in the colonizer's religion, in the Beast, the Great Tribulation, the Four Horsemen, the Seven Seals, and the other visions of St. John the Apocalyptic, whose hallucinogenic fantasies penetrated clearly into the essence, unleaving the inevitable end, the direction this civilization must head and the end it must reach. Fundamentalist Christians everywhere are working overtime to "bring it on"; they want to fulfill the conditions for the return of Christ, whose first priority and purpose in action, according to the book of the Revelation, will be the destruction of the Earth. But first, the fundamentalists believe, they must be certain of two things: the stability and existence of the white colonizer state of Israel, and that the "gospel" is "preached to every creature" on Earth. Throughout history the "gospel" has been "preached" through conquest. Otherwise there might not have been a single Christian in the Americas, Africa, or, for that matter, Europe. Christianity spread with the Roman Empire, and, in the midst of the Inquisitions, "spread" to the Americas in the wake of the Conquest, a conquest in which as many as 100 million native people died. It spread to Africa in the late 1800s as Europe divided the continent and colonized it in wars that cost another 50 million lives. It spread like a disease, bringing death to millions as part of the two greatest, most racist Holocausts in the history of "civilization." A practical interpretation of the fundamentalist perspective might view the matter this way: the fundamentalists believe that they have failed to conquer the world, and Jesus, or the Antichrist (there's little functional difference -- both come as Destroyers) will come back and conquer it for them in the battle of Armageddon. For this scenario to unfold requires the existence of Israel, and, at a minimum, that every living human has heard the "good news" of "salvation." Then, Jesus will come back with a vengeance. Everything will be under control; everything will be dead. And if it's not, then there's always the Last Judgment for backup. The images of the "end times," the symbols of the Revelation, Armageddon, and the rest are familiar throughout "Christendom" -- the lands and peoples conquered by the church and its allies -- the people who survived, at least. For many of us, they serve as a frame of reference that's not only familiar, but normal -- images lodged, unquestioned, in the subconscious and that function as a mythic encoded drama -- a script about where we come from, where we are, and the nature of our destiny. Like all such encoded dramas this one frames our identity. It's the myth we're living, as Joseph Campbell would have it. It doesn't matter if you "believe" in it or not. If you live in a "Christian Nation" and think you're not a "Christian" -- if you think you're above all that, put aside the question of "belief" for a moment. Dwell, instead, with the images: The Beast; Armageddon; the Seventh Seal, and watch as their compelling power asserts itself. A Way of Death Our current sense of self is no more sustainable than our current use of energy or technology. - Jensen Since the dropping of the Bomb on Hiroshima the cultural identity based on these images has been shattering. No one openly admitted that "success," according to the script, meant success as the total domination and destruction of Life on Earth -- even though we are on the brink of doing just that - or that the essence of civilization's "meaning" is to be found etched in the shadows burnt by the Bomb's atomic flash into Hiroshima's walls. No teacher openly tells a room full of school children "Success means destruction and meaning, in our culture, means death." In the US, elements of the sixties generation either clearly understood the matter -- beginning with Allen Ginsberg's Howl and the onset of the Black movement for freedom -- or they were caught up in the mass discontent that spread like a wave from Ground Zero, and from the worldwide anti-colonial uprisings of the post-war era. The most conscious elements of humanity got the deeper message -- often at great personal cost: not only that the Bomb is evil, or that slavery, conquest and genocide are evil, but that this way we live is a way of death, in its entirety. Many understood that there must be an alternative, and they were by no means naive or merely "idealistic" in demanding it "NOW." They were, rather, speaking the language of life, a language most were unable to hear or speak. This was the impetus behind the great cultural transformations of that time. Much of the exploration, the seeking of a way out of here, led toward an embrace of various forms of salvationist ideology and practice -- Marxist, Buddhist, Hindu and their thousand and one New Age variations - none of which break the fundamental mold of the civilization that shaped them. So much has changed for nothing to have changed. But underlying much of these explorations and permeating the approach of many of the explorers was a "new" -- actually ancient, paradigm -- one ultimately grounded in the science of ecology and the intuition of ecologists and those close to the Earth -- holistic thinking. This approach to the world has gained a foothold in Western Civilization over the last 35 years or so -- just soon enough for many to begin to remember what indigenous peoples have always held close. The Earth is one living being. And now, as a species and as a planet of living beings, we have nothing but a toehold between us and the abyss. It's not just the bomb, of course, it's the whole thing -- the Earth isn't "dying" – we're killing Her. This is the Apocalypse; Mass Extinction, Peak Oil, Agricultural Collapse, Ecosystem Collapse, Nuclear War: the Apocalypse goes by many names.
Its most occult name is "Everyday Life." Our "way of life" has never worked on planet Earth and it never will – every empire in world history has collapsed, every empire overshot its "resources" – and this empire will be no different. We've had, as Daniel Quinn has put it, our Great Forgetting of our place on Earth. Now, we urgently need a Great Remembering. Resource Wars and Fascism: Babylon's Way Out Those in power rule by force, and the sooner we break ourselves of illusions to the contrary, the sooner we can at least begin to make reasonable decisions about whether, when, and how we are going to resist. Jensen Cognicant that life itself has but a bare toehold on the planet, the bible thumpers are thumping; the business as usual clock is ticking, and the empire builders are gunning for oil. They don't think that when it goes down, they'll go down with us. The bible-ists think they'll be "raptured" into "Heaven." The capitalists and super capitalists have their own brand of "rapture." They plan to buy the lifeboats, to live in ease, squeezing the earth for every copper cent and ounce of oil left in Her. And they mean for their progeny to rule what is left after the wall comes tumbling down. That's what today's massive and deliberate redistribution of wealth and resources toward the rich is about. They mean to run what's left on "clean nuke," as Bush calls it, even though – like the reserves of coal, oil, and natural gas, uranium will mostly be depleted by 2100. They plan to control the world's nuclear weaponry, as best they can, and thus what remains of the oil. As the rest of the world sinks into oil starvation, economic depression, and mass starvation, no one – the US imperialists hope - will be able to challenge their dominance of the Earth's "resources." In the meantime, they mean to overthor and on the Big 3, the oil rich 3, the new evil axis of Iraq, Iran, and of course, the newest target – Venezuela. Bolivia will not be far behind; it's also hydrocarbon-rich, and its government is no more "cooperative" than the rest. Mexico, with its stolen elections, and Saudi Arabia, with its bloated royal family, are under control, for the moment, and Bush, the idiot savant, will never let go of Iraq. The current US/ Israeli assault on Lebanon and Hizbollah is phase two of a plan to gain strategic control over the Middle East. US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice calls it a "New Middle East," in the same spirit as the "New World Order" declared by Bush1. Prominent members of the Bush 2 administration, such as Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others linked to the "Project for a New American Century", speak openly of a Pax Americana and openly advocate that the US totally dominate the globe militarily, beginning with the Middle East. The aim is to crush non-state resistance groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, to squeeze Syria, and lay the groundwork for a massive assault on Iran – whose vast reserves of oil and Islamic ideology represent the most formidable block to utter US power over the region and its oil reserves, and thus, over the world. "It is time for a new Middle East, it is time to say to those who do not want a different kind of Middle East that we will prevail; they will not," Rice said in Jerusalem. The Project for a New American Century says Iran is "rushing to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American intervention..." Even the hint that Iran might – one distant day - combine its vast reserves of hydrocarbons with a nuclear capacity to defend them and thus remove them permanently from the grasp of the American Empire, has unleashed a storm of preparations for a major war - even a nuclear war - one pitting the US, Israel and Turkey against Iran and its ally Syria. Such an aggression could readily draw China, Russia, or even France into the fray in an effort to protect their own stakes in Iran's oil, lighting the fuse of a nuclear Armageddon. Make no mistake, however – the elites of each of these nations mean to milk Mother Earth of fossil fuels for their own benefit – not that of the US, and certainly not in the interest of planetary stability and the sustenance of Life. This is a way of death -rebel state, rogue state and Empire alike. Only Cuba is different at all, and it has no oil. All civilization is about power and the addiction to power; Euro-American culture is permeated with nothing but power; all the West does is in its pursuit. For now, at least, they're the "experts." Enter the era of resource wars and fascism. It's "necessary" if "civilization" and our "way of life" and "standard of living" are continue for even a while – even for the elites. We are entering the dark tunnel of the new era now. The US's colonial war of occupation in Iraq is a resource war. The overt threats against Iran, the rumblings and assassination plots against Venezuela and the bombing of Lebanon portend more of the same. As the economy – and thus the civilization – based on oil runs dry, as it can no longer deliver, as it consumes itself in "economic downturns" the powerful will see only one choice. War and mass repression. As the availability of cheap energy evaporates, as oil production peaks, Third World economies will begin to collapse, even as the Green Revolution – the hydrocarbon based agricultural "miracle" that has led to a doubling of the Earth's population – also begins to collapse Starvation, mass rebellion and insurrection will become the order of the day for already impoverished...
peoples on a global scale. With the onset of increasingly dramatic impacts of global warming and the rapidly escalating depletion of the world’s aquifers much of the Third World may become as desperate and chaotic as sub-Saharan Africa is today. The Pentagon has developed plans, not only for resource wars, but for dealing with a global and vastly accelerating refugee crisis – their aim is to keep the refugees out of the First World entirely. This is the backdrop for today’s targeting and scapegoating of migrant populations within the US and Europe. Under such conditions the ruling elites see migrant peoples as a potential source of acute internal instability. As the Empire seeks to establish its hegemony over oil and to maintain its hegemony over its Third World puppets while suppressing its colonized and dispossessed populations at “home”; as it is forced to become increasingly brutal to carry out its aims (witness Lebanon) mass disinterest and rebellion could erupt, even in the belly of the beast. It would seem that mass repression — even open fascism — are the only things that might keep the peasants — us – starving in line. Peoples of color within the US will be the first and most visible mass targets. But every targeted group – including women, will be increasingly at risk of overt, violent repression as the State careens toward open fascism. If the destroyers have their way, there will be no light at the end of the tunnel we are entering, only starvation, limited but ceaseless resource wars, and the thousand year reign of the Anti-Christ - a permanent new Reich. Their other option is Armageddon.

That causes escalating warfare and turns case

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(Beate, “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part I),” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1:1, 87-106)

In the first section of this essay I will briefly set out the core claims of liberalism as formulated by John Locke. These core claims, it turns out, are not primarily economic, political or philosophical. Quite fundamentally, they entail a dynamic, constitutive relationship between market economy and government by consent, based on a philosophy of history embodying a particular definition and narrative of human freedom. I shall also argue that this definition and narrative contains inner tensions which, when expressed in policies towards non-liberal societies, generate interventionist dynamics which rapidly become counterproductive. This liberal philosophy of history underpinned, as I will show in the second section, the modernization theories of the early Cold War period. Translated into modernization policies, as surveyed in section three, they exhibited precisely those interventionist dynamics in practice. And this interventionism was widely experienced as a de facto denial of self-determination which turned the targets of American ‘altruism’ into ‘enemies’. American foreign policies thus managed to achieve exactly the opposite of their goals: instead of turning Third World countries into liberal market democracies and thus adding to American security, it led to widespread radicalization and questionable security. William Appleman Williams famously called this ‘the tragedy of American diplomacy’. My argument however is that, with this nod to ‘American exceptionalism’, Williams himself had underestimated the historical and philosophical scale of the process, one part of which he was analyzing.

US democracy promotion during the Cold War produced at best very mixed results. The intellectual balance sheet of modernization theory, however, was even more disappointing. For reasons drawn out below, its explicit assumptions were in time largely discredited as contradictory and ideological. And yet, in a second instalment of this essay, I will show that the core liberal claims are now, in the post-Cold War period, embodied in the ‘democracy transition’ paradigm. This paradigm has once again been
translated into (democracy promotion) policies and, just like its predecessors, it has generated a dynamic leading to intervention and attempted statebuilding. And, finally, these policies, too, have so far met with widespread failure.

Once again therefore the tragedy of American diplomacy seems to be playing itself out. Pervasive interventions are contradicting the claim to support selfdetermination and democracy, and are turning the targets of American ‘altruism’ into its enemies. And yet, as suggested above, the roots of this tragedy are more liberal than American and thus in principle are shared by other liberal states, by IOs and NGOs. This liberalism may have a particular American flavour today, (and I shall concentrate on American foreign policy), due to the United States’ powerful position and, of course, because general ideologies will always be refracted through the particular historical experience of those who endorse and apply them. But it has a much longer history which originates in classical European political thought. Moreover, these policies seem bound to be repeated, despite their intellectual and practical failures, as long as the most powerful actors in world affairs are liberals. What we witness in the world today, I will argue in conclusion, is not the ‘end of history’ but its repetition and that is the real tragedy of liberal diplomacy.

Rejection is necessary to explore new ways of engaging the Middle East – this is key to solve the aff
Bilgin 5 (Pinar, Assist Prof of IR at Bilkent U, Regional security in the Middle East: a critical perspective, p 205-207) j]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is conceptualised as constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future - our conjectures and prognoses - have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more 'realistic' picture of the future becomes 'real' through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a 'desired' future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a 'reality' through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a 'desired' future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a 'desired' future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as 'threats to the future' to use Beck's terminology, and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an 'optimistic', but a more 'realistic' picture of the future. Considering how the 'realism' of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world 'out there', but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more 'realistic' approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the 'realistic' picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller, or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between
them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the 'Middle East' by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that 'theories do not leave the world untouched'. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the 'politics behind the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that 'everything is socially constructed' or that 'all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them' is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a 'reality' in line with the tenets of 'realist' Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the 'reality' 'out there', foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call 'reality'. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a 'threat to the future', or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic' vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a 'desired' future but is also cognisant of 'threats to the future'.

Alternative: reject securitized democracy assistance.

Calls for external intervention strip political agency – resistance should start as a bottom-up movement

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(Asef, Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East, p. 2-7)

Given these constraints, an alternative view postulates that instead of waiting for an uncertain revolution, change should be instigated by committing states to undertaking sustained social and political reforms. Such a nonviolent strategy of reform requires powerful social forces—social movements (of workers, the poor, women, youth, students, and broader democracy movements) or genuine political parties—to challenge political authorities and hegemonize their claims. Indeed, many activists and NGOs in the Middle East are already engaged in forging movements to alter the current state of affairs. However, while this may serve as a genuinely endogenous strategy for change, effective movements need political opportunities to grow and operate. How are social and
political movements to keep up when authoritarian regimes exhibit a great intolerance toward organized activism, when the repression of civil-society organizations has been a hallmark of most Middle Eastern states? It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that growing segments of people, frustrated by the political stalemate, lament that although most people in the Middle East suffer under the status quo, they remain repressed, atomized, and passive. Popular activism, if any, goes little beyond occasional, albeit angry, protests, with most of them directed by Islamists against the West and Israel, and less against their own repressive states to commit to a democratic order. Since there is slight or no agency to challenge the ossified status quo, the argument goes, change should come from outside, by way of economic, political, and even military pressure. Even the Arab Human Development Report, arguably the most significant manifesto for change in the Arab Middle East, is inclined to seek a “realistic solution” of a “western-supported project of gradual and moderate reform aiming at liberalization.”4 Still, the perception that the Middle East remains “unchangeable” has far greater resonance outside the region, notably in the West and among policy circles, the mainstream media, and many think tanks. Indeed, a strong “exceptionalist” outlook informs the whole edifice of the “democracy promotion industry” in the West, which pushes for instigating change through outside powers, one which does not exclude the use of force.5 The idea of Middle Eastern exceptionalism is not new, indeed, for a long time now, change in Middle Eastern societies has been approached with a largely western Orientalist outlook whose history goes back to the eighteenth century, if not earlier.6 Mainstream Orientalism tends to depict the Muslim Middle East as a monolithic, fundamentally static, and thus “peculiar” entity. By focusing on a narrow notion of (a rather static) culture—one that is virtually equated with the religion of Islam—Middle Eastern societies are characterized more in terms of historical continuity than in terms of change. In this perspective, change, albeit uncommon, may indeed occur, but primarily via individual elites, military men, or wars and external powers. The George W. Bush administration’s doctrine of “regime change,” exemplified in, for instance, the occupation of Iraq and the inclination to wage a war against Iran, represents how, in such a perspective, “reform” is to be realized in the region. Consequently, internal sources of postcolial transformation, such as group interests, social movements, and postcolial economies, are largely overlooked. But in fact the Middle East has been home to many insurrectionary episodes, nationwide revolutions, and social movements (such as Islamism), and great strides for change. Beyond these, certain distinct and unconventional forms of agency and activism have emerged in the region that do not get adequate attention, because they do not fit into our prevailing categories and conceptual imaginations. By elaborating on and highlighting these latter forms, or what I call “social nonmovements,” I wish also to raise a number of theoretical and methodological questions as to how to look at the notions of agency and change in the Muslim Middle East today. Indeed, conditioned by the exceptionalist outlook, many observers tend to exclude the study of the Middle East from the prevailing social science perspectives. For instance, many narratives of Islamism treat it simply in terms of religious revivalism, or as an expression of primordial loyalties, or irrational group actions, or something peculiar and unique, a phenomenon that cannot be analyzed by the conventional social science categories. In fact, Islamism had been largely excluded from the mode of inquiry developed by social movement theorists in the West until recently, when a handful of scholars have attempted to bring Islamic activism into the realm of “social movement theory.”7 This is certainly a welcome development. However, these scholars tend largely to “borrow” from, rather than critically and productively engage with and thus contribute to, social movement theories. Indeed, it remains a question how far the prevailing social movement theory is able to account for the complexities of socioreligious movements in contemporary Muslim societies, in particular when these perspectives are rooted in particu lar genealogies, in the highly divided and postcolial open Western societies, where social movements often develop into highly structured and largely homogeneous entities—possibilities that are limited in the non-Western world.

Charles Tilly is correct in alerting us to be mindful of the historical specificity of “social movements”—political per formances that emerged in Western Europe and North America after 1750. In this historical experience, what came to be known as “social movements” combined three elements: an organized and sustained claim making on target authorities; a repertoire of performances, including associations, public meetings, media statements, and street marches; and finally, “public representations” of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.8 Deployed separately, these elements would not make “social movements,” but some different postcolial actions. Given that the dominant social movement theories draw on western experience, to what extent can they help us understand the process of solidarity building or the collectivities of disjointed yet parallel practices of noncollective actors in the non-western postcolial closed and technologically limited
settings? In contrast to the “exceptionalist” tendency, there are those often “local” scholars in the Middle East who tend uncritically to deploy conventional models and concepts to the social realities of their societies, without acknowledging sufficiently that these models hold different historical genealogies, and may thus offer little help to explain the intricate texture and dynamics of change and resistance in this part of the world. For instance, considering “slums” in light of the conventional perspectives of urban sociology, the informal communities in the Middle East (i.e., ashwa‘iyat) are erroneously taken to be the breeding ground for violence, crime, anomie, extremism, and, consequently, radical Islam. There is little in such narratives that sees these communities as a significant locus of struggle for (urban) citizenship and transformation in urban configuration. Scant attention is given to how the urban disenfranchised, through their quiet and unassuming daily struggles, refigure new life and communities for themselves and different urban realities on the ground in Middle Eastern cities. The prevailing scholarship ignores the fact that these urban subaltern redefine the meaning of urban management and de facto participate in determining its destiny; and they do so not through formal institutional channels, from which they are largely excluded, but through direct actions in the very zones of exclusion. To give a different example, in early 2000 Iranian analysts looking uncritically at Muslim women’s activism through the prism of social movement theory—developed primarily in the United States—concluded that there was no such a thing as a women’s movement in Iran, because certain features of Iran and women’s activities did not resemble the principal “model.” It is perhaps in this spirit that Olivier Roy warns against the kind of comparison that takes “one of the elements of comparison as norm” while never questioning the “original configuration.” A fruitful approach would demand an analytical innovation that not only rejects both Middle Eastern “exceptionalism” and uncritical application of conventional social science concepts but also thinks and introduces fresh perspectives to observe, a novel vocabulary to speak, and new analytical tools to make sense of specific regional realities, it is in this frame of mind that I examine both contentious politics and social “nonmovements” as key vehicles to produce meaningful change in the Middle East. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE A number of remarkable social and political transformations in the region have resulted from or organized contentious endeavors of various forms, ranging from endemic protest actions, to durable social movements, to major revolutionary mobilizations. The constitutional revolution of 1905–6 heralded the end of Qajar despotism and the beginning of the era of constitutionalism in Iran. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952, led by free officers, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 terminated long-standing monarchies and British colonial rule, augmenting republicanism and socialist economics. In a major social and political upheaval, the Algerians overthrew French colonial rule in 1962 and established a republic. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 galvanized millions of Iranian women in a movement that toppled the monarchy and ushered in a new era, not only in Iran, but in many nations of the Muslim world. Some twenty-five years earlier, a nationalist and secular democratic movement, led by Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh had established constitutionalism, until it was crushed by a coup engineered by the CIA and the British secret service in 1953, which reinstated the dictatorship of the Shah. In 1985, a nonviolent uprising by a coalition of students, workers, and professional unions (National Alliance for National Salvation) forced President Jaafar Numeiri’s authoritarian populist regime (born of a military coup) to step down in favor of a national transitional government, paving the way for free elections and democratic governance. The first Palestinian intifada (1987–93) was one of the most grassroots-based mobilizations in the Middle East of the past century. Triggered by a fatal accident caused by an Israeli truck driver, and against the backdrop of years of occupation, the uprising included almost the entire Palestinian population, in particular women and children, who resorted to nonviolent methods of resistance to the occupation, such as civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations, withholding taxes, and product boycotts. Led mainly by the local (versus exiled) leaders, the movement built on popular committees (e.g., women’s, voluntary work, and medical relief) to sustain itself, while serving as an embryonic institution of a future independent Palestinian state. More recently, the “Cedar Revolution,” a grassroots movement of some 1.5 million Lebanese from all walks of life demanding meaningful sovereignty, democracy, and an end to foreign meddling, resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. This movement came to symbolize a model of peaceful mobilization from below that could cause momentous change in the region. At almost the same time, a nascent democracy movement in Egypt, with
Kifaya at its core, mobilized thousands of middle-class professionals, students, teachers, judges, and journalists who called for a release of political prisoners and an end to emergency law, torture, and Husni Mubarak’s presidency. In a fresh perspective, this movement chose to work with “popular forces,” rather than with traditional opposition parties, bringing the campaign into the streets instead of broadcasting it from headquarters, and focused on domestic issues rather than international demands. As a postnational and postideological movement, Kifaya embraced activists from diverse ideological orientations and gender, religious, and social groups. This novel mobilization managed, after years of Islamist hegemony, nationalism, and authoritarian rule, to break the taboo of unlawful street marches, and to augment a new postnationalist, secular, and nonsectarian (democratic) politics in Egypt, it galvanized international support and compelled the Egyptian government to amend the constitution to allow for competitive presidential elections. More spectacularly, the nonviolent Green Wave mobilized millions of Iranians against Ahmadinejad’s hardline government (accused of fraud in the presidential elections of June 12, 2009) pushing for democratic reform.

The role of the ballot is to democratize the meaning of democracy – rejecting the initial focus on the liberal model in favor of contestation creates more effective promotion

Kurki, Lecturer in International Relations Theory, ‘10


This approach has some difficulties and dangers associated with it. For example it might result in the breaking down of consensus on the liberal model. It also raises the difficult question: if there are many models of democracy and these are contextual, can democracy be promoted at all? These questions (and many other questions that we have not discussed here, such as questions about the ethics of democracy promotion) are difficult but also essential to consider. By pushing us to deal with these questions the approach here has some potential in furthering debate in two regards. First, it allows us to be more open — historically, politically, and theoretically — to the plural meanings of democracy and how this concept is used in various social and political struggles and contexts in different ways by different actors. Quite simply, we can see that if we fail to listen to and acknowledge alternative models we also fail potentially to listen to and acknowledge social and political actors in different roles from us, who might have very different views on successes and failures of liberal democracy. Also, democratizing debate on democracy might lead to a more equal and a more dialogical approach to democracy promotion, where democracy is promoted on multiple levels and in multiple senses. This may allow democracy promoters to better understand the attitudes to democracy and democracy promotion of those target populations whose differing voices can be within the liberal paradigm too readily ignored.

Of course putting to practice such an approach in democracy promotion agencies is not going to be easy and some actors might even reject it. Also, much more work needs to be done on how aims of pluralization and contextualization might be effectively integrated into a policy process. (This is the subject of the European Research Council-funded project, “Political Economies of Democratisation.”) Yet, in the meanwhile it is important to recognize that conceptual contestation, and the political disagreement it reveals, should not be ignored for the sake of mere convenience. We should not forget that thought on democratization and democracy promotion, and thought on democracy, “[emerge in the struggle for social power” (Corcoran 1983:22). Engaging in
conceptual debate on democracy in democracy promotion then is not just an abstract conceptual exercise, but in itself implicated in important global struggles over social and political power.
Reps First

Reps shape reality in the middle east- it causes a flawed description of the middle east that results in policy failure and conflict


The significance of conceiving the relationship between regions and security as mutually constitutive becomes more explicit once one recognizes that the 'Middle East' has developed to its present condition partly due to the way it has been represented by the dominant security discourses. Throughout the 20th century representations of the 'Middle East' (in foreign policy- and opinion-makers' discourses as well as in popular culture)15 have underwritten certain security practices that were deemed fit for the 'character' of the region. In other words, the current state of (in)security in the 'Middle East' has its roots in practices that have been informed by its representation. What shaped this particular dominant representation, in turn, was the conception of security in which it was rooted. It is in this sense that having a better grasp of what Simon Dalby calls the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics'16 becomes crucial, for it enables one to begin thinking differently about the future of security in the 'Middle East' while remaining sensitive to security concerns and needs of myriad actors that propound contending perspectives. Having traced the development of the 'Middle East' (as a concept and as a region) back to security policies of late 19th-century Britain, the following sections will turn to four contending perspectives on regional security that developed during the Cold War years (the 'Middle East', 'Arab Middle East', 'Muslim Middle East' and 'Mediterranean Middle East') each one of which give primacy to different kinds of threats.17 It will be argued that when rethinking regional security in the 'Middle East,' students of Critical Security Studies need to pay attention to regional people's conceptions of security: what they view as the referent; and how they think security should be established in this part of the world. The aim is to show how difficult it is to generalize about questions of security; how people's ideas about security differ from one another; and how they changed in the past and might change in the future. Within the context of the 'Middle East' this amounts to amplifying the voices of those whose views have been left out of security analyses and pointing to possibilities for change that exist. This is not meant to suggest that these alternatives should not be put under critical scrutiny. The role of students of Critical Security Studies should not be merely to represent those views that have so far been marginalized by the dominant approaches, but also to critically analyse them. To adopt a relativist perspective and argue that all approaches voice the concerns of their proponents and are therefore equally valid is not helpful (especially if one is interested in pointing to possible avenues for change). It is even less desirable in places like the 'Middle East' where contending conceptions of security often clash. A striking example of this can be found in Israel/Palestine. 'Peace is my security' is what a PeaceNow activist's banner read when celebrating the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.18 But 'peace with security' has long been the motto of those Israelis sceptical of the virtues of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Rather, the role of the student of Critical Security Studies is to adopt a critical distance:19 to 'anchor'20 him/herself by being self-conscious and open about other versions of 'reality' and by reflecting upon his/her own role as an intellectual and the effects of the research on its subject matter.21 Within the context of the Middle Eastern context this involves being sensitive towards conceptions of security adopted by the region's peoples, representing the ideas and experiences of those who have been marginalized by the dominant discourses and drawing up an alternative template for thinking about regional security that promotes emancipatory practices. This will be the focus of the final section of the article. The 'Middle East' What I call the 'Middle East' perspective is usually associated with the United States and its regional allies. It derives from a 'western' conception of security which could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon while holding Islamism in check, and the maintenance of 'friendly' regimes that are sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is a topdown conception of security that privileged the security of states and military stability, it is top-down because threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers, rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the 'Middle East' during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the 'Middle East' during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely
due to their military capabilities and the resistance character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity, at the same time hinder others. For example the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes under the cloak of religious traditions. For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the cannibalising of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health.

Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses. This top-down approach to regional security in the ‘Middle East’ was compounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards – that is threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace. Although it could be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a realm of danger, the practices of regional actors that do not match up to the teleological prescriptions include the Baathist state in Iraq that infringed on their citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. Those who dare to challenge their states’ security practices may be marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst. The military priority of state security thinking in the Cold War manifested itself within the Middle Eastern context by regional as well as external actors’ reliance on such heavy defence outlays, concern with orders-of-battle, military exercises and defence pact. For the British, US security practices during this period took the form of defending regional states against external intervention by way of helping them to strengthen their defences and acquiring military bases in the region as well as bolstering ‘friendly’ regimes’ stronghold over their populace so that the ‘Middle East’ would become invisible to Soviet infiltration and intervention. The ‘Middle East’ perspective continues to be military-focused and stability oriented in the post-Cold War era, US policy towards Iraq before and after the Gulf War (1990–1) and the 1998–9 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraq cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraq weapons of mass destruction programme could be viewed as examples of this. What has changed in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks is that US policy-makers decision-makers achieved an ‘advancing’ or ‘actively constructing the threats to peace from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’.26 The 2003 ‘war on Iraq’ and the US effort to change the Iraq regime were explained with reference to this new policy priority. At the same time, US policy-makers sought to give momentum to Israeli–Palestinian peacemaking by presenting a new ‘roadmap’. For the peace process (that began in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War) had reached the end of the 1990s largely to do with the region’s leaders securing the May 1993 extension of the Oslo peace accords and the 1995 Oslo agreement on the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. However, US policy-makers were in the h therapy of ‘constructing legitimacy’ (for the peace process) and the argument that achieving a ‘peace process’ would ultimately enable them to be ‘virtuous and powerful’.37 Arguably, there is more agreement among the proponents of the ‘Arab’ perspective in this arena of the US policy agenda, but there is also a difference of opinion within each of the two perspectives. The proponents of the ‘Arab’ perspective are most often concerned with defining and understanding the region’s security-related threats in a way that would be aligned with US security interests. Indeed, since the 1990s, the discourse about security in the region has been shaped by US security interests. This top-down approach to regional security has been backed Organis which they are supposed to defend. Thus, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its regional allies have been keen to maintain. Still, the proponents of the Islamist perspective have also been concerned, if only at the discursive level, with the well-being of moderate Islamist forces.38 The actions and demands of these Islamist organizations serve as a reminder of how problematic the concept of ‘state security’ is in the Middle East.39

For many regional policy-makers it is not only specific regions of the Middle East that are supposed to be secure, but what they are for. They often define ‘unsecurity’ as the threat of ‘outside’ forces, which would ultimately enable them to be ‘virtuous and powerful’. Arguably, there is more agreement among the proponents of the ‘Arab’ perspective as to what they are against than what they are for. They often define ‘unsecurity’ as the threat of ‘outside’ forces, but there is little agreement among these actors as to what constitutes ‘unsecurity’ (or ‘Islamic’ for that matter). Some would consider ‘western’ influence over and intervention in the region as ‘unIslamic’. Some Islamist groups criticize the existing political and religious establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US troops to step on the ‘holy lands’) as well as the forces of nationalism as being ‘unIslamic’. Lastly, there are those who define ‘structural violence’ as ‘unIslamic’ and call for its erosion. The actions and demands of these Islamist organizations serve as a reminder of how problematic the task of defining security. From the perspective of the governments of the United States, Egypt and Israel, most Islamist organizations constitute threats to regional security due to their anti-status quo discourses and (at times) violent practices. Viewed through the lenses of some regional political, these organizations serve as agents of security by providing welfare services that the state fails to provide. On the other hand, from the perspective of some of these women, Islamist organisations constitute a significant threat. For it is women who get caught in the middle when Islamist actors – be it Iran, Saudi Arabia or their ‘Islamic’ credentials.39 And it is important to point that the very same actors that could be considered as angling for power and political influence are engaged in violent practices (when viewed from a Critical Security Studies perspective) at the same time create insecurity for some. In fact, supporters of this perspective argue that online and offline insecurity is a result of the promoting and legitimating of violent practices. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of these women find it hard to trust these organizations, which participate in the construction of an image of these organizations that are not only doing harm, but also promoting insecurity. For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the cannibalising of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health.

Anand notes, there exist security concerns voiced by myriad societal actors. These concerns differ depending on the society in question. In the Middle East, the ‘Arab’ perspective is likely to be of particular significance for the attempts to jump-start Arab–Israeli peacemaking. The ‘Arab’ perspective derives from the concept ‘Arab national security’1 that emphasizes that the attainment of a set of pan-Arab security concerns. The concept ‘Arab national security’ was conceived and practised in the 1950s and 1960s by the Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and other related bodies. The latter, the critique brought by the proponents of what I term the ‘Arab’ perspective is likely to be of particular significance for the attempts to jump-start Arab–Israeli peacemaking. The ‘Arab’ perspective is the one that defines the security concerns of ‘Arab’ states as being of ‘Arab’ peoples.35 The place accorded to the Israel/Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas was conceived and practised, b
in the Islamic tradition ‘fertile resources of nonviolent thought’ should Islamist actors choose to tap them.40 The point here is that although it is possible to view the Islamist perspective as the most uncompromising among the four, should its proponents choose to rethink some key precepts of Islam, a concept such as jihad that is often viewed as an obstacle to peaceful coexistence today could become the common ground for tomorrow’s debates between the Islamists and other actors (notably non-governmental actors at the local and global levels) on issues such as the structural causes of economic security, human rights, identity, human dignity and equality – that is, the nexus of security and emancipation. The ‘Mediterranean Middle East’ The Mediterranean perspective began to take shape from the 1970s onwards, largely in line with the development of and changing security conceptions and practices of the European Union. The EU’s close interest in Middle Eastern affairs was provoked by the OPEC oil embargo and the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Since then, EU policies towards the ‘Middle East’ have been shaped by three major concerns: energy security, regional stability (understood as the maintenance of domestic stability in the countries in the geographically close North Africa) and the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU member states as a result of the growth of the Middle Eastern diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy-makers to rethink their priorities, and come to consider stability in the ‘Middle East’ (especially North Africa) as an integral part of their own security. Accordingly, EU policy-makers have sought to create cooperative schemes with the Mediterranean-rim countries of the ‘Middle East’ to encourage and support economic development and growth. It was hoped these steps would serve to reduce refugee flows from the ‘Middle East’ into Europe, and prevent regional conflicts being exported into Europe. Over the years these schemes have taken various forms: the Euro–Arab Dialogue, the EU’s ‘Overall Mediterranean Policy’, agreements with sub-regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ (CSCM) proposal and the ongoing ‘Euro–Mediterranean Partnership’ process.41 Although other actors such as the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Egyptian policymakers and intellectuals have also encouraged and supported some of these schemes, the EU has been the prime actor in constructing the Mediterranean as a region.42 The EU’s conceptualization of the Mediterranean does not (so far) include nonMediterrenean Middle Eastern states. This is largely because the EU’s delineation of the Mediterranean region reflects its own societal security concerns that have less to do with the Gulf than with the geographically closer Southern Mediterranean. Furthermore, in line with its conviction that the threat and use of force would not solve those problems that are non-military in character, the EU has so far emphasized democratization and economic development as the means to establish security in the Mediterranean region. On the issue of Gulf security, however, many EU policy-makers still follow the US lead and do not rule out the threat and use of force as an instrument of policy (as the Gulf War demonstrated). Although the EU remains divided over this issue, many member states subscribe to US conceptions (and practices) of security in the Gulf, which prioritize military stability and predictability over democratization and development. The debates within the EU regarding the 2003 war on Iraq could be viewed as signalling a deepening of divisions within the EU, and between the EU and the US. The main strength of the Mediterranean perspective stems from the fact that it is a relatively neutral conception; it does not a priori exclude some states or have colonial baggage. Moreover it remains the only scheme that managed to bring Syria, Israel and a wa...
Serial Policy Failure

View their evidence with extreme skepticism – Western scholarship on the Arab world fails to take into account dynamic factors and internal complexity needed to understand the situations – ensures serial policy failure


Western media and think-tanks have long presented a mistaken and divisive understanding of Arab – and other – societies. There is a discrepancy between the actual situation and indicators-driven understanding. Entire Arab societies are deconstructed and reduced into simple data, which is filtered, classified and juggled to fit into precise criteria and clear-cut conclusions. Public opinions and entire policies are then formed or formulated based on these conclusions. The problem does not lie in academic practices, per se, but rather the objective-specific understanding that many in the west have towards the Middle East. Most Washington-based think tanks – regardless of their political leanings – tend to study distant societies only for the sake of producing definite answers and recommendations. However, providing an all-encompassing depiction of a society like Yemen’s – whose internal dynamics and complexity necessarily differs from any other’s in the region – would be most unhelpful for those eager to design policies and short-term strategies on the go. Arab revolutions continue to tear down archaic beliefs and misguided understandings, challenging the wild theories around Arab peoples and their supposed wrangling between secularism and Islamism. Despite all of this, the self-seeking objectifying of Arabs continues in western media. Under the all-inclusive title, “The Arab World: The Awakening”, an article in Economist Magazine (Feb 17) attempted to describe the upheaval currently underway throughout the Arab world. Interspersed with such predictive terms as ‘extremists’, ‘Islamists’, ‘strongmen’ and so on, the inane analysis made way for equally silly conclusions. The article, for example, suggested that the West’s decision to accommodate dictatorial regimes in the Middle East was motivated by a mix of despair and altruism: “The West has surrendered to this (Arab) despair too, assuming that only the strongmen could hold back the extremists.” While words such ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘terrorists’ may have their own special ring to western audiences, they could well mean something entirely different — if anything at all — to Arabs.

Listening to the Arab media’s coverage of ongoing revolutions, one may not even encounter any of the above terminologies. At times, they can be entirely irrelevant in terms of understanding the momentous happenings underway throughout the region. The Libyan rebellion is another example to note here. Revolution and war in Libya have ignited a heated debate among Arab intellectuals, pertaining to the use of violence and foreign intervention — although barely in support of the Libyan regime. However, for the New York Times, the coverage of the story is often slated and removed from current reality in Libya. The article Exiled Islamists Watch Rebellion Unfold at Home “(NYT, July 18) attempted to answer a nagging question concerning the relationship between Islamists and the Libyan rebels. This question is relevant only to western governments. Although the group examined – the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – has long been dismantled, its alleged former ties with al-Qaeda continue to concern many in the west. While for Libyans, “the men are seen not as an alien, pernicious force but as patriots,” the article claims that many in the West “are trying to assess their
influence and any lingering links to Al Qaeda.” Arab revolutions are attempting to examine larger issues that have tremendous impact on all aspects of life. They are actively confronting the suffering caused at the hands of local dictators supported by Western and other foreign governments. Western media and intellectuals, however, continue to seek only easy answers to intricate, multi-faceted questions. In doing so, they follow the path of the same superficial, stereotypical and predictable discourse. While Arab societies discuss democracy, freedom and social justice, Western writers continue to follow the imagined paths of al-Qaeda, Islamists, moderates and extremists. In all of this, they are embarking on yet another futile hunt, a hunt that will yield no concrete answers, and more misguided policies.
Terror Talk

No objective criterion for “terrorist” – their discussion is self-serving to the political objectives of their authors

Collins and Glover 2 (John – Assistant Professor of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross - Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 157-158) jl

Equally important for the purposes of this essay, the same amnesia has the effect of hiding the history of “terrorism” as a concept, specifically the ways in which the meaning of the term was shaped in recent decades by individuals with close links to American power. What we think we “know” about “terrorism” is not an objective reality; on the contrary, the very idea of “terrorism” is the product of specific efforts by specific people to define certain examples of political violence (typically violence committed by those who are opposed to U.S. policies in the world) as illegitimate. In other words, when someone uses the word “terrorism,” they are describing the world in a way that works to the advantage of the powerful. In cultural studies, the academic field in which I was trained, words and ideas that masquerade as neutral or objective “reality,” while actually expressing the narrow interests of a dominant group, are called ideology. We can say that ideology is most successful when it is able to erase its own footprints, that is, when people are not aware of the work that had to be done in order to fix the meaning of the word or idea in question. The concept of “terrorism,” in this sense, appears to be a very effective example of ideology because the public at large has come to accept the definition promoted by the U.S. political elite, without knowing how this definition was created in the first place. Yet even this explanation is unsatisfactory because, for reasons I will discuss below, U.S. officials actually have rarely provided explicit definitions of “terrorism,” relying instead on a vague, even tautological set of descriptions and assumptions that mask the government’s own historical role in carrying out, supporting, and provoking political violence. Thus we have a situation in which Americans are being asked to support an open-ended war not against a clearly defined “enemy,” but rather against an ideological concept whose definition is assumed rather than offered.

The impact is extinction

Collins and Glover 2 (John – Assistant Professor of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross - Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 6-7) jl

The Real Effects of Language

As any university student knows, theories about the “social construction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, immediate way possible: its use by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence— from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of manufacturing consent and shaping people’s perception of the world around them; people are more likely to support acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire
populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering language of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

Fundamentalism is a sweeping term to ambiguously imply enemies of America
Renold 2 (Leah, Visiting Professor in Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p 94-95) jl
We are at war, declares an article in the New York Times published shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center. The author, Andrew Sullivan, argues that we are in a religious war, a war that threatens our very existence. Not only our lives, but also our souls are at stake. Who is the enemy? It is not Islam. It is a specific form of Islam called fundamentalism. In his essay Sullivan argues that fundamentalism constitutes a large section of Islam. The article explains that fundamentalism has ancient roots and has attracted thousands of adherents for centuries from different religious faiths, including Christianity and Judaism. Sullivan’s essay in the New York Times is only one of many articles and broadcasts in the U.S. media since the attacks on the World Trade Center that use “fundamentalism” as a category to describe those groups targeted as enemies of the American people. The term has been applied to the political and religious positions of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, as well as a significant portion of the world’s Muslims. “Islamic fundamentalism” has been used so frequently in the media since September 11 that publishers of history textbooks are now scrambling to revise their books to include discussions of the term. An article in the Wall Street Journal reports that in a rush to update textbooks, Prentice Hall, the publisher of The American Nation, the top-selling U.S. history textbook for middle-school students, has begun to highlight the topic of Islamic fundamentalism, where previously the topic had not been included: When the term “fundamentalist” is used in the media in association with Islam, it is rarely defined. Such usage suggests a common understanding of the term. While most Americans are not familiar with the different schools of thought within Islam, they are acquainted with fundamentalism in the Christian context, where the term is used in common parlance to refer, often negatively, to a certain brand of Christianity. When the term fundamentalism appears as an appendage of Islam, the reading public can only assume that the same connotations associated with Christian fundamentalism must also apply. Fundamentalism becomes a blanket term, shrouding Islam in Western perceptions of fundamentalism. In using the term, the media manages to associate large numbers of Muslim people with certain attitudes and behavior of a backward and inherently dangerous nature. In instances where the term fundamentalism is defined, stereotypical images are only reinforced, without specific mention of historical, political, social, or theological developments within Islam. Fundamentalism is applied as an essential term, implying that there is a certain characteristic, a core essence of the phenomenon, which transcends distinctions of specificity.

That justifies genocide
Renold 2 (Leah, Visiting Professor in Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p 103-105) jl
Muslims today are debating similar issues regarding the influence of Westernization on Islamic cultures. Often the issues are enmeshed in political and economic concerns. Other than the few basic religious suppositions shared by all Muslims, there is no fundamental Islamic stance for all matters, in all times, and all places. Contrary to various representations in the media, there is no such thing as a single worldwide Islamic nation, as there is not a nation composed only of people who believe in Jesus Christ or Lord Ram. There are differences of opinion between Muslims on issues of political and religious leadership, as well as a host of other matters. During the partition of India in 1947, for instance, two sections of India were lopped off and declared to be Pakistan, a Muslim-majority nation. It was not long, however, before a civil war ensued, resulting in the birth of the new nation of Bangladesh. Within both countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, political rivalries between powerful interest groups are as fierce as they are in the United States. There is no such thing as overall political unity among Muslims in a single country, much less across the entire globe. What is happening when articles in a highly respected and widely distributed U.S. publication like the New York Times reflect a perception of a single, homogeneous Islamic nation operating in the world, one that is described as largely composed
of fundamentalists? An interview with Nobel laureate V. S. Naipaul, which appeared in an edition of the New York Times Magazine, further fuels this misunderstanding of Islam. In the interview, Naipaul describes Islam as having an imperial drive to extend its reach and to root out the unbeliever, to destroy anything that does not conform to Islamic thinking. The interviewer understands Naipaul to be speaking only about fundamentalist Islam and therefore asks Naipaul what he thinks about nonfundamentalist Islam. Naipaul responds that there is no such thing as nonfundamentalist Islam. It would be a contradiction. In clarifying himself, he states that the most important thing in Islam is paradise, heaven, and that no one can be moderate about wanting to go to heaven.

Naipaul then adds that for this reason there are no moderate Muslim governments. They are all fundamentalists. The picture that emerges for the American public is that the face of the enemy is Islamic. Fundamentalism is a Christian theological movement related to specific events, places, and people. Christian fundamentalism should not be applied indiscriminately to Christian charismatic movements, Christian conservatism, or evangelicalism, though it has connections with these. But fundamentalism has come to be employed very loosely. The term “fundamentalist” is seldom defined specifically, but it is almost always used derogatively. Implied in the term fundamentalism is all that is oppressive, bigoted, and antimodern in religion, regardless of the faith. Members of other religions such as Hindus and Muslims, erroneously described as fundamentalists in popular journalism, are thus depicted in a negative light. Vague assumptions regarding fundamentalism widely accepted in the West as descriptive of Islam include the idea that fundamentalists are against freedom of thought and modernity. The rhetoric that attributes a dangerous and oppressive characteristic to a large and specific group of people is the rhetoric of war. It is an inhumane rhetoric, portraying millions of innocent people as the enemy. Muslims have long been subject to this kind of portrayal. Most U.S. citizens have never lived in a Muslim country. They have never been intimate friends with Muslim store-keepers, farmers, grandparents, and children. They have most likely never seen a Muslim portrayed as a good and noble figure in movies, on television, or in Western literature. If a Muslim appears on the TV screen, he or she will appear as a menacing character, wearing a gun belt and bearing a raised fist. The American public has long been subject to such negative portrayals, which severely distort and manipulate the lives of one in every five humans on earth (the approximate population of Muslims). The use of the derogatory term “fundamentalist” to pinpoint the enemy in the current crisis is not too dissimilar from the rhetoric used in attacks throughout history. During the Cold War, all citizens of the USSR were dangerous “commies.” As most Americans did not know any citizens of the USSR and knew nothing about the politics of the country, we were not immune to such all-encompassing propaganda. All the Jews of Europe, every man, woman, and child, were characterized as rubbish, absolute rubbish by the Nazi regime. To the Spanish conquistadors, native American Indians were less than human; they had no soul. In all cases of such dehumanization of the enemy, the point is to legitimate nothing less than the extinction of another people.
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Growth is a pre-condition for democracy – empirically demonstrated across regions

One of the most notable empirical regularities in political economy is the relationship between income per capita and democracy. Today, all OECD countries are democratic, while many of the nondemocracies are in the poor parts of the world, for example sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The positive cross-country relationship between income and democracy in the 1990s is depicted in Figure 1, which shows the association between the Freedom House measure of democracy and log income per capita in the 1990s.1 This relationship is not confined solely to a cross-country comparison. Most countries were nondemocratic before the modern growth process took off at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Democratization came together with growth. Robert J. Barro (1999, 160), for example, summarizes this as follows: "Increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in democracy. In contrast, democracies that arise without prior economic development... tend not to last."2 This statistical association between income and democracy is the cornerstone of the influential modernization theory. Lipset (1959) suggested that democracy was both created and consolidated by a broad process of "modernization" which involved changes in "the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education [which] are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy" (80). The central tenet of the modernization theory, that higher income per capita causes a country to be democratic, is also reproduced in most major works on democracy (e.g., Robert A. Dahl 1971; Samuel P. Huntington 1991; Dietrich Rusechemeyer, John D. Stephens, and Evelyn H. Stephens 1992).

Growth facilitates democracy—transforms institutions toward more freedom and greater political participation

That conclusion is mistaken. The underlying conditions of societies around the world point to a more complicated reality. The bad news is that it is unrealistic to assume that democratic institutions can be set up easily, almost anywhere, at any time. Although the outlook is never hopeless, democracy is most likely to emerge and survive when certain social and cultural conditions are in place. The Bush administration ignored this reality when it attempted to implant democracy in Iraq without first establishing internal security and overlooked cultural conditions that endangered the effort. The good news, however, is that the conditions conducive to democracy can and do emerge—and the process of "modernization," according to abundant empirical evidence, advances them. Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked to industrialization. Once set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational
specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political institutions, bringing rising mass participation in politics and—in the long run—making the establishment of democratic political institutions increasingly likely. Today, we have a clearer idea than ever before of why and how this process of democratization happens. The long-term trend toward democracy has always come in surges and declines. At the start of the twentieth century, only a handful of democracies existed, and even they fell short of being full democracies by today’s standards. There was a major increase in the number of democracies following World War I, another surge following World War II, and a third surge at the end of the Cold War. Each of these surges was followed by a decline, although the number of democracies never fell back to the original base line. By the start of the twenty-first century, about 90 states could be considered democratic. Although many of these democracies are flawed, the overall trend is striking: in the long run, modernization brings democracy. This means that the economic resurgence of China and Russia has a positive aspect: underlying changes are occurring that make the emergence of increasingly liberal and democratic political systems likely in the coming years. It also means that there is no reason to panic about the fact that democracy currently appears to be on the defensive. The dynamics of modernization and democratization are becoming increasingly clear, and it is likely that they will continue to function.

**Growth key to democracy – empirics prove**


Inspection of the cross-country data suggests that countries at low levels of economic development typically do not sustain democracy. For example, the political freedoms installed in most of the newly independent African states in the early 1960s did not tend to last. Conversely, nondemocratic places that experience substantial economic development tend to become more dramatic. Examples include Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Portugal. Moreover, the countries of central and eastern Europe— which have been reasonably advanced economically for some time, especially in terms of education— eventually became more democratic. Thus a casual view of the data seems to support the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. A surge of democratization since the late 1980s meant that many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa became more democratic than predicted by 1995. This group includes Benin, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and Zambia. In some of these cases, the democratization may be explicable from the pressures and rewards exerted by international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. (The recent U.S. efforts in Haiti are analogous.) In any case, the regression analysis predicts that, as with the African experience of the 1960s, democracy that gets well ahead of economic development will not last. As a possible indicator of this process, Niger had a military coup in January 1996 and then became nondemocratic.

The data for a large panel of countries confirm the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis, which says that a higher standard of living promotes democracy. This relation shows up when democracy is represented by electoral rights or civil liberties and when the standard of living is measured by per capita GDP, primary school attainment, the gap between male and female primary schooling (which enters negatively), and the importance of the middle class. Democracy does not relate significantly to school attainment at the secondary and higher levels. For a given standard of living, democracy tends to fall with urbanization and a greater reliance on natural resources but has little relation to country size.
Hegemony Key to Middle East

Heg is key to prevent Middle East conflict

Schmitt 6 (Gary, Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Pax Americana,” http://www.eng.gees.org/articulo/6/)

In the case of Europe, after examining both the sources of tension and cooperation in current transatlantic relations, Lieber argues that Europe has no choice but to depend on American leadership and power. Europe’s lack of unanimity over foreign policies, and its own lack of hard power, leave it with little choice but to rely on the United States when it comes to maintaining the world’s security blanket. As for the Middle East, after making the case for going to war with Saddam’s Iraq—a case that ultimately hinges on the risks of not acting—Lieber notes that it still remains the case that "only the U.S." can deter regional thugs, contain weapons proliferation to any degree, keep the Arab-Israeli peace process afloat, and keep the oil supplies flowing to us and our allies. And in Asia, it is the United States that “plays a unique stabilizing role . . . that no other country or organization can play.” Absent America’s presence, the region’s key actors would face a dramatically different set of security concerns, in which more overt, "great power" competition would likely become the norm.

Heg withdrawal emboldens rogues – it signals weakness

Thayer ’6 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a “time out”, and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is “going home”, thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.
Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war, and the consequences of such a failure would be profound. Peer-reviewed studies predict that less than 1% of the nuclear weapons now deployed in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon States, if detonated in urban areas, would immediately kill tens of millions of people, and cause long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people. A full-scale war, fought with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, would so utterly devastate Earth's environment that most humans and other complex forms of life would not survive. Yet no Nuclear Weapon State has ever evaluated the environmental, ecological or agricultural consequences of the detonation of nuclear weapons in their own territory. Military and political leaders in these nations thus remain dangerously unaware of the existential danger which their weapons present to the entire human race. Consequently, nuclear weapons remain as the cornerstone of the military arsenals in the Nuclear Weapon States, where nuclear deterrence guides political and military strategy. Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their strategic nuclear weapons are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12- to 30-minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S. and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status – ready to launch with only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be “safe” from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment’s notice? A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war. Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history.

We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals – through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth’s environment and ecosystems – threaten continued human existence. Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence. We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that “nuclear war” means “global nuclear suicide.”

A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to: * A nuclear war between India and Pakistan; * 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons detonated in the mega-cities of both India and Pakistan (there are now 130-190 operational nuclear weapons which exist in the combined arsenals of these nations); * The deaths of 20 to 50 million people as a result of the prompt effects of these nuclear detonations (blast, fire and radioactive fallout); * Massive firestorms covering many hundreds of square miles/kilometers (created by nuclear detonations that produce temperatures hotter than those believed to exist at the center of the sun), that would engulf these cities and produce 6 to 7 million tons of thick, black smoke; * About 5 million tons of smoke that would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where strong winds would carry it around the Earth in 10 days; * A stratospheric smoke layer surrounding the Earth, which would remain in place for 10 years; * The dense smoke would heat the upper atmosphere, destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer, and block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface; * 25% to 40% of the protective ozone layer would be destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern and southern high latitudes; * Ozone destruction would cause the average UV Index to increase to 16-22 in the U.S., Europe, Eurasia and China, with even higher readings towards the poles (readings of 11 or higher are classified as “extreme” by the U.S. EPA). It would take 7-8 minutes for a fair skinned person to receive a painful sunburn at mid-day; * Loss of warming sunlight would quickly produce average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere colder than any experienced in the last 1000 years; * Hemispheric drops in temperature would be about twice as large and last ten times longer than those which followed the largest volcanic eruption in the last 500 years, Mt. Tambora in 1816. The following year, 1817, was called “The Year Without Summer”, which saw famine in Europe from massive crop failures; * Growing seasons in the Northern Hemisphere would be significantly shortened. It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada for at least several years; * World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would be completely depleted; grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs; * The one billion already hungry people, who currently depend upon grain imports, would likely starve to death in the years following this nuclear war; * The total climate of the Earth would be changed for centuries. (Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence by Steven Starr February 07, 2011 * Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation * Senior Scientist for PSR)
explosive power in these 100 Hiroshima-size weapons is less than 1% of the total explosive power contained in the currently operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

**Escalation and nuclear use is likely — MAD doesn’t check**

Kapur ‘8[. Paul Kapur is Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a Faculty Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. , “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia”, International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 71–94]

As noted above, nuclear weapons facilitated provocative Pakistani behavior in the wake of the 1998 tests, triggering major Indo-Pakistani crises such as the Kargil conflict and the 2001–02 standoff. Significantly, the effect of these crises has not been limited to the past; they have had a profound effect on current Indian strategic thinking, inspiring an aggressive shift in India’s conventional military posture. This could increase the likelihood of serious Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. India has long enjoyed conventional military superiority over Pakistan. 58 This advantage has been mitigated, however, by India’s peacetime deployment of offensive forces deep in the interior of the country, far from the Indo-Pakistani border. As a result, Indian forces were slow to mobilize against the Pakistanis, requiring several weeks before launching a large-scale offensive. 59 This gave Pakistan time to prepare its defenses and ward off any impending Indian attack. It also allowed the international community to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on India’s civilian leadership, thereby preventing it from launching military action. Many Indian military leaders believe that this mobilization problem prevented India from acting decisively during the 2001–02 crisis. By the time Indian forces were prepared to move against Pakistan, the Pakistanis were able to ready their defenses, making a potential Indian attack far more costly. Most important, the Indians’ slowness enabled the United States to pressure the Indian government, convincing it to abandon plans to strike Pakistan. Thus, in the words of a prominent Indian defense writer, Operation Parakram demonstrated that India’s “mobilization strategy was completely fawed.” 60 In addition, the government’s restraint caused rancor within the armed forces. Senior officers believed that civilian leaders misused the military, ordering it to undertake a long and costly deployment and then opting for retreat, leaving the Pakistanis unpunished. As a senior U.S. defense official stationed in New Delhi puts it, Indian commanders “were frustrated... They really wanted to go after Pakistan but couldn’t.” 61 To prevent a recurrence of Parakram’s failures, the Indians began to formulate a new “Cold Start” military doctrine, which will enable India to rapidly launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan. The doctrine will augment the offensive capabilities of India’s traditionally defensive holding formations located close to the Indo-Pakistani border. It also will eventually shift offensive forces from their current locations in the Indian hinterland to bases closer to Pakistan. Within 72 to 96 hours of a mobilization order, Cold Start would send three to four division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery roughly 20–80 kilometers into Pakistan along the breadth of the Indo-Pakistani border. The IBGs would aggressively engage Pakistani forces and seize a long, shallow swath of Pakistani territory. Cold Start seeks to achieve three goals: to inflict significant attrition on enemy forces; to retain Pakistani territory for use as a postconflict bargaining chip; and, by limiting the depth of Indian incursions, to avoid triggering a Pakistani strategic nuclear response. Indian military planners hope that these doctrinal changes, coupled with India’s growing conventional military capabilities, 62 will result in a more nimble force that is able to prevent a repetition of Operation Parakram’s shortcomings. 63 Cold Start is currently in its nascent stages. 64 The doctrine’s continued development and implementation, however, will likely have two major effects. First, it will probably exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics. Pakistan has always been a deeply insecure state, militarily outmatched by India, lacking strategic depth, and suffering from domestic instability. The Pakistanis could previously expect India’s lengthy mobilization schedule to mitigate its military advantages. In the future, however, this may not be the case. As a result, Pakistan will have to maintain a higher state of readiness, 65 and will face incentives to offset Indian strategic advances through increased arms racing and asymmetric warfare. Such behavior could trigger aggressive Indian responses, which would further heighten Pakistani insecurity. These dynamics could undermine recent improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations and increase the probability of crises between the two countries. Second, Indian doctrinal changes increase the likelihood that Indo-Pakistani crises will escalate rapidly, both within the conventional sphere and from the conventional to the nuclear level. In the conventional realm, Cold Start will enable Indian forces to attack Pakistan quickly, pushing an Indo-Pakistani dispute from the level of political crisis to outright conflict before the Indian government can be deterred from launching an offensive. Vijay Oberoi explains that the decision to attack Pakistan would require “a certain amount of political will. But Cold Start makes that political will more likely to be there, since now we can mobilize before world opinion comes down on political leaders and prevents them from acting.” 66 In the nuclear realm, India’s Cold Start doctrine would likely force Pakistan to rely more heavily on its strategic deterrent. Brig. Gen. Khawar Manif, Pakistan’s defense attaché to the United States, argues that Cold Start will create a “greater justification for Pakistani nuclear weapons” and may increase the danger of nuclear use. “The wider the conventional asymmetry,” he maintains, “the lower the nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan.” To the extent that India widens the conventional asymmetry through military spending and aggressive doctrinal changes, the nuclear threshold will get lower.” Maj. Gen. Muhammad Mustafa Khan, director-general (analysis) of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, similarly argues that Cold Start “is destabilizing; it is meant to circumvent nuclear deterrence and warning time,” and “it is entirely Pakistan-specific.” “This will force
Cold Start may erode the firebreak between conventional and nuclear conflict on the subcontinent. The Indians reportedly anticipate such an outcome at the tactical level and are preparing to fight through Pakistani battlefield nuclear strikes. Indian strategists dismiss the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear response against India proper, however. Rather, they maintain that India can calibrate its attack, stopping short of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thresholds and waiting for international diplomatic intervention to end the conflict. As Gurmeet Kanwal explains, “We war-game this all the time, and we do not trip their [strategic] red lines.” According to Arun Sahgal, Cold Start “will give Pakistan no option but to bring down its nuclear thresholds. But this shouldn’t really worry us. We don’t think Pakistan will cross the nuclear Rubicon.”

Given the uncertainties that would be inherent in a large-scale Indo-Pakistani conflict, however, such a benign outcome is not guaranteed. For example, an unusually rapid and extensive Indian victory, or failure to achieve a quick diplomatic resolution to the conflict, could result in a far more extreme Pakistani response than the Indians currently anticipate. Thus India’s planning for a carefully controlled limited war with Pakistan could prove to be overly optimistic. As a senior U.S. defense official familiar with Cold Start worries, the Indians “think that they can fight three or four days, and the international community will stop it. And they believe that they can fight through a nuclear exchange. But there are unintended consequences. Calibrate a conventional war and nuclear exchange with Pakistan? It doesn’t work that way.”

Significantly, a large-scale Indo-Pakistani crisis could erupt even without a deliberate decision by the Pakistani government to provoke India. The Islamist forces that the Pakistanis have nurtured in recent decades have taken on a life of their own and do not always act at Islamabad’s behest. Indeed, they often behave in ways inimical to Pakistani interests, such as launching attacks on Pakistani security forces, government officials, and political figures. If these entities were to stage an operation similar to the 2001 parliament attack, India could hold the Pakistani government responsible, whether or not Islamabad was behind the operation. And with a doctrine that would enable rapid mobilization, India’s military response could be far more extensive, and more dangerous, than it was during the 2001–02 crisis. By facilitating the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani crises in the past, then, nuclear weapons have inspired strategic developments that will make the outbreak and rapid escalation of regional crises more likely in the future. Thus nuclear weapons proliferation not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade since the 1998 tests; proliferation is also likely to increase dangers on the subcontinent in years to come.
Middle-East War

Middle East war causes extinction

Russell 9 (Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs @ Nava Postgraduate School (James, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” Online)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent, relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to preemptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any of the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

Extinction


Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both sides quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory. The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world’s total population. Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is
left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.
Pakistan is the biggest risk of terrorist attacks


Of the 32 “serious” jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011, 53 percent had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan and just 6 percent to Yemen. A decade after 9/11, despite growing concerns over Yemen, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the country’s northwest arguably remain al Qaeda’s main safe haven, and the area from which it can hatch its most dangerous plots against the West. 1 Al Qaeda’s presence in these areas has long threatened international security. It was in Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest that al Qaeda was founded in 1988, and ever since Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan has been a gateway for recruits joining the terrorist network and its affiliates, and an area in which its senior figures have felt comfortable planning operations, including the 9/11 attacks. After being driven out of Afghanistan, it was on the Pakistani side of the border that al Qaeda built up a new safe haven. 2 And while bin Laden went to ground in Abbottabad in the settled areas of Pakistan some 70 miles north of Islamabad where he was killed on May 2, 2011, many of his key lieutenant remain in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Recent years have seen increased numbers of Westerners travelling to the region for paramilitary training, with 100 to 150 suspected of making the trip in 2009 and reports of recruits continuing to stream in during 2010 and 2011, according to Western counterterrorism officials. 3 While many went there because the area is the principal point of entry to join the fighting in Afghanistan, the presence of al Qaeda, and its sustained ability to train recruits and persuade them to launch attacks in the West, continue to make the FATA what President Obama called in 2009 “the most dangerous place in the world.” 4 U.S. officials have recently suggested that when it comes to the U.S. homeland, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen – al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – could now pose a greater threat than “al Qaeda Central” in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In February 2011, Michael Leiter, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) testified, “Al Qaeda, we believe, in Pakistan is at one of its weakest points in the past decade, and it is continuously forcing – being forced to react to a reduced safe haven and personnel losses, but it remains a very determined enemy,” and added, “I actually consider al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with Awlaki as a leader within that organization, probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland. I’m hesitant to rank them too carefully.” 5

According to a senior U.S. counterterrorism official, while it can be debated whether the Yemeni or Pakistani branch of al Qaeda poses the greatest threat, the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan remains the more dangerous to the United States as well as other Western countries. While only one terrorist group in Yemen threatens the Unite States, several groups are now operating in the tribal area of Pakistan with a track record of targeting the U.S. homeland. 6 This paper’s findings put the relative threat from al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan and Yemen to the West in som historical context. In a survey below of the 32 “serious jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 an 2011, 53 percent had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan and just 6 percent t Yemen. This paper will illustrate how an intensification in the CIA drone campaign and Pakistani military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas have reduced al Qaeda’s ability to operate in the area, but by no means removed it, as the terrorist network has shown a significant ability to adapt its operations to the threat from the missile strikes. In recent years, despite the intensification of drone strikes in Pakistan, this paper finds that Pakistan has continued to incube more serious terrorist plots than Yemen. Between January 2009 and June 2011 there were seven serious plots against the West in which plotters were trained or directed by jihadist terrorist groups in Pakistan and just two linked in this way to Yemen. Both those plots – the Christmas Day 2009 attempt to bomb an airliner approaching Detroit and the October 2010 “package bomb plot” against cargo planes – were directed against the United States, which was also targeted by an equal number of serious plots linked to Pakistan during this period – the September 2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi to bomb New York and the May 2010 attempt to bomb Times Square. These metrics do not yet bear out Obama administration claims that the terrorist threat from Pakistan’s tribal areas has been reduced. In 2010 there were four serious plots against the West with an operational or training link to Pakistan, the most in any year since al Qaeda began to consolidate a safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan in 2004. Two of these plots saw plotters train in Pakistan a year before activating plots against the West (the July 2010 plot by Norwegian militants and the August 2010 Canada plot), while two saw militants train in Pakistan the same year (the May 2010 Times Square plot and the December 2010 plot to attack a newspaper in Denmark).
Despite growing concern over Yemen, the tribal areas of Pakistan remain al Qaeda’s number one safe haven and the most threatening to the West as a whole. According to U.S. intelligence officials, the terrorist group has reasonably successfully adapted its operational structures to take account of the harsher security environment. The latest eyewitness accounts from Western recruits suggest that as recently as 2010 al Qaeda was able to offer recruits the sort of bombmaking training that would be useful for attacks in the West. And Western militants have continued to stream into the tribal areas. The case studies contained in this paper suggest that most Western recruits were drawn there by the desire to fight U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan, providing al Qaeda opportunities to recruit these operatives for attacks against the West. But it would be wrong though to draw the conclusion that this by itself warrants an acceleration of the withdrawal of troops from the region. Western officials warn that any precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would likely provide al Qaeda an even greater sanctuary in the region, and new opportunities to plot attacks. This paper has shown that by some measures al Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan has actually become more dangerous. 411 More serious plots emerged in the West in 2010 linked to established jihadist groups in Pakistan than in any year since al Qaeda built up its operations in FATA in the early 2000s. If upbeat assessments from the Obama administration stating that al Qaeda and its allies have recently been significantly weakened in the tribal areas prove accurate, fewer plots should be expected in future years. The death of bin Laden, long an inspirational magnet for recruits, may lessen the enthusiasm of Western militants for travelling to the region. While Obama administration officials have stated publicly that AQAP in Yemen may recently have emerged as a greater threat to the U.S. homeland than “al Qaeda Central,” the threat from al Qaeda in Pakistan remains high. And as those officials concede, it is difficult to rank which is now the more dangerous. Furthermore, while al Qaeda in Pakistan still appears to be plotting large-scale attacks, AQAP has signaled it may try to launch smaller scale plots against the United States in the future with more frequency, something which may reduce the likelihood of significant loss of life in any one attack by the group. The FATA safe haven continues to be the greater threat to the United States, as well as other Western countries, given the decades-long presence of al Qaeda’s leaders, numerous bombmaking instructors, training facilities, and facilitators in the region, and the presence of several Pakistani militant groups like the Pakistani Taliban increasingly determined to attack the United States. While Osama bin Laden’s death is a deep blow to al Qaeda, the emergence of Ilyas Kashmiri and re-emergence of Saif al Adel, two highly capable operatives, within the al Qaeda “Central” organization, means the organization still has the “brainpower” to continue to plan ambitious attacks against the United States like the 2006 airline plot. (Reports surfaced in June 2011 of Kashmiri’s death, but they have not been confirmed by the United States.) 415 In the last three years, as outlined in detail in the previous iteration of this paper, a growing number of Westerners have also joined groups affiliated with al Qaeda. Of all Western countries, Germany has seen the most alarming rise of its citizens traveling to the tribal areas, largely a product of recruitment drives by Uzbek jihadist groups. The dangers caused by these flows were highlighted by an unprecedented Europe-wide terror alert in the autumn of 2010 linked to a group of militants who had traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas from Hamburg in 2009. The plot was a wake up call that the threat from the Afghanistan Pakistan border region was very much alive more than a decade after Mohammed Atta travelled to the Afghanistan Pakistan from the northern German port city. As the 9/11 attacks illustrated, a small group of determined terrorists can create great carnage. In 2006, al Qaeda operatives in North Waziristan recruited, trained, and directed a group of British militants to blow up more than half a dozen transatlantic airliners, a plot that if successful could have killed more than 1,500 people and created significant global economic repercussions. According to British authorities, the airline plotters were just weeks away from building bombs that would have been undetectable by airport scanners and powerful enough to bring down airliners. Almost half a decade later, al Qaeda operatives still enjoy significant sanctuary in North Waziristan, demonstrated by their continued ability to distribute videos from the region. 417 New encryption methods used by the group in online communications now also appear to have offered al Qaeda operatives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region greater command and control of plots in the West than ever before. As long as Western militants continue to stream in, al Qaeda and allied groups will continue to have the opportunity
Pakistan terrorism destroys stability in Afghanistan

The bloody terrorist attacks in Mumbai have serious repercussions for NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban insurgency. Whether or not any alleged links between the Mumbai terrorists and Pakistan are confirmed, the rise in tensions between India and Pakistan and the possible further escalation of their bilateral disputes will harm the military campaign against the Taliban, likely exacerbate a crisis of governance in Afghanistan, and jeopardize efforts to imbed the country in a regional security framework. At minimum, the terrorist attacks will delay a quick launch of a regional initiative toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India that has been urged by analysts to be the centerpiece of the incoming administration’s policy toward the region. The initiative was devised to assist Pakistan and India in reaching accommodation over Kashmir and reducing tensions along their border so that Pakistan could genuinely embrace efforts against militants on its western front.

Pakistani reluctance for several years until recently to attack the Taliban safe havens in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the Northwest Frontier Province significantly contributed to the Taliban’s ability to recoup in Pakistan and launch an intense insurgency against the Karzai government and NATO. Pakistan’s rather fickle and lukewarm efforts have been mainly due to U.S. inducements – both pressure, including in the form of U.S. air strikes into Pakistan, and U.S. aid transfers. Underlying Pakistan’s reluctance to target the Taliban have been not only the longstanding and carefully cultivated ties to the mujahadeen by the Pakistani intelligence services, the Director for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), but also crucially the Pakistani military view that Afghanistan could provide a necessary strategic depth for Pakistan during a military confrontation with India. Given India’s conventional military superiority and the difficulties in defending the narrow territory that separates the border with India from Islamabad and Peshawar, the Pakistani military has considered it imperative to be able to fall back into Afghanistan, recoup forces there, and launch a counterattack against India. Above all, an encirclement by hostile powers in Afghanistan and India had to be avoided. Thus, a regional initiative that reduced one of the main triggers of India-Pakistan conflict – Kashmir – would permit Pakistan to come fully on board, focusing its resources on its western front and systematically targeting the Taliban and other groups. Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan is also a critical piece of a necessary larger regional framework toward Afghanistan, which for centuries has been plagued by regional and great power rivalries. The tensions between India and Pakistan following the Mumbai attacks can greatly reduce the political will in both Islamabad and New Delhi to agree to such conflict resolution efforts. In India, the Congress Party government, already weak before the attacks, will likely find it too risky politically to participate in such efforts, especially before the national elections there next year. In Pakistan, the civilian government of Asif Zardari will struggle to maintain control over the military-intelligence services to conduct policy, especially towards its archival India. Any escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan will also result in the redeployment of the Pakistani military away from its border with Afghanistan toward its eastern border. Such a standoff between the two militaries following the 2001 Jaish-e-Mohammed (a militant Kashmiri group with deep connections to the Pakistani intelligence services) attack on the Indian parliament critically contributed to the ability of al Qaeda to slip out of Afghanistan into Pakistan. Any reduction of pressure on the Taliban and other groups, such as the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks, that operate along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, will augment their ability to regroup, resupply, train, recruit, and fundraise in Pakistan, thus increasing the already serious level of violence in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban insurgency is self-sustaining at this point and has developed a substantial internal base, the external safehaven in Pakistan greatly hampers the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. The United States and NATO do not have the military resources in Afghanistan to seal off the border with Pakistan; the three U.S. brigades to be deployed to Afghanistan will not redress this problem. Any lessening of the anti-Taliban effort on the Pakistan side will be felt in Afghanistan. A serious escalation of the tension between India and Pakistan could easily result in a full-blown proxy war between the two countries. Afghanistan has repeatedly been the theater for such rivalry. During the 1980s, while Pakistan and the United States supported the mujahadeen, India backed the pro-Soviet regime of president Mohammad Najibullah. During the 1990s, while Pakistan supported the Taliban, India provided assistance to the Northern Alliance. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, President Karzai’s embrace of India has been a major irritant to Islamabad. Indian consulates in Afghanistan are regarded by Pakistan as spying outfits and sources of aid to the separatist movement in Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan while Indian aid in dam construction in the Afghan province of Kunar is interpreted by Islamabad as a way to divert water resources from Pakistan. Pakistan’s paranoia about being encircled and possibly carved up between Afghanistan and India was....
already tragically revealed by the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008. Although the attack was conducted by the Haqqani network, U.S. intelligence sources have reported that elements in the ISI provided support. A major confrontation between India and Pakistan may in fact push India into conducting operations in Afghanistan that the Pakistanis fear. Such a proxy war would spell the end of Pakistani assistance against the Taliban. It would also further fracture the fragile and frequently fratricidal relations among Afghanistan’s political leaders. With the approaching presidential elections in Afghanistan next summer, the rivalry among the political elite in Afghanistan is already intense. The sense of exclusion and grievances among the various leaders are running high, fed by and reverberating through ethnic, tribal, and clan competition. Any proxy war in Afghanistan by the regional powers would fuel these internal fissures, possibly bringing Afghanistan to the brink of a 1990s-like Civil war. Already, the collapse of governance in much of the country, caused by insecurity as well as a weak and frequently corrupt and predatory leadership, has eviscerated the legitimacy of the Kabul government and added fuel to the Taliban insurgency. Countrywide arming of various militias, stimulated by a proxy war, would reverse one of the remaining widely-popular accomplishments after the fall of the Taliban, the disarmament of the various warlords.

**Failure in Afghanistan sparks multiple nuclear wars**

*Carafano ’10 (Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe By JAMES JAY CARAFANO  Saturday, Jan. 2, 2010 James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies.)*

There’s little chance Kabul will become Saigon 1968. If the war in Afghanistan starts going south for allied forces, President Obama will probably quit rather than risk getting bogged down. President Lyndon B. Johnson considered Vietnam more a distraction than a national mission, yet he ramped up the troop commitment all the same. In 1968, the North Vietnamese launched a major offensive during the Tet holiday. They lost that battle. Badly! But the fact that they were able to mount such a large-scale offensive gave many Americans—including Walter Cronkite—the impression that the war wasn’t winnable. As “the U.S. is bogged down” became the common view, Johnson’s presidency fell to ashes. Not much chance Obama will go that route. If the violence skyrockets next year and it looks as though the president’s ambitious objectives can’t be met, Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They lost, and America’s standing fell as well. The world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war.

Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India, potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances...
AQAP is gearing up for major attacks in India – they’ll be successful


In this context, Al Qaeda and its emerging connections in Yemen have become very relevant for India. Yemen’s predominantly tribal culture and harsh inaccessible terrain create an inherent insularity which, in many ways, makes the country an ideal sanctuary for terrorists. Yemen has, in fact, reportedly become the principal new destination for Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban fleeing intensifying attacks by American drones. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has gradually established itself here through a web of alliances with the local tribes, including some by intermarriages, particularly in the inaccessible mountains of the Shabwa province, and has now become a strong presence within the country. There is every likelihood that Pakistan’s ISI has established contacts with the AQAP, though the organisation has been targeted by Saudi and Yemeni intelligence and military who consider Al Qaeda a threat to the ruling establishments. Yemen was in the news because of reports that the AQAP was attempting to procure large quantities of castor beans for manufacturing ricin powder, an extremely lethal poison; it’s swiftly fatal if inhaled in even the most minute doses. These were then to be packed into small explosive dispenser packages and smuggled into the US and Europe, and exploded in crowded places like shopping malls, aircraft or subway stations. It would be a dirty chemical bomb from ingredients freely available in the open market, comparatively cheaper and much more accessible than even the smallest nuclear equivalent. Of course, there is much scepticism about the very feasibility of developing such a project in the primitive environments of Yemen, which is where the significance of a possible Pakistani connection with the AQAP comes in. Consider this. Pakistan has already given a Dr A.Q. Khan to the illegal nuclear market. Given the jihadi influence within the Pakistani scientific community, it is not at all impossible that another similar figure may emerge in that country in the illegal bio-chemical field as well. The AQAP has demonstrated the capability to devise imaginative and ingenious plans to carry out attacks in the heartlands of the US and western Europe, and some were even put into operation, but detected almost at the last minute. In the past, numerous jihadi attacks have originated from Yemen, including suicide bombing of the US Navy warship USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2010, the attack on the French tanker Limburg, the failed attack on another US Navy warship The Sullivans in 2002, besides the attempted assassination of the Saudi anti-terrorist chief Prince Mohammad bin Nayef. There was also the more bizarre case of an African passenger of Yemeni origin with plastic explosives sewn into his underwear who boarded an American commercial flight flying from Amsterdam and Detroit but failed to set off the explosive when over American airspace. But fanciful or not, the US for one is certainly taking seriously the capabilities of the AQAP as a potential threat. American military aid and intelligence activities in Yemen, including strikes by American aircraft and drones, have been ramped up, and there are reports that a new American airbase for this purpose is under construction in a yet unspecified country in West Asia. Threats to India’s national security can build up in any quarter, from any region of the world. India should have no doubts that it is very much on the AQAP’s target list, through local proxies like the LeT in Pakistan, including possible “ricin bomb” operations. So even as Mr Hazare wrestles with the threat of corruption to ensure good governance, India must take due note of other threats as well and exercise the requisite caution.

This scenario ensures escalation to nuclear war


In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration between nuclear-armed historic rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein’s monster of the Pakistani government’s creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches’ brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of
Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader, more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with Pakistan’s attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence report concluded last month that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes.

India is unlikely to show restraint, in the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India’s superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons, were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India. So what can the United States do to ratchet down tensions? We need to build trust, confidence and consistent lines of communications between India and Pakistan. This begins by helping both parties pave the way for a constructive dialogue on the status of Kashmir. Steps toward progress would include pushing for real accountability of figures responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the handing over of wanted Lashkar-i-Taiba facilitators such as Indian crime lord Dawood Ibrahim. The United States also needs to disrupt the terrorist groups’ fundraising and planning. The focus should be on unearthing names and disrupting cells outside Pakistan that are tied to Lashkar-i-Taiba, which involves pressuring Islamabad for the names of Westerners who may have trained at Lashkar-i-Taiba camps. This is among the thorniest U.S. national security and counterterrorism problems. It requires officials to focus on imagining the “aftershocks” of a terrorist attack and act before the threat manifests - even as other national security issues such as unrest in the Middle East boil over. Yet without political attention, diplomatic capital and sustained preventative actions, a critical region could descend into chaos. History shows that the actions of a small group of committed terrorists, such as the Black Hand in 1914 or al-Qaeda in 2001 - can spark broader wars. History could repeat itself with Lashkar-i-Taiba. Asymmetric threats that serve as flash points for broader geopolitical crises may be the greatest threat we face from terrorism.

Best new studies prove this would cause extinction

Starr ’11 (Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence by Steven Starr February 07, 2011  * Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  * Senior Scientist for PSR

Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war, and the consequences of such a failure would be profound. Peer-reviewed studies predict that less than 1% of the nuclear weapons now deployed in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon States, if detonated in urban areas, would immediately kill tens of millions of people, and cause long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people. A full-scale war, fought with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, would so utterly devastate Earth’s environment that most humans and other complex forms of life would not survive. Yet no Nuclear Weapon State has ever evaluated the environmental, ecological or agricultural consequences of the detonation of its nuclear arsenals in conflict. Military and political leaders in these nations thus remain dangerously unaware of the existential danger which their weapons present to the entire human race. Consequently, nuclear weapons remain as the cornerstone of the military arsenals in the Nuclear Weapon States, where nuclear deterrence guides political and military strategy. Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their weapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S. and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status – ready to launch with only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be “safe” from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment’s notice? A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and
stored in a locked safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war. **Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history.** We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth's environment and ecosystems threaten continued human existence. Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence.

We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth's environment and ecosystems threaten continued human existence. Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence.

We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that "nuclear war" means "global nuclear suicide".

A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to:

* A nuclear war between India and Pakistan;
* 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons detonated in the mega-cities of both India and Pakistan (there are now 130-190 operational nuclear weapons which exist in the combined arsenals of these nations);
* The deaths of 20 to 50 million people as a result of the prompt effects of these nuclear detonations (blast, fire and radioactive fallout);
* Massive firestorms covering many hundreds of square miles/kilometers (created by nuclear detonations that produce temperatures hotter than those believed to exist at the center of the sun), that would engulf these cities and produce 6 to 7 million tons of thick, black smoke;
* About 5 million tons of smoke that would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where strong winds would carry it around the Earth in 10 days;
* **A stratospheric smoke layer surrounding the Earth, which would remain in place for 10 years;**
* The dense smoke would destroy Earth's protective ozone layer, and block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching Earth's surface;
* 25% to 40% of the protective ozone layer would be destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern and southern high latitudes;
* Ozone destruction would cause the average UV Index to increase to 16-22 in the U.S, Europe, Eurasia and China, with even higher readings towards the poles (readings of 11 or higher are classified as "extreme" by the U.S. EPA). It would take 7-8 minutes for a fair skinned person to receive a painful sunburn at mid-day;
* Loss of warming sunlight would quickly produce average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere colder than any experienced in the last 1000 years;
* Hemispheric drops in temperature would be about twice as large and last ten times longer than those which followed the largest volcanic eruption in the last 500 years, Mt. Tambora in 1816. The following year, 1817, was called "The Year Without Summer", which saw famine in Europe from massive crop failures;
* Growing seasons in the Northern Hemisphere would be significantly shortened. It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada for at least several years;
* World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would be completely depleted; grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs;
* The one billion already hungry people who currently depend upon grain imports, would likely starve to death in the years following this nuclear war;
* The total explosive power in these 100 Hiroshima-size weapons is less than 1% of the total explosive power contained in the currently operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
Empirically denied multiple times over

Nowhere was the scope and intensity of violence during the 1990s as great as in Africa. While the general trend of armed conflict in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East fell during the 1989-99 period, the 1990s witnessed an increase in the number of conflicts on the African continent. During this period, 16 UN peacekeeping missions were sent to Africa. (Three countries—Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Angola—were visited by multiple missions during this time.) Furthermore, this period saw internal and interstate violence in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states (see table 1). In 1999 alone, the continent was plagued by 16 armed conflicts, seven of which were wars with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths (Journal of Peace Research, 37:5, 2000, p. 638). In 2000, the situation continued to deteriorate: renewed heavy fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed tens of thousands of lives in the lead-up to a June ceasefire and ultimately the signing of a peace accord in December; continued violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria as well as the outbreak of new violence between Guinea and Liberia in Zimbabwe, and in the Ivory Coast have brought new hardship and bloodshed to the continent.

Great powers won’t get involved

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win—especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.
Anti-American Sentiment

Anti-Americanism inevitable


Anti-American anger, and the violence and terror that can result, is fueled by long-standing grievances; as long as millions of Arabs and Muslims hold them, whether those grievances are legitimate is almost beside the point. For Americans, the CIA-sponsored coup that toppled a democratically elected leader in Iran in 1953 stands as an isolated incident. Yet for many who live in the region, the coup is one part of a broader narrative: that the United States has opposed, and at times actively undermined, nascent democratic movements in the Middle East. Too many Arabs and Muslims hold the inverse of America’s opinion of itself: It is not a force for good, or even a burdened, yet flawed, protector of the international system, but rather an actor that has worked, in remarkably consistent fashion, to suppress and subjugate the people of the region. All of this is compounded by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the perception that America has unquestioningly aided Israel’s persecution of the Palestinians. There is little doubt that this perception at some level poisons nearly everything the United States does in the region. For this reason, among others, the Obama Administration decided to make the pursuit of peace a centerpiece of its Middle East policy. According to this approach, once the conflict is satisfactorily resolved, and the most important grievance removed from an otherwise long list, a truly refashioned relationship with the people of the Middle East will be possible. With lower levels of anti-Americanism and enhanced credibility, the United States will find it easier to tackle other problems.
**AT Indo-Pak War**

**Deterrence and no first-strike capabilities prevents war**
Ashley Tellis, foreign policy research institute, Winter, **2002**, Orbis, p. 24-25

In the final analysis, this situation is made objectively "meta-stable" by the fact that neither India, Pakistan, nor China has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks either "out of the blue" or during a crisis. Even China, which of the three comes closest to possessing such capabilities (against India under truly hypothetical scenarios), would find it difficult to conclude that the capacity for "splendid first strikes" lay within reach. Moreover, even if it could arrive at such a determination, the political justification for these actions would be substantially lacking given the nature of its current political disputes with India. On balance, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a high degree of deterrence stability, at least with respect to wars of unlimited aims, exists within the greater South Asian region.

**Economic interdependence prevents war**
Ashley Tellis, foreign policy research institute, Winter, **2002**, Orbis, p. 19

In any event, the saving grace that mutes the potential for exacerbated competition between both countries remains their relatively strong economic constraints. At the Pakistani end, these constraints are structural. Islamabad simply has no discretionary resources to fritter away on an open-ended arms race, and it could not acquire resources for this purpose without fundamentally transforming the nature of the Pakistani state itself—which transformation, if it occurs successfully, would actually mitigate many of the corrosive forces that currently drive Islamabad's security competition with India. At the Indian end, these constraints may be more self-imposed. New Delhi commands a large pool of national resources that could be siphoned off and reallocated to security instruments, but the current weaknesses of the central government's public finances and its reform program, coupled with its desire to complete the technological modernization programs that have been underway for many decades, prevents it from enlarging the budgetary allocations for strategic acquisitions at will. With these constraints on both sides, future nuclearization in India and Pakistan is more likely to resemble an "arms crawl" than a genuine Richardson-type "arms race." The strategic capabilities on both sides will increase incrementally but slowly—and in India will have further to go because of its inferior capabilities compared to China's. This slowness may be the best outcome from the viewpoint both of the two South Asian competitors and the United States.

**No first-use and confidence-building measures promote regional stability**
Mohan Malik, **2003**, The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, Asian Affairs, Fall

Regarding the technical requirements of stable deterrence, questions about command, control, and safety procedures continue to be raised. Both Pakistan and India claim to have maintained tighter controls over their arsenal—it is not in their own interests to see antistate actors gaining control of nuclear technology. Both India and Pakistan publicly have declared moratoriums on further nuclear tests, and India's adherence to no-first-use (NFU) posture and its confidence-building measures such as prenotification of missile tests and an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations promotes crisis stability. Devin Hegarty argues that this is responsible behavior in stark contrast to U.S.-Soviet nuclear options, including "deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, bombers flying on 24-hour alert status, and the nuclear safety lapses that characterized the superpower arms race." Post-September 11 measures to promote greater security and control over nuclear weapons and materials have been accorded the topmost priority. India's nuclear arsenal is firmly under the control of civilian leadership, and the Pakistani army always has retained the real authority over its country's nuclear weapons, regardless of who is head of state. Pakistan's military chain of command appears intact despite internal turmoil and reshuffling at the top of the government. The United States reportedly is considering offering assistance to ensure the physical protection of sensitive nuclear assets with vaults, sensors, alarms, tamperproof seals and labels, and other means of protection, ensuring personnel reliability and secure transport of sensitive items.

**Risk of miscalc prevents preemptive attack**
Stephen Cohen, senior fellow at Brookings, **2002**, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia, p. online

There will be little likelihood of a preemptive attack by India against Pakistan or against India by Pakistan or China, in part because the numbers will make such an attack difficult, and in part because of mobile basing. In the India-Pakistan case, both sides...
will be worried about miscalculations and, as the numbers increase, the possibility of significant fallout on one's own country from even a successful attack will increase, thus enhancing self-deterrence.
AT Iran-Saudi War

No war
Alexander, 11


Trying to predict the consequences of confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, experts rule out the use of force but agree that tensions will continue to grow in the region. Military expert Vladimir Anokhin continues: “Iran has been seeking leadership in the Islamic world. Meanwhile, this status belongs to Saudi Arabia, which certainly stirs up conflict. However, Iran will hardly let this result in a military campaign because the Saudis are strong enough to attract the entire Arab world to their side in a war against Iran. They can boast a high level of authority, which is exactly what the West expects from them.” Mr. Anokhin thinks that neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia is interested in military confrontation. Otherwise it might affect oil exports, which will be a serious blow to the House of Saud. Apart from this, Mecca and Medina, the holiest places for all Muslims, attract billions into the country’s budget each year during the Hajj. As far as Iran is concerned, it risks becoming a rogue state because of its nuclear ambitions. In its recent statements, Riyadh said it was going to seek nukes to have a mechanism of deterrence against Tehran. Saudi Arabia even discussed the issue with Pakistan. One should not forget that security of Saudi Arabia is also guarded by the US and NATO, which will never allow to interrupt oil supplies from the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is not a Mideast leader the West could sacrifice like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or Bashar Assad in Syria. Expert Sergei Demidenko believes that a part of criticism is the only thing the King of Saudi Arabia might face: “The Saudis are not ready to join a war. They simply do not know how to do it. Secondly, their responsibility is a matter of concern for the US and NATO. It means that if Iran attempts to escalate tensions further, it will have to deal with the alliance.”
No Mid East Escalation:


Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-country warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so? Common interest not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

Empirics prove


Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East, Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.
Prefer empirical ev --

a) Best prediction model


Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, policymakers should keep in mind that the unprecedented is also unlikely. Outliers in international behaviour do exist, but in general the past is the best guide to the future. Since geopolitical catastrophes that pessimists expect will follow US withdrawal are all virtually without precedent, common sense should tell policymakers they are probably also unlikely to occur. Five years ago, US leaders should have realised that their implicit prediction for the aftermath of invasion – positive, creative instability in the Middle East that would set off a string of democratic dominoes – was without precedent. The policy was based more on the president’s unshakeable faith in the redemptive power of democracy than on a coherent understanding of international relations. Like all faith-based policies, success would have required a miracle; in international politics, miracles are unfortunately rare. Faith is once again driving predictions of post-withdrawal Iraq, but this time it is faith in chaos and worst-case scenarios. Secondly, imagined consequences are usually worse than what reality delivers. 

b) Best Middle East methodology

Luttwak 7 [Edward, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/’7 “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine]

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is “five minutes to midnight” catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless... And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein’s son Abdullah periodically repeating his father’s speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these “moments of truth”—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much, only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough.

The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

More ev.

Maloney and Takeyh, 7 – *senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution AND **senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Susan and Ray, International Herald Tribune, 6/28, “Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast”)


Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First,
Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants.

The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman, and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

Empirically denied


Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq's troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization.

No escalation – their evidence doesn’t take into account new developments

KELLEY 2 (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7)

During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war. In those days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflict could spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initiative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. Israeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. The Soviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their
enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times in history have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over, Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror. Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has, after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer good reason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread. Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the Arab oil embargo. But the oil “weapon” has lost much of its bang. We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then, but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabs more than the loss of their oil would harm us.

No risk of prolif, it wouldn’t cause a chain reaction, and it would be slow at worst - your evidence is alarmism

Gavin 10 (Francis, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law @ the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs @ the University of Texas at Austin, “Sam As It Ever Was; Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” Lexis)

Fears of a tipping point were especially acute in the aftermath of China’s 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia. 40 A U.S. government document identified “at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)” with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon “grow substantially” to include “South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico.” 41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that “the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers.” 42 These predictions were largely wrong. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for “almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb.” All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased “access to fissile materials,” improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of “chain reactions,” or a “scramble” to proliferation when “even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability.” The 1985 report goes on, “The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964.” Although “some proliferation” of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades, they did not have “the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated, they would.” 43 In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear proliferation, analyst Moeeed Yusuf concludes that “the pace of proliferation has been much slower than anticipated by most.” The majority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability “never even came close to crossing the threshold.” In fact, most did not even initiate a weapons program. 44 If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, “the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today.” 44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, government and academic experts frequently “exaggerated the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation.” 45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, the pool of potential proliferators has been shrinking. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers—Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea—began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended. 46 As far as is known, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons program since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. 47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states,
policymakers may have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of proliferation in "respectable" states such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
No prolif – only Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could build nukes but they won’t

Posen ‘6 (Barry R. Posen, Professor of political science at MIT, 2-28-6, New York Times)

A Middle Eastern arms race is a frightening thought, but it is improbable. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, among its neighbors, only Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could conceivably muster the resources to follow suit. Israel is already a nuclear power. Iranian weapons might coax the Israelis to go public with their arsenal and to draw up plans for the use of such weapons in the event of an Iranian military threat. And if Israel disclosed its nuclear status, Egypt might find it diplomatically difficult to forswear acquiring nuclear weapons, too. But Cairo depends on foreign assistance, which would make Egypt vulnerable to the enormous international pressure it would most likely face to refrain from joining an arms race. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has the money to acquire nuclear weapons and technology on the black market, but possible suppliers are few and very closely watched. To develop the domestic scientific, engineering and industrial base necessary to build a self-sustaining nuclear program would take Saudi Arabia years. In the interim, the Saudis would need nuclear security guarantees from the United States or Europe, which would in turn apply intense pressure on Riyadh not to develop its own arms. Finally, Turkey may have the resources to build a nuclear weapon, but as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it relied on American nuclear guarantees against the mighty Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. There’s no obvious reason to presume that American guarantees would seem insufficient relative to Iran.
AT NATO

No impact to NATO collapse – limited influence or deterrence


When Defense Secretary Robert Gates devoted his final policy speech this month to berating NATO and our European allies, he was engaging in a time-honored tradition: Americans have worried about Europeans shirking their share of global burdens since the start of the 60-year-old alliance. Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of “the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance.” Yet, the outgoing Pentagon chief may not have been pessimistic enough. The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing and winning the Cold War will inevitably play a far diminished role in the years to come. To some extent, we’re already there: If NATO didn’t exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The honest, if awkward, answer is no. In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited.

and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year), but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent. With NATO, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts. Critical decisions are still made nationally, much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that — talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance’s effort in Libya — the poorly conceived intervention, the widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining intense operations — is a daily reminder of what the world’s most powerful military organization cannot accomplish. With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. (Britain and France, which each spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as in Afghanistan, where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have historically limited their participation in combat operations, while the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading in many European nations.

No impact to NATO collapse – alliances fail inevitably


Finally, the very nature of international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly
inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated. Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the week — just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit.

For the United States, the conclusions are simple. First, no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed. Second, NATO as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world, including with military force. Third, other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others. None of this justifies a call for NATO’s abolition. The alliance still includes members whose forces help police parts of Europe and who could contribute to stability in the Middle East. But it is no less true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. The answer for Americans is not to browbeat Europeans for this, but to accept it and adjust to it.
AT Oil Shocks

Empirically proven, no oil wars


We've heard the argument before: scarcity of future oil supplies is a danger to the global international system and will create international conflict, death and destruction. In 1982, noted historian and oil-policy guru Daniel Yergin wrote that the energy question was 'a question about the future of Western society', noting that 'stagnation and unemployment and depression tested democratic systems in the years between World War I and World War II' and asserting that if there wasn't sufficient oil to drive economic growth, the 'possibilities are unpleasant to contemplate'.

His words proved typical prose foreboding the top of a commodity cycle. A year later, oil prices began a four-year collapse to $12 a barrel. That oil is a cyclical industry is not in question. Since 1861, oil markets have experienced more than eight boom-and-bust cycles. In 1939, the US Department of the Interior announced that only 13 years of oil reserves remained in the United States. In more recent history, Middle East wars or revolutions produced oil price booms in 1956, 1973, 1979, 1990 and 2003. Each time, analysts rushed to warn of doomsday scenarios but markets responded and oil use was curtailed both by market forces and government intervention rather than by war and massive global instability. The question Nader Elhefnawy raises in 'The Impending Oil Shock' is whether this time will be different.

Adaptation empirically resolves supply problems resulting from Mid-East instability


Among those asking this tough question are two young professors, Eugene Gholz, at the University of Texas, and Daryl Press, at Dartmouth College. To find out what actually happens when the world’s petroleum supply is interrupted, the duo analyzed every major oil disruption since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that in almost all cases, the ensuing rise in prices, while sometimes steep, was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact. When there have been prolonged price rises, they found the cause to be panic on the part of oil purchasers rather than a supply shortage. When oil runs short, in other words, the market is usually adept at filling the gap. One striking example was the height of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. If anything was likely to produce an oil shock, it was this: two major Persian Gulf producers directly targeting each other’s oil facilities. And indeed, prices surged 25 percent in the first months of the conflict. But within 18 months of the war’s start they had fallen back to their prewar levels, and they stayed there, even though the fighting continued to rage for six more years. Surprisingly, during the 1984 “Tanker War” phase of that conflict — when Iraq tried to sink oil tankers carrying Iranian crude and Iran retaliated by targeting ships carrying oil from Iraq and its Persian Gulf allies — the price of oil continued to drop steadily. Gholz and Press found just one case after 1973 in which the market mechanisms failed: the 1979-1980 Iranian oil strike which followed the overthrow of the Shah, during which Saudi Arabia, perhaps hoping to appease Islamists within the country, also led OPEC to cut production, exacerbating the supply shortage. In their paper, Gholz and Press ultimately conclude that the market’s adaptive mechanisms function independently of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, and that they largely protect the American economy from being damaged by oil shocks. “To the extent that the United States faces a national security challenge related to Persian Gulf oil, it is not ‘how to protect the oil we need’ but ‘how to assure consumers that there is nothing to fear,’” the two write. “That is a thorny policy problem, but it does not require large military deployments and costly military operations.” There’s no denying the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the US economy. Although only 15 percent of imported US oil comes directly from the Persian Gulf, the region is responsible for nearly a third of the world’s production and the majority of its known reserves. But the oil market is also elastic: Many key producing countries have spare capacity, so if oil is cut off from one country, others tend to
Today, regions outside the Middle East, such as the west coast of Africa, make up an increasingly important share of worldwide production. Private companies also hold large stockpiles of oil to smooth over shortages — amounting to a few billion barrels in the United States alone — as does the US government, with 700 million barrels in its strategic petroleum reserve. And the market can largely work around shipping disruptions by using alternative routes; though they are more expensive, transportation costs account for only tiny fraction of the price of oil.

Reserves check instability shocks

Many countries maintain strategic petroleum stockpiles under the direct control of the government to ensure access to oil during supply shocks. For example, the United States holds approximately seven hundred million barrels of crude in strategic reserves; the International Energy Agency holds approximately four hundred million barrels, half as crude oil and half as refined product stocks. In East Asia, Japan, China, and South Korea hold large reserves. In other words, the United States and its closest allies control more than 1.4 billion barrels of ready-to-deploy oil. Consumer governments make the decision on whether to release this oil, and the first barrels could be auctioned and pumped into the market in a matter of days. Analysts often criticize these stockpiles too harshly. At first glance, these stocks appear woefully inadequate. For example, the United States consumes roughly nineteen million barrels of oil per day (mb/d), so a seven hundred million barrel reserve would last less than six weeks. Furthermore, the maximum flow rate of oil out of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is far lower than 19 mb/d. This criticism, however, misses the mark because there is no plausible scenario in which the United States petroleum reserve would have to replace all nineteen million barrels of oil the United States consumes. A better benchmark for these reserves would compare the size of the stockpile to the size of plausible disruptions. For example, the largest plausible disruption (after factoring in the other adaptations listed in this section) would leave the world 3 mb/d short, then the United States alone could replace every lost barrel for many months. The combined stockpiles of U.S. and allied governments could replace lost oil from most plausible disruptions, barrel-for-barrel, for well over a year. Governments that hold large strategic petroleum stockpiles try to avoid tapping them as a response to fluctuations in oil prices; their reserves can respond to temporary supply shocks but cannot change the long-term trends in global oil supply and demand. Government stockpiles were not an antidote to the high oil prices of 2007–08, nor will they insulate the global economy if commodity prices rise sharply when the global economy recovers from the current recession. But a fire, labor unrest, or a series of attacks on oil tankers reduces access to oil, governments can sell stocks to quickly add millions of barrels of oil to global markets.

No impact to Oil Shocks – newest empirical study proves

Khadduri, Former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, 8-23-11


What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?”, IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset [...] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally
A 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less. The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries].” In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy.
AT Terrorism – AQAP

AQAP poses no threat to the west - only does small-scale attacks

Riedel 11 – Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a professor at Georgetown University (Bruce, 08/01, “AQAP’s ‘Great Expectations’ for the Future,” http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqap%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98great- expectations%E2%80%99-for-the-future)

Strategy of a Thousand Cuts AQAP devoted the third issue of Inspire to the parcel bomb plot and to outlining its strategy for defeating the United States. It expanded beyond traditional al-Qa’ida strategic thinking. AQAP claims it now has a team of crafty bombmakers producing its wares that can supposedly get through the most sophisticated airport surveillance equipment in the world. It says its goal is to “hemorrhage” the U.S. economy by conducting waves of small-scale attacks similar to the parcel bombs (a “thousand cuts”) and the Christmas Day plot that forced security countermeasures. The cover proudly proclaimed that the parcel plot cost just $4,200 to execute. The Detroit operation has already produced expensive new security measures at airports from Amsterdam to Auckland. These new attacks are notable for their relatively small footprint. They are harder to defeat because they are less complex. Unlike the 9/11 plot or the 2006 failed attempt to blow up 10 airliners en route from London to North America, these efforts are conducted by a small number of people. Only a few participate in the planning and execution, and the plots went from concept to action in a few months. Abdulmutallab, for example, was recruited and trained for his mission in Shabwa Province only a few weeks before his attack.[6] The recent intelligence on AQAP’s attempts to acquire ricin fit within this strategy. According to U.S. officials cited in the New York Times, “evidence points to efforts to secretly concoct batches of the [ricin] poison, pack them around small explosives, and then try to explode them in contained spaces, like a shopping mall, an airport or a subway station.”[7] As part of this strategy, AQAP is using its propaganda message to inspire American Muslims to act on their own to attack targets on U.S. territory. Al-`Awlaqi says he encouraged Major Nidal Malik Hasan to conduct his carnage at Fort Hood in Texas on November 5, 2009, an attack that killed 13 people. More recently, another U.S. soldier of Palestinian descent, Naser Abdo, tried to carry out an attack at the same base.[8] The police found a copy of an article from Inspire in his possession.[9]
Public won’t demand retaliation


Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion.

Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents—hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.
AT Terrorism

Terrorism won’t go nuclear and they won’t be able to attack the US - several warrants

Mearsheimer 11, January, John J., Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.


The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely.

Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case. The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

Your evidence is all hype – there’s a 1 in 3.5 billion chance of a terrorist strike


There is an “almost vanishingly small” likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult — buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, police are going
to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult, but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 [and a half] 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat — noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said.

No motivation to use nukes

Roberts and Moodie 2 (Brad and Michael, Headed the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Served as Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs @ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, "Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy," Book)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal potential. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties—had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged—militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States—and much of the rest of the international community—to the annihilation of the perpetrators.
No risk of nuclear terror


Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated, among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly willing to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland’s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult,
dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered,” a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.” Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best. Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would easily be required to go through an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke” somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse. Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such
conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor. The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place around 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists were probably incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical or nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available ... rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he
says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires." Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely—indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls "a case for fear," Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are "not the most comforting." Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

Our statistics are for the most plausible scenarios—anything else is even less likely.

Mueller 8—John, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State, 1/1/
(http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHG0.PDF)

These odds are for the most plausible scenario by means of which a terrorist group might gain a bomb: constructing one from HEU obtained through illicit means. As noted, there are other routes to a bomb: stealing a fully constructed one (or the HEU needed to make one) or being given one as a gift by a nuclear state. However, as also noted, those routes are generally conceded, even by most alarmists, to be considerably less likely than the one outlined in Table 1 to be successful for the terrorists. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments—there is considerable agreement, for example, that Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were ten or fifteen years ago (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 257). Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

Couldn’t get the bomb in

Mueller 9—John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science 30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?”
http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf

The finished product could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant target country. The conspirators could take one of two approaches. Under one of these, they would trust their precious and laboriously-fabricated product to the tender mercies of the commercial transportation system, supplying something of a return address in the process, and hoping that transportation and policing agencies, alerted to the dangers by news of the purloined
uranium, would remain oblivious. Perhaps more plausibly, the **atomic terrorists would hire an aircraft or try to use established smuggling routes, an approach that, again, would require the completely reliable complicity of a considerable number of criminals**, none of whom develops cold feet or becomes attracted by bounteous reward money. And even if a sufficient number of reliable co-conspirators can be assembled and corrupted, there is still no guarantee their efforts will be successful. There is a key difference between smuggling drugs and smuggling an atomic weapon. **Those in the drug trade assume that**, although a fair portion of their material will be intercepted by authorities, the amount that does get through will be enough to supply them with a tidy profit. That may be tolerable for drug smugglers, but distinctly unsettling for terrorists seeking to smuggle in a single, large, and very expensively-obtained weapon. Regardless of how transported, the enormous package would have to be received within the target country by a group of collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The IND would then have to be moved over local roads by this crew to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. And, **finally, at the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off its improvised and untested nuclear device, one that, to repeat Allison’s description, would be “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.”** While doing this they would have to hope, and fervently pray, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there were no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, doesn’t prove to be a dud.
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Best studies prove democracy assistance solves civil conflict

Savun and Tirone 11 (Burcu Savun is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Daniel C. Tirone is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science,” Volume 55, Issue 2, pages 233–246, April 2011)

Scholars of intrastate conflict have shown that **credible commitment problems facilitate the outbreak of civil conflict** (e.g., Fearon 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Building upon this literature, we propose that **democracy aid can decrease the risk of conflict by mitigating the severity of commitment problems prevalent during the early phases of democratization**. **Democracy assistance programs help transitioning states not only strengthen their key political institutions** such as the legislature and judiciary **but also empower nonstate actors** such as civil society organizations. Functioning political institutions increase the central government’s ability to credibly signal its intentions to opposition groups and make future promises to the society. Similarly, using external electoral assistance programs to support democratic transitions provides additional credibility to the promises made by the state to the newly enfranchised domestic groups. Finally, the **empowered civil society organizations can monitor the state’s actions and thereby reduce the centralization of power and fears about state’s intentions**. Although it does not constitute as large a portion of the foreign aid budget of Western democracies as development aid, democracy aid is gaining in importance. For example, the amount the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has spent on democracy promotion programs has increased from $121 million to $722 million per year from 1990 to 2003 in constant 1995 U.S. dollars (Scott and Steele 2011). In this article, we investigate whether higher levels of external democracy aid can partially compensate for the instability created by democratic transition. The goal of this research is not to establish whether democracy aid is effective in increasing democratic governance. Recent work on democratization shows a mostly positive relationship between democracy aid and democratization (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010; Scott and Steele 2011; Wright 2009). **We are instead interested in whether the civil war propensity of democratizing countries that receive democracy aid is lower than that of countries that receive little or no aid.** In other words, our goal is to assess whether **democracy aid can provide political stability in a fragile environment**. The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature on democratization and civil conflict and develop an argument about how democracy aid can help democratizing countries reduce the risk of civil conflict. In the following section, we test our argument using the OECD’s governance and civil society promotion data between 1990 and 2003, including considerations for potential endogeneity problems in aid allocation. The findings provide strong and robust empirical support for our theoretical argument. Then, we briefly address some of the existing arguments against aid effectiveness and discuss how our research fits into this debate. We conclude by discussing our key argument, findings, and projecting avenues for future research. Democratization, Civil Conflict, and Democracy Aid The fact that democracies do not fight each other is one of the most well-established findings in international relations (e.g., Maoz and Abdolahi 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1998; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). It is safe to argue that no other empirical regularity identified by international relations scholars has found as much resonance within the policy community as the “democratic peace” proposition. The rise in democracy promotion efforts by the international community since the 1990s is a testament to this argument (Carothers 1999; Diamond 1995). Within this context, when Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 1997) proposed that democratization can be a violent process, it inevitably initiated a controversial debate in the literature. While several scholars lent support to Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis (Hegre et al. 2001), a number of others have been more critical of its validity, particularly on methodological grounds (e.g., Enterline 1996; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Goldsmith 2010; Narang and Nelson 2009; Vreeland 2008; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). Given the two competing positions, there is still no scholarly consensus on the subject. How does democratization increase the risk of conflict? Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society, and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics. More generally, democratization increases the risk of civil conflict by creating several credible commitment problems. First, the political elites have difficulty in trusting each other’s intentions and promises. During regime transitions, political actors “find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents” (Karl 1990, 6). The new and old political elites are wary of each other’s intentions and hence are unlikely to believe that any promises made or concessions given during the transition period will be honored once central authority is consolidated. The key problem is that the elites perceive each other as “conditional in their support for democracy and equivocal in their commitment to democratic rules of the game” (Burton, Gunther, and Higleye 1992, 31). The “equivocal commitment to democratic rules” increases the level of distrust and suspicion among the elites and thereby increases the risk of collapse of political rule. If a state includes multiple ethnic groups, another credible commitment problem is likely to arise between the elites and domestic ethnic groups during early phases of democratization.2 The weakening of state authority, combined with uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity that comes with democratization (Pridham 2000). This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, weak state authority, and rising nationalism. Weingast (1998) demonstrates that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. Institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other. Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence
based on fears of victimization is particularly low (Weingast 1998, 191). That is, it does not take much for the minority group to resort to violence out of fear during regime change. The extant literature on wars shows that minority groups are more likely to resort to violence if there is a risk of exploitation in the future and the commitments made by the state are not credible (Fearon 1998). We propose that democracy assistance programs can provide a potential constraining force on the risk of domestic political violence. That is, even if a state does not have strong institutions to manage the democratization process, democracy aid can provide an exogenous source of state strength, stability, and institutional credibility to smoothen the transition. Before discussing how democracy assistance programs can help reduce the risk of civil conflict in democratizing countries, we need to define democracy assistance and differentiate it from development aid. Our focus is on foreign aid given primarily for democracy promotion. According to Carothers, democracy promotion programs consist of “aid that is specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (1999, 6).3 For analytical purposes, we divide democracy assistance programs into three categories: (a) state institutions, (b) civil society, NGOs, and the media, and (c) electoral assistance. We discuss how by bolstering both state institutions and civil society, which supports both top-down and bottom-up democratization, democracy aid can lower the risk of domestic political violence during the early phases of regime transition. One of the central goals of democracy aid is to help transitioning states establish democratic governance. Aid programs are designed to assist democratizing states adopt key principles such as the decentralization of political power and increased transparency and accountability as they develop democratic institutions. By training state officials and providing necessary financial resources, democracy assistance programs can increase the legislature's capacity to shape and monitor policy and strengthen its oversight capacity in recipient countries. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) role during the Indonesian transition from Suharto’s regime to democracy in 1999 is a case in point. The end of Suharto’s regime unleashed religious, economic, and ethnic tensions in Indonesia with a potential to lead to a full-scale civil war. The Office of Transition Initiative (OTI), operated by the USAID, was instrumental in assisting the Indonesian government with the implementation of a series of democratic reforms. For example, as a part of decentralization of political power, the new Indonesian government enacted a series of laws that gave strong powers to local administrations across the country. This was an important step for reducing the concentration of power in the center and thereby alleviating minorities’ fear of exploitation in the future. In return for decentralization, local public officials were expected to be fully accountable to their constituents. Yet, being the first popularly elected local officials in Indonesia, these officials’ ability to run a transparent and efficient local government was of great concern for the public. The USAID’s assistance in training local officials and setting up procedures to improve accountability and efficiency at the local level was an important step in alleviating some of the concerns and distrust held by the Indonesian public about the new regime’s ability to govern fairly.4 Democracy aid can also contribute to democratic governance by strengthening a country’s judicial institutions and the rule of law. In authoritarian regimes, courts are usually treated as adjuncts to the regime in power. Therefore, in most democratizing states, judicial independence is limited and institutions have not yet developed the capacity to implement the existing law. Aid money can be used for legal reforms, administration of justice, training judges, helping write detailed constitutions, and providing resources to improve citizens’ access to justice. Strengthening the judiciary is important for political stability as a strong judiciary implies the rule of law and increased legitimacy of the state. Increased legitimacy in turn improves a state’s credibility in the eyes of the society. Support for political parties is another essential component of democracy assistance programs. Strengthening political parties has been a major component of the aid programs extended by the Western European countries (Carothers 1999). Political parties, especially the inclusive ones, impose a structure to the chaotic political process during the transition period by aggregating interests into broader governing coalitions and bridging social cleavages. By doing so, they help decrease uncertainty about intentions and actions of key political actors. Political parties also help with commitment problems as it is easier to negotiate and strike successful bargains among well-defined parties than individuals. In sum, by contributing to the establishment of democratic governance in transitioning states, democracy aid can improve a state’s legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the public. Democratic opening is a major component of the aid programs extended by the Western European countries (Carothers 1999). Political parties, especially the inclusive ones, impose a structure to the chaotic political process during the transition period by aggregating interests into broader governing coalitions and bridging social cleavages. By doing so, they help decrease uncertainty about intentions and actions of key political actors. Political parties also help with commitment problems as it is easier to negotiate and strike successful bargains among well-defined parties than individuals. In sum, by contributing to the establishment of democratic governance in transitioning states, democracy aid can improve a state’s legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the public.
as a “validation” of promises that the new government makes, and thereby decrease the risk of domestic political violence, Carothers (1996) argues that even if democracy assistance programs fail to produce the desired effects in some countries, they still can be important in boosting the morale and commitment of the public in the early stages of the democratization process. Improving the public’s morale and commitment to the democratic principles during the democratization period may be critical for maintenance of domestic political stability as improved commitment to democracy is likely to decrease attacks on the new regime. Therefore, we hypothesize that: Higher levels of external democracy aid are less prone to civil wars than democratizing states that receive no or low levels of democracy aid, holding everything else constant. Research Design, Empirical Models, and Findings The sample for our study is composed of Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible countries between 1990 and 2003.6 There has been a steady increase in the number of democracy aid recipient countries over the years. While only 30 countries received OECD democracy aid in 1990, this number increased to 76 in 1995, and 134 countries received democracy aid in 2003. The unit of analysis is country-year.7 The main theoretical variable of interest is the level of democracy aid. The data for this variable come from the OECD’s categorization of aid as intended for “Government and Civil Society.” The OECD defines aid aimed at good governance as aid intended to enhance “the accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness of the official sector,” while aid for democratization “integrates participation and pluralism, including the right of opposition, into the political life of the country and provides a basis for legitimacy of the government” (OECD 2007, 118).8 Democracy aid also includes aid intended to increase the respect of human rights, gender equality, and participatory development, among other elements. Democracy Aid is measured as bilateral aid disbursements per 1,000 citizens from OECD members to recipients in constant 2005 USD.9 The dependent variable is Conflict Initiation, a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 for a given year if a domestic conflict with at least 25 battle deaths begins after at least two years without an initiation. We use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset for this variable (Gleditsch et al. 2002).10 We measure democratization as the change from year t-2 to year t in the 21-point Polity score from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Democratization is coded 1 if a country experiences a 3-point or more positive change in its Polity score during the previous two years, and 0 otherwise. This measure of democratization is similar to one used in other studies assessing effects of democratization (Morrow 1999; Smith 2004; Wright 2009). Given the conditional nature of our hypothesis, we construct an interaction of Democracy Aid and Democratization. Also included in the models are a set of factors shown to be robust predictors of civil war initiation (see Collier and Hoefler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Growth Real GDP per capita is a measure of per capita GDP growth, expressed as the percentage change in 2000 constant prices, while Real GDP per capita measures the real GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Population is the natural log of the recipient’s population (in thousands). Each of these variables is taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006). Democracy is the recipient country’s Polity score from the 21-point scale as a measure of the existing regime type. Larger values of Democracy indicate increased levels of democracy while smaller values show higher levels of autocracy. It is also important to account for the time dynamics in grouped duration data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). In order to capture temporal dynamics within our model, we utilize three cubic splines and a time-counter, Peace Years, which measures the period since the last conflict initiation. We also include a dummy measure, Conflict, Prior Year, indicating whether there was an active conflict in the prior year. The data for this measure are taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).11 Model 1 in Table 1 presents the result of our base logit estimation.12 In line with our expectations, the interaction of Democracy Aid * Democratization is negative, and the conditional coefficient of Democracy Aid and the interaction term is statistically significant.13 This suggests that democratizing states that receive higher levels of aid are less likely to experience conflict than those that receive less aid. Substantively, the conflict-dampening effect of every dollar of aid per thousand citizens is around 4%.14 This finding supports our hypothesis. We also find that democratization is conflict enhancing: democratizing states which do not receive democratization aid are over four times more likely to experience civil wars than nonaid recipients. Democracy Aid is itself statistically insignificant, indicating that democratization aid has no effect upon the likelihood of experiencing a conflict outside of democratization. Since our expectation of the effect of aid on conflict pertains to the democratization period, this is not a surprising finding. Of the controls, higher levels of economic development reduce the probability of an initiation, while countries with larger populations are more likely to experience conflict. Table 1. Logit Estimates of Civil War Onset, 1990–2003 Model 1 Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (one-tailed). Estimated with three cubic splines (not reported). Democracy Aid 0.00009 (0.00001) Democracy Aid * Democratization -0.042 (0.024) Democratization 1.48*** (0.55) Democracy -0.026 (0.028) Growth Real GDP per capita 0.006 (0.011) Real GDP per capita -0.00022*** (0.00007) Population (logged) 0.312*** -0.112 Conflict, Prior Year -0.356 (0.33) Peace Years 0.033 (0.115) Constant -4.75*** (1.06) N 1600 Pseudo Log-Likelihood –196.56 Akaike Information Criterion 419.11 One important issue researcher need to address when they estimate the effect of aid on conflict is the possibly endogenous process of aid allocation. If the presence or immediate threat of a conflict influences donors’ decision-making calculus regarding whom to give aid and how much to allocate, the model would be nonrecursive and potentially biased. This is of particular concern if donors anticipate the outbreak of conflict and adjust the aid allocation accordingly.15 If donors decrease aid to countries in which a conflict is thought to be imminent, aid would then go predominantly to countries at peace, and a pacifying effect of democratization aid may be a reflection of this selection. A priori, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that donors might actually increase the amount of aid flows to war-prone countries due to strategic considerations.16 Lagging aid flows may be a precautionary move against such endogenously generated, lagging aid may take on the character of reverse causality. However, as the aid is given in anticipation of conflict and not in response to conflict, it could be insufficient to deal with omitted variable bias as donors may adjust the level of aid they are willing to extend in anticipation of conflict in recipient countries (2009, 305). A more systematic way to deal with the endogenous process of aid allocation is the use of instrumental variables (IV) analysis. The basic intuition behind the IV approach is to estimate the endogenous variable, in our case the level of aid allocation, using an exogenous variable(s) that is (are) correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the dependent variable, in our case civil conflict onset, beyond its effect on the endogenous variable (Angrist and Krueger 2001; Angrist and Pischke 2009). For our IV analysis, we base our models on those adopted by other studies which analyze the effect of endogenous regressors (economic growth and aid allocations, respectively) on conflict.17 In line with these studies, we estimate the effect of democracy aid on conflict initiation using the Instrumental Variables Two-Stage Least Squares method (2SLS).18 The validity and reliability of IV estimation depend crucially upon the selection of the instruments. A good instrument needs to satisfy two important criteria: (a) it must be correlated with the endogenous variable; and (b) it must not have a direct causal effect upon the dependent variable (or by extension the error component of the estimation). These criteria imply that any changes in the dependent variable that may result from changes in the values of an instrument must be attributable to the endogenous variable and must be unrelated to the reciprocal relationship between the dependent variable and the endogenous variable. We use two instruments for Democracy Aid. First, following de Ree and Nillesen (2009), we use Donor GDP as an instrument of aid flows. Donor GDP measures a logged average of the annual GDP in millions of constant 2000 USD of three major OECD aid donors: the United States, France, and Sweden. These donors are selected given their representative nature of three different types of aid donors.19 The data for this measure are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Donor GDP is lagged two periods prior to the observations for Democracy Aid. We select this measure on the understanding that aid allocations should be related to the economic health of the donor; when the donors are experiencing economic growth, aid allocations should increase. However, when donor economies are slumping, aid allocations may diminish if more funds are diverted towards the domestic economy. The second desirable property of Donor GDP is that it is a priori exogenous to conflict initiation in the recipient country; it is difficult to identify a mechanism by which the economic performance of the donor countries could have a direct effect upon conflict initiation in the recipients, so any effect should be indirect and through donor aid allocations. Although Donor GDP is enough to identify the equation (that is, providing as many instruments as there are endogenous regressors), using it as the sole instrument is insufficient. Since Donor GDP will be the same for each recipient country in a given year, it will help explain differences in aid allocations between years but it will not explain variation within years and between recipients. Therefore, we also select a second instrument which varies according to the characteristics of the recipient to account for within-panel heterogeneity. For our second instrument we use Affinity with U.S., which measures the change in the annual Affinity measure generated by Gartzke and Jo (2002).20 Affinity calculates the similarity in two countries’ votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in a given year on a scale from -1 to 1, with higher values indicating greater similarities in member votes. We interpret Affinity as a measure of the similarity (or divergence) in the interests of the recipient state with the United States.21 Therefore, positive changes in Affinity with U.S. represent convergence in the states’ interests, while negative changes indicate movement towards −1, or increasing dissimilarity in the interests
of the two states. We use the recipient’s affinity with the United States for a number of reasons. The first is that the United States is one of the largest donors of democracy aid. Additionally, the external policy orientation should be sufficiently exogenous from domestic conflict initiation to satisfy the second criterion. Having identified our instruments, we implement IV-2SLS analysis in the following manner. First, we regress Democracy Aid on our instruments to ensure that instruments are not related to democracy aid. Model 2 in Table 2 presents the first-stage results of the IV-2SLS estimation. The results show that both instruments are significant predictors of the endogenous variable—Democracy Aid. To further assess whether the instruments satisfy the first criterion, we need to consider the F-test and the partial R2. For an instrument to be relevant, the F-statistic needs to be at least 10 and the partial R2 should be at least 0.10 (Shea 1997; Staiger and Stock 1997). In our model, the F-statistic is 25.62 (p < 0.01) and R2 is 0.13. Based on this F-statistic we can also reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002). Overall, the results indicate that the instruments satisfy the first criterion by showing covariation between the instruments and the endogenous variable.25 Table 2. Instrumental Variables Analysis Results Dependent Variable Model 2 IV-2SLS First Stage Democracy Aid Model 3 IV-2SLS Second Stage Conflict Initiation Model 4 IV-2SLS Instrumented Interaction Conflict Initiation All variables lagged one year unless otherwise noted. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses in Model 4. \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01 (two-tailed).

Democracy Aid
-0.000022** -0.000042*** (0.00001) (0.00002) Democracy Aid * Democratization -0.000083** (0.000344) Excluded Instruments Donor GDP 3990.7*** (564.22) Affinity with U.S. -326.08*** (113.86) Democratization -145.05 -0.001 0.013 (160.89) (0.018) (0.035) Democratization 20.78* -0.0004 0.002 (10.21) (0.0099) (0.003) Growth Real GDP per capita 2.05 0.002 -0.003 (3.69) (0.005) (0.006) Real GDP per capita -0.59*** -0.000034*** (0.0002) (0.000039) (0.000003) Population (logged) -25.48*** 0.004 0.026 (17.05)***(0.006) (0.08) Conflict, Prior Year -163.83* 0.003 -0.15*** (90.56) (0.017) (0.04) Constant -111965.73 0.029 -0.156 (16033.32) (0.053) (0.713) N 1474 1478 Number of Clusters 129 129 Second, we need to show that the instruments can be omitted from the second-stage estimation without inducing bias: i.e., the instrument should only affect the dependent variable (conflict) operating through the endogenous variable (democracy aid) as the key “channel” or “mechanism.” This is an intrinsically uncontrollable assumption. It is very hard to identify the exact mechanism through which the instrument is associated with the dependent variable (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sargent 2004). However, as stated above, we have theoretical grounds to believe that our instruments comply with the exclusion restriction, and the empirical results are also favorable. The Sargan-Hansen statistic, which adopts a null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.27 By failing to reject the null assumption of the test, we find evidence in support of our second criterion for instrumental variables. Taking the results of all three empirical tests of our criteria, we have joint evidence that our instruments perform adequately on each criterion and are satisfactory for our purposes. Model 3 presents the second-stage estimation of the impact of democracy aid on conflict. The second-stage regression uses instrumented values of Democracy Aid estimated in the first-stage model as a substitute for observed values of Democracy Aid in the second-stage. The resulting effect on the likelihood of conflict is that of the endogenous variable. The results of the above analysis suggest that the instrumented Democracy Aid satisfies the criteria for a good instrument. However, as our hypothesis directly addresses the conditional nature of the relationship between democracy aid and democratization, we also present an instrumented interaction term. Since our endogeneity concerns extend only to our measure of democracy aid, and we have already determined that we have a valid measure of this construct, we use this instrument to generate the interaction. We do this by estimating the first-stage equation as in Model 2, and then capturing the predicted value of Democracy Aid interacted with the instrument. The results show that democracy aid increases democratization. To estimate the instrumented interaction using fixed-effects ordinary least squares with bootstrapped standard errors.28 The second-stage results of this procedure are presented in Model 4. As in Model 1, the sign on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, in line with our hypothesis. That this result holds even controlling for potential endogeneity provides a stringent test of the hypothesis. Another advantage of our approach is that the second stage is estimated using fixed effects, controlling for unobserved qualities of the recipient countries which may also affect conflict propensity. We ran a series of additional tests to assess the robustness of the main results presented in Table 1.29 First, we excluded the U.S. portion of democracy aid to examine whether the United States may be unduly affecting our results. It does not. The results are also robust to the inclusion of official Development Assistance (ODA), a potential alternative source of revenue to the government during democratization. Then, we ran models with ethnic fractionalization, a series of regional dummies, and a population-averaged logit to alleviate concerns about omitted variable country bias. In each model the effect of democracy aid on civil war onset during democratization remains negative and statistically significant. The results also remain the same using a logged measure of democratization aid to ensure that potential skewness in the aid measure is not influencing the results. Finally, some have questioned the use of the Polity democracy scale in predicting the onset of civil conflict given that particular subcomponents of the Polity measure reflect domestic violence (Vreeland 2008).30 We address these concerns by estimating two new models using additional indicators of democracy: the Freedom House index of political rights and Vreeland’s (2008) measure of Polity, “popularity,” which omits the subcomponents linked with domestic conflict. The results of the estimates using these alternative democracy measures are supportive of our original findings. The robustness of the estimated effect to various measures of democracy gives us confidence that our results are not an artifact of Polity IV coding rules. What is the substantive effect of democracy aid on the risk of civil war? Figure 1 presents a graph of the predicted probability of conflict as a function of democratization aid within the sample conditional on the recipient state’s democracy status. From the estimates, we see that democratizing states, on average, face a higher risk of civil conflict than nontransiting states. However, the probability of conflict onset during democratization decreases as the amount of aid received increases. For example, countries at or above the 40th percentile of democratization aid within the sample have a risk of conflict initiation during democratization which is similar to that of a nondemocratizing country. Figure 1, therefore, suggests that the aid effect is substantively as well as statistically significant. Figure 1. Predicted Probability of a Conflict Onset During Democratization The data on aid effectiveness reflect the impact of democracy aid on democratization. To test evidence that democracy aid is a significant predictor of democratization in the recipient country (e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Knack 2001). The common argument against the effectiveness of aid is that aid reduces the government’s accountability by reducing its need for taxes. The assumption is that aid goes to the central government and decreases the government’s incentives to collect taxes (similar to oil-producing countries) and thereby reduces the government’s accountability to the public. However, this argument is not very applicable to our study for two reasons. First, most existing studies of foreign aid utilize the official Development Assistance (ODA) as a measure of aid. We argue that this is not a proper practice as it conflates the effect of democracy assistance programs with the effect of aid given for purposes other than democratization. Although the promotion of democracy may be a by-product of aid allocated for economic development, it is unfair to expect such aid to have a significant effect on democratization of the recipient country. Indeed, the recent revisionist work on aid efficacy shows that when democracy promotion aid is isolated from development aid, democracy aid increases democratization. Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson (2007), using democracy promotion assistance programs extended by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1990 and 1993, show that democracy assistance is a significant predictor of democratization in recipient countries. More recent empirical studies by Kalvitz and Vachha (2010) and Scott and Steele (2011) give additional credence to Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson’s (2007) finding: democratic aid flows are positively associated with a move towards democracy in recipient countries. The critics of foreign aid efficacy also assume that foreign aid always goes to the government of the recipient country. Although most of the development aid goes to the governments of the recipient countries, democracy assistance aid is usually disbursed to a variety of sectors in the recipient country (Crawford 2001; Scott and Steele 2005). For example, Crawford (2001) shows that in 1994 and 1995 an average of 54% of the European Union’s political aid programs were implemented by the recipient governments, and this percentage was only 5.1% for Swedish political aid (124). Similarly, Crawford reports that between 1992 and 1995, central and local governments were the main beneficiaries of 54% of the EU political aid. This number was 35.4% for Sweden and 55.7% for the United States, and 92.9% for the United Kingdom. On the other hand, civil society organizations, such as democracy groups and human right groups, were the main beneficiaries of 46% of the EU political aid, 64.6% of the Swedish aid, 44.3% of the U.S. aid, and 7.1% of the U.K. democracy aid programs (138). These figures indicate that, unlike development aid, the majority of democracy aid goes to nongovernment actors. In sum, our research can be considered as a part of the recent revisionist literature that challenges the dominant pessimistic view of the role of foreign aid. Recent cross-sectional studies of the aid effect are effective in achieving its goal of democratization. However, this article complements this new line of research by identifying an additional positive role that democracy aid can play in democratizing countries. We show that there is an additional benefit of democracy promotion programs—democracy aid decreases the risk of conflict. Therefore, aid effectiveness should be assessed with these important second-order effects of aid in mind. Conclusion The virtues of democratic regimes have been long praised in academic and policy circles alike. However,
the path to democracy may not be an easy one. Democratization is likely to increase the uncertainty domestic actors have regarding the intentions of others and thereby weaken the credibility of commitments made. In such environments, the risk of domestic political violence increases. We argue that democracy assistance programs can help democratizing countries cushion this risk by improving democratic governance and providing external validation of commitments and promises made during the transition. The empirical evidence is consistent with our argument: democratizing countries that receive high levels of democracy aid are less likely to experience civil conflict than those that receive little or no democracy aid. Unfortunately, the existing literature fails to consider such potential positive roles of democracy assistance programs. The main focus of the literature has been on the direct involvement of international and regional organizations in democratic transitions (e.g., Hawkins 2008; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2005). For example, Pevehouse (2005) suggests that external reassurances by regional organizations provide a crucial inducement during early phases of the regime transition (22). However, he acknowledges that it is not costless for regional organizations to undertake this task, and there are certain conditions under which regional organizations can make a difference. We argue that although democracy assistance programs may not be a perfect substitute for regional organizations, they can act as a complement or a less expensive alternative to the legitimization and validation functions of regional organizations in their efforts to smoothen the thorny aspects of the democratization process. Our findings also shed some light on the debate on the “dark side of democratization.” Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis has been rebutted on methodological grounds. However, there may also be theoretical reasons as to why democratization does not sometimes lead to war. For example, some democratizing countries receive external assistance while others do not. In this article, we provide evidence that the former group is less vulnerable to conflict than the latter as democracy aid helps these countries better address commitment problems during the early phases of democratization.
**Democracy = Peaceful**

Liberal democracy is statistically more peaceful than any alternative

Zakaria, Political Science – Harvard, editor – Newsweek, ‘97

(Fareed, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/other/democracy.html)

Lang’s embarrassment highlights two common, and often mistaken, assumptions -- that the forces of democracy are the forces of ethnic harmony and of peace. Neither is necessarily true. Mature liberal democracies can usually accommodate ethnic divisions without violence or terror and live in peace with other liberal democracies. But without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war. The spate of elections held immediately after the collapse of communism were won in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by nationalist separatists and resulted in the breakup of those countries. This was not in and of itself bad, since those countries had been bound together by force. But the rapid secessions, without guarantees, institutions, or political power for the many minorities living within the new countries, have caused spirals of rebellion, repression, and, in places like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, war. Elections require that politicians compete for peoples' votes, in societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilation, it is easiest to organize support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. Once an ethnic group is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic groups. Compromise seems impossible; one can bargain on material issues like housing, hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split the difference on a national religion? Political competition that is so divisive can rapidly degenerate into violence. Opposition movements, armed rebellions, and coups in Africa have often been directed against ethnically based regimes, many of which came to power through elections. Surveying the breakdown of African and Asian democracies in the 1960s, two scholars concluded that democracy "is simply not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences."

Recent studies, particularly of Africa and Central Asia, have confirmed this pessimism. A distinguished expert on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz, concluded, "In the face of this rather dismal account . . . of the concrete failures of democracy in divided societies . . . one is tempted to throw up one's hands. What is the point of holding elections if all they do in the end is to substitute a Bemba-dominated regime for a Nyanja regime in Zambia, the two equally narrow, or a southern regime for a northern one in Benin, neither incorporating the other half of the state?"

Over the past decade, one of the most spirited debates among scholars of international relations concerns the "democratic peace" -- the assertion that no two modern democracies have gone to war with each other. The debate raises interesting substantive questions (does the American Civil War count? do nuclear weapons better explain the peace?) and even the statistical findings have raised interesting dissent. (As the scholar David Sprio points out, given the small number of both democracies and wars over the last two hundred years, sheer chance might explain the absence of war between democracies. No member of his family has ever won the lottery, yet few offer explanations for this impressive correlation.) But even if the statistics are correct, what explains them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace, contended that in democracies, those who pay for wars -- that is, the public -- make the decisions, so they are understandably cautious. But that claim suggests that democracies are more pacific than other states. Actually they are more warlike, going to war more often and with greater intensity than most states. It is only with other democracies that the peace holds.

When divining the cause behind this correlation, one thing becomes clear: the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant believed that democracies were tyrannical, and he specifically excluded them from his conception of "republican" governments, which lived in a zone of peace. Republicanism, for Kant, meant a separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and some level of representation in government (though nothing close to universal suffrage). Kant’s other explanations for the "perpetual peace" between republics are all closely linked to their constitutional and liberal character: a mutual respect for the rights of each other's citizens, a system of checks and balances assuring that no single leader can drag his country into war, and classical liberal economic policies -- most importantly, free trade -- which create an interdependence that makes war costly and cooperation useful. Michael Doyle, th leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism, democracy itself has no peace-inducing qualities. Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argument offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities -- democracies -- should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For two thousand years before the modern age, popular rule was widely associated with aggressiveness (by
The decisive preference of [the] median voter might well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities. The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies sheds light on another striking statistical correlation. Political scientists Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield contend, using an impressive data set, that over the last 200 years democratizing states went to war significantly more often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hyper-nationalism and war-mongering. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed they must rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, which often drag countries into confrontation and war. Noteworthy examples range from Napoleon III’s France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan to those in today’s newspapers, like Armenia and Azerbaijan and Milosevic’s Serbia. The democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy.
NGO Assistance Good

NGO assistance builds civil society— independent of democratization

Fagan, 11
Adam Fagan, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, June 2011, EU assistance for civil society in Kosovo: a step too far for democracy promotion?, Democratization, Volume 18, Issue 3

The problem for many commentators is precisely this rather audacious conflation of democratic civil society with externally funded professional NGOs. Ottaway and Carothers contend that the NGOs favoured by foreign donors, including the EU, are ‘set up along the lines of advocacy NGOs in the United States…with designated management, full-time staff, an office, and a charter or statement of mission’. Such NGOs will engage government through US-style advocacy and lobbying, but will not themselves seek political office, nor necessarily become embroiled in local conflicts and campaign agendas; they will operate above the cut and thrust of party politics and above indigenous civil society networks, engaging with the latter only incidentally. What this essentially creates is a sense of donor-funded NGOs pursuing a lesser public interest role, committed to civic values rather than divisive party politics or the contentious politics of ‘local’ civil society. The function of such non-partisan organizations takes on additional resonance in post-conflict situations, in which NGOs act as a counterbalance to nationalist-ridden party politics. Whilst the roles played by NGOs in such contexts are legitimized by the international community in terms of ‘civil society’, these semi-professional organizations lack political legitimacy or authority, and act primarily as service providers in lieu of the market and the state and as distributors and conduits of emergency aid. However, this critique places too much emphasis on the participatory or ‘democratic’ deficit; it is also somewhat blind to the potential ‘behind the scenes’ roles that NGOs play in fermenting change and as conduits for new policy formation. The commentary is based on an unrealistic notion of what civil society and NGOs themselves can be expected to achieve, as well as being too dismissive of what scholars see as ‘apolitical’ activities. Although NGOs are often ostensibly involved in service provision and do not appear to operate in the fray of politics, their community development and education-related activities can help stimulate participation and trigger the emergence of coalitions for change. Thus, rather than judging NGOs solely in terms of their success in mobilizing citizens and directly challenging political elites, it is important to value what Petrova and Tarrow term their transactional activism, which they define as ‘the ties – enduring and temporary – among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions’. The extent to which NGOs are capable of interacting with state and other non-state actors in the formulation of new policies and the transformation of power is rarely subjected to significant analysis. Whilst the new embryonic NGOs may not be terribly successful in generating participation and mobilizing support in the short term, they may function as the nuclei of new epistemic communities, or sit at the epicentre of new pro-change coalitions, their often undisclosed agency in policy debates, however small and apparently insignificant, needs to be at least anticipated not least because it may ultimately be laying the foundations for civic participation and the legitimation of NGOs in the future.
Though the United States needs to be careful not to be the central protagonist or taint the organic movements of the Arab Spring thereby playing into Zawahiri’s narrative of the United States being the grand puppeteer it cannot sit idly by hoping that all works out for the best. With likely disillusionment on the horizon, the time to shape the reform is now. President Obama’s May speech certainly set forth the outlines for U.S. involvement and values and offered explicit and actionable measures to bolster the Egyptian and Tunisian economies, among other objectives. This, along with a follow-up commitment from the G8 economies for an initial pledge of at least $20 billion in assistance to Egypt and Tunisia, are important signals and steps, but they are not sufficient to sustain the type of reform needed. Absent in persistent attention, these measures will not suffice if the United States hopes to be an indispensable partner for Arab reformers and in so doing irrevocably diminish AQAM’s prospects in the Arab world. Achieving these objectives will require the fulfillment of our commitments, sustained focus, and, importantly, a society-wide effort to leverage the unique expertise and influence of private citizens, non-governmental organizations, and corporations. Admittedly, in many quarters, the United States has not been seen as a consistent or credible advocate for democracy in the Arab world. Its longstanding deals and relationships with autocratic regimes and the region’s monarchies cast shadows on the ideals of American democracy. This moment, however, provides an opportunity for a strategic adjustment and recalibration of perceptions. The principles of the Arab Spring rooted in individual liberties and the shedding of fear and oppression are fundamentally American principles for which the United States and its people are best suited to support and advocate. Importantly, this approach would help bring clarity to the broader U.S. policy toward the Arab Spring and the region. It would align with U.S. values and interests. Importantly, too, it would help answer the challenge from AQAM to define what happens next and would further ensure that the movement remains on its heels after the death of bin Laden. If the United States makes a significant effort to help the Arab Spring succeed in the long term, it will accelerate the defeat of AQAM and its ideology. Combined with the killing of bin Laden, this could mark the beginning of the end of the long war.
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Zero risk of intervention
David Mathieson, Associate Fellow at FRIDE. He holds a doctorate from the University of London, Richard Youngs, Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick, “Democracy Promotion and the European Left: Ambivalence Confused?”, December, working paper 29 at FRIDE.

The left needs to get beyond a line of ‘the US is imposing democracy by force, therefore we must retreat from democracy promotion’, President Bush can be criticised for many things but not (yet) for ‘imposing democracy by military force’. While the US has been routinely berated for seeking to ‘impose’ democracy in blanket fashion around the world, the notable shift has in fact been back towards protecting alliances with non-democratic states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China. The Bush administration has launched two military invasions, and neither of these had democracy promotion as their main objective, but rather as side effect. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Freedom House lists 49 countries in the world that still lack basic democratic rights; countries where there is (as of this writing) little evidence that the US has planned to invade in democracy’s name. Equally important, leftist analysts and politicians on the other (pro-Iraq invasion) side of the debate must also de-link their views on Iraq from the broader democracy agenda. A fixation with justifying the Iraq invasion from a progressive point of view is also in danger of obscuring a clearer vision on more proactive democracy promotion. This ‘democracy by force’ debate is a diversion. One analyst points out that this debate has dragged the European left into rallying forcefully behind the ‘imperialism’ judged to lie behind a small number of interventions, but to ignore the far larger number of cases around the world where the West has by its inaction and silence been complicit with autocracy. There is no prospect of a far-reaching ‘doctrine of democratic intervention’. Debate at the multilateral level has long settled on the view that an absence of democracy cannot in itself justify military intervention in a particular country. At least for the present, no state appears likely to challenge this. The morality of military intervention is of course a crucial issue for international ethics; but, the core business of democracy promotion is essentially about civilian strategies. It is here where the left must engage and have something more creative and productive to say. More than any other foreign policy issue of modern times, Iraq has split the European left. Some important points have been made, not least those around the validity of international law and the efficacy of using armies for regime change. But the debate has also been damaging and confused. When not actively disagreeing with each other some on the left have appeared simply to be talking at cross-purposes. Tony Blair’s speeches abound with references linking democracy with firmness whilst Zapatero constantly stresses the need for democracy through non-prescriptive dialogue. The European left risks regressing to an unsatisfactory binary distinction between ‘intervention’ and ‘doing nothing’ in non-democratic countries. Ironically, while it lambasts US military power, the left itself appears to have slid back towards a Westphalian view of international relations, reversing the evolution in its own internal debates during the 1990s.
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Democratic governments aren't particularly accountable to their constituency

Rosato 3 (Sebastian, PhD, Asst. Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Former Research Fellow at the International Security Program, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," Nov, American PoliSci Review Vol 97 No 4, Muse)

Each variant of the institutional logic rests on the claim that democratic institutions make leaders accountable to various groups that may, for one reason or another, oppose the use of force. I do not dispute this claim but, instead, question whether democratic leaders are more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Since we know that democracies do not fight one another and autocracies do fight one another, democrats must be more accountable than autocrats if a accountability is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies. On the other hand, if autocrats and democrats are equally accountable or autocrats are more accountable than democrats, then there are good reasons to believe that accountability does not exert the effect that democratic peace theorists have suggested.11 Following Goemans (2000a) I assume that a leader’s accountability is determined by the consequences as well as the probability of losing office for adopting an unpopular policy. This being the case, there is no a priori reason to believe that a leader who is likely to lose office for fighting a losing or costly war, but not likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed in the process, should feel more accountable for his policy choices than a leader who is unlikely to lose office but can expect to be punished severely in the unlikely event that he is in fact removed. Therefore, determining whether autocrats or democrats are more accountable and, consequently, more cautious about going to war rests on answering three questions: Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be removed from power? Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be punished severely? and Are democrats or autocrats more likely to be removed and/or punished for involvement in costly wars, regardless of the outcome? To answer these questions I have used a modified version of Goemans’s (2000b) dataset. Our analyses differ in one fundamental respect: While he counts the removal of leaders by foreign powers as examples of punishment, I do not. This decision is theoretically formed. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether leaders’ decisions for war are affected by their domestic accountability, that is, if there is something about the domestic structure of states that affects their chances of being punished. Punishment by foreign powers offers no evidence for or against the claim that democrats or dictators have a higher or lower expectation of being punished by their citizens for unpopular policies, and these cases are therefore excluded. I have also made two minor changes to the data that do not affect the results: I have added 19 wars that appear in the COW dataset but not in Goemans’s dataset and coded 11 regimes that Goemans excludes.12 The results appear in Table 4. Although democratic losers are two times more likely to be removed from power than autocratic losers, this evidence is not strong. This is because there are only four cases of democratic losers in the entire dataset, making it impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the likelihood that losing democrats will be removed. Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, for example, resigned early in the Vietnam War, but his resignation may have had more to do with the fact that he was in his seventies than the expectation of defeat in South East Asia a decade later. If this case is recoded, as it probably should be, democratic losers have only been removed from power 50% of the time and the distinction between democrats and autocrats is small. Losing autocrats are more likely to suffer severe punishment than their democratic counterparts. None of the four losing democrats was punished, whereas 29% of autocratic losers were imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Thus, while democratic and autocratic losers have similar chances of being removed from office, autocrats seem to be more likely to suffer severe punishment in addition to removal. The evidence from costly wars, regardless of whether the leader was on the winning or losing side, confirms these findings. Costly wars are defined as wars in which a state suffered one battle fatality per 2,000 population, as the United States did in World War I.13 Historically, autocrats have been more likely both to lose office and to be punished severely if they become involved in a costly war. Autocrats have been removed 35% of the time and punished 27% of the time, while democrats have only been removed 27% of the time and punished 7% of the time.
Democratization in one country won’t spillover regionally or globally

Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR Southeast Asia Fellow, 5/19/11, "The Great Democracy Meltdown,

But China and Russia are only part of the story. In many ways, the biggest culprits have actually been stable democracies. Consider the case of Myo, a Burmese publisher and activist who I met four years ago in a dingy noodle shop in Rangoon. The educated son of a relatively well-off Burmese family, he told me he had been working for a publishing company in Rangoon, but had to smuggle political messages into pieces he published in magazines that focused on safe topics like soccer or Burmese rap. “It’s kind of a game everyone here plays,” he explained, “but after a while it gets so tiring.”

When I next met Myo, it was in Thailand two years later. He’d finally grown weary of trying to get his writing past the censors and left for India, then for Thailand. “I’d heard that, before, India had been very welcoming to Burmese activists, particularly after 1988,” Myo said, referring to a period of anti-government rioting in Burma. At one time, Indian officials had assisted Burmese democracy activists, and India’s defense minister from 1998 to 2004 was George Fernandes, a prominent human rights advocate who even gave some Burmese exiles shelter in his family compound. By the time Myo came to India, however, Delhi had stopped criticizing the Burmese junta. Instead, it had reversed itself and was engaging the generals under a policy called “Look East.” When Than Shwe, the Burmese junta’s leader, paid a state visit to India, he was taken to the burial site of Mahatma Gandhi, a cruelly ironic juxtaposition that Amnesty International’s Burma specialist called “entirely unpalatable.” For Myo, India’s chilly new pragmatism was a shock. “I expected China to work with Burma,” he said, “But to see it from India, it was so much more disappointing.”

Like Myo, many Western officials had expected that stable developing-world democracies like India, Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and Turkey would emerge as powerful advocates for democracy and human rights abroad. But as they’ve gained power, these emerging democratic giants have acted more like cold-blooded realists. South Africa has for years tolerated Robert Mugabe’s brutal regime next door in Zimbabwe, and it even helped to block a U.N. resolution condemning the Burmese junta for human rights abuses. Brazil has cozied up to Iranian dictator Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and to local autocrats like Cuba’s Castros. When a prominent Cuban political prisoner named Orlando Zapata Tamayo held a hunger strike and eventually died, former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva seemed to ridicule Tamayo’s struggle, likening the activist to a criminal who was trying to gain publicity.

There are exceptions to this trend. Poland, for one, has used its influence to support reformers in other post-Soviet states like Belarus. But Poland is unusual, and by playing a limited—or hostile—role in international democracy promotion efforts, countries like South Africa or Brazil or Turkey have made it easier for autocratic leaders to paint democracy promotion as a Western phenomenon, and even to portray it as an illegal intervention.

Why have regional democratic powers opted for this course? It seems hard to believe that a country with, say, Brazil or South Africa’s experience of brutal tyranny could actively abet dictators in other nations. But it now appears that the notion of absolute sovereignty, promoted by authoritarian states like China, has resonated with these democratic governments. Many of these emerging democratic powers were leading members of the non-aligned movement during the cold war and weathered Western efforts to foment coups in their countries. Today, they feel extremely uncomfortable joining any international coalition that could undermine other nations’ sovereignty, even if potentially for good reason. And many of these countries, such as Turkey and Indonesia and India, may simply be eager to avoid criticism of their own internal human rights abuses.

No global transition—durable authoritarian states stop transitions

Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR Southeast Asia Fellow, 5/19/11, "The Great Democracy Meltdown,

Even as domestic politics in many developing nations has become less friendly to democratization, the international system has changed further weakening democratic hopes. The rising strength of authoritarian powers, principally China but also Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other states, has helped forestall democratization. Moscow and Beijing were clearly rattled by the “color revolutions” of the early and mid-2000s, and they developed a number of responses. First they tried to delegitimize the revolts by
arguing that they were not genuine popular movements but actually Western attempts at regime change. Then, in nations like Cambodia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, Moscow and Beijing intervened directly in attempts to reverse democratic gains. The Kremlin's youth group, Nashi, known for its aggressive tactics against democracy activists, launched branches in other Central Asian nations. In Kyrgyzstan, Russian advisers helped a series of leaders emulate the Kremlin's model of political control. In part because of this Russian influence, "[p]arliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been hobbled," according to the International Crisis Group. China and Russia even created new “NGOs” that were supposedly focused on democracy promotion. But these organizations actually offered expertise and funding to foreign leaders to help them forestall new color revolutions. In Ukraine, an organization called the “Russian Press Club,” run by an adviser to Putin, posed as an NGO and helped facilitate Russia's involvement in Ukrainian elections.
Democracy Doesn’t Solve War

Democracy doesn’t prevent the main threats to peace


Spencer R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and makes people far too sanguine about democracy’s ability to deliver the world’s greatest need today – peace. In reality, the main threat to world peace today is not war between two nation-states, but (1) nuclear arms proliferation; (2) terrorism; and (3) ethnic and religious conflict within states. As this paper was being written, India, the world’s largest democracy, appeared to be itching to start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than it has been for many years. The United States, the world’s leading democracy, is waging war in Afghanistan, which war relates to the second and third threats noted above – terrorism and ethnic/religious conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed – and why would they lie? – they struck at the United States on September 11th because of its democratically-induced interventions into ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world.

There’s no causality between democracy and lack of war - just correlation


The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the “democratic peace” theory is the essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The ‘democratic peace’ theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of other domestic factors such as political culture, degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations, the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies, strategic culture among others in decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the “democratic peace theory” lacks sensitivity to context and decisionmaking process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/ regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in decision-making unaccounted for. Consequently, although “democratic peace” theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the importance of “democracy” in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that “democratic peace” is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.

Popular sentiment empirically doesn’t prevent wars even in a democracy - multiple reasons

Rosato 3 (Sebastian, PhD, Asst. Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Former Research Fellow at the International Security Program, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” Nov, American PoliSci Review Vol 97 No 4, Muse)

Pacific public opinion does not appear to place a fundamental constraint on the willingness of democracies to go to war. If it did, then democracies would be more peaceful in their relations with all types of states, not just other democracies. However, instead of being more peaceful, on average democracies are just as likely to go to war as non-democracies (Farber and Gowa 1995). There are three reasons why publics are unlikely to constrain democratic war proneness. First, the costs of war typically fall on a small subset of the population that will likely be unwilling to protest government policy. Excluding the two World Wars, democratic fatalities in war have exceeded 0.1% of the population in only 6% of cases. In 60% of cases, losses represented less than 0.01% of the population or one in 10,000 people. Most democratic citizens, then, will never be
**personally affected** by war or know anyone affected by military conflict. Adding the many militarized disputes involving democracies strengthens this finding. Both the United States and Britain have suffered fewer than 100 battle casualties in approximately 97% of the militarized disputes in which they have been involved (Singer and Small 1994). Moreover, modern democracies have tended to have professional standing armies. Members of the military, then, join the armed forces voluntarily, accepting that they may die in the service of their country. This in turn means that their families and friends, that is, those who are most likely to suffer the costs of war, are unlikely to speak out against a government that chooses to go to war or are at least less likely to do so than are the families and friends of conscripts. In short, the general public has little at stake in most wars and those most likely to suffer the costs of war have few incentives to organize dissent. Second, any public aversion to incurring the costs of war may be overwhelmed by the effects of nationalism. In addition to the growth of democracy, one of the most striking features of the modern period is that people have come to identify themselves, above all, with the nation state. This identification has been so powerful that ordinary citizens have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to fight and die for the continued existence of their state and the security of their co-nationals. There are, then, good reasons to believe that if the national interest is thought to be at stake, as it is in most interstate conflicts, calculations of costs will not figure prominently in the public's decision process. Third, democratic leaders are as likely to lead as to follow public opinion. Since nationalism imbues people with a powerful spirit of self-sacrifice, it is actively cultivated by political elites in the knowledge that only highly motivated armies and productive societies will prevail in modern warfare (e.g., Posen 1993). Democratically elected leaders are likely to be well placed to cultivate nationalism, especially because their government's interests are often perceived as more representative and legitimate than authoritarian regimes. Any call to defend or spread "our way of life," for example, is likely to have a strong resonance in democratic polities, and indeed the historical record suggests that wars have of- ten given democratic leaders considerable freedom of action, allowing them to drum up nationalistic fervor, shape public opinion, and suppress dissent despite the obligation to allow free and open discussion. Events in the United States during both World Wars highlight the strength of nationalism and the ability of democratic elites to fan its flames. Kennedy (1980, 46) notes that during the First World War, President Wilson lacked "the disciplinary force of quick coming crisis or imminent peril of physical harm" but turned successfully to "the deliberate mobilization of emotions and ideas." At the same time his administration turned a blind eye to, or actively encouraged, the deliberate subversion of antiwar groups within the United States. The Roosevelt administration was equally successful at generating prowar sentiment during World War II. Early in the war the president spoke for the nation in asserting that the German firebombing of population centers had "shocked the conscience of humanity," and yet, remarkably, there was no sustained protest in the United States against the bombing of Japanese cities that killed almost a million civilians a few years later. This abrupt transformation, notes Dower (1986), was made possible by a massive propaganda campaign, con- doned by the political elite, describing the Japanese as subhuman and untrustworthy "others." In stark con- trast, America's allies were forgiven all their faults "Russian Communists were transformed into agrarian reformers, Stalin into Uncle Joe..." (Ambrose 1997, 150).

**Democratic peace theory is wrong - no causality**

Rosato 3 (Sebastian, PhD, Asst. Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Former Research Fellow at the International Security Program, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," Nov, American PoliSci Review Vol 97 No 4, Muse)

Democratic peace theory is probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace. In this paper I examine the causal logics that underpin the theory to determine whether they offer compelling explanations for the finding of mutual democratic pacifism. I find that they do not. Democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not trust or respect one another when their interests clash. Moreover, elected leaders are not especially accountable to the public or pacific interest groups. Democracies are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition does not guarantee that a democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve thereby avoiding conflict. Since his evidence suggests that the logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents, there are good reasons to believe that while there is certainly peace among democracies, it may not be caused by the democratic nature of those states.

**Empirics flow neg/aff - democracy does NOT prevent conflict or increase cooperation**

Rosato 3 (Sebastian, PhD, Asst. Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Former Research Fellow at the International Security Program, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," Nov, American PoliSci Review Vol 97 No 4, Muse)

The imperialism of Europe's great powers between 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal democracies have often waged war for reasons other than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values. Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies in the international system during this period, they were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset of extrastematic wars (Singer and Small 1994). Of these 66 wars, 33 were
"Imperial," fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were "colonial," waged against existing colonies. It is hard to justify the "imperial" wars in terms of self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy faced no immediate threat and conquered simply for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered non-European peoples in order to create buffer states against other empires or to establish control over them before another imperial power could move in. Thus Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order to create a buffer state against Russia, and France in- vaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation. Some commentators describe these wars as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of overseas wealth, thereby enhancing national power at the expense of other European powers. There are three reasons to dispute this assessment. First, these wars were often preventive rather than defensive. Russia had made no move to occupy Afghanistan and Italy had taken no action in Tunisia. A war designed to avert possible action in the future, but for which there is no current evidence, is not defensive. Second, there was frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could have offered non-European peoples military assistance in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive occupations were a product of competition between Britain and France, two liberal democracies that should have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if democratic peace theory is correct. A third set of cases includes wars waged directly against non-Europeans whose territory bordered the European empires. Because non-Europeans sometimes initiated these wars contemporaries tended to justify them as defensive wars of "pacification" to protect existing imperial possessions. Again, there are good reasons to doubt the claim that such wars were defensive. In the first place, non-Europeans often at- tacked to prevent further encroachment on their lands; it was they and not the Europeans that were fighting in self-defense. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the imperial powers often provoked the attacks or acted pre-emptively and exploited local instabilities as a pretext for imposing control on the peripheries of their empires (Table 1). Nor were any of the extrasytemic wars fought to prevent egregious abuses of human rights or with the express purpose of replacing autocratic rule with a more liberal alternative. The "colonial" wars, by defini- tion, were conflicts in which imperial powers sought to perpetuate or reimpose autocratic rule. The "imperial" wars simply replaced illiberal indigenous governmen with authoritarian rule. When imperial rule was not imposed directly, the European powers supported lo- cal elites but retained strict control over their actions, thereby underwriting unjust political systems and ef- fectively implementing external rule. In short, despite protestations that they were bearing the "white man's burden," there is little evidence that liberal states' use of force was motivated by respect for human rights or that imperial conquest enhanced the rights of non- Europeans. There are then, several examples of liberal states violating liberal norms in their conduct of foreign policy and therefore the claim that liberal states generally externalize their internal norms of conflict resolution is open to question. Proponents of the democratic peace have down- played the importance of these findings in three ways. First, they have restated their argument and claimed that democracies remain at peace because they trust and respect one another and fight nondemocracies be- cause they neither trust nor respect them. As Doyle (1997, 32) notes, "Extreme lack of public respect or trust is one of the major features that distinguishes re- lations between liberal and nonliberal societies from relations among liberal societies." According to this re- statement, we should not be surprised to observe Euro- pean democracies fighting non-Europeans and the nor- mative logic can therefore accommodate the imperial evidence. This alternative presentation of the logic is, however, ad hoc. A more satisfying logic, and the one put forward by most democratic peace theorists, is more complex: Democracies rarely fight each other because they trust and respect one another, and they are able to do so because they know that their democratic coun- terparts will act on the basis of democratic norms, that is, they will only fight in self-defense or to democra- tize others. The key to this logic is that democracies must reliably externalize democratic norms, if they do, then trust and respect will prevail; if they do not, then we cannot be confident that peace will obtain between them. The history of imperialism suggests that they do not and therefore casts doubt on the normative logic's explanatory power. Second, democratic peace theorists have claimed that Britain, France, and the United States were not sufficiently liberal in the period under review and thus cannot be expected to reliably externalize their internal norms (e.g., Rawls 1999, 53-54). If this claim is true, the normative logic cannot tell us a great deal about inter- national politics. Britain, France, and the United States are generally considered to be classic liberal democracies; if they cannot be expected to behave in a liberal fashion, then few, if any, states can. Finally, democratic peace theorists assert that they do not claim that liberal norms are the sole determinant of decisions for war; factors such as power and contiguity matter as well (e.g., Russett 1995). This defense would be convincing if I were claiming that liberal norms were not the only factors that went into decision making or that they were not as important in the decision making process as other factors. However, the claim made here is quite different: Liberal states have consistently violated liberal norms when deciding to go to war. It is not that liberal norms only matter a little; they have often made no difference at all. In sum, there are good reasons to believe that one of the normative logic's key causal mechanisms does not operate as advertised. Liberal democratic great powers have frequently violated liberal norms in their deci- sions for war, thereby casting doubt on the claim that democracies generally externalize their internal norms of conflict resolution.

Democracy promotion fails

Haass 5 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Former Director of Policy Planning for the State Department, Washington Post 1-24)
It is also difficult to spread democracy. It is one thing to oust a regime, quite another to put something better in its place. Prolonged occupation of the sort the United States carried out in Japan and West Germany after World War II is the only surefire way to build democratic institutions and instill democratic culture. But as Iraq demonstrates, the rise of modern nationalism and modern methods of resistance means that such opportunities will be rare, costly and uncertain to succeed, despite an investment of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Prospects for the democratic improvement of a society can prove even worse absent occupation. Those who rejoiced 25 years ago in the overthrow of the shah of Iran should reflect on the fact that unattractive regimes can be replaced by something far worse. We thus need to be measured in what pressures we place on such countries as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Here as elsewhere it is important to observe the Hippocratic oath and first do no harm. Time is a factor in another sense. There is no realistic way that democracy will arrive in either North Korea or Iran before nuclear weapons do. And even if "freedom" were somehow to come to Tehran, it is almost certain that free Iranians would be as enthusiastic as the mullahs are about possessing nuclear weapons owing to the political popularity of these weapons and their strategic rationale given Iran's neighborhood.
S’quo Solve

Squo Solves and No Brink: Democracy has expanded globally even without U.S. promotion and will continue

Mandelbaum 7 (Michael, Christian Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Democracy Without American Subtitle: The Spontaneous Spread of Freedom,” Foreign Affairs, September/October)

Yet the Failure of Washington’s democracy promotion has not meant the failure of democracy itself. To the contrary, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, this form of government enjoyed a remarkable rise. Once confined to a handful of wealthy countries, it became, in a short period of time, the most popular political system in the world. In 1900, only ten countries were democracies; by midcentury, the number had increased to 30, and 25 years later the count remained the same. By 2005, fully 119 of the world’s 190 countries had become democracies. The seemingly paradoxical combination of the failure of U.S. democracy promotion and the successful expansion of democracy raises several questions: Why have the deliberate efforts of the world’s most powerful country to export its form of government proved ineffective? Why and how has democracy enjoyed such extraordinary worldwide success despite the failure of these efforts? And what are the prospects for democracy in other key areas -- the Arab countries, Russia, and China -- where it is still not present? Answering these questions requires a proper understanding of the concept of democracy itself.

DEMOGRAPHIC GENEALOGY

What the world of the twenty-first century calls democracy is in fact the fusion of two distinct political traditions. One is liberty -- that is, individual freedom. The other is popular sovereignty: rule by the people. Popular sovereignty made its debut on the world stage with the French Revolution, whose architects asserted that the right to govern belonged not to hereditary monarchs, who had ruled in most places at most times since the beginning of recorded history, but rather to the people they governed. Liberty has a much longer pedigree, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome. It consists of a series of political zoning ordinances that fence off and thus protect sectors of social and civic life from government control. One of the oldest is the inviolability of private property. The oldest is the inviolability of private property. Religious liberty arose from the split in Christendom provoked by the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Political liberty emerged later than the other two forms but is the one to which twenty-first-century uses of the word "freedom" usually refer. It connotes the absence of government control of speech, assembly, and political participation. Well into the nineteenth century, the term "democracy" commonly referred to popular sovereignty alone, and a regime based on popular sovereignty was considered certain to suppress liberty. The rule of the people, it was believed, would lead to corruption, disorder, mob violence, and ultimately tyranny. In particular, it was widely thought that those without property would rise, oust the rulers from their thrones, and install a new group of rulers. When that did not happen, the leaders concluded that the cause of liberty had been lost. Liberty was not a right, but a thing whose acquisition required the exercise of political talent. Liberty was not a fundamental political value, but a means to the ends of personal and social morality. Liberty and freedom were often considered synonyms.

The key to understanding why this common view of liberty failed to take hold lies partly in the fact that liberty is a very highly abstract concept, and partly in the fact that the system of government in which it is possible for an individual to acquire liberty is not made of a single, obvious thing. It is, rather, a complex of institutions that must be present to make the idea of liberty concrete. The relevant unit of time for creating the social conditions conducive to liberty is not the lifetime of a single individual, but the lifetime of an entire generation. In the modern era, the key social institution that has made liberty possible is the market economy.

The market is both a political and a social institution. It is political because it is a form of government; it is social because it is a form of social organization. In the market, society is divided up into a large number of small communities, each of which has its own rules and laws. The market is a system of government because the market is a way of organizing society in which the decision to establish and operate economic enterprises is made by individuals and groups rather than by a central authority. The market is a social institution because it is a way of organizing society in which people can interact and exchange goods and services. The market is both political and social because it is both a form of government and a form of social organization.

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one that will not yield immediate results. Still, the rapid spread of democracy over the past three decades did exhibit a distinct association with free markets. Democracy came to the countries of southern Europe and Asia and to almost every country in Latin America after all of them had gained at least a generation's worth of experience, sometimes more, in operating market economies. Viewed in this light, however, promoting democracy indirectly by encouraging the spread of free markets might seem unnecessary. Countries generally need no urging to recast their economies along free-market lines. Today, virtually all countries have done so, for the sake of their own economic growth. So important and so widespread had the goal of economic growth become in the second half of the twentieth century that the capacity to foster it had emerged as a key test of the political legitimacy of all governments. And the history of the nineteenth century seemed to demonstrate conclusively that the market system of economic organization—and it alone—can deliver economic growth. The free market, in this account, acts as a kind of Trojan horse. Dictatorships embrace it to enhance their own power and legitimacy, but its workings ultimately undermine their rule. Indeed, this line of analysis would seem to suggest not only that a free market policy of deliberate market promotion is insufficient but that the ultimate triumph of democracy everywhere is assured through the universal voluntary adoption of free-market economic institutions and policies. That, however, is not the case. The continued spread of democracy in the twenty-first century is no more inevitable than it is impossible, as is demonstrated by the decidedly varying prospects for this form of government in three important places where it does not exist: the Arab world, Russia, and China. THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM The prospects for democracy in the Arab countries are poor. A number of features of Arab society and political life work against it. None is exclusive to the Middle East, but nowhere else are all of them present in such strength. One of them is oil. The largest reserves of readily accessible oil on the planet are located in the region. Countries that become wealthy through the extraction and sale of oil, often called petro-states, rarely conform to the political standards of modern democracy. These countries do not need the social institutions and individual skills that, transferred to the realm of politics, promote democracy. All that is required for them to become rich is the extraction and sale of oil, and a small number of people can do this. They do not even have to be citizens of the country itself. Furthermore, because the governments own the oil fields and collect all the petroleum export revenues, they tend to be large and powerful. In petro-states, the incentives for rulers to maintain control of the government are therefore unusually strong, as are the disincentives to relinquish power voluntarily. In these countries, the private economies, which elsewhere balance state power, tend to be small and weak, and civil society is underdeveloped. Finally, the nondemocratic governments of petro-states, particularly the monarchies of the Middle East, where oil is plentiful and populations are relatively small, use the wealth at their disposal to resist pressures for more democratic governance. In effect, they bribe the people they rule, persuading these citizens to forgo political liberty and the right to decide who governs them. Arab countries are also unlikely candidates for democracy because their populations are often sharply divided along tribal, ethnic, or religious lines. Where more than one tribal, ethnic, or religious group inhabits a sovereign state in appreciable numbers, democracy has proved difficult to establish. In a stable democracy, people must be willing to be part of the minority. But people will accept minority status only if they feel confident that the majority will respect their liberty. In countries composed of several groups, such confidence is not always present, and there is little reason to believe it exists in Arab countries. The evidence of its absence in Iraq is all too clear. For the purpose of developing democratic governments, Arab countries labor under yet another handicap. For much of their history, Arab Muslims saw themselves as engaged in an epic battle for global supremacy against the Christian West. The historical memory of that rivalry still resonates in the Arab Middle East today and fuels popular resentment of the West. This, in turn, casts a shadow over anything of Western origin, including the West’s dominant form of government. For this reason, liberty and free elections have less favorable reputations in the Arab Middle East than elsewhere. In view of all these obstacles, whatever else may be said about the Bush administration, in aiming its democracy promotion efforts at the Arab world it cannot be accused of picking an easy target. The prospects for democracy in Russia vs. the next two to three decades are brighter. Russia today has a government that does not respect liberty and was not chosen through free and fair elections. The absence of democracy is due to the fact that seven decades of communist rule left the country without the social, political, and economic foundations on which democratic government rests. But Russia today does not confront the obstacles that barred its path to democracy in the past. The communist political and economic systems have disappeared in Russia and will not be restored. Russia is also largely free of the historically powerful sense that the country had a cultural and political destiny different from those of other countries. Russia’s population no longer consists, as it did until the industrialization and urbanization of the communist era, largely of illiterate peasants and landless agricultural workers. Today, the average Russian is educated, and lives in a city—the kind of person who is eventually likely to find democracy appealing and dictatorship unacceptable. The revolutions in transportation and communication have made it far more difficult for Russia’s rulers to close the country off from the outside world. In particular, Russians today are far more aware of the ideas and institutions of the democracies of the world than they were during the centuries when absolute monarchies ruled the country and during the communist period. Finally, Russia in the twenty-first century faces far less danger of attack by a neighbor than did the former Soviet Union. Monarchs and commissars from the sixteenth century through most of the twentieth justified gathering and exercising unlimited power on the grounds that it was necessary to protect the country from its enemies. That rationale has now lost much of its force. A countervailing force must be set against these harbinger of a more democratic future for Russia, however. The country’s large reserves of energy resources threaten to tilt Russia in the direction of autocratic government. Post-Soviet Russia has the unhappy potential to become a petro-state. Russia’s democratic prospects may therefore be said to be, with only modest exaggeration, to be inextricably related to the price of oil. Of the nondemocratic countries in the world, the one where democracy’s prospects matter most is China—the world’s most populous country and one that is on course to have, at some point in the twenty-first century, the world’s largest economy. The outlook for democracy in China is uncertain. Beginning in the late 1970s, a series of reforms that brought many of the features of the free market to what had been a communist-style economy set in motion a remarkable quarter-century-long burst of double-digit annual economic growth. Although the core institution of a free-market economy, private property, has not been fully established in China, the galloping pace of economic growth has created a middle class. As a proportion of China’s huge population it is small, but its numbers are increasing rapidly. More and more Chinese live in cities, are well educated, and earn a living in ways that provide them with both a degree of independence on the job and sufficient income and leisure time for pursuits away from work. Along with the growth of the economy, the sorts of independent groups that make up civil society have proliferated in China. In 2005, 285,000 nongovernmental organizations were officially registered with the government—a tiny number for a country with a population of 1.3 billion—but estimates of the number of unofficial groups ran as high as eight million. Furthermore, twenty-first-century China emphatically fulfills one of the historical conditions for democracy: it is open to the world. Communist China’s founding leader, Mao Zedong, sought to wall China off from other countries. His successors have opened the country’s doors and welcomed what Mao tried to keep out. The dizzying change that a quarter century of economic reform and its consequences have brought to China has therefore installed, in a relatively short period of time, many of the building blocks of political democracy. As Chinese economic growth proceeds, as the ranks of the country’s middle class expand and civil society spreads, the pressure for democratic change is sure to increase. As it does, however, democracy advocates are just as certain to encounter formidable resistance from the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although it has abandoned the Maoist project of exerting control over every aspect of social and political life, the party remains determined to retain its monopoly on political power. It squelches any sign of organized political opposition to its rule and practices selective censorship. Explicit expressions of political dissent and any questioning of the role of the CCP are prohibited. Its efforts to retain power are not necessarily doomed to fail. The CCP has greater staying power than the ruling communist parties of Europe and the Soviet Union enjoyed before they were swept away in 1989 and 1991. Because it has presided over a far more successful economy than did its European and Soviet counterparts, the CCP can count on the tacit support of many Chinese who have no particular fondness for it and who do not necessarily believe it has the right to govern China in perpetuity without limits on its authority. Popular indulgence of communist rule in China has another source: the fear of something worse. Recurrent periods of violence scar China’s twentieth-century history. The Chinese people certainly wish to avoid further bouts of large-scale murder and destruction, and if the price of stability is the continuation of the dictatorial rule of the CCP, they may reckon that this is a price worth paying. The millions who have done particularly well in the quarter century of reform—many of them educated, cosmopolitan, and living in the cities of the country’s coastal provinces—have reason to be wary of the resentment of the many more, mainly rural, residents of inland China whose well-being the economic boom has failed to enhance. The Chinese people may well be more forgiving, better educated, and more assimilated with the rest of the world, and they want to avoid the danger that the CCP’s rule may one day lose its legitimacy. The Chinese people are not necessarily eager to embrace democracy, but their desire for freedom and for economic growth is so strong that it is likely to demand attention sooner or later. The outlook for democratic change in Russia and China sets the scale for assessing the prospects for democracy in the rest of the world. United States. The other is that pressure for democratic governance will grow in the twenty-first century whatever the United States does or does not do. It will grow wherever nondemocratic governments adopt the free-market system of economic organization. Such regimes will adopt this system as part of their own efforts to promote economic growth, a goal that governments all over the world will be pursuing for as far into the future as the eye can see.
Trade-Off (Link to Some DA)

The foreign assistance budget is zero-sum- plan forces a tradeoff

Sessions ‘6 (Myra Sessions, Center for Global Development program coordinator, 2006, "The PMI Turns One – How Will We Measure Success?," Center for Global Development, blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2006/07/the-pmi-turns-one-how-will-we.php)

Thanks for the comment and question, Michael. I have not done the analysis of the data to see if the PMI is having a negative impact on the funding levels of other health initiatives– and given all of the other changes in the US foreign assistance budget I am not sure it would ever be possible to isolate the impact of the PMI. However, during a recent CGD event, Congressman Kolbe talked at length about the future challenges in maintaining foreign assistance funding levels in light of increasing domestic federal expenditures. Mark Lippert, the Director of Foreign Policy for Senator Barak Obama also touched on this key issue at an April CGD event about the future of MCA. The message from each of these speakers was that funding levels for any particular initiative or priority should be looked at in the broader context– and that the appropriations process is essentially a zero-sum game full of trade-offs. In today’s tight budget climate, I think that there is no doubt that funding for the PMI and other new initiatives will detract from real or potential funding for other areas of the foreign aid budget – and that that reality should be a part of the conversation about the successes and opportunities of the initiatives.
Defense

Democracy assistance can’t overcome historical divide – policy irrelevant.


Most Muslims also blame the West for their economic ills, even though their own economically oppressive governments are the root of the problem. America’s support of Israel is a huge negative in their eyes, but so, too, is our support for the regimes that rule over them. This may be understandable, but I doubt that a wholesale U.S. condemnation of regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Arab states would make Muslim publics any less anti-American. After all, the U.S. actually went to war to remove genocidal regimes in Bosnia and Iraq, and all we got for our trouble was widespread condemnation in the Muslim world, not to mention assertions that we did so mainly to kill Muslims. Here’s the rub: The U.S. can try to do the right thing like removing genocidal regimes and abandoning oppressive authoritarians such as former Egyptian President Hosn Mubarak, but it does little or nothing to change Muslim views of America. Muslims claim to want more democracy, of which America is the standard bearer, but their anti-American complexes and grievances are so huge that they are forever trying to find some third Muslim way that ignores hundreds of years of historical experience, born mainly in the West, of what works and what doesn’t. This is not about who’s right or wrong. We can argue with Muslim nations all day long about our support for Israel, but it won’t make any difference. In fact, Israel could disappear tomorrow, and we would still have a problem. The root of the problem is a great historical divide, going back centuries, which will not be easily manipulated by public diplomacy programs or expressions of good will. This is a problem to be managed, not solved. No amount of Obama-like engagement will change Muslim public opinion about America and the West. They hold their views for historically complex reasons, which more often than not are reflections of their internal problems rather than objective reactions to what we do.

High expectations doom solvency.


There is a likely explanation for such a severe reaction. Most Arabs had few illusions about U.S. foreign policy toward their region under George W. Bush — or for that matter, under most of his predecessors. But Obama’s initial rhetoric suggested that this time, there might be a real change in Washington’s approach. The plummeting ratings in the new Zogby poll probably reflect dashed hopes. It is a very normal human reaction to regard a hypocritical adversary with even greater loathing than an adversary who makes no pretensions. In that respect, the Arab reaction toward Obama’s performance mirrors the reaction of Americans who thought that his foreign policy — and perhaps even his domestic economic policy — would be an improvement on the Bush years. Disillusioned supporters who have watched as Obama has dramatically escalated the ill-advised war in Afghanistan, continued to seek ways to prolong U.S. military presence in Iraq and persisted in lavishing money on the Pentagon, can empathize with Arabs who had hoped for better policies coming out of Washington. So, too, can Americans who held out at least faint hopes that Obama might be a new kind of Democrat — one who took the need for fiscal responsibilty seriously.

Leakage of funds from government aid kills effectiveness

Desai, 10
Official aid is perceived to have low transaction costs because it operates at large scale. But official aid travels a long route, with costs at each stage. The first stage is the cost of tax collection when money is transferred from individuals to the treasury. In this stage, costs consist of the direct administrative costs of tax collection as well as deadweight losses from taxation. These costs can be substantial. In the second stage, official donor agencies transfer funds to recipient country governments to support specific development projects and programs. The administrative costs of these agencies have averaged between 4 to 5 percent, according to statistics reported by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The third stage involves costs associated with transferring the money from the recipient government to final beneficiaries through project implementation. Administrative costs of the project, corruption, and other leakages mean that only about half the funds actually reach their stated end purpose. In all, transaction costs on official aid could amount to 60 percent or more. Private aid, particularly internet-based, offers a more direct connection between donors and recipients and potentially reduces transaction costs. At both GlobalGiving or Kiva, the flow of funds route is short: money goes from an individual to the online platform, where it is pooled and transferred to a financial or project intermediary in a recipient country, which then disburses to the final beneficiaries. The long route of passing through government bureaucracies is avoided.

And, government aid bureaucracy destroys innovation

Carothers, 9

USAID’s basic operating procedures—a term used here as shorthand for the rules, regulations, and procedures that underpin the agency’s programming—are a major cause of the lamentable patterns of inflexibility, cumbersomeness, lack of innovation, and mechanical application that hobble much of its democracy and governance work. These basic operating procedures are a study in dysfunctional bureaucratization. Some career professionals at the agency liken them to an enormous accumulation of barnacles on the hull of a ship. They are attached one by one over the years by Congress or the agency itself in response to some particular incident or concern, but then they are never removed or rationalized over time, and the accumulated mass threatens to eventually sink the ship. These basic operating procedures are much more intrusive and constraining than just “normal” government bureaucracy. They reflect years of trying to spend billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars on assistance programs carried out in difficult foreign contexts under the constant fear that even a scrap of evidence that any money has been misspent will trigger howls of righteous protest in Congress. Over time this pressure produces an institutional culture of paralyzing risk avoidance, leading to ponderous controls and deadening requirements, as well as the pervasive mistrust noted above between the agency and the recipients of its funding. The highly problematic nature of USAID’s basic operating procedures manifests itself at every stage of programming. The work involved in preparing requests for proposals or requests for
assistance and then negotiating and finalizing contracts or grants is extremely burdensome. It greatly slows the development of new programs, encourages the use of cookie-cutter approaches that have already paved a path through the procurement jungle, and limits the number and range of organizations that compete for and take part in the assistance programs. The procedures relating to the implementation of programs are similarly troublesome. USAID’s implementing partners reserve some of their harshest criticism for this part of the assistance process. They describe the role of USAID officers overseeing their programs as often being petty, unhelpful micromanagement in service of a thicket of regulatory and procedural complexities that make even simple actions like hiring a short-term consultant or arranging a training seminar, slow and difficult. They lament that basic elements of the implementation process make it a struggle to be nimble, to innovate as learning occurs, or to adapt easily when basic circumstances change.

Compliance conflicts make government-based democracy assistance ineffective
Natsios, 10
(Prof of Diplomacy and Government-Georgetown and former administrator of USAID, Center for Global Development, “The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development”, July)

The Counter-bureaucracy
One of the little understood, but most powerful and disruptive tensions in established aid agencies lies in the clash between the compliance side of aid programs and the technical, program side. The essential balance between these two tensions in development programs—accountability and control versus good development practice—has now been skewed to such a degree in the U.S. aid system (and in the World Bank as well) that the imbalance threatens program integrity. The regulatory pressures in Washington created a force of auditors, accountants, lawyers, and procurement and contracts officers whose job it is to make sure the aid program is managed: (1) in accordance with federal law and regulation—principally the 450-page Foreign Assistance Act, a volume of OMB management circulars, and the 1977 pages of Federal Acquisition Regulations; (2) to produce rapid, measureable program success tracked through quantitative performance indicators usually based on U.S. domestic models of program management or of private industry; and (3) to follow good federal management and accounting practices as demanded by law and regulation. The compliance officers often clash with the technical program specialists over attempts to measure and account for everything and avoid risk. These technical program specialists are experts in the major sector disciplines of development: international health, agriculture, economic (both macro and micro) growth, humanitarian relief, environment, infrastructure, and education. Undertaking development work in poor countries with weak institutions involves a high degree of uncertainty and risk, and aid agencies are under constant scrutiny by policy makers and bureaucratic regulatory bodies to design systems and measures to reduce that risk. In practice, this means compromising good development practices such as local ownership, a focus on institution building, decentralized decisionmaking and long-term program planning horizons to assure sustainability in order to reduce risk, improve efficiency (at least as it is defined by federal administrative practice), and ensure proper recordkeeping and documentation for every transaction. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, over several decades, the compliance side of U.S. government aid programs has grown at the expense of the technical, program side. This has happened as a result of four factors. First, the size of the career USAID staff has declined over three decades, stabilizing after 9/11 (and only beginning to rise slowly again in 2005), even as spending more than doubled since 9/11. Second, is the emergence of what Georgetown professor, William Gormley, has called the —counter-bureaucracy—a set of U.S. government agencies charged with command and control of the federal bureaucracy through a
set of budgeting, oversight, accountability, and measurement systems that have grown over several decades to a massive degree, with extraordinary layer upon layer of procedural and compliance requirements. Third, the counter-bureaucracy has become infected with a very bad case of Obsessive Measurement Disorder (OMD), an intellectual dysfunction rooted in the notion that counting everything in government programs (or private industry and increasingly some foundations) will produce better policy choices and improved management. Fourth, demands of the oversight committees of Congress for ever more information, more control systems, and more reports have diverted professional USAID (and now MCC) staff from program work to data collection and reporting requirements. The counter-bureaucracy ignores a central principle of development theory—that those development programs that are most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are the least measurable. This brings us to a central question: what is it that USAID does in its programs that is considered transformational? USAID's humanitarian and development work may be broadly broken into three categories: (1) the delivery of goods and services (e.g., distributing food aid and humanitarian assistance after a disaster, doing immunizations, distributing bed nets to control malaria, building of schools and roads), often through USAID partner contractors, universities, and nongovernmental organizations, (2) the building of local self-sustaining institutions—government, private sector, and nonprofit—through the training of staff, construction of business systems, and development of regular organizational procedures and institutional cultures, and (3) policy dialogue and reform, which means an ongoing discussion and debate about reform and policy changes, between development professionals in USAID missions, in the field, and with cabinet ministers, heads of state, local NGOs and civil society leaders, parliamentarians, and business leaders. The first of these missions—service delivery—includes outcomes that can be counted and seen and that are under the control of the USAID program implementers, while the latter two missions often are neither easily measured nor very visible, and require a long time horizon to achieve success; more important, they require the cooperation and consent of the power structure and leadership in the developing countries, which makes their outcomes more problematic and unpredictable. (A USAID-funded NGO can do a mass immunization of children successfully, but providing funding, training, and equipment to a local health ministry to do the same thing will usually have a more problematic outcome). For that reason, those latter two functions are increasingly underfunded and neglected, yet they are the most important in the long run, as they are more transformational and more central to what development—and state building—is all about. The counter-bureaucracy, dominated by civil servants trained in schools of public administration and business management, employs the measurements and program standards of U.S. domestic government agencies, foundations, and private industry and misapplies them to development programs in poor countries. Nothing could be further from good development theory and practice. When the Federal Highway Administration funds and oversees a highway building project, it uses the managerial standards of domestic transportation departments to judge whether the project was managed properly. When GM or Ford builds a car, it uses assembly-line processes developed over the past century. The purpose of these efforts is the building of a highway or assembly of a car. Development, on the other hand, is at its root an effort to build or strengthen institutions (public, private profit-making, and nonprofit civil society) in poor and fragile states, with the ultimate goal of developing a capable state, market economy, and civil society that can manage public services, design good policies, create jobs, and protect human rights and the rule of law on a reliable, sustainable basis after the aid program is over and funding ends. All construction or service delivery projects should be subordinate to the larger institution-building task. The counter-bureaucracy, with its elaborate control mechanisms, misunderstands this central development doctrine and thus misapplies a domestic management lens to aid programs by turning the means into an end. The demands of the counter-bureaucracy are now so intrusive that they have distorted, misdirected, and disfigured USAID's development practice to such a degree that it is compromising U.S. national security objectives and challenging established principles of good development practice. This regulatory apparatus has created an incentive structure that has led to an emphasis on process over program substance and, in so doing, has produced a perverse bureaucratic result: as the career staff has declined in size absolutely and proportionately to the size of the aid budget, the compliance side of aid has taken over management and decision making at the agency. When the agency does not comply with the commands of the counter- bureaucracies, it faces stiff penalties, but there is no legal or regulatory consequence if agency staff do not regularly interact with government officials, civil society organizations, and the business people in developing countries about political, economic, and social policy reform — i.e., the central practices of development work. The newest addition to the counter-bureaucracy—the State Department's Office of the Director of
Foreign Assistance—is making matters worse, creating an even more dysfunctional set of incentives that are compromising the integrity of aid programs by the demand for metrics for every program and through the laborious and time-consuming annual process of each USAID mission writing an Annual Operating Plan. The question remains whether under sustained pressure from the counter-bureaucracy and the Congress, USAID is now spending as much money on oversight and control as on implementation of the aid program itself. What is more, the staff time needed to comply with all of these paperwork requirements has crowded out any remaining available time for the actual implementation of programs in the field offices. A point can be reached when compliance becomes counterproductive. I believe we are well past that point. What happened, why it happened, and how it happened is a disturbing, but also fascinating, story of good intentions—accountability and transparency—gone bad. The consequences of these counter-bureaucratic trends explain a great deal about why USAID business systems are designed as they are. But, before we get to the story of compliance and bureaucracy —gone bad, we need a framework for our analysis. The source for that framework comes from the work of political scientist and scholar on public administration practice in U.S. state and national governments—and my former professor—James Q. Wilson.
Offense (Policy-y)

The US is toxic – any group that accepts assistance becomes discredited.

So it may come as a surprise to learn that neither President Obama nor Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has even uttered the word democracy in a manner related to democracy promotion since taking office more than two months ago. The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has put out 30 public releases, so far, and not one of them has discussed democracy promotion. Democracy, it seems, is banished from the Obama administration’s public vocabulary. “They’re trying to recalibrate,” said Kenneth Wollack, president of the National Democratic Institute, one of those government-funded organizations. And no wonder. By now, everyone knows that former President George W. Bush despoiled the word. Right now it is toxic. Much of the world still believes that when the United States talks about democracy promotion, its intent is to impose it, as in Iraq. As Bush put it, his mission was to “end tyranny in the world” and replace it with democracies. Didn’t that tell dozens of leaders worldwide that Bush’s aim was to drive them from office? No wonder this policy caused so much acrimony. Last week, Obama abandoned Bush’s lofty goal of imposing a Western-style democracy on Afghanistan and instead said America’s mission was simply to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban. That’s all. Bush is gone, but the damage he caused remains. Vice President Joe Biden, speaking in Europe a few weeks ago, offered one of the very few references to democracy promotion to be heard from any Obama administration official, and it was principally a rebuke. “Our administration,” he said, “will advance democracy not through the imposition of force from the outside, but by working with moderates in government and civil society to build those institutions that will protect that freedom.” An obscure German study of democracy promotion in Morocco, a monarchy, tells the story behind Biden’s remark. Almost alone among the Arab states, Morocco’s leaders voiced enthusiasm for Bush’s Middle East democracy initiative while offering little that would temper the absolute authority of the Moroccan king. The German study, published late last year, found that “contrary to popular expectations, there has been no popular backlash against democracy promotion in Morocco to date,” adding: “All Moroccan actors, from Islamists to feminists, are involved in some form of international collaboration.” At the same time, however, the study found a blanket “refusal to cooperate with the U.S. government” on democracy promotion. One Moroccan NGO leader told the researchers: “It is indeed a poisoned chalice for serious NGOs that think they serve a good cause by accepting American aid, but then end up losing their souls and becoming discredited.” Doesn’t that sound like making a pact with the devil? The researchers completed that study just before Obama took office. But Lorne Craner, head of the International Republican Institute, another government-funded democracy-promotion agency, said that even today, “overseas it is tougher. If I could trade for the anonymity we had in the ’90s,” before Bush took office, “I would do it in a minute.” And Craner was a Bush administration assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor until 2004. Craner’s group conducts public-opinion surveys on democracy-related issues in numerous countries, and then presents government leaders with the findings. But even this relatively benign strategy is viewed with deep suspicion. Moroccans of all political persuasions, quoted in the study, called the studies unprofessional. Even the political party that was shown to be most popular in one of the polls said it was harmful, politically, and urged the institute not to do any more polling. Finally, the Moroccan government, saying it was concerned about “American meddling in Moroccan affairs,” proposed a law to curtail political polling. In the Middle East, particularly, memories are long. Just think about Iran’s retort to Obama’s public overture for better relations last month. Iran cited grievances stretching back half a century. For democracy promotion, the United States will wear the stench of the Bush strategy for many years.

Turn- US demo assistance efforts empirically result backlash- turns case
Bandow, Cato Institute Senior Fellow, 2-25-11

Chaos in Cairo’s streets wrecked Hosni Mubarak’s presidency in Egypt. The collapse of any dictatorship should please Americans. Several other Middle Eastern leaders may soon follow him into history’s dustbin. However, the process in Egypt and elsewhere has only started. The most difficult question for any revolution is how any it ends. Tragically, revolts against repressive regimes often lead to even greater tyranny. Washington was little more than an interested bystander in Egypt. Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said, “Neither the protesters nor the government are relying on signals from the United States.” But the U.S. has no good options in such cases.Long identified with dictators, Washington now must separate itself from repressive regimes. Attempting to
promote particular individuals or factions is likely to be counterproductive, however. Having chosen wrong for so long, U.S. officials are unlikely to choose right this time. More important, the U.S. government has no credibility with democracy demonstrators. In Lebanon Druze leader Walid Jumblatt recently joined with Hezbollah to oust the government backed by Washington. He observed: “Why should we follow American advice in the name of democracy? They have nothing to teach us when they have supported dictators.” At the same time, Washington fears losing key allies. Potential Republican presidential candidate Michael Huckabee even criticized the Obama administration for doing too little to support Mubarak. Although much ink has been spilled on the geopolitical importance of such authoritarian allies, they matter far less today than during the Cold War. Oil producers will want to sell their only valuable export in any case. Even potentially radical groups like the Muslim Brotherhood would be unlikely to support attacks on the U.S., given the certainty of retaliation. Some Americans worry about Israel, but it is a regional superpower able to defend itself. Thus, while adapting to fast-moving events in the Middle East, the Obama administration should not attempt to micro-manage politics in foreign nations. Americans should support democracy and a liberal society in the best sense of the word. But U.S. officials should not work to bolster or oust even authoritarian governments. Washington has a long history of supporting foreign thugs to advance perceived geopolitical interests. Sometimes horrible choices must be made, such as allying with Joseph Stalin against Adolf Hitler. In most cases, however, the interests being advanced are not worth the moral price of underwriting brutal repression. For instance, former Reagan official Daniel Oliver declared: “however great the interest of the Egyptian people in their own freedom and human rights, it is eclipsed, even if they don’t realize it, by the national security interest of the United States.” It is hard to imagine what cause short of national survival could warrant Americans seeking to keep the Egyptian people in chains for the benefit of America. And such a policy would ensure enduring hostility, since the Egyptian people are unlikely to view their “freedom and human rights” as mere incidentals to be tossed aside at Washington’s behest. Even when the U.S. government is successful in temporarily buying authoritarian friends, it inevitably makes enemies, many of whom have long memories. When such regimes ultimately collapse, as in Iran, the results are not pretty. Attempting to forcibly reform, or even overthrow, repressive regimes seems more satisfying morally. But the outcome is not necessarily more positive. It is far easier to blow up a society than put it back together. In Iraq at least 200,000 civilian likely have died after America’s ill-considered invasion. In 2006 the U.S. government pressed for elections in the Palestinian territories, which propelled Hamas to power in the Gaza Strip. Washington then refused to recognize the result, adding hypocrisy to stupidity. Abrupt changes of regime are more likely to result in violence and repression. While Washington should not oppose democratic movements even if they seem less likely to promote its geopolitical interests, the U.S. government should not actively spur revolution. American policymakers simply don’t know how to get there or even where “there” is. The world in which Washington can simply tell everyone else what to do is illusory. Even in pushing for the liberal ideal American officials risk doing more harm than good. Better for the U.S. government to advocate respect for human rights and democracy and then shut up. The less said by Washington about what the U.S. government desires, the better. People in Egypt and across the Middle East deserve liberation. Americans and other people of goodwill should promote the principles of liberty and national cultures in which those principles are most likely to ultimately flourish. But the U.S. government should recognize its limited ability to influence events, and even more important, to do so positively.
Offense (Kritik-y)

Promoting democratic peace necessitates war against those who choose to exist outside the Western liberal order

Ivie 2005 – Professor and Chair in the Department of Communication and Culture at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana (Robert L., Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 6-7)

A third affiliated point of tension locates democracy at the intersection of war and peace. Consistent with the fear of foreign contamination and a determination to control domestic distemper, the quest to achieve a universal peace is motivated by a desire to expand the domain of liberal democracy in order contain the forces of disorder and curtail chaos within an ever-diminishing perimeter. The truism that democracies do not fight one another has become a commonplace of scholarship and public discourse alike and the centerpiece of a national security policy driven by the attitude that democracy is too frail to survive alien influences. The very pursuit of a perfect peace through global democratization belies an abiding uncertainty and deep suspicion of democracy that in turn, provides an enduring and powerful incentive for war, so much so that Americans typically do not even notice the oxymoronic conceit of fighting for a democratic peace. This festering conundrum of pacific belligerence extends to a fourth point of tension in the republic of fear. America’s democratic appetite for war and corresponding inclination toward a politics of quiescence and coercion were intensified by the tragic events of 9/11, which spurred the nation to declare an open-ended war on international terrorism. As that vague but invasive state of hostilities expanded to various foreign and domestic fronts, it brought with it an evolving presumption of preemptive and perpetual war. A nation of reluctant belligerents who historically proclaimed themselves predisposed to peace no longer placed the principal burden of proof on those who advocated for war. The United States, it was now broadly presumed, was merely engaging in one battle after another in a seamless war on terrorism when it invaded Iraq, for example, not committing acts of aggression. Preemptive wars and curtailments of civil liberties were merely tactical requirements in an overall strategy to defeat terrorists who had initiated hostilities with their unprovoked attack on the twin towers of Manhattan and the Pentagon. The administration’s rigid and simplistic rhetoric of evil profiled the enemy crudely but powerfully in a manner that entangled the United States even more dreadfully in a theater of reciprocal and escalating violence perpetrated against civilians for political purposes and proving once again the gruesome validity of Nietzsche’s observation that “every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures”: “The good man’ sees himself as if surrounded by evil, and under the continual onslaught of evil his eye grows keener, he discovers evil in all his dreams and desires; and so he ends, quite reasonably, by considering nature evil, mankind corrupt, goodness an act of grace (that is, as impossible for man). In summa: he denies life, he grasps that when good is the supreme value it condemns life.”? Reciprocal demonizing spurred each side to participate in an escalating dance of death. By this logic, Americans were expected to fight for the hollowed-out symbols of freedom and democracy while succumbing to the righteous, even crusading, will of the administration and disregarding the underlying causes of terrorism.

Democracy assistance is a façade – it allows the US and its Western allies to coerce impoverished countries into the neoliberal order – the result is destabilization, war, and repression of true democracy.


While the uprisings spreading across the Arab world have surprised many observers, the same could not be said for the American foreign policy and strategic establishment. A popular backlash against American-supported dictatorships and repressive regimes has been anticipated for a number of years, with arch-hawk geopolitical strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski articulating a broad conception of a ‘Global Political Awakening’ taking place, in which the masses of the world (predominantly the educated, exploited and impoverished youth of the ‘Third
have become acutely aware of their subjugation, inequality, exploitation and oppression. This ‘Awakening’ is largely driven by the revolution in information, technology and communication, including radio, television, but most especially the Internet and social media. Brzezinski had accurately identified this ‘Awakening’ as the greatest threat to elite interests regionally, but also internationally, with America sitting on top of the global hierarchy. This spurred on the development of an American strategy in the Arab world, modeled on similar strategies pursued in recent decades in other parts of the world, in promoting “democratization,” by developing close contacts with ‘civil society’ organizations, opposition leaders, media sources, and student organizations. The aim is not to promote an organic Arab democracy ‘of the people, and for the people,’ but rather to promote an evolutionary “democratization” in which the old despots of American strategic support are removed in favour of a neoliberal democratic system, in which the outward visible institutions of democracy are present (multi-party elections, private media, parliaments, constitutions, active civil society, etc); yet, the power-holders within that domestic political system remain subservient to U.S. economic and strategic interests, continuing to follow the dictates of the IMF and World Bank, supporting America’s military hegemony in the region, and “opening up” the Arab economies to be “integrated” into the world economy. Thus, “democratization” becomes an incredibly valuable strategy for maintaining hegemony; a modern re-hash of “Let them eat cake!” Give the people the ‘image’ of democracy and establish and maintain a co-dependent relationship with the new elite. Thus, democracy for the people becomes an exercise in futility, where people’s ‘participation’ becomes about voting between rival factions of elites, who all ultimately follow the orders of Washington. This strategy also has its benefit for the maintenance of American power in the region. While dictators have their uses in geopolitical strategy, they can often become too independent of the imperial power and seek to determine the course of their country separate from U.S. interests, and are subsequently much more challenging to remove from power (i.e., Saddam Hussein). With a “democratized” system, changing ruling parties and leaders becomes much easier, by simply calling elections and supporting opposition parties. Bringing down a dictator is always a more precarious situation than “changing the guard” in a liberal democratic system. However, again, the situation in the Arab world is still more complicated than this brief overview, and American strategic concerns must take other potentialities into consideration. While American strategists were well aware of the growing threat to stability in the region, and the rising discontent among the majority of the population, the strategies tended to identify the aim as “democratization” through evolution, not revolution. In this sense, the uprisings across the Arab world pose a major strategic challenge for America. While ties have been made with civil society and other organizations, they haven’t all necessarily had the ability to be firmly entrenched, organized and mobilized. In short, it would appear that America was perhaps unprepared for uprisings to take place this soon. The sheer scale and rapid growth of the protests and uprisings makes the situation all the more complicated, since they are not dealing with one nation alone, but rather an entire region (arguably one of, if not the most strategically important region in the world), and yet they must assess and engage the situation on a country-by-country basis. One danger arises in a repeat in the Arab world of the trends advanced in Latin America over the past decade: namely, the growth of populist democracy. The protests have brought together a wide array of society – civil society, students, the poor, Islamists, opposition leaders, etc. – and so America, with ties to many of these sectors (overtly and covertly), must now make many choices in regards of who to support. Another incredibly important factor to take into consideration is military intervention. America has firmly established ties with the militaries in this region, and it appears evident that America is influencing military actions in Tunisia. Often, the reflex position of imperial power is to support the military, facilitate a coup, or employ repression. Again, this strategy would be determined on a country-by-country basis. With a popular uprising, military oppression will have the likely effect of exacerbating popular discontent and resistance, so strategic use of military influence is required. This also leaves us with the potential for the ‘Yemen option’: war and destabilization. While presenting its own potential for negative repercussions (namely, in instigating a much larger and more radical uprising), engaging in overt or covert warfare, destabilizing countries or regions, is not taboo in American strategic circles. In fact, this is the strategy that has been deployed in Yemen since the emergence of the Southern Movement in 2007, a liberation movement seeking secession from the U.S.-supported dictatorship. Shortly
after the emergence of the Southern Movement, al-Qaeda appeared in Yemen, prompting U.S. military intervention. The Yemeni military, armed, trained and funded by the United States, has been using its military might to attempt to crush the Southern Movement as well as a rebel movement in the North. In short, the ‘Arab Awakening’ presents possibly the greatest strategic challenge to American hegemony in decades. The likely result will be a congruence of multiple simultaneously employed strategies including: “democratization,” oppression, military intervention and destabilization. Again, it could be a mistake to assume one strategy for the whole region, but rather to assess it on a country-by-country basis, based upon continuing developments and progress in the ‘Awakening’.
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Civil Society Aid is Counterproductive – focus on short term project, undermines local agenda and support, distorts civil society, narrowly targets least influential groups, ignores coalition building, provides bad advice


Aid for prodemocracy groups often suffered from the opposite problem: too much informality. This assistance was typically for short-term, one-off projects, with little follow-up. Across the board, the evaluation of civil society projects was superficial, rarely getting past the question of how many activities were completed to probe the deeper issue of whether the assistance contributed to political change. Many civil society assistance programs were also overly instrumental. That is, the United States often looked upon NGOs as instruments to advance its own agenda. The result was that too often civil society assistance was designed around an American agenda of what issues NGOs should focus on and how. Financially strapped NGOs usually try to be responsive to such donor agendas in the hope of receiving funding, even when the recommended activities do not have much local resonance. This phenomenon is evident in the large numbers of Arab NGOs working on the environment and on women’s issues, recent donor favorites, as well as in the launching of advocacy campaigns by service NGOs that have never before undertaken such activities. The line between donors’ useful suggestion of new ideas and the imposition of an external agenda is a fine one. When the latter takes over, the result is programs that undermine the concept of civil society as a sphere where indigenous citizen groups pursue causes and activities of their own choosing. The second and larger problem was the fact that civil society aid was based on a flawed vision of civil society, its weaknesses, and its role in democratization. The U.S. conception of civil society equated the sectors it considered politically acceptable—service NGOs and certain prodemocracy groups—with civil society writ large. This had the effect of targeting assistance to the groups with the least political influence or the shallowest roots in the community and thus placing unrealistic expectations on them. In adopting such a narrow definition of civil society, assistance providers lacked a full understanding of how these groups fit into the broader sphere of civil society, and why some citizens were more drawn to other forms of associative life. Narrowly targeted aid also missed the opportunity to help groups develop links to and build coalitions across sectors. Assistance providers also misdiagnosed the reasons for civil society organizations’ weaknesses as agents of democratic change. Too often, NGOs’ lack of political influence was attributed mainly to their lack of professionalism—often meaning the ways in which they differed from Western NGOs. Many NGOs do suffer from poor financial management and undemocratic internal practices, and many influential American NGOs are well managed. But there is no proven direct link between stellar accounting procedures and staff management and influence as an agent of democratic change in an authoritarian setting. More often, civil society groups derive political influence from charismatic leadership, activities and messages that appeal to a broad audience, deep community support, and the ability to mobilize diverse followers around their cause. As was explained above, service NGOs were unlikely to become the vanguard of democratic change or lead governments to relax political controls on civil society regardless of these groups’ professionalism; prodemocracy groups struggled with the problem of isolation as much as they faced management challenges.

Empirics prove the aff is overly optimistic – civil society aid fails.

Contrary to these optimistic predictions, civil society groups have not made a real dent in the Arab world’s surprisingly durable authoritarianism. Many civil society groups manage to survive and sometimes even become rather active within the limited space regimes have granted them. But they have not been able to expand this space much or to affect the political game more broadly. The growth in the number of civil society organization has not led to democratization. In fact, this proliferation is better understood as a product of top-down liberalization than as a cause of it. Several factors have contributed to civil society’s weakness as a democratizing force. State repression is perhaps the most obvious one. Although Arab regimes may be poor performers in many respects, they have been unusually successful in maintaining control and quashing dissent. 11 As was described above, some governments simply outlaw independent civic activity altogether; and others permit it but impose severe restrictions. These include allowing registered NGOs, professional syndicates, Islamic organizations, and other groups to undertake only “social welfare” or “cultural” work and forbidding “political activities.” They regularly intervene in labor and syndicates’ activities. 12 They require that NGOs’ charters, boards of directors, and meetings be approved by government officials, who can send a representative to any activity. All funding must be approved by the government. Across the region, ministries of the interior investigate NGOs’ staffs and reject applications for registration on security grounds. 13 In Gaza, for instance, civil society organizations seeking to register must submit the life histories of their founding members to the Palestinian Ministry of the Interior. 14 In Jordan, all NGO volunteers must be vetted by the security services. 15 Many groups prefer to register and submit to these controls because without legal status, they are even more vulnerable to the whims of the state. 16 Regimes also skillfully use emergency laws, harassment by security forces, and arrests to isolate those who cross the line of “unacceptable” civic activity and to deter others who are contemplating it. Another obvious factor is political culture. The level of independent civic participation across the Arab world remains extremely low. Most civil society organizations attract only a very small percentage of the population; truly active membership is even less. For example, the membership of most unions and professional associations, though numbering in the millions because many professions require people to join, is often dormant. Not only have decades of authoritarian rule bred widespread political apathy, but throughout the Arab world social, economic, and political life still revolves to a remarkable degree around the bonds of family, clan, or tribe. Thus a critical mass of voluntary citizen activity extending beyond these primary relationships—of the sort that would begin to shift political weight from the realm of state control to that of society and thus contribute to democratization—has yet to develop.

Studies prove plan trades off with progressive movements, parties and volunteerism—plan spurs perception of partisanship and solidifies emerging public backlash—Rising xenophobia and media spin ensure net direction of link is negative - and plan makes it far worse – public is just starting to sign up


Although this exaggerates the situation, given the public and monitored nature of the civil society organizations in Egypt, there are, of course, justified arguments for monitoring and scrutinizing the foreign aid for civil society organisations and its local impact and seeing it as a form of neo-colonialism. In Palestine, for example, research has found that Western funding in the fields of democracy and human rights has actually harmed these issues and politically marginalized the progressive grassroots movements and parties that represent these issues. Furthermore, the huge wave of foreign funding for the Palestinian Authority and the civil society has eliminated the spirit of voluntary work and thus the basic foundation for an effective struggle for freedom and independence. Civil society leaders in Egypt have reacted to the accusations and investigations with indignation, claiming that they are aiming to tarnish Egyptian civil society’s reputation. Furthermore they have argued that this propaganda against a certain part of civil society aims to divert the people’s attention
away from pressing issues that have been brought to the forefront by civil society institutions, like the campaign for the national minimum wage, the ongoing subjugation of civilians to military trials, and the regime’s intimidation and violation of protesters’ human rights as was the case by subjecting female protesters to virginity tests and other protesters to torture and severe beating. Delegitimizing progressive movements Political movements have not been immune to these accusations of foreign subordination. On 23 July 2011, the SCAF, in its 69th statement, accused the April 6 Youth Movement[7] of receiving foreign donations and of driving a wedge between the people and the Armed Forces. More accusations have been made by Armed Forces figures like Major General Hassan Al Ruwein, Head of the Central Military Command of Egypt to the April 6 Movement and to the Kefaya (Enough) Movement for Change[8] whereby he accused them of treason and “accepting foreign funds”. These accusations have been refused by all political movements, especially because they are made by the SCAF, as the Egyptian government itself is the receiver of the second largest amount of annual military aid from the United States after Israel[9]. It is worth noting that these two political movements have had a very important role in helping ignite the spark of the revolution. But although the discussion about foreign funding has remained superficial until now, there are many who push interesting questions. What is a bigger threat to Egypt’s national security: the USA to the Egyptian military that ties it to US interests or the Western funding to Egyptian civil society? If we have such an intrusive law governing NGOs and lengthy, unpractical procedures, how can you blame NGOs for trying to find other means to survive and work? The foreign funding of Islamist parties and their civil society organizations has not been part of the debate. Will they also be monitored now? As the regime has been trying in the past years to co-opt the fields of advocacy and human rights, it has created organizations working in the field which take a large proportion of the foreign funding[10]. Will these semi-governmental institutions also be subjected to monitoring? Why should international relations be monopolized by a government? Shouldn’t civil society’s relations with the outside world be seen in a more balanced light, with its pros and cons? The danger in the current debate is that there are no distinctions made by different sources and agencies of funding and no attention given to Gulf countries’ funding to Egypt, despite the fact that it might also have harmful effects. More importantly, the Egyptian community with all the changes that are taking place, due to the instability of the transitional period and all the rising xenophobia and the media’s stories on alleged spies is also starting to sign up for this view of the NGOs as “rich affiliates to foreign interests”.

US Civil society assistance funds business NGOs to support “good governance” – they use influence advantage to weaken wages and labor protections

Carothers 99. [Thomas, Vice President for Global Policy and Co-Director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project @ the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Formerly a Legal Adviser @ the US Department of State, an International Affairs Fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, and Guest Scholar @ the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve]

As NGO development proceeds in some transitional countries, NGOs representing business interests are clearly becoming more powerful relative to public interest NGOs. The most effective part of the NGO sector in Romania is the growing set of NGOs that represent businesses, such as the National Council of Small and Medium Enterprises. Unlike the public interest NGOs, these groups have their own domestic sources of funding (membership dues from businesses), a pool of talented, organized, energetic people to carry out their work, and above all, advocacy methods with teeth, such as member businesses pressuring the government on an issue by refusing to pay their taxes. Similarly, in Zambia, the NGOs that have most influence on government policy and the legislative process are not the human rights and democracy NGOs but the National Association of Manufacturers and other business groups. In some countries, USAID supports business NGOs as part of civil society programs, in the hope that they will become advocates of anticorruption, governmental reform, and rule-of-law development. The advocacy agenda of business groups in transitional societies is, however, concentrating instead on measures specifically favorable to business, such as a low minimum wage, weak environmental laws, and minimal labor rights.

Weaken political parties –human and resource tradeoff, image erosion, uniquely true when parties are already weak


But where political parties generally are weak—where not only are they indistinguishable on the basis of policy, but also where party organization tends to exist primarily to mobilize voters at elections and defections by leaders and members are frequent—choosing the best DG strategy and set of tactics is much more difficult. There is in a sense no organization to open up in weak party systems. Political parties are temporary vehicles for ambitious individuals. Understandably, where there is little or no interest in reform within such party systems, where the timeframe for obtaining results is relatively short, and where civil society is vibrant, DG programs may, understandably, focus on civil society. The question to raise here is not how much support each sector deserves under these circumstances, or even how best one can spark reform in weak party systems. It is, when political parties and the party system are weak, and a
decision has been made to support CSOs, how can we avoid further weakening the party system? At the macro level, we face a potential imbalance in the direction of civil society. Donor emphasis on civil society may exacerbate a drain of human and other resources away from political parties, and further erode the image of political parties. How do we address the issue of CSOs potentially constituting a replacement for political parties? This should not be a long-term goal if you accept the liberal democratic argument outlined above that political parties and CSOs perform different roles. But is it an acceptable outcome in the short- to medium-term, if party reform is a distant prospect? How can we moderate the risk of “replacement,” given an opportunity to expand representation and participation and effect policy change through CSOs?

Can’t Build liberal parties or electoral support


The problem for the civil-society promoters is that, unlike White, they are not prepared to limit their claims as to what civil society can achieve, and so they are drawn into the analytical trap of attempting to include too many of these subdivisions within their notion of civil society. This leads to definitional inconsistency. For the purpose of dislodging an authoritarian regime, for instance, USAID is willing to stretch its definition of civil society to include virtually any mass organisation that can bring pressure to bear on the government. This even encompasses “first-tier associations” -- that is, those of “a more ascriptive nature (kin, clan, ethnic, or religious)”. When discussing the later task of consolidating democracy, however, these groups (which correspond to White’s second category) are nowhere to be found in USAID’s vision of civil society. They have been surreptitiously erased from the “CAO strategic logic”. But political reality works rather differently. Such mass movements have a tendency to live on beyond the transition phase. As mobilizers of identities which cut across sectoral interests, their actions continue to affect the organisations contained within the more restrictive definition of civil society. Their persistence as agents in the structuring of patronage networks also impinges upon efforts to promote the type of market-affirming civil society that aid programmes would like to see entrenched. While it is possible for USAID to refuse them funding once their usefulness in assisting the transition from authoritarian rule has been exhausted, ethnic associations mobilized for political purposes cannot simply be wished away. Their role in bringing about the demise of a dictatorial regime brings with it a sense of empowerment that can embolden such movements to make further demands for a different type of society and polity. These organisations need to be integrated into the matrix of competitive politics -- as they have been in India -- rather than cast as obstacles on the road to modernity and good governance. That donor agencies are not unaware of the downstream implications of an inclusive approach to civil society during the period of democratic transition is evident from their approach to other associational entities. Anticipating the difficulties that emerge when attempts are made to “consolidate” a newly installed democracy, USAID explicitly excludes political parties from all of its definitions of civil society, termed them part of “political society”. This is an attempt to nip the problem in the bud. While there is ample theoretical precedent for such an exclusion, USAID’s stated rationale for doing so -- that parties seek to capture, rather than to influence the exercise of, state power -- is dubious. It is not until this logic is extended to the point of excluding from its operational definition of civil society those organisations with close links to political parties that it becomes manifestly untenable. To assert that political parties can and ought to remain distinct from the social groups it is their function to reconcile is to assign them a role as dispassionate interest aggregators, shorn of ideology and immune to the pressures of power. There is little empirical justification for such a view, in either the recent spate of democratization -- the “Third Wave” -- or in the second wave that followed decolonization from the late 1940s through the mid 1970s.
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Aid = Taxes = Coercion

Foreign aid expands government coercion and destroys liberty

DiLorenzo, professor of economics at Loyola College, 1/6/2005


Politicians are bound to politicize this disaster as they do with all other world events, in a way that helps them accumulate more power and confiscate more wealth from their citizens. Specifically, now that they are becoming rather fond of portraying themselves as internationalized Mother Teresas, coming to the aid of anyone, anywhere, as long as it is all paid for by their hard-working, hapless taxpayers, they will be inclined to become champions of ever-expanding foreign aid spending. To do this they will have to ignore the truth about foreign aid: For over half a century, it has been either ineffective or counterproductive in stimulating prosperity. The late Peter Bauer (Lord Bauer) devoted his entire career to studying the law of unintended consequences as it applied to foreign aid, and many of his conclusions are summarized in his 1991 book, The Development Frontier. First of all, notes Bauer, foreign aid is not "aid" but a transfer or subsidy. And it is typically not a transfer to the poor and needy but to governments. Thus, the predominant effect of "foreign aid" has always been to enlarge the size and scope of the state, which always ends up impairing prosperity and diminishing the liberty of the people. Worse yet, it leads to the centralization of governmental power, since the transfers are always to the recipient country’s central government.
“Framework”

Moral side constraint
Petro, Wake Forest Professor in Toledo Law Review, 1974
(Sylvester, Spring, page 480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

No value to life under coercion
Raz, Philosopher, 1986
(Joseph, The Morality of Freedom, page 307)

One way to test the thesis of the primacy of action reasons is to think of a person who is entirely passive and is continuously led, cleaned, and pumped full with hash, so that he is perpetually content, and wants nothing but to stay in the same condition. It’s a familiar imaginary horror. How do we rank the success of such a life? It is not the worst life one can have. It is simply not a life at all. It lacks activity, it lacks goals. To the extent that one is tempted to judge it more harshly than that and to regard it as a ‘negative life’ this is because of the wasted potentiality. It is a life which could have been and was not. We can isolate this feature by imagining that the human being concerned is mentally and physically effected in a way which rules out the possibility of a life with any kind of meaningful pursuit in it. Now it is just not really a life at all. This does not preclude one from saying that it is better than human life. It is simply sufficiently unlike human life in the respects that matter that we regard it as only a degenerate case of human life. But clearly not being alive can be better than that life.

Extinction is justified to protect liberty
Shue, 89 – Professor of Ethics and Public Life at Princeton University (Henry, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, p. 64-5)

The issue raises interesting problems about obligations among generations. What obligations do we owe to future generations whose very existence will be affected by our risks? A crude utilitarian calculation would suggest that since the pleasures of future generations may last infinitely (or until the sun burns out), no risk that we take to assure certain values for our generation can compare with almost infinite value in the future. Thus we have no right to take such risks. In effect, such an approach would establish a dictatorship of future generations over the present one. The only permissible role for our generation would be biological procreation. If we care about other values in addition to survival, this crude utilitarian approach produces intolerable consequences for the current generation. Moreover, utility is too crude a concept to support such a calculation. We have little idea of what utility will mean to generations very distant from ours. We think we know something about our children, and perhaps our grandchildren, but what will people value 8,000 years from now? If we do not know, then there is the ironic prospect that something we deny ourselves now for the sake of a future generation may be of little value to them. A more defensible approach to the issue of justice among generations is the principle of equal access. Each generation should have roughly equal access to important values. We must admit that we shall not be certain of the detailed preferences of increasingly distant generations, but we can assume that they will wish equal chances of survival. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that they would want survival as a sole value any more than the current generation does. On the contrary, if they would wish equal access to other values that give meaning to life, we could infer that they might wish us to take some risks of species extinction in order to provide them equal access to those
values. If we have benefited from "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," why should we assume that the next generation would want only life?

Violation of freedom negates the value of human existence and represents the greatest threat to human survival


A society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that sets up a conflict between it’s ethics and the requirements of man’s nature — is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule. Such a society destroys all values of human coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents, not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to man’s survival. Life on desert island is safer than and incomparably preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.

Causes genocide and war

Browne, former Libertarian presidential candidate, 1995


The reformers of the Cambodian revolution claimed to be building a better world. They forced people into reeducation programs to make them better citizens. Then they used force to regulate every aspect of commercial life. Then they forced office workers and intellectuals to give up their jobs and harvest rice, to round out their education. When people resisted having their lives turned upside down, the reformers had to use more and more force. By the time they were done, they had killed a third of the country’s population, destroyed the lives of almost everyone still alive, and devastated a nation. It all began with using force for the best of intentions—to create a better world. The Soviet leaders used coercion to provide economic security and to build a “New Man”—a human being who would put his fellow man ahead of himself. At least 10 million people died to help build the New Man and the Workers’ Paradise. But human nature never changed—and the workers’ lives were always Hell, not Paradise. In the 1930s many Germans gladly traded civil liberties for the economic revival and national pride Adolf Hitler promised them. But like every other grand dream to improve society by force, it ended in a nightmare of devastation and death. Professor R.J. Rummel has calculated that 119 million people have been killed by their own governments in this century. Were these people criminals? No, they were people who simply didn’t fit into the New Order—people who preferred their own dreams to those of the reformers. Every time you allow government to use force to make society better, you move another step closer to the nightmares of Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany. We’ve already moved so far that our own government can perform with impunity the outrages described in the preceding chapters. These examples aren’t cases of government gone wrong; they are examples of government—period. They are what governments do—just as chasing cats is what dogs do. They are the natural consequence of letting government use force to bring about a drug-free nation, to tax someone else to better your life, to guarantee your economic security, to assure that no one can mistreat you or hurt your feelings, and to cover up the damage of all the failed government programs that came before.
Aff Can’t Outweigh

Cause-and-effect claims require a coherent theory of human behavior – their advantages are epistemologically unacceptable or we make unending violence inevitable

Rockwell Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/2008

(Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” http://mises.org/story/2982)

Not even an event as spectacular as the spontaneous meltdown of a superpower and all its client states was enough to impart the message of economic freedom. And the truth is that it was not necessary. The whole of our world is covered with lessons about the merit of economic liberty over central planning. Our everyday lives are dominated by the glorious products of the market, which we all gladly take for granted. We can open up our web browsers and tour an electronic civilization that the market created, and note that government never did anything useful at all by comparison. We are also inundated daily by the failures of the state. We complain constantly that the educational system is broken, that the medical sector is oddly distorted, that the post office is unaccountable, that the police abuse their power, that the politicians have lied to us, that tax dollars are stolen, that whatever bureaucracy we have to deal with is inhumanly unresponsive. We note all this. But far fewer are somehow able to connect the dots and see the myriad ways in which daily life confirms that the market radicals like Mises, Hayek, Hazlitt, and Rothbard were correct in their judgments. What’s more, this is not a new phenomenon that we can observe in our lifetimes only. We can look at any country in any period and note that every bit of wealth ever created in the history of mankind has been generated through some kind of market activity, and never by governments. Free people create; states destroy. It was true in the ancient world. It was true in the first millennium after Christ. It was true in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. And with the birth of complex structures of production and the increasing division of labor in those years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world’s population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their position. In the decades and years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world’s population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their position. In the decades and years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle.

Concerning method, we need to recognize that Mises was precisely right concerning the relationship between facts and economic truth. If we have a solid theory in mind, the facts on the ground provide excellent illustrative material. They inform us about the application of theory in the world in which we live. They provided excellent anecdotes and revealing stories of how economic theory is confirmed in practice. But absent that theory of economics, facts alone are nothing but facts. They do not convey any information about cause and effect, and they do not point a way forward. Think of it this way. Let’s say you have a bag of marbles that is turned upside down on the ground. Ask two people their impressions. The first one understands what numbers mean, what shapes mean, and what colors mean. This person can give a detailed account of what he sees: how many marbles, what kinds, how big they are, and this person can explain what he sees in different ways potentially for hours. But now consider the second person, who, we can suppose, has absolutely no understanding of numbers, not even that they exist as abstract ideas. This person has no comprehension of either shape or color. He sees the same scene as the other person but cannot provide anything like an explanation of any patterns. He has very little to say. All he sees is a series of random objects. Both these people see the same facts. But they understand them in very different ways, owing to the abstract notions of meaning that they carry in their minds. This is why positivism as pure science, a method of assembling a potentially infinite series of data points, is a fruitless undertaking. Data points on their own convey no theory, suggest no conclusions, and offer no truths. To arrive at truth requires the most important step that we as human beings can ever take: thinking. Through this thinking, and with good teaching and reading, we can put together a coherent theoretical apparatus that helps us understand. Now, we have a hard time conjuring up in
our minds the likes of a man [person] who has no comprehension of numbers, colors, or shapes. And yet I suggest to you that this is precisely what we are facing when we encounter a person who has never thought about economic theory and never studied the implications of the science at all. The facts of the world look quite random to this person. He sees two societies next to each other, one free and prosperous and the other unfree and poor. He looks at this and concludes nothing important about economic systems because he has never thought hard about the relationship between economic systems and prosperity and freedom. He merely accepts the existence of wealth in one place and poverty in the other as a given, the same way the socialists at a lunch table assumed that the luxurious surroundings and food just happened to be there. Perhaps they will reach for an explanation of some sort, but absent economic education, it is not likely to be the correct one. Equally as dangerous as having no theory is having a bad theory that is assembled not by means of logic but by an incorrect view of cause and effect. This is the case with notions such as the Phillips Curve, which posits a tradeoff relationship between inflation and unemployment. The idea is that you can drive unemployment down very low if you are willing to tolerate high inflation; or it can work the other way around: you can stabilize prices provided you are willing to put up with high unemployment. Now, of course this makes no sense on the microeconomic level. When inflation is soaring, businesses don't suddenly say, hey, let's hire a bunch of new people! Nor do they say, you know, the prices we pay for inventory have not gone up or have fallen. Let's fire some workers! This much is true about macroeconomics: It is commonly treated like a subject completely devoid of any connection to microeconomics or even human decision making. It is as if we enter into a video game featuring fearsome creatures called Aggregates that battle it out to the death. So you have one creature called Unemployment, one called Inflation, one called Capital, one called Labor, and so on until you can construct a fun game that is sheer fantasy. Another example of this came to me just the other day. A recent study claimed that labor unions increase the productivity of firms. How did the researchers discern this? They found that unionized companies tend to be larger with more overall output than nonunionized companies. Well, let's think about this. Is it likely that if you close a labor pool to all competition, give that restrictive labor pool the right to use violence to enforce its cartel, permit that cartel to extract higher-than-market wages from the company and set its own terms concerning work rules and vacations and benefits — is it likely that this will be good for the company in the long run? You have to take leave of your senses to believe this. In fact, what we have here is a simple mix-up of cause and effect. Bigger companies tend to be more likely to attract a kind of unpreventable unionization than smaller ones. The unions target them, with federal aid. It is no more or less complicated than that. It is for the same reason that developed economies have larger welfare states. The parasites prefer bigger hosts; that's all. We would be making a big mistake to assume that the welfare state causes the developed economy. That would be as much a fallacy as to believe that wearing $2,000 suits causes people to become rich. I'm convinced that Mises was right: the most important step economists or economic institutions can take is in the direction of public education in economic logic. There is another important factor here. The state thrives on an economically ignorant public. This is the only way it can get away with blaming inflation or recession on consumers, or claiming that the government's fiscal problems are due to our paying too little in taxes. It is economic ignorance that permits the regulatory agencies to claim that they are protecting us as versus denying us choice. It is only by keeping us all in the dark that it can continue to start war after war – violating rights abroad and smashing liberties at home — in the name of spreading freedom. There is only one force that can put an end to the successes of the state, and that is an economically and morally informed public. Otherwise, the state can continue to spread its malicious and destructive policies.
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Comparing American and European approaches to democracy promotion requires defining what American democracy promotion entails. It is an elusive task. In the 1990s, for example, some twenty-three different departments and independent agencies of the U.S. government carried out programs to promote political and economic change in the former Soviet Union. Around the world, U.S. government efforts to promote democracy involve far more than self-defined “democracy assistance” programs administered by USAID, or the familiar cast of American diplomats overseas. In fact, a host of less expected players — such as the Pentagon, Treasury Department, and individual Congressmen — devote millions of dollars and countless man-hours to promoting internal political change abroad. It is too simplistic to say that only USAID cares about democracy, and the Pentagon worries only about weapons. Yet evaluations of American democracy promotion efforts often give scant attention to the complex interaction of various arms of the U.S. government. Discussing the “American approach” to democracy promotion risks implicitly assuming the U.S. government is a rational, unified actor that is implementing a single, internally coherent democracy promotion policy. To the contrary, the American government does not have one democracy promotion policy or strategy, but rather several policies, which interact in complex and often unexpected ways. That is, several different bureaucratic actors within the U.S. government promote democracy using different strategies, resources, tools, and levels of coordination. In short, this paper argues that it is difficult to understand the effects of American democracy promotion abroad without examining the bureaucratic context from which the policy emerges at home. Which actors within the U.S. government are involved in promoting political and economic change abroad? What strategies and conceptual models guide them? What tools and resources do they bring to bear? How does the interaction of American bureaucratic politics affect the impact of American democracy promotion? Articulating this mix of goals, strategies, and resources helps explain incoherent patterns of outcomes on the ground. This paper explores these questions by reference to the U.S. government’s most ambitious democracy promotion efforts of the past decade: the effort to rebuild its former Soviet enemies into a democratic allies in the 1990s. Yet the patterns of American bureaucratic politics are not unique to this democracy promotion effort. While American democracy promotion has changed in tone and substance under the watch of George W. Bush, American domestic politics has powerfully shaped American democracy promotion in similar ways in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. In the 1990s, American policymakers at the highest levels had a clear vision of their desired outcome in the former Soviet space: stable democracies that would no longer threaten the West. But three obstacles complicated policymakers’ attempts to translate strategy into tactics: domestic political constraints in mobilizing resources for the task, competing policy goals, and conceptual uncertainty about the meaning of democracy promotion. Since no consensus existed in the early 1990s about how to promote democracy, bureaucratic policymaking filled this conceptual gap. This produced not a single U.S. preference or message in support of democracy abroad. Yet evaluations of American democracy promotion policy or strategy, but rather several policies, which interact in complex and often unexpected ways. That is, several different bureaucratic actors within the U.S. government promote democracy using different strategies, resources, tools, and levels of coordination. 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The sheer range of official American activities to promote democracy meant that the U.S. could either wield enormous power to convince other governments to change their behavior, or send weak and disorganized signals that realized little of America’s potential for influence. This paper first describes the particular conceptual uncertainty about democracy promotion that contributed to the bureaucratic confusion. It next articulates the few big, though problematic, ideas that unified American democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union, and still do today. These principles are: defeat the old regime, hold elections on time, and undertake economic reform first. But these elements form an incomplete model of democratization. To that end, this paper next describes the elements of U.S. policy incoherence, which results from as many as six different arms of the American government implementing democracy promotion in different ways: the White House, State Department and U.S. Embassies, USAID, the Pentagon, Treasury Department, and Congress. The interactions of these agencies explain why familiar tools of promoting democracy, like foreign aid, often had less influence than expected. Finally, this paper spells out some of the consequences limited bureaucratic coordination. In
the former Soviet Union, these included weak resources devoted to the task, a policy driven by personality and American domestic politics, a reactive policy, and unresolved tensions between policy goals.