Hi all,

This is Premier’s fourth brief of the 2015-2016 season. The topic is “Resolved: The United States ought to promote democracy in the Middle East.” We’ve gotten a lot of great feedback over the past year on our free briefs, and while we can’t make them any freer, we can make them better. Please, let us know what you think! And send them around. Not everyone has the resources to pay for briefs and this is one important way to level the playing field. If you use these briefs please help us and direct other debaters to PremierDebate.com/Briefs. The more people that are aware of the service, the more likely it gets to those who need it most.

We want to remind the readers about standard brief practice to get the most out of this file. Best practice for brief use is to use it as a guide for further research. Find the articles and citations and cut them for your own personal knowledge. You’ll find even better cards that way. If you want to use the evidence in here in a pinch, at the very least, you should re-tag and highlight the evidence yourself so you know exactly what it says and how you’re going to use it. Remember, briefs can be a tremendous resource but you need to familiarize yourself with the underlying material first.

We want to thank Adam Tomasi and Tom Placido for their help with this season’s fourth brief. Together we make a pretty good team! If you don’t know Adam or Tom, find them online and send a thank you for their hard work.

Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

Bob Overing & John Scoggin
Directors | Premier Debate
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Inherency

The Middle East overwhelming suffers from destabilized nations, ethnic conflict, civil war, and terrorism

Piazza 07

Next to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East is the region exhibiting the largest percentage of states that suffer from state failures from 1998 to 2003, although all of the regions of the world dominated by developing or transitional states besides Latin America have relatively high levels of state failure. What makes the Middle East unique, and what is not captured by the figures in Table 1, is the intense and chronic nature of state failure exhibited in some states in the region. Several states—Lebanon from 1975 to 1991; Israel from 1987 to 2004; Iraq from 1980 to 1998; and Turkey from 1984 to 2000—have experienced prolonged periods of armed ethnic conflict, civil war, and widespread political insurgency. Others suffer from prolonged but low-grade insurgencies such as the Saharawi insurrection in Morocco 1975 to 1989 or the Dhofar tribal insurgency in Oman from 1970 to 1976, or from short but intense bouts of large-scale conflict such as the Syrian confrontation with Islamist guerrillas in 1982 or the suppression of a separatist insurgency by Yemen in 1993. Like many African states, Middle Eastern states suffer from what Kahler (2002) refers to as “stateless areas,” a condition linked to the incubation of terrorism where the central government is unable to project its power in substantial regions of the country controlled by insurgents or regional actors. A report on terrorism in Yemen by the International Crisis Group faults the weakness of Yemeni political institutions, poverty and the inability of the state to extend its authority to more remote tribal regions as precipitants of domestic terrorism (International Crisis Group 2003). Kahler does allow for a non-spatial variant of the stateless area condition in the case of Saudi Arabia, arguing that the Saudi government was not able to penetrate powerful civil society and parastatal institutions, namely Muslim charities, that provide material sustenance to groups like Al Qaeda. Lebanon from 1975 to 1982 (and possibly later) also fits the bill as failed state suffering from stateless areas, which permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization to base its operations in Beirut and Southern Lebanon.
Aid is Effective

The US should establish a Multilateral Endowment for Reform to promote democracy in the Middle East.

Hamid and Mandaville 13, (Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Peter Mandaville is a professor of Public & International Affairs at George Mason University and a former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. “Bringing the United States Back into the Middle East,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, FALL 2013, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_13Winter_Hamid-Mandaville.pdf) [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

Arab attitudes toward the United States are inelastic. Anything short of a major policy overhaul—including tinkering around the margins with well-intentioned but small-scale initiatives—will not make much of a difference. In contrast, decisive action, as in Libya, drove favorability ratings for the United States to all-time regional highs, putting Libyans on par with Australian and Israeli attitudes. With this in mind, we propose that the United States reorient its policy based in part on ideas that have emerged, but stalled, within the Obama administration itself. The centerpiece of this new approach would involve establishing a Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) with an initial funding stream of $5 billion. This endowment builds on the administration’s proposed MENA Incentive Fund, a tool designed to encourage governments in the region to make measurable reform commitments in return for significant increases in U.S. economic aid. Our proposed MER, which operates on similar principles but at a much larger and multilateral scale, would provide the contours of a new framework to incentivize reforms and could reshape our basic relationship with the Middle East. While the idea of a “Marshall Plan” for the Middle East may be misplaced—the historical analogy is faulty and the post-WWII geoeconomic calculus fundamentally different—the metaphor does speak to the scale of imagination and ambition required of any adequate policy response to the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. The core of such an effort must include a sustained, systematic attempt at tying much-needed economic assistance to explicit democratic reforms—something that has never before been attempted in the Middle East.

A multilateral aid fund led by the US is key to democracy—failure of current US policy risks regime collapses and causes terrorism.

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This isn’t just about morality or doing the right thing; the success of democracy matters for very practical reasons. Authoritarian “stability” is the brittle kind that can collapse at any moment, as we saw in 2011. Repressive regimes may offer short-term comfort by suppressing terrorism along with dissent. However, by blocking meaningful political competition, they also increase the likelihood...
that citizens will consider violence as an alternative. To be sure, democratization is messy and elections will occasionally bring objectionable individuals and groups to power, but in the long run governments that are responsive and accountable to their people are more stable and therefore more reliable as allies. Importantly, a sustained effort at supporting Arab democracy would also better align U.S. interests and values, thereby neutralizing one of the key sources of tension—and incoherence—in the United States’ post-2011 Middle East policy.

If genuine democratic reform is a desirable goal as well as a core U.S. interest, at least in the long term, then how can various policy tools be employed to promote it more effectively? For one, using aid as leverage only works if there are meaningful consequences when countries don’t meet minimal expectations and significant reward when they do. With this in mind, the new funding platform we propose would need at least $5 billion initially with the aim of reaching $20 billion in ten years (compared to the mere $580 million requested for the Obama administration’s MENA Incentive Fund in FY14). The central thrust of this model is the idea that the international community, led by the United States, makes a serious investment in the economic and political future of the Middle East by making available significant new funding above and beyond existing aid commitments. Its multilateral nature would be key to its success, both in terms of reducing the level of direct financial burden on the United States as well as avoiding perceptions that Washington hopes to engineer political outcomes. Europe would be a major partner and contributor to the Endowment. Regional players such as Turkey and Qatar that have shown interest in skirting the pre-ultra status quo and supporting political change will also be encouraged to contribute significant dollar amounts. Of course, it may be difficult to get countries beyond the usual club of international donors to make large contributions. For the model to succeed, however, it will need to be informed by the kinds of technical expertise and experience found in many countries—from Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe to Asia—which have undergone successful transitions to democracy in recent decades.

The fund helps reform institutions—provides political cover to democratically elected leaders.

Hamid and Mandaville 13, (Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Peter Mandaville is a professor of Public & International Affairs at George Mason University and a former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. “Bringing the United States Back into the Middle East,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, FALL 2013, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_13Winter_Hamid-Mandaville.pdf) [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

With the rising tide of nationalism in the region, populist leaders may see this as unwelcome interference in their domestic affairs. But, considering that unused funds would be reinvested back into the Endowment and accumulate over time, politicians in cash-strapped countries would be hard pressed to justify rejecting billions in international support. Moreover, such support can give political cover to democratically-elected leaders—Islamist and secular alike—in their efforts to restructure corrupt government bureaucracies and institutions. Even if funds are ultimately rejected, the Endowment can send a clear message to understandably skeptical Arab audiences that although democracy cannot be imposed, it can be actively and vigorously supported in good faith.

The plan is popular—doesn’t link to previous Republican concerns about Middle East aid funding.

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The Obama administration’s proposed MENA Incentive Fund stalled for a variety of reasons. First, the White House structured its funding request in a way that combined both the distinctive incentive mechanism as well as resources pegged to vague “stabilization contingencies.” This diluted the appeal of the former and caused the incentive Fund to appear to some in Congress as little more than a slush fund. Second, once the idea was launched, the administration did not actively promote or build support for the Fund among appropriators. Finally, given the U.S. fiscal climate, any request for sizeable amounts of new foreign aid was likely to engender resistance. But the administration missed crucial opportunities to help Republicans on Capitol Hill—who tend to be wary of foreign aid “giveaways”—to understand that the various forms of accountability built in to the Fund meant that it would operate according to foreign assistance principles they support. Our proposed MER would not avoid all of these pitfalls, but would have at least two clear advantages over the Incentive Fund. First, it would operate exclusively on the basis of transparent and benchmarked incentives measured against actual performance on reform indicators, thereby avoiding any accusation of slush funding. The multilateral nature of the MER would spread the financial burden across a wider range of stakeholders (meaning that the United States would not have to foot the entire bill) and thereby avoid some of the political sensitivities in the region associated with U.S. bilateral funding.

The fund helps boost US and European leadership in the Middle East. Hamid and Mandaville 13, (Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. eler Mandaville is a professor of Public & International Affairs at George Mason University and a former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. “Bringing the United States Back into the Middle East,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, FALL 2013, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_13Winter_Hamid-Mandaville.pdf) [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

The Endowment would have benefits beyond promoting democracy. By minimizing their direct involvement, the United States and Europe have allowed a strategic vacuum to emerge in the region, with largely autocratic Gulf countries moving to fill the gap. With its institutionalization over time, the Endowment can reestablish U.S. and European leadership in the Middle East, allowing them more opportunities to help shape critical transitions in the region. In the short term, participants will need to discourage large payouts tied to partisan political developments such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait’s $12 billion pledge in the immediate aftermath of Egypt’s July 2013 military coup—a move intended to signal support for a return to the pre-2011 status quo. Ideally, certain regional actors would be asked to join the MER’s efforts. Failing that, Endowment contributors will need to use their diplomatic clout to minimize the competition and conflict arising from dueling funding streams.
The fund avoids the pitfalls of previous funding assistance—it represents a fundamental shift in US policy towards the Middle East.

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In some countries, MER funding could directly support aspects of democratic consolidation such as overhauling the civil service sector, justice sector reform, and anti-corruption initiatives. Approached correctly and at the appropriate scale, this would mean moving well beyond the activities of conventional U.S. democracy promotion such as political party training and civil society strengthening. In many cases, such as Mubarak’s Egypt, these standard democracy promotion tools were thoroughly co-opted by the regime and integrated into the very mechanisms through which it maintained its hold on power. Under such conditions, small-scale democracy programs amounted, at best, to little more than tinkering around the margins of closed political systems, and at worst as convenient accessories to authoritarianism. With this in mind, the United States should fundamentally reorient its approach to reflect the changing nature of reform challenges in Arab countries. For example, one of the greatest obstacles to democratization in the Arab world is an ossified civil service habituated to—and in many respects a byproduct of—deeply entrenched autocracy. A changing of the guard in the top echelons of power will only take a democratic transition so far, particularly when there are good reasons to doubt new incumbents’ commitment to inclusive democracy. And while the path to accountable governance certainly must be signaled from above, its realization in practice depends on reformulating everyday bureaucratic processes. This kind of necessarily wholesale, top-to-bottom reform of government institutions is an expensive undertaking that requires resources far beyond the relatively paltry sums of democracy and governance funding the United States currently provides. A tool such as the MER, however, could provide funding of the magnitude needed to make comprehensive bureaucratic change a meaningful prospect, including in the security, judicial, and media sectors.
**Solvency**

U.S. democracy promotion, reforming domestic politics through conditional aid and civil society assistance will solve in the long term by diminishing extremism

Lilli 15


In order to stop, and possibly reverse, this negative trend, the United States needs to thoroughly reevaluate its Middle East policy to take into account widespread popular demands for change. US officials should adopt the long view while confronting the immediate terrorist threat. In particular, a primary aspect of US policy should be to address the domestic dynamics inside Middle Eastern states that are standing on the way of the kind of durable social and political peace critical to counter the extremists’ narrative. Accordingly, action in two policy-areas becomes of paramount importance. First, the United States should identify innovative and effective ways to leverage US bilateral assistance to promote political, economic, and social reforms in the Greater Middle East. Special attention should be given to programs aimed at fostering individual freedoms, human development, and economic opportunity as essential tools against the radicalization of Middle Eastern populations. When applicable, conditionality clauses on US assistance should be enforced without exception to avoid damaging charges of hypocrisy and double standards. Second, the United States should commit meaningful resources to support the development and empowerment of civil society. In fact, by providing frustrated Middle Eastern people with non-violent channels to find a satisfactory solution to their longstanding grievances, domestic civic groups can represent a peaceful alternative to terrorists’ violence. Moreover, domestic civic groups can also help to spread those democratic values, such as pluralism and tolerance, badly required in the long-term fight against extremism.

Democracy promotion works – reject empirics since success is long-term and hard to define. Also, promotion is on a case-by-case basis. There’s no one-size fits all method, so no disadvantages to individual countries based on blanket policy

Sharp 06


With U.S. democracy promotion policy toward Islamists left somewhat vague, perhaps even deliberately so, there are many foreign policy practitioners in the U.S. State Department who believe that, at the moment, the United States is taking a pragmatic approach toward Middle East democratization. Some officials assert that U.S. policy is flexible and applied to specific circumstances on a country-by-country and case-by-case basis, since political conditions and the orientation and legal status of Islamist movements in one country may be markedly different from another. According to one scholar, moderate Islamist parties are mistakenly treated as monolithic entities, when instead, groups "differ among themselves on the question of how much of the historical Sharia (Islamic law)--that is, the corpus of traditional Islamic legal rulings inherited from the past--can and should be revised." (9) Some suggest that the U.S. government, because it is constrained by its strategic relationships with authoritarian regimes, may only be capable
of selective engagement with some non-violent Islamist groups. In this viewpoint, such an approach, though it would be far less ambitious than the grand rhetoric outlined by the Administration and would leave the U.S. government open to accusations of promoting reform inconsistently, could serve U.S. interests by promoting reform where it is possible without disrupting relations with other key Arab partners. Implementing U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy Though many have criticized U.S. democracy promotion efforts both inside and outside the Arab world, there has been widespread recognition that President Bush and his Administration have made the pursuit of regional reform a high-profile issue and have provided additional resources for its implementation. The United States employs a variety of diplomatic tools and policy instruments to promote democracy in the Middle East. Behind the scenes bilateral diplomacy, in which U.S. officials engage Arab governments on the reform issue, is considered by many experts to be one of the most effective ways of promoting democracy. Public statements by Administration officials visiting the region, such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's July 2005 policy speech on democracy at the American University of Cairo in Egypt, is another way for U.S. policy makers to keep reform a visible issue in U.S. dealings with Arab regimes. However, visiting U.S. officials who raise the democratization issue are often accused in the Arab media of unfairly meddling in Arab affairs or as patronizing the Arab people. Islamist groups often reiterate such attacks, seizing on opportunities presented by visiting U.S. delegations speaking on reform to criticize U.S. policies in the Middle East. U.S. Democracy Programs Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States has significantly increased funding for democracy promotion in the Arab world. Measuring its effectiveness is difficult since democracy cannot be quantified or measured like traditional U.S. foreign assistance for tangible projects, such as road construction, water resource development, and school improvement. Further, proponents of current policy say that the United States continues to spend far more resources on military assistance to the region than on reform. While this statement is factually correct, it focuses too narrowly on levels of spending rather than on the substance of U.S. programming. Support for indigenous reformers does not necessarily require large amounts of financial assistance. Rather, it must be properly channeled to support reformers without de-legitimizing them in the process. Providing democracy assistance can be problematic since some regimes legally restrict foreign assistance to non-governmental organizations. Through annual foreign operations and State Department appropriations, Congress currently provides funding for the following reform programs: * the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a State Department program designed to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society, encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting women's rights; (11) * the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), an account that funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority countries; and * the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Muslim Democracy Program.
Democracy Promotion Inevitable

U.S. involvement is inevitable, so it’s only a question of how effective it can be
Maogoto and Coleman 14
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto • Andrew Coleman, Univ of Manchester and Monash University,
“The ARAB Spring’s Constitutional Indigestion: Has Democracy Failed in the Middle East?”

The temptation for foreign powers that have a vested interest in the region to intervene is far too tempting: if the local leaders cannot restore stability and certainty then who will? Despite the significance of Article 2(4) UN Charter and the pre-eminence of non-intervention in international law, Western policy makers still discuss to what extent they should be involved. The question of not being involved is simply not on the table, it is how far the US should go to assist in the development of democratic evolution. ‘They simply don’t know how to govern’ was a comment made in 2013 by a panel member in an international relations festival in the US discussing the Arab Spring.91 Former President Bush’s concerns that the Middle East was unable to embrace ‘liberty’ was followed by this warning: ‘...the United States has adapted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East’. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo.92 These are not empty words. In 2002 the US implemented their Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) a small grants based program managed by the US State department that sought to assist democratic reform through educational and economic reform as well as seeking to create better opportunities for women.93 MEPI’s assistance was in addition to the billions of dollars provided by United States Agency for International Development (USAID).94 US support for democratic transition continued beyond the Bush Jr. era of neo-liberalism, and what could be perceived as aggressive US Foreign policy. MEPI’s budget was increased to $65 million by President Barack Obama in 2009. In 2011 Obama continued support for democratic transition by relieving Egypt of $1 billion in debt owed to the US. In addition USAID increased its support by providing $65 million to cover the cost of holding elections, and other democratic political processes. Furthermore, an additional $100 million was made available to provide much needed economic assistance to address a perceived flaw in the US strategy of democratic reform through fostering economic development.
Previous DP efforts failed because they weren’t long-term enough—US support is the only way democracy will thrive in the Middle East

Baran 9


Throughout the world, liberal democracy is once again being challenged both as a political system and, more fundamentally, as an ideology. We are engaged in an ideological struggle—and the United States is losing ground. The further spread of Islamism will leave America isolated and powerless to achieve its goals in security and foreign policy. Faced with authoritarian threats in both religious and secular forms, the United States should not be questioning whether to promote democracy, but how. A democracy-promotion effort must not be piecemeal, but comprehensive; a holistic challenge requires a holistic response. The whole concept needs to be redesigned with an eye toward a longer timeframe that lasts beyond any one presidential administration. In general, the United States looks for short-term successes when a generational commitment is needed, as the administration of George W. Bush originally stated. But again, the United States had to demonstrate success quickly, and thus went for the "low-hanging fruit"—at points even sounding as doctrinaire about democracy promotion as those who oppose democracy. Now, as a result, we are back at the same point in the cycle—if not lower. Despite over 60 years of on-again, off-again efforts at democracy promotion in the Middle East and places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, the binary model that forces a choice between autocrats in power and populist extremists out of power has never really disappeared. It is a mystery to me why the United States does not remain true to its own values and support the third option: the liberal democrats. Yes, liberal democrats in most parts of the so-called Muslim world are but a small minority today, but they will never grow in support unless backed by the United States; the other two sides already get all the financial and organizational help they could want.

Democratic ideals are powerful—authoritarians are vulnerable, so we shouldn’t accept defeat

Puddington 13


For some time now, democracy promotion has been under concentrated attack from authoritarian sources ranging from Robert Mugabe and Vladimir Putin to the leaders of Venezuela. More recently, criticism has spread to the democratic world, with the United States front and center. To some degree, the growing impulse for a less ambitious U.S. democracy policy reflects an understandable, if misplaced, disillusionment with developments in Egypt and the Arab world generally. Increasingly, however, the doubters are calling for an across-the-board retreat that would encompass the likes of Russia and China as well as Egypt and Libya. And joining the traditional critics from the “realist” camp are an assertive new group of libertarian isolationists who have gained influence within the Republican Party. Meanwhile, the leading authoritarians remain firmly on message. They portray foreign assistance to local reformers as a Trojan horse for violent revolution. They hold up every breach of democratic norms in the leading free societies—particularly the United States—as proof that all countries are equal in their democratic deficits. They are quick to label nonviolent
disdains as terrorists, insisting that all governments should join hands against such "extremism." Clearly, these are difficult times for those who believe that democracy, with all its complexities and imperfections, is far and away the most humane and successful form of government.

But a bit of historical perspective should remind us that today's authoritarians, while more sophisticated than the Politburo chiefs and junta leaders of the past, are at the same time less confident and more vulnerable than their predecessors. The very idea of democracy promotion once seemed preposterous in totalitarian environments where there were no elections, no opposition parties, a totally censored press, vast numbers of political prisoners, and complete state control over civil society. Today, opportunities for democratic gains are apparent throughout the world, even in such hard cases as Cuba and Belarus. But the march toward freedom will move forward only if those who have experienced democracy's benefits refuse to succumb to the arguments of isolationism and retreat.

Remember, it's the autocrats who are worried: The internal divisions that beset the world's democracies today are loudly and publicly declared. But even as the United States experiences legislative gridlock and Europe falters over a strategy for economic recovery, their democratic institutions remain strong and their futures bright. Reform advocates seek more democracy, not less. Meanwhile, China regularly issues instructions on what can and cannot be written or said, dismisses professors for independent thinking, and jails internet users for questioning official narratives. In Venezuela, massive power outages and a breakdown in law and order are blamed on spies and saboteurs. Russian officials threaten opposition candidates with jail and seek to drum up popular support by scapegoating minorities. These actions suggest an intense fear of open debate and a recognition that the idea of freedom is more powerful than the evasions and deceits on which their rule is based.
AT U.S. Policy Inconsistent/Flawed

Painting the US as “inconsistent” is faulty thinking

Reject the consistency trap: A former U.S. senator recently chastised critics of Russia for—hold your breath—ignoring the failings of China! This is faulty thinking on several fronts: First, advocates of global democracy are altogether aware of China’s role as the world’s most economically successful dictatorship and devote considerable attention to its authoritarian innovations. Second, democracy advocates quite rightly pick and choose their targets of the moment based on opportunities for change, whether repression is hardening or easing, the harshness of a given crackdown, and so forth. A statement critical of Zimbabwe need not invariably be accompanied by one directed at Saudi Arabia. Third, the consistency argument ranks among the trustiest dodges of dictators as they seek to change the subject from their own abuses to the alleged deficiencies of other states, usually the homelands of their foreign critics. We expect such tactics from dictators; we should push back aggressively when similar formulations are advanced by prominent figures in the democracies.

Even if the US has flaws, democracy isn’t supposed to be infallible—that means democracy promotion is still justified

Criticize, but don’t apologize for, the United States: The United States is complicated, its democracy is imperfect, and it is going through a period in which political polarization prevails. Activists working in other countries should not hesitate to acknowledge America’s problems and criticize Washington’s errors. But they should also remember that the United States is home to genuinely competing parties, an independent judiciary, an aggressive press, and thousands of civil society organizations whose missions touch on every social problem and every democratic defect, from prison conditions and undocumented workers to violence against women and political corruption. There is even an association for the defense of national security whistle-blowers. Democracy does not produce infallibility, it simply provides
society with the means for peaceful self-correction. Moreover, on the international stage, good deeds can be performed by sinners as well as saints. Where the spread of freedom is in the balance, America, despite its faults, is one of the very few countries with the power and predisposition to push events in the right direction.
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Democratization is key to more effective climate change adaptation

Burnell 12
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Democracy, democratization and climate adaptation Are people in non-democracies more vulnerable to the effects of climate change compared to people who live in liberal democracies? Grounds for saying that democracy is more likely than non-democracies to take steps to insulate citizens from the harm done by global warming (adaptation) and help those who are harmed by extreme weather events (disaster mitigation) resemble the arguments suggesting democracy is more favourable for environmental sustainability generally. If political equality defines the democratic ideal, then the empirical claim that power inequalities – mediated through political institutions – are associated with poor people suffering disproportionately from (climate-induced) environmental harm is telling. Noteworthy also is the requirement of democratically elected governments to respect the expressed wants of voters, which underpins Sen’s well-known extrapolation from South Asian experience that democracies blessed with free media are less likely than non-democracies to experience large famines. So democratization that moves a country towards stable democracy carries hopes of better climate adaptation.

US efforts to address climate change in the Middle East should be considered as democracy promotion

Hobson 12
Christopher Hobson (presently an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University). “Addressing climate change and promoting democracy abroad: compatible agendas?” Democratization, 19:5, pp. 974-992. 2012.

The comparatively low priority that has been accorded to dealing with climate change may finally begin to alter as it starts having a more direct, sustained and recognizable impact on societies. Climate change will have far reaching consequences for the domestic makeup of states, and it will also further impinge upon their foreign policies. As a recent report notes: ‘the impacts of climate change will need to be factored in across all areas of government policy which have an international dimension’. In this regard, it will unavoidably affect
Building on other contributions to the special issue, this inquiry extends the discussion further by specifically focusing on how climate change will likely intervene with the democracy support agenda. In considering climate change and democracy assistance together this account is consciously exploratory in its aims. On first glance it may seem unusual to combine these issues, but as will be shown, they are increasingly coming into contact. It is better to take a proactive stance and start thinking how environmental degradation will impinge on other policy areas, such as democracy assistance. Climate change is not simply a scientific, technical issue: it is deeply political with far-reaching ramifications for the way we rule ourselves and live. Insofar as democracy promotion seeks to support and advance a certain form of government, it is valuable to begin considering how these practices may interact with global warming. Indeed, by doing so it may be possible to identify more synergistic and integrated responses, which is what the Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) has called for.

To briefly summarize the main argument: the democracy assistance and climate change agendas are now coming into contact, a convergence which is likely to continue as environmental problems worsen. It is suggested that global warming raises questions for all the major components of democracy promotion: first, the ends of democracy itself; second, the means and resources used to support democratization; and third, the actors involved in these activities. In regards to the ends, the way liberal democracies – and other regime types – handle this huge policy challenge could influence the overall standing and legitimacy of these different kinds of government. In terms of means, environmental disasters could directly impact upon democratization projects that are instituted, as well as worsening ‘donor fatigue’. Meanwhile, civil society concerns about environmental problems could impact on democratization in a positive or negative manner, potentially being either a spark for democratic mobilization or for authoritarian repression. As for the actors involved, the moral authority of Northern democracies is likely to be further questioned due to their historical culpability and ongoing failure to make progress in substantially reducing their carbon emissions. This is relevant for democracy promotion insofar as external actors require a certain degree of legitimacy and acceptance to facilitate their roles. When all these different aspects are combined, it suggests that climate change could pose an increasingly significant challenge to the democracy promotion agenda. The study will contextualize the convergence of the democracy support and climate change agendas, before looking at their interaction in terms of the end, means, and actors of democracy promotion. In concluding, the possibilities for a more synergistic relationship to emerge, whereby addressing climate change can be a way of contributing to strengthening democracy at home and abroad, are reflected on.

Democracies like the US need to provide key support

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Christopher Hobson (presently an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University). “Addressing climate change and promoting democracy abroad: compatible agendas?” Democratization, 19:5, 974-992. 2012.


The ends of democracy promotion Democracy assistance, as noted, is now moving into a more challenging and uncertain period. As Youngs observes, ‘democracy promotion has lost traction around the world. ... [and] doubts are growing over liberal democracy’.21 The manner in which industrialized Northern democracies respond to climate change could either exacerbate or temper the recent relative weakening of liberal democracy’s ideational positioning. This is significant insofar as democracy’s ideational ascendancy has been an important element underpinning contemporary democracy promotion. Environmental issues have the potential to intervene – either positively or negatively – on the way democracy is perceived and valued by publics. On this point, the world’s ‘leading’ democracies also are
leaders, both in historical and contemporary terms, in GHG emissions. Giddens proposes that: It is these countries that pumped most of the emissions into the atmosphere in the first place, and they have to take prime responsibility for controlling them in the near future. They must take the lead in reducing emissions, moving towards a lowcarbon economy and making the social reforms with which these changes will have to be integrated.22 While addressing climate change is not solely the responsibility of Northern democracies, they have an absolutely crucial part to play. Not only should these democracies take the lead in responding to climate change because of their ‘environmental debt’,23 they also should act because they have the greatest capacity to do so. A continued failure of responsibility by Northern democracies does little to advertise their regime type, and might also be used by authoritarian regimes to dissuade their own citizens against political change.

“Eco-authoritarianism” isn’t preferable—democracy is comparatively better at solving warming, even if it isn’t perfect

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Christopher Hobson (presently an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University). “Addressing climate change and promoting democracy abroad: compatible agendas?” Democratization, 19:5, 974-992. 2012.


The limited progress made to date by democracies in addressing climate change has raised questions over whether democracies have the political resources and resolve to handle this issue. The most regularly identified problem of democracy is the short-term decision-making cycles that elections tend to produce, which works against longer-term planning and pursuing difficult policy choices necessary for managing the environment.24 While this is certainly a significant problem for democracies, it is worth noting that there are few, if any, assurances that decision-making in authoritarian regimes would be much better. It may be easier for authoritarian rulers to press ahead with major, longer-term decisions, but if these happen to be wrong, the consequences can be far more costly. The twentieth century was depressingly full of ominous warnings in this regard. History also suggests that liberal democracies have had a better overall environmental record compared to authoritarian regimes, even if this is not something to be especially proud of.25 For these and other reasons, within green theory proposals for some kind of ‘eco-authoritarianism’ have been largely discarded. To take one example, leading environmental theorist John Dryzek offers the assumption that ‘most of those who think very hard about politics and the environment now come down on the side of democracy in some form or another as being preferable to more authoritarian alternatives’.26 This position does not deny the historically significant role of liberal democracies in contributing to global warming, but notes their comparatively better historical records with environmental management. It also focuses on certain inherent strengths democracies have, such as a capacity for learning and greater flexibility. Democracies are far from perfect, but they have more potential to adjust, and in a modified form, perhaps offer the best form of governance for dealing with this considerable challenge.
Liberal democracy is too individualistic, which hurts the environment—green democracy promotion is a key shift from this model

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Green democratic theorists, such as Dryzek and Eckersley, argue that the problem is not democracy in toto, but the specific kind that currently dominates: ‘the green critique adds further weight to the argument that the promise of liberal democracy is a false promise’. From this perspective, the best response to the failings of existing democratic structures to deal with environmental problems is not an abandonment of them in favour of more authoritarian solutions, but a reinvigoration and extension of democracy. There are many different proposals about how this can be done, with deliberative and global forms of democracy being two significant alternatives that have the potential to be more democratic and more environmentally sensitive.27 These proposals by green theorists for expanding democracy are especially relevant for democracy assistance, which has long been dominated by liberal conceptions of democracy. This hegemony of the liberal model has been maintained, in part, through an unquestioning acceptance of this understanding of democracy in democracy promotion.28 By adopting the more open perspective of environmental theorists it may instead encourage questioning about the kind of democracy being supported. In thinking about more synergistic responses, ‘green democracy promotion’ may be one possible way forward. The alternative – continuing to support the replication of growth obsessed, individualistic liberal democracies – will do little to improve the situation.

Warming is real, anthropogenic, and risks catastrophic consequences

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Put simply: democracy support is entering a much more uncertain, and potentially difficult, era. The relevance of this context for the argument here is also rather straightforward: the consequences – both environmental and political – of global warming threaten to intervene and deepen the considerable challenges democracy promoters already face. As a recent report concludes: ‘climate change is expected to act as a “risk multiplier”, [when] interacting with other trends’.14 With the ascendency of democracy beginning to falter, the global economy showing few signs of stabilizing, the democracy promotion backlash continuing, and many other important changes occurring, there are already plenty of elements making the already difficult task of trying to support democratization even more challenging. The incredibly tricky issue of climate change has great potential to amplify this state of affairs. A failure to properly engage with, and respond to, climate change has the potential to place further strain on democracy promotion practices at a time when it already has many challenges to deal with. In regards to climate change, it now presents itself as one of the most important issues of our time. There is mounting certainty that global warming is occurring, and that it will have far-reaching – perhaps catastrophic – consequences. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 were clear: ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’, and ‘there is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming’.15 Despite the stark conclusions of the IPCC, it is worth noting that the negotiated nature of these findings makes them strongly conservative, thus they likely underplay the true level of threat.16 In the intervening years since the last IPCC report the science
indicating anthropogenic climate change has only strengthened. While greenhouse gas emissions have dipped due to the economic downturn, there are already signs that this trend will be short lived. Meanwhile, global temperatures are still increasing; the melting of icesheets, glaciers, ice caps and sea-ice is continuing at an alarming speed, and sealevel rise is accelerating at a faster rate than previously thought. There is now widespread acceptance that anthropogenic climate change is occurring, that it poses a serious threat to the world, and that major shifts are needed now to avoid irreversible, catastrophic damage. Nonetheless, there has been much more limited progress in translating this knowledge into political action. While it is important that the science continues to develop, there should be much more focus on the politics than has been the case.
Democratic Values / Inclusion

Democracy promotion is justified, not because the US is somehow superior, but because democracy is key to self-correction and inclusion


Democracy: A Human Fail-Safe The events of the last year make this as good as a time as any to ask ourselves (again) what place democracy promotion should have in our foreign policy. Can democracy promotion be saved, in the face of all our mistakes, all our inconsistencies, all our false starts, hypocrisies, and hesitations? I think the answer is yes. Democracy promotion should remain a vital part of our foreign policy—not despite our mistakes, inconsistencies, false starts, hypocrisies, and hesitations, but because of them. We should embrace and promote democracy not because it is perfect or because we are perfect, but because democracy remains the only political system yet devised that builds in a capacity for self-correction. Start by going back to first principles. Democracy is premised on an idea that remains radical in many parts of the world: the idea that every human being counts, that we all have a right to participate in making the decisions that will affect us, that no person or group has a permanent monopoly on political wisdom. Political theorists can debate whether civil and human rights require democracy to protect them or whether democracies must protect civil and human rights in order to sustain themselves. For our purposes, it is probably enough to say that the idea of democracy carries with it at least some minimal assumptions about rights and the rule of law: Democracy cannot thrive without at least some degree of freedom of expression and assembly, and it requires at least some minimal institutional arrangements to sustain it (courts, legislatures, and so on). How much free expression (or judicial independence, or parliamentary power) is "enough" is hard to say; certainly, reasonably stable and contented democracies have answered this question in different ways. But the basic contours of the idea remain both clear and sound. If everyone counts, then everyone must be allowed to speak and organize and assemble with others; everyone must have a shot at arguing with and persuading others.

This is how ideas emerge, struggle for life, gain prominence, and are tested. Some survive; some vanish; some fade for a time and re-emerge again later on. Democracy is a vision of governance that rests equally upon the conviction that worthy ideas can come from anyone, and upon the conviction that humans are inherently fallible. Pernicious ideas can also come from anyone, and there will be times when pernicious ideas will dominate our politics and our policies. We will get things wrong, repeatedly. And this is why we need democracy. Only if we build into our political systems a capacity for change and self-correction, a capacity for new ideas to emerge and old ones to be rejected, can we hope to make it through the inevitably recurring dark periods.

This is why progressives should care about promoting democracy: not out of any triumphalist conviction that we (America, the West) are the best of the best, but rather out of humility. We—and our American democracy—are manifestly imperfect. We more or less wiped out our continent’s indigenous population and marginalized the survivors. We enslaved millions of our fellow human beings, denied women the right to hold property and vote, and withheld basic civil rights from African Americans. We have made progress, but it has been slow and uneven, and as a nation we’re hardly out of the woods. We incarcerate a higher percentage of our population than any other country, and felony disenfranchisement laws continue to deny the vote to millions of mostly black men. We have not yet found a way to solve the problem of money in politics; as wealth inequalities grow, we increasingly inhabit a democracy in which some are distinctly more equal than others. Here, ironically, our own free-expression doctrines have come back to bite us; in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that limits on corporate spending amount to infringements on the free-expression rights of corporations. Our democracy remains deeply flawed, and continues to produce bad policies with impressive regularity. The Bush Administration’s pursuit of democracy through military force was one of those bad ideas our democracy managed to produce. Our (thankfully brief) official embrace of torture was another. Our democracy enabled all of it—but our democracy also ultimately enabled its repudiation. Democracy, after all, has allowed us to change our Constitution repeatedly.
over time to **create a more inclusive polity**. Democracy has enabled and empowered political extremism, but it has also allowed us to protect moderates and minorities. **Democracy lets us start foolish wars, but it also let us elect leaders capable of stopping them.**

Democracy promotion can be based on **genuine humility**, not a triumphant Western narrative

**Brooks 12**

**A Humbler, More Patient Power**

This approach to democracy promotion is **the polar opposite of Bush-era triumphalism**, and it has certain practical corollaries. If we support democracy because we’re imperfect, it follows that the project of promoting democracy abroad needs to be undertaken with honesty, **humility, patience, and realism**. Honesty involves acknowledging our own past mistakes and hypocrisys, and admitting that we will make new mistakes in the future. Humility is related—we still have not solved all our problems here at home, and it would indeed be hubristic to imagine that we can solve someone else’s problems with speed or ease. This point has been made before by many thoughtful commentators, but it bears additional repetition. **To put it bluntly, when it comes to fostering democracy abroad, we really don’t know what we’re doing much of the time.**

What sort of democracy is best? What sort of electoral and party system? What checks and balances? What rights, for whom, how understood? What role does support for civil society play, and how shall we identify and define “civil society”? What role do legal and judicial institutions play in buttressing nascent democracies? Can we create that most elusive thing of all, “political will”? How should these challenges be prioritized?

**We often offer an a-cultural, technocratic approach to these and a multitude of other issues, and yet we know remarkably little about what is useful and what is not.** There is no one more thoughtful on these issues than Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who concludes ruefully in his book, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, that “we are still largely groping in the semi-darkness, bumping into a lot of things, gradually discerning the outlines of the major pieces of furniture in the room, and hoping to do more good than harm.” I would add that we usually do more harm when we are most convinced we are doing good. (Consider Latin America in the 1980s, or Iraq in 2003.)

**Progressives’ approach to democracy promotion also needs to be more patient.** Too often, we fall into one of two equal and opposite errors when contemplating undemocratic societies. Either we fool ourselves into thinking that a decade or so of carefully tailored aid packages, diplomacy, and technical assistance will produce “democracy” in short order (which virtually never happens), or we become cynical and despondent when things fail to change on schedule, and conclude instead that the society at issue is somehow “not ready” for democracy (the powerless don’t want it), so we might as well give up and simply accept the repressive status quo.

It’s worth recalling that our own democracy was hardly created overnight. American democracy didn’t come about in a decade or two thanks to generous aid from foreign benefactors. It didn’t develop as a result of ten years of technical assistance supplied by well-meaning international bureaucrats or nicely packaged loans from the World Bank. On the contrary. It was a long hard slog from ancient Greece to the Magna Carta, from the English Bill of Rights to the Declaration of Independence, from abolitionism to the Nineteenth Amendment. It’s still a long hard slog today, full of backsliding. **And if it took centuries of struggle to get to the messy and imperfect form of democracy we have now, why imagine that other societies can transition or transform into democracies overnight?**

In short, modern communications and transport technologies have accelerated the pace of cultural change, but embargoing digital beers and nude teen Star Trek. The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report cites some academics who suggest that it takes a country’s average citizens ten years to develop the skills and institutions needed to make democracy work. I’m skeptical of this, but it is an important reminder that we need to think about the long, complex project of building democratic societies, even where those societies are partially and unevenly liberalized or democratized. This is true for Latin America, for Iraq, for countries that have gone through real and messy transitions, and for countries that have never been anything like democracies to begin with. Time honored principles need to be understood, embraced, and broadened.

**But we do need a more thoughtful and principled approach for deciding when and how we should get directly involved in democracy.**
promotion in a particular society, and when we should remain in the role of sympathetic bystander. So how’s Obama doing? The Bush Administration largely made a hash of democracy promotion, despite recent revisionist attempts to claim credit for the Arab Spring. Has Obama done any better, so far? On the whole, yes. It took a while—at first, the Administration’s approach to democracy promotion could be most generously characterized as mendacious avoidance—but by the late spring of 2011 Obama had found his way to a sober, principled stance: It’s not America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo—it was the people themselves who launched these movements, and it’s the people themselves that must ultimately determine their outcome. Not every country will follow our particular form of representative democracy, and there will be times when our short-term interests don’t align perfectly with our long-term vision for the region. But we can, and we will, speak out for a set of core principles... [We oppose] the use of violence and repression... [support] a set of universal rights... [and] support political and economic reform. Obama’s May 2011 speech was a good one—an excellent one, in fact—though its subtler messages were almost entirely overshadowed by a brief reference to the appropriate borders for a Palestinian state. Putting our principles into practice will be an enormous challenge—and so far, the jury is still out on whether the Obama Administration is truly serious about the project. It should be—it can be. But will it be?
Sovereignty

Democracy promotion is key to self-determination, and autocracies don’t have a right to non-interference

Glennon and Ackerman 7

Second, the emergence of internationally protected rights to information exchange, civic participation and democratic governance undermines the autocrats’ protestations against intervention. Talleyrand’s famous quip about non-intervention being “a metaphysical term which means about the same as intervention” may go a step too far, because even today there still exist unlawful forms of intervention, such as state-sponsored assassination or kidnapping. However, it is closer to juridical truth today than ever before. This is particularly true with the advent of internationally recognized human rights. Since 1945, explicit international restrictions have increasingly reached within state boundaries to prevent governments from denying basic rights to their citizenry. Central to these rights is the right to information exchange. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” This right is reinforced by the long-recognized right of free assembly, codified along with it in virtually all human rights legal instruments. Such rights suggest the existence of other, implicit rights that are necessary to give them meaning. The right to exchange information, for example, would be empty without a right to gather information and communicate it effectively. The protection of these rights by international law has gone hand in hand with the global advance of democratic self-government. The most profound event of the 20th century, as Thomas M. Franck has written, may well prove to be the “almost-complete triumph of the democratic notions of Hume, Locke, Jefferson and Madison—in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Asia.” 1 That triumph is reflected in the words of numerous international agreements and UN General Assembly resolutions. Their net effect is to make clear that, in the words of the Universal Declaration: “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.” The will of the people is now the accepted basis of governmental authority, as the 2000 Warsaw Declaration declared. That authority must be expressed “by exercise of the right and civic duties of citizens to choose their representatives through regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation.” More than a hundred nations now join in the Declaration. Third, the original rationale behind the non-intervention norm has become illogical in current circumstances. That rationale was intended to ensure that a state remains free to choose its own political system. But in the modern world, as Lori Damrosch puts it, “A state ‘freely’ chooses its political system only when its people are free to choose.” 22. Damrosch, “Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs”, American Journal of International Law (January 1989). Efforts to strengthen the people’s ability to select their governmental system, even efforts aided from abroad, advance the purpose of the non-intervention norm by enhancing opportunities for self-determination. The original rationale for the norm thus supports, rather than disallows, actions by states and organizations to foster democratic governance and accountability in other states. Of course, the line between democracy and autocracy is not always distinct. The advance of freedom often travels a circuitous path, with apparent advances in one category (electoral process, for example) accompanying real setbacks in another (such as free expression). These countervailing trends create confusion that foes of democracy can exploit. Indeed, the National Endowment for Democracy’s 2006 report, “The Backlash against Democracy Assistance”, describes “the emergence of semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes characterized by superficially democratic processes that disguise and help legitimate authoritarian rule.” There are currently anywhere from 45 to sixty such regimes. Some present no obstacles to democracy promotion; others seek, in one way or another, to quash it. Thus the lawfulness of specific state regulations that restrict democracy assistance will always depend on the facts of each case—whether the law’s aim is to stifle democratic advocacy, whether it effectuates a legitimate state policy objective, whether it discriminates on its face, whether it is enforced even-handedly, and whether a more narrowly tailored regulation could achieve the same end. Part of the answer to these questions will always lie in the nature of the regime promulgating the regulations.
Whatever the level of a state’s commitment to freedom, however, international law as it exists today counsels that the presumption is on the side of democracy promotion. The governing principle is the same in all cases: Where a given regulation is part of a larger scheme aimed at depriving groups or individuals of internationally protected human rights, it violates international law. **Even democracy promotion in its most controversial form—the provision of information and resources to promote non-violent civic disruption—is therefore consistent with widely accepted international standards. Its beneficiaries have a right to receive it. Its providers have a right to give it. And neither an autocrat-in-full nor an autocrat “lite” has any right to obstruct it.** Let us not be confused by those who would conflate democracy promotion with other, less savory features of current U.S. foreign policy. An irreducible truth remains: Peacefully providing information and resources in response to requests from those waging a non-violent struggle for their freedom is a far cry from invading a country and offering its population unrequested “assistance”—in promoting democracy or anything else. President Putin is correct that, in centuries past, international law did little to stop the exploitation of colonial peoples and the plundering of their resources under the cover of a “civilizing mission.” He is wrong, however, to equate contemporary democracy promotion to European colonialism. Democracy today is not a “white man’s” idea; it is heard from West Papua to Western Sahara, from Belarus to Tibet. Its success, as its best advocates know, depends upon indigenous initiative and energy, not foreign influence or pressure. **Democracy promotion does not deny any peoples’ right to self-determination; it gives life to that right.**
Stability / Terror

Democracy reduces the likelihood of conflict and terrorism

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In this sense, democracy is an inevitable concomitant to a belief in human fallibility. And it is on this basis that progressives should champion democracy: because democracy is the only form of governance to enshrine the capacity for self-correction, debate, and argument. Democracy is what lets us struggle through our mistakes and learn. Democracy is no guarantor of wise political decision-making, but lack of democracy correlates with stagnation and conflict. There is ample empirical evidence for this claim: Democracies are far more likely than autocracies or failed states to be prosperous, stable, and safe. Democracies form the backbone of the international institutions that, while imperfect, have helped minimize and manage conflict since World War II. Democracies produce and export far fewer violent extremists than repressive societies. This understanding of democracy suggests that promoting democracy abroad can be both principled and pragmatic. Democracy is a human fail-safe. Things can go badly wrong in democracies, but it is hard for them to go badly wrong forever.
US democracy promotion in the Middle East solves terrorism—authoritarian regimes are a breeding ground for recruits


America is a good and a great nation, founded on values of freedom, liberty and individual rights. It is right that we should use our position as the world’s only superpower to spread freedom, democracy and economic opportunity. Promoting democracy in the Middle East is also one of the best ways to ensure our victory in the war on terror. America is at war with enemies driven by a radical ideological hatred to destroy us and all we stand for. These terrorists weren’t created by U.S. policy. They are religious zealots who will stop at nothing to further their aim of establishing a global caliphate in which individual lives have no value, women are oppressed and the only legitimate faith is a perverted version of Islam. The leaders of al Qaeda can’t prevail alone. Their cause depends upon recruits. They must convince young men and women that they have no hope for a better future here on Earth. They must convince them to strap on bombs and kill as many innocents as possible. For decades, terror leaders have been feeding on young people living in despair under authoritarian regimes with closed and decaying economic systems and schools that teach hatred and intolerance. America must work with the forces of freedom and moderation in today’s Middle East to change this deadly status quo. To win the war on terror, America must defeat today’s terrorists and prevent the recruitment of tomorrow’s. One of the best ways to prevent recruitment is to make clear that life holds real opportunity. Young people in the Arab world as elsewhere yearn for the freedom to be heard, to stand for something larger than self, to control their own destinies and to choose their own leaders. Only democracy can fulfill these aspirations. Al Qaeda’s worst enemy is a democratically elected government giving voice to its people’s hopes and dreams. They know that people don’t choose to be ruled by al Qaeda. One need only read the captured writings of former al Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Musab al Zarqawi to understand the fear democracy strikes into the hearts of terrorists.

Democracy promotion is key to stop terrorism—empirics prove—democracy’s better than the alternatives


Crises have a way of provoking interesting, occasionally useful intellectual debates. September 11 was no exception, forcing foreign policy analysts and policymakers to grapple with bigger ideas. Oddly enough, it was some in the Republican Party who made perhaps the most radical argument, that the attacks that day were, in fact, a direct result of Middle East’s
In the absence of freedom, Arabs lacked legitimate outlets to express their political grievances, making them more likely to resort to political violence and terrorism. This formed the intellectual justification for the Bush administration’s rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion and for what would later become the "forward strategy for freedom." As President George W. Bush and senior officials like Condoleezza Rice were fond of saying, “the status quo is untenable.” The status quo was untenable. But to draw a link between Bush’s policies and the Arab revolts -- as some neoconservatives insist on doing -- makes little sense. In Arab eyes, Iraq became a model not of what to do, but what to avoid. That said, actions have unintended consequences. Would the Arab spring have happened without September 11? With so many variables at play, it is a difficult counterfactual to entertain. What we do know, though, is that the 2000s, alongside Bush’s democracy promotion program, were a breakthrough for democracy in the region. December 12, 2004 saw Egypt’s first explicitly anti-Mubarak protest. Soon, protests became a routine sight in the streets of Cairo. The numbers were rarely overwhelming but a precedent, at least, had been set. Across the region, elections, however fraudulent, offered a semblance of competition. There was something to fight for. Whatever its faults, and whatever its intent, the Bush administration had helped inject democracy and democracy promotion into Arab public discourse. The story then took a tragic turn. By 2006, the Bush administration had backed away from democracy promotion, reverting to the "stability paradigm" of previous decades. Autocratic regimes were as emboldened as ever. They -- sometimes with brute repression, sometimes with a dash of subtlety -- cracked down on the opposition. In Egypt, the period between 2006 and 2010 was likely the worst since the 1960s. In Jordan, another close U.S. ally, the regime presided over what were arguably the most fraudulent elections in the country’s modern history. The Bush administration didn’t act on its own ideas. But the ideas were there. In the long run, democracy promotion remains the best and most effective way to fight terrorism. That such a notion came to be associated with such an unpopular president made it easy to dismiss. The academic literature, however, appears to lend it support. Drawing on considerable empirical data, Alan Kruger -- who is now, interestingly, President Barack Obama’s pick to head the Council of Economic Advisers -- found that "terrorists are more likely to come from countries that suppress political and civil rights." Reviewing the evidence, Steven Brooke and I made the argument for a causal link between lack of democracy and the incidence of terrorism in this 2010 Policy Review article. As Egypt and Libya -- formerly two of the more flagrant exporters of terrorists -- democratize, scholars will be better able to test the hypothesis. But, with or without the data, what we see right in front of us tells a powerful story. The triumph of democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia can do what all the "hard" counter-terrorism measures can’t -- discredit al-Qaeda’s narrative that political change can come only through violence. So, yes, the advent of democracy is likely to contain the spread of violent extremism. But it is, of course, no panacea. Democracy, more often than we like to think, empowers radical and illiberal forces. Even the best established democracies struggle with this reality. In countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, far-right populists are the second or third largest parties in parliament. The United States has its own particular Tea Party variant. The Arab world will prove no exception. But if there are going to be radicals -- and there almost always will -- then better to incorporate them in the democratic process. There, they can promote their illiberalism through peaceful means within the confines of a credible political system. It’s not perfect. At times, it can even be dangerous. But it’s better than the alternative.
War

Democracies are less likely to start wars—as democratic norms spread, even autocracies will become less violent

Kinsella and Rousseau 8


Democratic norms and conflict resolution Many explanations of democratic peace emphasize the socialization of political leaders within their domestic political environments (Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Huth and Allee 2002). This argument has two parts. First, democratic political elites have risen to positions of leadership within a political system that emphasizes compromise and nonviolence. Conflicts of interest in democracies are usually resolved through negotiation and log-rolling. Losing a political battle does not result in the loss of political rights or exclusion from future political competition. Moreover, coercion and violence are not considered legitimate means for resolving conflicts. Conversely, political leaders in nondemocratic states are socialized in an environment in which politics is more akin to a zero-sum game in which rivals and those on the losing end of political struggles are regularly removed from the game. Coercion and violence are more widely accepted as legitimate means for resolving political conflicts. In general, political leaders in autocracies are more likely to impose decisions rather than compromise when dealing with the opposition. Second, the argument assumes that domestic political norms are externalized by decision makers when they become embroiled in international disputes. Presidents and prime ministers approach conflicts of interest in the international environment in much the same way they approach conflicts in the domestic environment, and with conflict-resolution skills honed by their domestic political experiences. Compared to their counterparts in authoritarian regimes, democratic leaders are more likely to seek negotiation, mediation, or arbitration (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994). Their approach to international conflict resolution reduces the likelihood that an international dispute will escalate into a militarized crisis and war.

Explanations for both the monadic and dyadic versions of democratic peace imply that as the number of democracies in the international system increase, the number of interstate wars will fall. However, the literature also identifies causal processes operating at the systemic level. As democratic practices spread globally—that is, as they become internalized by more societies and are reflected in public policymaking—the international system is increasingly “saturated” with democratic culture and norms of peaceful conflict resolution. In an international society in which democratic practice is so commonly viewed as legitimate and effective, the methods of conflict resolution employed by democratic states have a greater probability of being reflected in the behavior of nondemocratic states as well. When viewing the international system as a whole, then, we should observe fewer interstate conflicts. Testing arguments operating at the systemic level of analysis is difficult; a correlation between two variables at the systemic level (e.g. number of wars and the percentage of nondemocracies) may be expected even if the causal relationships are limited to those hypothesized for the monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace (Rousseau and Kim 2005; Gartzke and Weisiger 2006). Problems of inference notwithstanding, statistical analyses of the systemic normative argument have provided some
support for the system-level claim (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; McLaughlin et al. 1999; Crescenzi et al. 2005).
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Ineffective

Big study on democracy promotion says no impact

Durac 09

Scepticism regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid for democracy is reinforced by the findings of a study on the impact of aid on democratisation in ‘a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975 – 2000’ which came to the stark conclusion that ‘no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy’ (Knack 2004, p. 251). However, while there may be no scholarly consensus regarding the contribution that external promotion of democracy can make to political reform, nonetheless, in relation to Egypt, as elsewhere in the Middle East, major international actors in the form of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) express themselves to be committed to these ends. This paper examines the impact of current Western policies, specifically those of the European Union and the United States, seeking to promote political change in Egypt, on the overall distribution of political power in that country. It is argued that these policies are fatally undermined by the incoherence and inconsistency that are their primary characteristics. Furthermore, such is the scale of inconsistency between the asserted aim of supporting political change and that of maintaining a stable and friendly Egypt that current policies have the paradoxical effect of strengthening, rather than challenging the position of a regime that is deeply undemocratic, and which has limited regard for the human rights of its citizens.

Democracy promotion backfires – ideological opposition to the U.S., no long-term solvency, and the U.S. gives up in favor of more ‘realist’ goals

Durac and Cavatorta 09

In addition, the evidence gathered indicates that the promotion of democracy, irrespective of the intentions of its promoters, takes the backseat when confronted with more realist goals. While this might be satisfactory in the short-term as it seems to guarantee a positive outcome for both the EU and the US, the long-term effects of such a choice might be much more problematic. Specifically, all of the double-talk about democracy in the Middle East and North Africa has profound and negative domestic implications. In a country such as Tunisia, (but also in Egypt and elsewhere), it gives false hope to local activists and actors, while doing next to nothing to undo the structures which preclude meaningful popular political participation. In turn, this has three further effects. First, it brings the whole idea and the ‘ideal’ of democracy into disrepute thereby legitimizing the ideological discourse of those who articulate the rejection of democratic governance. Second, it further diminishes the credibility of the US and other Western actors as promoters/supporters of democracy in the region. Thus, even those who are favourable to a Western-style democracy feel compelled to distance themselves from its external proponents. This makes both the US and the EU lose important constituencies. Finally, and paradoxically, the incumbent regimes continue to enjoy all the fruits of office, unchallenged by the very policies ostensibly designed as their undoing.
The aff leads to backlash against foreign interference that saps energy from internal pressures to reform government
Maogoto and Coleman 14


Finally, turning to Bayat once again, he perceives of the development of democracy in the Middle East in this manner: *‘Freedom from foreign domination took precedence over freedom at home.’* 163 This quote answers in part the question asked by former President Bush Jr. mentioned earlier: ‘Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty?’ 164 Bayat’s wisdom is important, the peoples of the Arab Spring were denied liberty, and by freeing their attention from foreign subjugation, the peoples of the Arab Spring have finally been able to focus their attention to domination and internal subjugation: there’s no need to turn back the clock and redirect their attention to fight imaginary or real foreign intervention again. To do so will stall the democratic transition, so the West, including Israel needs to tread very carefully indeed, and not interfere.

Democracy promotion undermines the US’s security interests
Fein 14


The U.S. government should cease its arrogant and ill-informed attempts to promote democracy around the globe — whether in Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, Communist China, Ukraine, Burma or otherwise. The attempts are extraneous to the purposes of the United States Constitution. Democratically elected leaders can be every bit as tyrannical and aggressive towards the United States as unelected dictators. Hamas, listed as an international terrorist organization, decisively triumphed in Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. It has ruled in Gaza since 2007, routinely denies human rights, chronically attacks Israel, and execrates the United States. Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, proved as much or more contemptuous of the rule of law, human rights and amity towards Israel and the United States than his dictatorial predecessor, Hosni Mubarak. Thus, the United States shed only crocodile tears when he was overthrown in a military coup. Adolf Hitler climbed to power through popular elections. His Nationalist Socialists captured more than 37 percent of the vote in 1932 to become the largest party in the Reichstag. Free and fair elections in Saudi Arabia would yield victory for radical Islamic parties with affinity and sympathy for the murderous perpetrators of 9/11. In sum, promoting democracy in foreign lands may aggravate rather than diminish threats to perceived interests of the United States. Thus, we have supported dictators over democrats in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Indonesia, Argentina, Bahrain, Kuwait, Cambodia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Spain, the Philippines, ad infinitum.
Democracy promotion is ineffective—history proves—democracy can’t be imposed because it requires underlying cultural shifts

Fein 14

In any event, democracy promotion is overwhelmingly a fool’s errand. The process is vastly too complex for us to master or to jump start. Sending nations copies of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution will not do. Words without a reinforcing political culture are worthless. Iraq’s Constitution prohibits laws that contradict the “principles of democracy.” But Salmon Rushdie would be killed if he attempted to sell The Satanic Verses in Baghdad. We also forget that democracy in the United States evolved over more than seven centuries. We cannot expect more from other peoples. Anglo-American democracy was born with the Magna Carta to check the absolutism of King John in 1215 on the fields of Runnymede. Through succeeding centuries and periodic civil wars, the powers of Parliament strengthened and the powers of the King diminished. Landmarks included the Grand Remonstrance, the beheading of Charles I by Oliver Cromwell, and the English Bill of Rights of 1688. American colonists claimed the rights of British freemen. They soon took on the trappings of democracy with the Virginia House of Burgesses, the Mayflower Compact, the Connecticut Charter Oak, the Maryland Toleration Act, etc. The United States Constitution was not drafted until 1787, more than five centuries after Magna Carta. Democratic principles did not completely triumph until the Civil War Amendments ending slavery and enfranchising blacks, and the Women’s Suffrage Amendment ending their disenfranchisement in 1919. Blacks did not de facto enjoy the right to vote until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, more seven and one-half centuries since the road to democracy began at Runnymede. It was facilitated in the United States by a literate society, a homogeneity of ethnicity, culture and language, natural boundaries, and an unprecedented array of profound and selfless leaders, for example, George Washington and James Madison. Despite these vast advantages, the United States still needed a bloody Civil War and an obscenely prolonged period of Jim Crow before finally achieving substantial national unity and racial justice. In light of our own seven-century journey to democracy, the idea that we can install democratic dispensations in nations that are at the pre-Magna Carta stage of political maturity and lacking our peculiar cultural advantages is delusional. Our miserable track record speaks for itself, including South Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Burma, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Bahrain. Taiwan moved into a democratic orbit in 1988 after the deaths of dictators Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, and South Korea did the same after military strongman Chun Doo Hwan left office. But these democratic movements were indigenous. The United States was complacent with reliable, friendly, and anti-democratic leadership. At best, democracy promotion is harmless — like shouting at the weather. At worst, it is counterproductive. Many societies are insufficiently mature, literate, and homogeneous to for its practice. Democracy in these places degenerates into majoritarian, sectarian, or tribal tyrannies notwithstanding formal elections. Russia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Sudan are emblematic. Democracy is given a bad name, which may handicap its return at a more propitious time. Our energies should be devoted to purging the evils from our own democracy. We should then be satisfied with influencing developments abroad by example, simpliciter.

Democracy promotion can’t overcome the closing space challenge—autocrats are restricting local NGOs, making civil society support less effective

Bush 15
People around the world were watching as Burma voted Sunday. The results of the election — the first there since the end of 50 years of military rule — will be pivotal for the country, also known as Myanmar. A number of international election observer groups have been present, attempting to evaluate whether the process is truly free and fair amid a number of concerns about state repression, discrimination against the Rohingya minority and post-election violence. In Burma and elsewhere, the ability of the international community to successfully promote democracy is being questioned. According to some observers, we are in an era of “resurgent dictatorship.”

Although this phenomenon has a number of dimensions, one prominent characteristic of the authoritarian backlash against democracy is the proliferation of domestic laws restricting the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and preventing foreign funding of local NGOs.

As James Savage of Amnesty International said in a recent interview, “This global wave of restrictions has a rapidity and breadth to its spread we’ve not seen before, that arguably represents a seismic shift and closing down of human rights space not seen in a generation.” A number of countries have been in the headlines this year for enacting these restrictive laws, which Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace refers to as the “closing space challenge.”

Russia made the news in July when it banned the National Endowment for Democracy from working within its borders. China also has been considering measures that would regulate and significantly hamper foreign NGOs. Although Russia and China may be among the most prominent countries engaging in these tactics, they are hardly unique. In 2013, Darin Christensen and Jeremy Weinstein examined 98 countries and found most had either prohibited or restricted foreign funding for local NGOs. Moreover, an examination of a complete sample of states between 1993 and 2012 by Kendra Dupuy, James Ron and Aseem Prakash found that 45 countries had adopted similarly restrictive laws. The passage of laws that target foreign support for civil society has had significant consequences for international efforts to advance democracy and human rights in the developing world. Since the 1980s, there has been a tremendous growth in foreign aid programs designed to advance democracy and human rights. As I document in my recent book, the United States has been a leader on this front, giving about $3 billion annually in recent years to democracy assistance programs. In addition, most European democracies — including recently transitioned states — and international institutions have been major donors.

Foreign aid programs supporting democracy and human rights in the developing world pursue a number of activities. They support the capacity of local civil society organizations, train journalists and election officials, and encourage women’s political participation. In the end, these activities are designed to encourage countries’ democratic transition and consolidation.

Yet the restrictions that many countries are placing on the work of democracy promoters make it difficult for organizations engaged in democracy assistance to choose the programs that they think are most likely to lead to democratization. In other words, countries’ restrictions increasingly encourage what I refer to as a “tame” approach to aiding democracy abroad. Restrictions on foreign-funded activities are not limited to the passage of laws — they also include informal tactics. Consider an example from my field research in Jordan. In 2012, I spoke to a woman working for an NGO who had prepared for months to host a training session for political parties. On the day of the workshop, several men who were not on her participant list showed up. The men sat quietly throughout the workshop, taking notes and observing the day’s events but not participating in the activities on crafting messages, developing platforms and designing voter outreach. As the workshop continued, the other participants became uncomfortable. Although the men had introduced themselves as members of an unidentified political party, it was clear to her that they were observers from the Mukhabarat, Jordan’s omnipresent and highly professional General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Unfortunately, such an anecdote is becoming increasingly familiar for NGO employees and funders from Cairo to Beijing. People in the field of democracy assistance must worry about maintaining good relations with the governments in the countries where they work. And those governments carefully monitor the foreign-funded programs within their borders. The end result is that it is harder than ever for states to directly and effectively aid democracy overseas.

Sometimes, the consequence is the cessation of foreign NGOs and foreign funding of local NGOs. This year, the headline-grabbing 2013 convictions of 43 people working for foreign and foreign-funded NGOs have been followed by yet more state repression of domestic civil society. Other times, the foreign NGOs and foreign-funded domestic NGOs are allowed to continue their work but must switch tactics to a tamer form of democracy assistance that refrains from directly confronting undemocratic rulers and sometimes even cooperates with them. In Azerbaijan, programs supporting women and youths in undemocratic environments have been criticized for failing to support meaningful social change. While the direct repression of foreign NGOs may be more shocking and newsworthy now, the indirect suppression and co-optation of these organizations may ultimately prove an even greater obstacle to democracy promotion in the years to come.

Islam

Islam is incompatible with democracy
Maogoto and Coleman 14

Islamists may argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam because democracy is based on pluralism, and an emphasis on diversity rather than homogeneity. A basic tenet of pluralism is that no single person, group or school of thought can claim to possess the ‘truth’. This tenet conflicts with some interpretations of some verses of the Quran, which state that Islam is the only source, the single source of truth. Consequently Islamists believe that Islam provides all the answers on how to live holistically. Essentially it is a code and a framework that covers all aspects of existence—moral, social, economic and political; in sum a complete system that ‘...respond[s] to all human problems.’21 This holistic system is based on the concept that only God is truly sovereign—not the ‘people’, another fundamental component of democratic thought.22

Aff leads to backlash
Maogoto and Coleman 14

At first glance, Islamist opposition to democracy can be explained simply: democracy due to the energetic crusading efforts of the West is viewed not only as a predominantly Western concept but the prevailing theme of modern Western political thought and as the standard to judge the efficacy of all other governance systems. In essence then, democracy offers a non-Arabic solution to address the grievances faced by many of the peoples of the Arab Spring. This latter point is particularly galling (and ironic) to Islamists who perceive the West to be responsible for the grievances suffered by the Arab peoples. Additionally democracy is seen as part of the package of Western liberalism and dominance, and its implementation a continuance of the pillage of non-Western, Islamic values, wealth, and potential. Seeking to protect human rights (including the equality of women, freedom of religion) two areas at the forefront of criticism of Islam by Western commentators is seen as hypocritical given the perceived evils of Western liberal society in tearing the social and moral fabric of society through vices such as pornography, alcoholism, sexual liberalism, crime, drug abuse and political corruption.33 Consequently, Islamists argue that any attempt to reconcile Islam (or to even argue that political participation is and always has been part of Islam) with democratic principles is a corruption of Islam, and any attempt to move away from strict application of Islamic teachings—Shari’a—in a sense continues the West’s enslavement of the Arabs, and non-Western people.
No Credibility

U.S. has ZERO credibility in promoting democracy in the Middle East – there will be backlash and the aff grows extremism

Durac 09


US policies on democracy promotion in North Africa and the Middle East have also met with considerable criticism. Firstly, the credibility of the US as a promoter of democratic political change in the region has frequently been called into question. The widespread perception throughout the Muslim world that the US is one-sided in its approach to the Palestine – Israel question, the invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent traumatic experiences of that country under what many Arabs clearly regard as occupation by foreign forces, and in particular, the maltreatment of Arab and Muslim prisoners in American controlled detention centres in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are some of the issues which limit the credibility of the US as an agent of desirable political reform in the Middle East. The Tunisian human rights activist, Moncef Marzouki, has written of the ‘the total lack of credibility of the US policy to promote democracy in the Arab world; suggesting rather that ‘US policy as a whole greatly facilitates the growth of extremist Islamist forces’ (quoted in Achcar 2004).8
No Empirics

There are no widescale, methodologically sound studies on democracy promotion Durac 09

Other commentators, however, do not share this largely unquestioning faith in the capacity of external democracy promotion to effect political change. A number of writers have commented on methodological and other difficulties in evaluating ‘democracy assistance’. Crawford suggests that some of these include the inappropriateness of conventional methodologies for evaluating the impact of development assistance in the context of complex political dynamics, as well as the dangers of donor-led enquiry into the efficacy of donor programmes. (Crawford 2003, p. 95) Similar methodological issues to do with evaluating the impact of democracy promotion are raised by Green and Kohl. They point to a number of obstacles to conducting quality research on the effectiveness of aid and, especially, ‘democracy and governance’ assistance. These range from problems of demonstrating causality, the availability or quality of data, the definition of ‘case’ and the possibility of bias in country selection. They conclude in the absence of a credible body of research analysing the impact of democracy assistance and suggest that this is due in part to ‘a fundamental difference in orientation between the retrospective approach of academics (interest in what was) and the prospective approach of donor agencies (concerned with what could be)’ (2007, p.
No Overthrow

There’s a natural psychological pressure against overthrowing a regime, and even if it works, violence only begets more violence – no stability

Maogoto and Coleman 14


Finally, it is no easy thing to overthrow a State. There is a ‘natural’ and very significant psychological hurdle that any revolutionary group must overcome, namely defying the perceived rightful authority of the State.81 Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall note: ...men can acquire in the socialization process perceptions of the regime as an ultimate source of authority, internalize prohibitions against aggression toward it, and at the same time respond to it as the added problem of the means by which a State is overthrown. For violence to become accepted as a means to an end the group must overcome any pre-established norms against violence.83 However, the psychological authority of the State is not insurmountable, and social norms regarding the use of violence will change. One way to change social norms is to change the environment in which those norms operate. As Gordon Allport stated in ‘The Role of Expectancy’: ‘Aggression breeds aggression. One comes to expect aggression to be a way of solving all problems...Thus aggression is pretty much of a habit; the more you express it the more you have of it.’84A group must be exposed to the viability of violence85: ‘Men who believe that it [violence] is both proper and useful are more likely to resort to it than men who think it is neither.’86 The insight we can derive from the world’s political history is that a structural readjustment of the incongruence between state and peoples that is achieved by violence tends to engender new cycles of violence, by and against communities that feel themselves disadvantaged in the new structure and become determined to subvert it.
Terror DA

Promoting democracy would mean ending key tactics in the War on Terror
Lilli 15

Some counterterrorism practices employed by the United States in its post-9/11 Global War on Terror have proved especially at odds with the US stated objective of advancing democratic values abroad. First, there is the ongoing practice of indefinite detention of mostly Middle Eastern terrorist suspects at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. According to a senior UN human rights official, “the continuing indefinite incarceration of many of the detainees [in Guantanamo] amounts to arbitrary detention and is in clear breach of international law.” (The World Post, 2013) Second, there were what then US Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld defined as “enhanced interrogation techniques”. An Orwellian way to describe interrogation practices, such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and forced-feeding, that many authoritative sources, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, criticized as plain torture. (Lewis, 2004) Finally, there was a highly classified CIA program of extraordinary rendition and secret detention. We now know that the CIA program consisted in terrorist suspects being secretly flown outside the United States to be interrogated by foreign governments that used torture, or by the CIA itself in clandestine “black sites” using torture techniques. (Open Society Foundations, 2013) Although these practices clearly infringed the very values the United States claims to stand for, US officials deemed them necessary to disrupt terrorist networks and protect the nation against further attacks.

A big study denies the aff – democracy promotion leads to more extremism and terrorist-backing states
Piazza 07

[Methodology:] This study seeks to add to the discussion of dictatorship and state failures as root causes of terrorism by conducting a cross-national, pooled, time-series statistical regression analysis on the incidence of terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern states from 1972 to 2003. The analysis is limited to the Middle East, specifically the cases of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, in order test the contention that democracy is a panacea for terrorism in the region of the world that U.S. foreign policymakers have chosen as their laboratory for their counterterrorism policy model and to also provide an empirical base to the largely descriptive and theoretical body of scholarship on terrorism produced by Middle Easternists2 (see, for example, Zunes 2003; Khashan 1997; Lewis 1987; Martin 1987; Amos 1985).

The results of this study are preliminary, but they do not lend support to the hypothesis that fostering democracy in the Middle East will provide a bulwark against terrorism. Rather, the results
suggest the opposite: that more liberal Middle-Eastern political systems are actually more susceptible to the threat of terrorism than are the more dictatorial regimes, as predicted by the strategic school approach to the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Furthermore, the result of the study do lend empirical support to the descriptive literature linking failed states to terrorism: those Middle-Eastern states with significant episodes of state failures are more likely to be the target of and the host for terrorists.

Their evidence assumes terrorists will be content with electoral outcomes—that’s illogical.

Gause 5

There are also logical problems with the argument supporting the U.S. push for democracy as part of the war on terrorism. Underlying the assertion that democracy will reduce terrorism is the belief that, able to participate openly in competitive politics and have their voices heard in the public square, potential terrorists and terrorist sympathizers would not need to resort to violence to achieve their goals. Even if they lost in one round of elections, the confidence that they could win in the future would inhibit the temptation to resort to extra-democratic means. The habits of democracy would ameliorate extremism and focus the anger of the Arab publics at their own governments, not at the United States. Well, maybe. But it is just as logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas that could mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based. If they could not achieve their goals through democratic politics, why would they privilege the democratic process over those goals? It seems more likely that, having been mobilized to participate in the democratic process by a burning desire to achieve particular goals -- a desire so strong that they were willing to commit acts of violence against defenseless civilians to realize it -- terrorists and potential terrorists would attack democracy if it did not produce their desired results.

Respect for the nascent Iraqi democracy, despite a very successful election in January 2005, has not stopped Iraqi and foreign terrorists from their campaign against the new political order. Terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small and secretive. They are not organized or based on democratic principles. They revolve around strong leaders and a cluster of committed followers who are willing to take actions from which the vast majority of people, even those who might support their political agenda, would rightly shrink. It seems unlikely that simply being outvoted would deflect them from their path.

Consensus of studies goes neg
Gause 5

Despite the wide acceptance of this connection, the academic literature on the relationship between terrorism and other socio-political indicators, such as democracy, is surprisingly scant. There are good case studies and general surveys of terrorists and terrorist organizations,
but few that try to determine whether more democracy leads to less terrorism. Part of the problem is the quality of the data available. The Western press tends to report terrorist incidents with a cross-border element more completely than homegrown terrorist attacks. Moreover, most of the statistics identify the location of an incident, but not the identity of the perpetrators -- and much less whether they came from nondemocratic countries. Given such incomplete information, only preliminary conclusions from the academic literature are possible. However, even these seem to discredit the supposedly close link between terrorism and authoritarianism that underlies the Bush administration's logic.

In a widely cited study of terrorist events in the 1980s, the political scientists William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg demonstrate that most terrorist incidents occur in democracies and that generally both the victims and the perpetrators are citizens of democracies. Examining incidents from 1975 to 1997, Pennsylvania State University's Quan Li has found that although terrorist attacks are less frequent when democratic political participation is high, the kind of checks that liberal democracy typically places on executive power seems to encourage terrorist actions. In his recent book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Robert Pape finds that the targets of suicide bombers are almost always democracies, but that the motivation of the groups behind those bombings is to fight against military occupation and for self-determination. Terrorists are not driven by a desire for democracy but by their opposition to what they see as foreign domination.

History proves they’re extremely wrong

Gause 5

F. Gregory Gause III (John H. Lindsey ’44 Chair, Professor of International Affairs and Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University). “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs. September/October 2005.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism

More anecdotal evidence also calls into question a necessary relationship between regime type and terrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of brutal terrorist organizations arose in democratic countries: the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Japanese Red Army in Japan, and the Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West Germany. The transition to democracy in Spain did not eliminate Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Basque separatist terrorism. Turkish democracy suffered through a decade of mounting political violence that lasted until the late 1970s. The strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has produced its own terrorists, including the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It appears that at least three of the suicide bombers in the London attacks of July were born and raised in the democratic United Kingdom. Nearly every day brings a painful reminder that real democratization in Iraq has been accompanied by serious terrorism. And a memorial in Oklahoma City testifies to the fact that even U.S. democracy has not been free of terrorism of domestic origins.

Empirics prove democracy promotion increases terrorism.

Piazza 7


The results of models 1 through 4 lend partial support to the strategic school, rather than the political access school, as it applies to Middle Eastern states. In Models 1 and 3, which examine international terrorist attacks only, specifically where the perpetrator and the target
or victim are of different national origins, Democracy (Polity IV) is a positive predictor of terrorism whereas FH Civil Liberties is a negative predictor. This suggests that terrorism is more likely to occur in Middle-Eastern states that are political democracies and that protect civil liberties. (Note that the operationalization of FH Civil Liberties is inverted—regimes that protect civil liberties are scored low on the scale)—so results are interpreted using the opposite sign of results for Democracy (Polity IV). However, when terrorism is measured as both domestic and international attacks by target, neither Democracy (Polity IV) nor FH Civil Liberties are significant. This is an interesting result because the two measurements of terrorism are logically and quantitatively—there are more total attacks coded per year when using the international and domestic aggregation—different. However, it is also possible that the different results found in models 1 and 3 and models 2 and 4 are due to the very different time-series used: the 26-year series (1972 to 1997) for international only versus the six year series (1998 to 2003) for the international combined with domestic. A more comparable span of data would be desirable, although presently unobtainable. However, across three of the first four models, State Failures is a strong, significant, and positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured. This suggests that Middle-Eastern states that suffer from state failures are more likely to both host groups that will commit terrorist acts at home and abroad and are also more likely to be the target of terrorist groups from other states. Moreover, in three of the four models, the coefficient for State Failures is the largest in the model, and the coefficients are significant at the highest (.000) level. Few of the control variables are significant across models 1–4, and there are two surprising results. Population is a significant predictor in models 1 and 3, as expected, but GDP is a significant positive predictor of terrorism in models 2 and 4 whereas Regime Durability is a significant negative predictor in model 2. The results for GDP and Regime Durability run counter to expectations, but it is telling that these counterintuitive results occur in the models with the shorter time series, as previously found. Table 4 presents the results of models 5 through 8, in which the dependent variable, terrorism, is sorted by source country among Middle-Eastern states. As in models 1 through 4, models 5 through 8 provide partial vindication for the strategic school at the expense of the political access school but leave some nagging questions. In Table 4, Democracy (Polity IV) is a consistent, significant positive predictor of terrorist attacks; however, FH Civil Liberties is not. That is to say that more politically liberal regimes in the Middle East, as measured by Polity IV, are more prone to harbor terrorist groups that commit terrorist acts either at home or abroad than are politically illiberal regimes. However, Middle-Eastern states that respect civil liberties—the very same freedoms that pose barriers to state actors who may seek to apprehend terrorists or quash terrorist networks— are no more likely than Middle-Eastern states with poor civil liberties protections to host terrorist groups. This is difficult to reconcile within the confines of the strategic school and either prompts a consideration of Middle-Eastern exceptionalism or a re-conceptualization of the relationship between the self-imposed limitations within democracies fighting terrorism. It may be possible that within the Middle East, mass political participation serves to inhibit governmental efforts to arrest terrorists and disrupt terrorist networks because the significant segments of the public regards them as having a legitimate political agenda. A cases in point would be Yemen, where Al Qaeda militants might enjoy some sympathy from a public that is permitted to participate in albeit incomplete elections. Or, a second possibility is that in countries where public outrage against terrorists has prompted an over-zealous antiterrorism policy from the government that itself fuels terrorist activity and recruitment. The case here would be Turkey, where public outrage against Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) attacks in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated a harsh antiterrorism policy that included torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and sentencing, and direct military reprisal against Kurdish civilians. These measures on the part of Turkish government security forces enhanced Kurdish support for the PKK’s objectives, thus assisting PKK recruitment, organization of safe houses, and procurement of supplies. Again, in models 5 through 8 state failures is a significant, at times highly significant, positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism. This illustrates that regardless of whether or not the Middle-Eastern state in question is considered to be a target of terrorist attacks or a source of terrorist attacks, terrorists thrive in countries beset with state failures. A few control variables are significant, and again yield results that counter expectations. GDP is a negative predictor of international terrorism in model 5, but is a positive predictor of terrorism in model 8, as is regime durability. Again, it is possible that sample size is responsible for these differences. Finally, all models are re-run omitting the potentially problematic case of Israel-Palestine, producing the results shown in Table 5. Roughly the same results are obtained in the modified data set analyzed in models 9 through 16. Democratic governance seems to be a somewhat consistent positive predictor of terrorism, while in at least one model (model 11), civil liberties protections are a positive predictor of international terrorism by source—given the negative relationship between FH Civil Liberties, an indicator where states exhibiting poor protections of civil rights are scored higher. Some support for the strategic school is found, although no support is evident for the political access school. And State Failures is a nearly perfectly consistent positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured or how terrorist attacks are sorted. Population, as a control variable, is significant in two of the models (9 and 11) and is a positive predictor, as expected. However, GDP and Regime Durability continue to exhibit inconsistent and counterintuitive results. Overall, models 9 through 16 dispel the possibility that the results found in Tables 1 and 2—that state failure is the most significant predictor of the incidence of terrorism, while democracy and civil liberties are more weakly associated with terrorist incidents—are a mere product of the inclusion of a set of observations from an outlier case: a combined Israel and Palestine. Conclusion The results of this study are preliminary, but they do not lend support to the hypothesis that fostering democracy in the Middle East will provide a bulwark against terrorism. Rather, the results suggest the opposite: that more liberal Middle-Eastern political systems are actually more susceptible to the threat of terrorism than are the more dictatorial regimes, as predicted by the strategic school approach to the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Furthermore, the result of the study do lend empirical support to the descriptive literature linking failed states to terrorism; those Middle-Eastern states with significant episodes of state failures are more likely to be the target of and the host for terrorists. Because the study examines multiple measurements of terrorism, by target and by source, multiple measures of political liberalization, democratic processes and civil liberties, and includes what is strangely
overlooked by other studies of democracy and terrorism, the role played by state failures, it contributes to scholarly understanding of the relationship between terrorism, democracy, and political stability while assessing the potential effectiveness of current antiterrorism policy. These findings have significant policy implications. The results suggests that a foreign policy toward the Middle East constructed around democracy promotion, or around widening of civil liberties, will not reap a significant security dividend in terms of terrorism. Rather, it may exacerbate the problems of terrorism, both within Middle-Eastern states and for other countries targeted by terrorist groups based in Middle-East states. These findings potentially dampen the enthusiasm of some scholars of the Middle East who have hoped that stalled (or nonexistent) efforts at democratization or the widening of rights through the creation of “civil society” in the Middle East would be revived as the beneficiaries of a new U.S. foreign policy imperative toward the region. For much of the past ten years, the Middle East has lagged far behind every other world region in terms of democratization, as noted previously, and the field of Middle East Studies has vainly searched for signs of nascent democratization among civil society actors in Middle-Eastern countries.
U.S. Gives Up

Security, stability, and the war on terror will conflict with the aff’s democracy promotion, and then the U.S. will just give up, most recent and comprehensive empirics in the Middle East prove

Lilli 15


Tunisia is a peripheral country in the Greater Middle East, both in terms of its geographic location and of its political, economic, and social influence. As a consequence, Tunisia was not a top-priority for US foreign policymakers. In spite of some level of military-to-military cooperation on issues of counterterrorism, the United States had not vital strategic interest in the bilateral relationship with the Tunisian government. When unrest broke out, the Obama administration expressed concern but announced that it was "not taking sides". (Clinton, 2011) As a matter of fact, the United States played no meaningful role during the popular uprising that led to the ouster of President Ben Ali. Although US policymakers have repeatedly described Tunisia as a key test case for democratic transitions in Middle Eastern states, the country remains of marginal importance for the United States and, as such, it has received relatively little political attention.

In Libya, the Obama administration confronted a foreign policy emergency where US ideal and strategic interests converged. US officials concluded that backing the Libyan uprising would serve the US ideal interests of spreading democratic values in the Greater Middle East, protecting civilians from the brutality of an oppressive regime, and avoiding a severe humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, US endorsement of the anti-Qaddafi opposition would contribute to the protection of a number of US strategic interests: fostering transatlantic relations, justifying the role of NATO in the 21st century, preventing violence from spreading and destabilizing Libya’s neighbors, and offering a public relations opportunity to rebut criticisms regarding the perceived US lack of support for the Arab Awakening. The US decision to decisively side with the Libyan opposition was also facilitated by the fact that, beyond some level of bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism and nonproliferation, the Obama administration had no fundamental national interest in keeping Colonel Qaddafi in power. However, US commitment to the success of the Libyan uprising ended soon after the military defeat of the Libyan regime. Deeply weary of embarking on yet another exercise of state building (especially after the recent costly experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan), the United States quickly disengaged from Libya, leaving the war-torn country plunging into a state of prolonged chaos.

At first glance, Syria also appeared to provide a case of convergence among different US national interests. In fact, the ideal interest of supporting protesters demanding more freedom, democracy, and better living conditions seemed compatible with the strategic interest of putting an end to an openly hostile regime. The Obama administration, therefore, proved initially keen to offer rhetorical support for the anti-Assad opposition and to exert economic and diplomatic pressure on the Syrian regime. With time, however, US officials became increasingly concerned about the growing influence of Islamist extremist groups within the ranks of the Syrian opposition. The US administration was caught between the understanding that the rule of President Assad had become untenable and serious concerns about the uncertainty of what would replace it. Consequently, the United States assumed a cautious policy of half-hearted support for the uprising that resulted in limited US military assistance to the Syrian armed opposition and rejections to repeated calls for direct US military intervention against Assad forces.

Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen presented the US administration with the difficult choice of either endorsing popular uprisings demanding democratic reforms or backing friendly Arab autocrats that had proved instrumental to the advancement of core US strategic interests. Eventually, the Obama administration adopted the US traditional Middle East policy (described above by Indyk and Pollack) of downplaying the promotion of US ideal interests in favor of the protection of US strategic ones. Hence, concerns about the future of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty led to the hesitation with which the Obama administration belatedly decided to espouse the Egyptian protesters’ call for President Mubarak’s immediate resignation. Likewise, the continuing strategic importance of stationing the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain limited the US administration’s response to the Bahraini government’s violent crackdown on the opposition mainly to expressions of mild criticism. Finally, US single-minded preoccupation with fighting Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula shaped the US response to unrest in Yemen.
Ensuing controversial US decisions have only strengthened the perception that the United States is not seriously committed to the cause of Arab democracy. In the aftermath of the Arab Awakening, the Obama administration proved especially keen on reestablishing business-as-usual relations with new and old Arab regimes that had responded to popular protests with increased political repression and human rights abuses. US policy toward Egypt is a case in point. Primarily concerned with maintaining cordial relations with Egypt’s military leaders, the Obama administration even refused to define the Egyptian military’s forced removal of a democratically-elected president in 2013 as a coup d’état; a definition, that according to US law, would have required the suspension of US bilateral aid to the country. The fact that Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was an Islamist formerly affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood was another important factor in the Obama administration’s decision not to take a strong stand against the military coup. Influential forces both inside and outside the United States were deeply uncomfortable with the idea of Islamists ruling Egypt and, therefore, they saw no compelling reason to oppose the coup. (Esposito, 2013)

Domestically, both Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress had repeatedly conveyed their skepticism about the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy. Internationally, US regional allies had also openly expressed their concerns. Israel, for example, feared that an Islamist-led Egyptian government would be more sympathetic toward the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas and perhaps decide to loosen or terminate the blockade against the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates, worried that an empowered Muslim Brotherhood would damage their religious legitimacy by offering a model of Islamic law different from the Wahhabi tradition of an absolute monarchy. The combination of these internal and external pressures certainly influenced President Obama’s response to the 2013 coup.

That turns the aff


All that considered, the events of these last few years have the potential to severely damage US current and future counterterrorism efforts in the Greater Middle East. To begin with, the hitherto failure of the Arab Awakening to significantly improve the political, economic, and social conditions of affected Arab countries has left the region open to extremist groups ready to exploit unresolved grievances, including widespread corruption, sectarian discrimination, high unemployment, and disregard for human rights. After that, the 2011 uprisings overwhelmingly started as peaceful protest movements. Because of the lack of meaningful success, disillusioned protesters may draw the dangerous conclusion that change in the Greater Middle East cannot be achieved by peaceful means; Arab protesters may buy into the extremists’ narrative that resorting to violence is their only chance to ameliorate their lot in life. Additionally, anti-Americanism was a negligible aspect during the early phases of the Awakening. Indeed, Arab protesters were predominantly calling for reforms in line with traditional US values and ideals. However, the Obama administration’s half-hearted support for the popular uprisings drew many criticisms, especially in the Greater Middle East, and it was deemed partly responsible for the eventual failure of the Arab Awakening to deliver meaningful change. In other words, the complex dynamics set in motion by the transformative events occurred since 2011 have sowed the seeds for future, wider, and possibly more anti-American, terrorist activity.

As of early 2015, clear signs of a renewed terrorist threat are already visible across the region. The proliferation of new and old extremist groups in almost every post-Arab Awakening country is hard to ignore. The Islamic State and the Nusra Front have undoubtedly emerged as two of the strongest actors involved in the Syrian civil war. Since the ouster of President Mubarak, the formation of Ansar Bayt al Maqdis has represented a persistent and challenging menace to Egypt’s stability. Three distinct extremist groups, sharing the common name Ansar al Sharia, have stepped up their operations in Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. In Yemen, AQAP remains perhaps the most dangerous of all Al Qaeda’s franchises. Even in relatively-quieter Bahrain, radical opposition factions have become more organized, claiming
responsibility for increasingly frequent violent actions. While these extremist groups primarily focus their attacks on local targets, US officials have identified them as credible threats to the United States or its allies, and to US national interests in the Greater Middle East. (Humud & others, 2014)

Democracy promotion will either support Islamist extremists in gaining power or will be given up, both turn the aff

Dalacoura 12

US democracy promotion in the Middle East fell victim, from the start, to tensions and frictions. Guantanamo Bay, extraordinary renditions and abetting torture, invading Iraq under what turned out to be false pretences (weapons of mass destruction were not found), all further de-legitimized the policy. Making democracy pivotal in US foreign policy discourse while linking it to US interests, and forcefully intervening in the Middle East to protect the latter, made the chasm between the rhetoric of democracy and the practice of serving US interests wider under Bush than under any previous US administration. It profoundly damaged the legitimacy of both the United States and the democratic ideals it purportedly stood for in the Middle East. Far from championing universal values, the policy of democracy promotion was perceived as a means of bolstering US interests to the detriment of regional ones. US democracy promotion was seen as wedded to US attempts to maintain political, economic, military and cultural dominance. (20)

As a result of these failures and contradictions, the policy of democracy promotion was gradually abandoned from around the middle of the 2000s. But there was another, more important reason for the change of direction: the realization that, in the short term, democracy promotion would lead to the strengthening of Islamist groups through the electoral process. In December 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt scored an important victory in the parliamentary elections by winning 88 seats. In January 2006, Hamas won the national elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In both cases, particularly the former, US pressure to respect democratic processes was partly a cause of its perceived enemies winning considerable power, to the detriment of its allies, Hosni Mubarak and Mahmoud Abbas.

This paper does not constitute an overall evaluation of US democracy promotion in the Middle East in the post-9/11 period. Instead, it is a comment on the flawed premise on which the policy rested. Democracy promotion as a way of countering terrorism in post-9/11 Middle East was a red herring because -- as shown above -- democratization would not have solved the terrorism problem. Although this was not the only reason for the failure of the democracy promotion policy, it did impact negatively on it in important ways.

Linking democracy promotion to the security of the West instrumentalized and gravely undermined the former, In the short term, the claim that democracy in the Middle East and Western security were symbiotic allowed the US government to present it to American citizens as being directly in their favour. However, the negative consequence of this approach was that, as soon as democracy ceased to be in the US interest, support for it would wane. This is exactly what happened in the case of the Middle East. Diplomatic and political pressure on allied regimes in the region to countenance democratic reforms -- in so far as it was employed at all -- was quickly abandoned when it became clear that democratization was going to have negative consequences for Western interests by allowing Islamist electoral successes. This
became evident with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas victories in Egypt and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as described above.

Disassociating democracy promotion in the Middle East from Western security and interests is particularly crucial in a region, which has been profoundly sceptical towards Western (in particular American), intervention for decades. Mistrust of the United States has been consistently high, as numerous opinion polls indicate. (21) Promoting democracy because it benefits the West is the wrong strategy, given the perception among Middle Eastern publics that Western governments have shown a disregard for the well-being and freedoms of the local people.
Elections alone can’t guarantee genuine democracy


According to Sen, therefore, democratic values and institutions advance a larger developmental interest not merely by endowing citizens with, in Hannah Arendt’s words, ‘the capacity to begin’, but by in fact bringing about just ends that would protect basic rights and serve the interests of all. The instrumental argument employed in Sen’s formulation is at once more substantive and more rationalist than Bohman’s, however, and for those reasons all the more problematic. First, there is the widely acknowledged problem in democratic theory that electoral competition and representative bodies do indeed produce discriminatory policies and injustice (for a good summation, see Shapiro, 1999). This is not a validation of the foundationalist refrain that democratic procedures and values are inherently faulty and hence in need of a common foundation or shared understanding of social and political life. Rather, it is a testament to the observable reality that reasonable people may very well disagree about what constitutes social justice and, more importantly, about how the underlying ideals of autonomy and equality in society ought to be interpreted. Examples of such instances abound in stable Western liberal democracies concerning issues such as the rights of women in the workplace (and reproductive rights), migrant workers, same-sex partnerships, and foreign detainees, to name a few. In each case, the authority of democratic decisions, whether through referenda, representative bodies, or judicial channels, is not congruent with the demands of justice. Second, abstract objectives of political justice may be achieved through a variety of forms of government. The socio-economic and cultural circumstances of certain societies may be such that justice can best be attained through non-democratic means. For instance, as can be observed in contemporary China, non-democratic governments can sometimes institute infrastructural, urban, educational, or economic plans that would improve the overall health and wellness of the general public and lead to prosperity without periodic, fair, and free elections. Of course, this does not mean that other forms of rule – especially non-egalitarian, authoritarian ones – are to be preferred over democracy. To the contrary, democratic values and institutions do serve the interests of individuals and groups better than any absolutist regime ever would, as multiple cases of once authoritarian but now democratic countries across the world demonstrate. But, if electoral competition is once again the only measure of democracy, as Sen seems to imply, then highly abstract considerations of justice might be better addressed through other forms of government depending on the socio-economic and political context of the case in question.

In the preceding, I hope to have shown the underlying flaws of the two most prominent instrumental arguments in support of democracy promotion. In the first case, the enduring argument in mainstream international relations scholarship (especially within the US academy) that democracy leads to peaceful relations among nations in international society relies on too minimal a definition of democratic citizenship and government for it to serve as a convincing justification for democracy promotion. In fact, it risks weakening the normative appeal of democracy by defining it solely in terms of the material and security interests of states. In contrast, the second argument – that is, that democracy leads to justice – relies on too demanding an understanding of both democratic ideals and justice to have general applicability across all societies. To be sure, there is a middle way between these dominant instrumental arguments in international society. It is to a consideration of this concept that I wish to turn next,
AT Relations

Turn – democracy promotion harms U.S. relations with the Middle East
Durac and Cavatorta 09
Vincent Durac & Francesco Cavatorta (2009) University College Dublin; Dublin City University,
Strengthening Authoritarian Rule through Democracy Promotion? Examining the Paradox of the
US and EU Security Strategies: The Case of Bin Ali’s Tunisia, British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, 36:1, 3-19 [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

Yet, as Neep observes, the US has lost all ‘moral standing in the eyes of most Arabs following its
uncritical support for Israeli repression of the Palestinians, its invasion of Iraq, and the abuse of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib’.27 However, the greatest difficulty US policy on democracy promotion faces in
the post-September 11, 2001, era stems from the logic of the ‘war on terrorism’. The National Security Strategy of the US from
the outset identifies the need to ‘strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism’.28 However, herein lies the problem. Most
commentators are agreed that the most obvious beneficiaries of political liberalization in the
Middle East would be Islamist, and to a lesser extent, nationalist opposition forces. For example, Gause
argues that further democratization in the Middle East would most likely generate Islamist
governments less inclined to cooperate with the United States on important policy goals... 29
However, these are precisely the forces that would oppose not only the US war on terrorism but
also many other aspects of US foreign policy in the region, not least the American position on
Palestine. This means that there is a gaping contradiction at the heart of US democracy promotion in the Middle East. Successful
promotion of democratic political reform clearly will benefit the enemies of the war on terror
and the war on terror is a non-negotiable element of the foreign policy of this US administration. The necessary tension between maintaining
the ‘global coalition’ against terrorism and the democracy imperative was recognized early by some. In a reflection on the implications of the
events of September 11, 2001, for the future direction of US foreign policy, Stephen Walt argued that because the United States needs help
from a number of states and groups with poor human rights records ... the war on terrorism will require it to downgrade its concern for human
rights temporarily.30 One of the results of this is what has been characterized as the ‘instrumentalization’ of democracy in US foreign policy.
Rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds
democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires. Dennis Ross, former Special Middle East Coordinator under Bill Clinton, advocates the promotion of democratization in the Middle East because ‘only the
proponents of moderate Islam can discredit the radical Islamists’.31 This inevitably raises the suspicion that democracy will be
acceptable only if it delivers the right kind of Islamists to power.32 The US reaction to the victory of Hamas in
the Palestinian elections makes this point only too obviously
Democracy promotion can’t solve war—it increases war’s likelihood absent an additional effort to promote liberal values

Banai 13

Indeed, the latter observation is borne out in the case of emerging or transitional democracies, where the absence of widely shared liberal values among those coming to power through hastily arranged elections or referenda increases the likelihood of war (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). What this suggests, then, is that the focus on democracy promotion, absent a concurrent effort to promote liberal values, will not necessarily produce a durable and stable peace. Furthermore, the appeal of the democratic peace theory rests entirely on a small universe of cases compared to the quite substantial range of international outcomes explained using realist arguments (Layne, 1994). This is largely due to the historical fact that there simply are very few examples of a cohort of countries satisfying Kant’s constitutional and cosmopolitan criteria for perpetual peace, whereas there are countless examples of non-democratic countries waging wars as well as maintaining long periods of peace (Spiro, 1994). Therefore, while there are stronger causal links between the breakdown of regional alliances and the outbreak of war—as in the case of World War I—as per realist theory, the liberal take on democratic peace is merely based on a correlation between cultural-normative factors and peace. Where does this leave us with respect to democracy promotion? At the very least, it ought to temper the certainty behind the instrumental argument that democracy can be a means toward world peace. As the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate—both of which have at various times been justified through reference to the core tenets of the Bush-era ‘freedom agenda’—looking at democracy solely through the lens of international security can have dire consequences for stability and peace. This is precisely the kind of faux idealism that is most disturbing to realists, and that over the past two decades has degraded the otherwise worthy pursuit of affirming the near-universal appeal of democratic values by reducing it to a mere tool of statecraft.
Specific States

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Status quo U.S. policy focuses on stability, not democracy


Unlike the European Union, the US did, in a number of ways, express concern that some of the actions of the Egyptian regime represented setbacks to the common commitment to political reform and respect for human rights. In February 2005, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, dropped plans to visit Egypt in apparent displeasure at the regime’s treatment of Ayman Nour (Kessler 2005). When she did visit in June of the same year, Rice called for engagement with civil society and for free and fair elections (US Department of State 2005). This was followed by a visit in October 2006, in the course of which Rice called for Egypt to be a leader in Middle Eastern progress on the path to democracy (US Department of State 2006). In January 2006, the US cancelled scheduled talks on a free trade agreement with Egypt in what was reported as a protest against the harsh treatment of Nour. A spokesman for the State Department also cited concerns regarding ‘the recent elections’ (Brinkley 2006). However, this apparently robust position was not sustained. The US maintained its historically high levels of aid to Egypt throughout this period and by 2007 a different tone was discernible in policy statements. On a visit to Cairo in January 2007, the Secretary of State, spoke not of democracy but of her appreciation of Egypt’s support for the US in the region. Stability, not democracy, was the key to policy (Slackman 2007a). One commentator suggested that there was a tacit understanding whereby ‘Washington criticises Egypt’s human rights failings, Egypt takes umbrage at the “interference” in domestic affairs and little changes (Slackman 2007b). The failure of both the EU and the US to respond in any substantial way to the entrenchment of the authoritarian order in Egypt since the two elections of 2005 expresses deep-seated problems and inconsistencies in Western policies on democracy promotion and political reform in the region more generally.
Egypt Solvency

No backlash – people like U.S. democracy promotion in Egypt and want more educational reforms

Ahmed 09
Moustafa Moursi Ahmed, PhD, “Promoting Democracy Through the Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Egyptian Example, May 2009, Diss.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States made democracy promotion a priority in the Middle East. The most notable effort is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a program operating on four pillars: political strength, educational opportunity, economic development, and women’s empowerment. A critical review of the literature revealed that the United Nations Development Programme conducted surveys relevant to the Greater Middle East Initiative, but not the MEPI specifically. Therefore, based on democracy-promotion theory, which postulates that democracy can be promoted through foreign assistance, the purpose of this quantitative study was to examine Egyptian, Egyptian-American, and American perceptions of which pillar would be most effective in helping MEPI achieve its goal of promoting democracy in Egypt. A pilot study employed a convenience sample of 20 participants to test the reliability and validity of a web-based survey instrument created for this study. A test-retest reliability analysis using Pearson’s correlation coefficient confirmed instrument reliability. The survey was administered to a convenience sample of 143 participants who reported their perceptions of the MEPI pillars. The data were analyzed using an analysis of variance. Findings from this research revealed that 47% of participants chose the educational opportunity pillar, political strength 28%, economic development 19%, and women’s empowerment 6%, leading to the conclusion that educational opportunity was perceived as the most important pillar. The implications for positive social change include the potential for democratic reforms in Egypt, improvement of MEPI’s performance, and the promotion of democracy in other Middle Eastern countries.
Egypt EU CP

EU will support democracy promotion in Egypt – has many benefits


Under the terms of the Euro-Med Partnership with Egypt, EU documents cite its willingness to support and build on national efforts undertaken for actions aiming at increasing governance in the broad sense, and focusing on areas such as human rights and civil society; promoting freedom of association; and strengthening women’s rights and women’s public participation; and supporting the rule of law and the administration of justice. The National Indicative Programme for Egypt speaks of all of this ‘based on mutual agreement with the Government of Egypt’.

Elsewhere, the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for Egypt describe the country in somewhat benign, if not optimistic, terms as: . . . a relatively stable multiparty democracy although a strong presidency and well-entrenched government party dominate politics. Human and civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution and the rule of law is upheld by an increasingly independent judiciary but very arbitrary ‘emergency powers’ are still in force and have been used to restrain the activities of democracy and human rights activists.

The extent to which the EU’s approach to political reform in Egypt is regime-led is visible in recent statements made by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. Noting the need for political and social reform to accompany economic reforms, she stressed that ‘political reform is a particularly complex and sensitive matter, but the EU is a loyal partner’. Addressing the Egyptian Foreign Relations Council and the Egyptian European Council, the Commissioner then re-stated the EU’s commitment to Egypt and its support for ‘your reform process’ (European Commission 2006).
Iran DA

The aff upsets Iran
Maogoto and Coleman 14

So it is Iran, the ‘...odd man out in a region it seeks to lead’, that appears to benefit most from this regional instability.109 The Arab Spring revealed the power of the ‘Arab Street’, something that strategic planners in Tehran had long surmised and supported in the hope of bringing down pro-US governments, and those that favoured Israel.110 Tehran’s planners believe that winning the ‘Arab Street’ will by extension win regional dominance. The means to this end is the use of ‘soft power’ — providing financial and political support to exploit popular frustration over domestic politics as well as regional issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.111 In particular Iran benefits perhaps more so than any other player in the region from an independent Egypt—one free from influence of the US-Israeli-Saudi ‘vertex’.112 As ‘Egypt recalibrates’ Iran will be there, exerting its full influence,113 thus, making Egypt the ‘new’ geo-political battleground between Iran (Shi’a) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni).114
Tunisia
Several factors make Tunisia ideal for democracy promotion

Durac and Cavatorta 09


**Tunisia has a number of advantages over other countries in the region.** Lebanon and Yemen might also be considered ‘good’ candidates, but Lebanon is still plagued by sectarianism and foreign destabilizing interventions (both Israel and Syria directly interfere in Lebanese politics), while Yemen suffers from poorer socio-economic indicators than Tunisia. Such advantages consist of the following (a) its limited size and population mean that the country per se is not a key strategic asset for Western powers (unlike Morocco); (b) the absence of significant natural resources further decreases its strategic value and therefore meddling from external actors with a high degree of dependence on current ruling elites (unlike the Gulf States or Algeria); (c) the relative lack of regional standing and cultural influence do not make Tunisian politics as internationally relevant as Egyptian politics; (d) the absence of a credible Islamist threat would seem ideal for the opening up of the political system given that the Tunisian Islamists had been interlocutors of Bin Ali’s during his first year as President56; and (e) recent solid economic growth has contributed to the rise of a moderately wealthy middle class and created a potentially vibrant civil society. All this should represent a clear advantage over all the other countries in the region and it would therefore seem that if both the EU and the US were seriously promoting democracy, Tunisia would be the perfect ‘target country’ on which to apply pressure for change. However, not only this does not happen, but over the course of the last decade the rule of Bin Ali has been strengthened and, paradoxically, his police state has come to represent the paradigm of what other countries in the region should aspire to in order to satisfy the governance requirements of the US and the EU.

**Tunisia is the perfect case**

Durac and Cavatorta 09


The EU and the US share the same objective and therefore their democracy promotion strategies are bound to fail. The maintenance of the international status quo, the enforcement of neo-liberal economic arrangements and the absolute control over the definition of what constitutes security make it impossible for these two actors to credibly promote democracy as the probable outcome is likely to throw up parties and movements that would contest precisely such objectives. Previous experiences are not encouraging in this sense. The FIS victory in the Algerian election in December 1991 were greeted with stunned preoccupation in Western capitals and the subsequent military coup depriving the FIS of power was hailed in the West as the means to save democracy.73 The more recent case of the shunning of Hamas obeys to the same logic of ‘boycotting’ what democracy in the region produces because it does not conform to the EU and US vision of international peace and security. Thus, in terms of obtaining both security and material gains, Tunisia provides the perfect paradigmatic partner: economically integrated, but non-threatening (unlike the Asian tigers), co-operative on security matters, but not ‘devious’ (unlike Saudi Arabia or Pakistan),
militarily weak and accommodating, but sufficiently strong to withstand potential Islamist pressure, and finally, docile when it comes to the Arab–Israeli conflict. If only the whole of the Arab world could be just like Tunisia.
Terror DA

If the aff’s political reforms get rid of the regime, the U.S. loses an ally in the war on terror


On its part, the US has been much more active in deepening the links with the Tunisian regime with a view to strengthening its coalition against terror. The threat of Islamism in Tunisia does indeed exist, but not in the extremist and violent forms that make the headlines these days. In spite of this, the US supports the heavyhanded practices of Bin Ali and Tunisia has become an important ally in the war on terror. Since 11 September 2001, contacts between the two countries have reached unprecedented depth, with Former Secretary of State Powell visiting Tunisia in 2003 and Tunisian Foreign Minister visiting Washington in 2004. During that visit the US State Department declared that ‘Tunisia has been a voice for moderation. Tunisia has been a voice for regional harmony. Tunisia has been a voice for putting efforts and resources into development’. 
AT Solvency

Democracy promotion has failed in Tunisia before
Powel 09
democracy promotion in Tunisia, The Journal of North African Studies, 14:1, 57-73, DOI:
10.1080/13629380802383562 [Premier Debate]

Tunisia is fairly typical of these states, scoring low on figures related to the freedom and
fairness of elections, on civic engagement and civic monitoring, and on press freedoms (King
2007). Despite coming to power amongst a fanfare of democratic overtures President Zine al-Abidine
EU recognises that progress on political aspects such as freedom of expression or association has
been very slow (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007, p. 2). Therefore, despite clear
commitments to the promotion of democracy in Tunisia, little has apparently changed.
Stability-Promotion CP

Instead the U.S. should promote stability, not democracy
Powel 09

Additionally, one might also wish to consider the location of democracy and security within the US/EU–Tunisia relationship. If democracy is considered as an end, then criticism of US/ EU inaction might be justified. Even if security is considered as the end, and democracy as the means of achieving it, then criticism might be warranted. Yet by reconceptualising democracy as neither end nor the only method of achieving other ends, then a different perspective is needed. By reimagining the US and the EU as seekers of security or stability rather than as democracy-promoters, their inaction as democracy promoters becomes more logical. This section now considers US and EU policy in Tunisia from this perspective, with security being the ultimate objective of both actors.

Better because democracy can be destabilizing at times; stabilization is key to an effective democracy, so the CP is a prerequisite to the aff
Powel 09

Whilst both the US and the EU have made the case for democracy as security facilitator, there is also a case that democracy threatens existing stability, particularly in the short term. Both Sorensen (1998) and Hinnebusch (2006) argue that the competitiveness necessary for a viable democracy can be divisive, fragmenting a polity into dysfunctional parts striving to achieve their respective agendas at the expense of a broader picture. Contestation and participation may be essential elements for a democratic system (Dahl 1971), but over-vigorous contestation may bring about the downfall of the system itself. In periods of crisis, social cohesion and stability might be preferable to potentially destabilising political reforms. Moreover, authoritarian regimes, particularly in the Arab world, have often proved incredibly robust during times of crisis, able to secure social cohesion through a range of populist policies and oppressive security practices (Hinnebusch 2006). Therefore, from the perspective of US and EU policy makers which have constructed the MENA region in essentialist or binary frameworks which emphasise violence and extremism, Tunisia’s authoritarianism begins to appear more attractive. This perspective is embodied in both US and EU policy in Tunisia. In the 1989 National Assembly elections in Tunisia, Islamist candidates were for the first time permitted to contest the elections, albeit as independents. During these elections, the Islamists secured over 15% of the popular vote, rising to over 30% in some Tunis suburbs (Perkins 2004, p. 190). Despite standing as independents, these Islamists are generally understood to have been sympathetic to the message of the only Tunisia Islamist party, Nahda (renaissance), which were banned from competing as a single party: a vote for an Islamist would have been interpreted as a vote for Nahda (Hamdi 1998, Murphy 1999, Perkins 2004). If these elections results are seen as a vote for Nahda rather than for independent candidates, then this is the largest percentage of the vote achieved by any Tunisian opposition party since independence in 1956. This establishes the Islamists as one of the most credible opposition movements in Tunisia during the early 1990s. Nevertheless, when the EMP was launched six years after these elections, Nahda did not receive any EU support made possible under the Barcelona Declaration. Indeed, to this day European Commission officials, member state diplomats, and both European and Tunisian NGO representatives maintain that the EU never engages nor supports Tunisian Islamist political 68 Brieg T. Powel Downloaded by [USC University of Southern California] at 14:20 28 February 2016 or civil society organisations (Brieg Powel interviews 2005, 2006). This is despite 12 years of EMP democracy promotion. Furthermore, this reluctance extends to the policies of individual EU member states. Some of these regularly consult with representatives from the secular opposition parties, legal or not (Brieg Powel interviews 2005, 2006).
Moreover, EU hostility towards Islamists is apparently not constrained to Tunisia. In the Mediterranean as a whole, no Brussels-related funding has reached Islamist political organisations (Bicchi and Martin 2006). There is still a fear in Europe that Islamists might come to power in North Africa (Gillespie 2006). The US government has also opted to steer clear of any engagement with Islamists. In fact, its cooperation with the Tunisian government is closer than ever, with the US for example allowing transcripts of the MEPI-sponsored roundtable discussions to be published in the government newspapers Le Temps and es-Sabah (Middle East Partnership Initiative 2008). Directly or indirectly therefore, both the US and the EU have been reluctant to included support of arguably the most electorally credible Tunisian opposition movement in their political reform agendas.

**Whilst democracy may be a desirable long-term goal for the international actors, the maintenance of the political status quo in Tunisia is a far less risky strategy when considered within the discourse of stability the regional policy frameworks.** Publically, President Bush argues that democracy is far more important than stability. In a recent speech on the ‘war on terror’ in Las Vegas, the President claimed that: There used to be a foreign policy that advocated stability as the cornerstone of our policy. But stability just masks the hopelessness that seethed beneath the surface. If you believe this is an ideological struggle like I do, then it’s paramount to help people realize a different ideology than that of the enemy (Bush 2008) Yet in Tunisia the US is now committing far more money in security-related aid than in sponsorship of political reform programmes. Figures for 2007 show that requested US military, security and anti-terrorism funding for Tunisia totalled over $11 million (Department of State 2007). This is over a quarter of the value of the previously mentioned region-wide MEPI political reform budget. Indeed, between 2002 and 2005, Tunisia received $74.8 million in US security assistance, more than Morocco ($66.9 million) and Algeria ($5 million) combined (Government Accountability Office 2006). Indeed, to complement this funding, the US has established the ‘Trans-Sahel Counter-Terror Initiative’. This military and intelligence includes Tunisia and other North African states within its area of operations, but contains no democracy-related component. Whilst not funding the Tunisian security forces per se, the EU is increasingly emphasising the need for stability rather than democracy in its relationship with the region. The Barcelona Declaration itself made much of the need for stability in the Mediterranean (European Union 1995). More recently Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2006a) has claimed that Europe must ‘export stability’ to a Mediterranean which is ‘undergoing fundamental shifts’, Cavatorta (2001) argues that Tunisia’s case illustrates how an exaggeration of a regional Islamist threat to a country’s stability limits European efforts to promote democracy. In the form current president Bin Ali, they also have a man who has a track record of delivering stability.
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EU aid never focuses on democracy enough – sacrifices democratic goals for other ones, and ends up stabilizing “friendly” regimes

In fact, conditionality was ‘oriented overwhelmingly to economic, not political, criteria’. Generous aid awards were made available to countries, including Egypt, which pursued economic reforms despite poor records on democracy (Youngs 2001, p. 37). The most obvious explanation for this is that the EU’s commitment to democracy and human rights is trumped by its pursuit of other priorities. As Kopstein observes, the primary concerns of the European Mediterranean Partnership are economic reform, trade harmonisation, migration, energy, security and counter-terrorism (2006, p. 92). However, stabilising migration and securing borders are objectives which may have little to do with democracy promotion, since their successful pursuit requires the co-operation of stable, friendly regimes, regardless of their character; regimes which, in the circumstances of contemporary North Africa, are likely to be antagonised by thoroughgoing external support for democracy promotion and domestic political reform.

Aff leads to the CP – unilateral action gets the EU involved, history proves

According to such commentators, the unilateralism of American foreign policy during the Bush administration simply accelerated what is inevitable: the attempt of the EU, once it found its own internal coherence on matters of foreign and security policy, to balance the unipolar activism of the US. Asmus for instance argues that the Atlantic Alliance has collapsed and Neuhold seems to agree that the rift is very significant. Policy-makers themselves, on both sides of the Atlantic, have been busy working on repairing such a rift. Other scholars prefer a more nuanced analysis and argue that the alliance is not broken, but simply strained and that such strains have often occurred in the past as well. However, this rift seems to be viewed as qualitatively different. In the past, we did not really have a coherent European position on matters of international politics and security, while today, through CFSP, this is no longer the case. While intra-European differences exist, the EU as a whole is a much more coherent actor. Despite disagreements about the depth of the Atlantic crisis, there is a consensus on the origins of it.
Conditional Aid CP

Democracy promotion only works when it’s conditional – otherwise it’s a largely domestic process

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Ethier also examines the question of the effectiveness of democracy promotion. She surveys the effectiveness of conditionality versus incentives in democracy promotion and arrives at clear but strictly delimited conclusions. She argues that democracy promotion influences the course of democratisation when based on conditionality, but even then, only in the context of EU conditionality, where the stake or reward is accession to the union. Perhaps, more significantly, her overall conclusion is that ‘democratization is a domestic affair par excellence’ (2003, pp. 116–117).
Democratic Solidarity, unlike democracy promotion, prioritizes non-interference in the affairs of other countries.


Democratic Solidarity: An alternative approach What I propose in the following is an alternative to the existing conceptual model of democracy promotion as an instrument of foreign policy in international relations. I do not wish to offer a comprehensive agenda for advancing democracy abroad, but rather to outline a set of principles – non-interference, inclusivity, reflexivity – that state and non-state entities should uphold in support of democratic ideals and movements abroad. Together, these principles form the basis of a global dialogue about the merits, pitfalls, potential scope, and limitations of democratic ideals. I call this alternative approach to advancing the cause of democracy abroad democratic solidarity, the purpose of which is twofold: first, to rescue the concern for democracy away from the ineluctable imperatives of statecraft, by instead making it a subject of rigorous global scrutiny; second, to affirm the counterintuitive notion that democratic ideals are minimally shared across different societies, but are nevertheless shaped in reference to a set of socio-economic, political, cultural, and historical circumstances that are unique to each society. Democratic ideals are made legitimate through a process of social construction, whereby divergent historical experiences are exerted and transcended in accordance with the underlying values of democracy. Democratic solidarity, in this regard, is a political disposition concerned with realizing and preserving democracy – at home and abroad – for its own sake. To the extent that it is guided by any instrumental arguments, the idea of democratic solidarity is premised on the notion that democracy is normatively preferred to other forms of rule simply because it leads to more democracy – only democracy can sustain democracy. This may seem like a tautology, but it is the only disposition that is conducive to expanding democratic zones of engagement at the international level. In the next section, I will explain the concrete policy implications of such a stance, but further elaboration of the principles involved is needed first if we are to understand what can legitimately be pursued by outside agents. Non-interference: The principle of non-interference is, in essence, an expressive approach to advocacy on behalf of democratic ideals in international society. It obliges states and non-state entities (non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, activist groups, civil society networks, etc.) to support the spread of democratic rights and values through acts of public expression, whether through open calls for democratic reforms, criticisms of anti-democratic regimes, or simply articulating the qualitative benefits of democracy in comparison to the existing alternatives. This principle, of course, is largely adhered to in international society today. Perhaps for the simple reason of the priority of national over normative interests, most democratic states limit their advocacy of democratic ideals to ceremonial speeches and grandiose declarations of support that seldom add up to anything more than mere rhetorical expressions of sympathy or solidarity. Indeed, many democratic states do employ coercive measures (sanctions and embargos, limited military strikes, or travel bans) against non-democratic states, but such means are usually employed to compel compliance with certain international legal obligations (e.g. non-proliferation) or to stop blatant violations of basic human rights (e.g. ethnic cleansing and genocidal campaigns). Occasionally, states do employ limited coercive measures against non-democratic states in the aftermath of fraudulent elections or in response to crackdowns against peaceful democratic oppositions, as has been the case with US and European Union sanctions against states such as Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Iran, and Côte d'Ivoire in recent years. But such measures are often reactive and adopted on an ad hoc basis, and at any rate do not interfere with the internal politics of the countries in question, but rather seek to express the views of the international community by creating incentives for democratic change. As such, they are as limited as they are symbolic. Of greater importance, moreover, are efforts by NGOs, think-tanks, and advocacy groups to document, analyze, and disseminate information about the development and plight of democracy movements around the globe. Organizations such as Freedom House, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Open Society Foundations, Reporters Without Borders, etc. – however earnest their missions and visions may be – raise awareness about the dearth of democratic practices and values among other nations around the world. Crucially, some offer a platform to suppressed and marginalized groups that are vying for democracy through advocacy campaigns especially designed to ‘name and shame’ anti-democratic forces and to compel a change in the behavior of complicit parties. These actions are consistent with the principle of non-interference because they do not seek to intervene in the internal politics of a given state, nor do they introduce new parties or acts to what is already taking place on the ground. Rather, by catalyzing the mobilization of ordinary citizens and their demands at the hands of self-appointed leaders and groups, they seek to offer citizens alternative platforms for airing their grievances and expressing their demands for democracy and the rule of law. For instance, since the advent of the reform movement in Iran in 1997, the organization Reporters Without Borders has amassed an exhaustive inventory of government closures of opposition newspapers, Internet and media censorship, brutal imprisonment of journalists and bloggers, and countless arrests on suspects, writers, artists, and public intellectuals. As a result, its database of governmental abuses has become an important reference point for freedom-of-expression activists both inside and outside Iran, for whom the organization’s goal of advocating on behalf of persecuted journalists and protecting press freedoms makes it neither a tool of foreign powers nor an umbrella group in the service of a rigid ideology. In this sense, the principle of non-interference paves the way for the limits of authoritarian regimes that pro-democracy activists championed by the international community are agents of foreign governments with invidious designs to weaken the country and compromise the national interest. Such assertions have, in the past, served to undermine the legitimacy of efforts and organizations that were indeed in the employ of foreign intelligence or aid agencies. But, as more state
agencies and NGOs have adopted a policy of persuasion and affirmed indirect support for pro-democracy causes, the profile and legitimacy of local democratic activists and movements have steadily risen in the eyes of concerned publics. The principle of non-interference, therefore, operates on the pragmatic notion that political change and democratic developments are long-term, contextual, and indigenous undertakings vulnerable to reversals and unforeseen convulsions in both domestic and international settings.

Elections-only focus creates illiberal democracies—only democratic solidarity ensures inclusivity which solves

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Inclusivity One of the major limitations of conventional democracy-promotion programs is their exclusivity. Specific programs geared at electoral processes, institutional reform, and civil society movements are designed solely for elites and perceived ‘key players’ within pro-democracy movements that are often handpicked by Western governments and aid agencies. This is often the result of the minimalist understanding of democracy, which reduces it to a competition between different sets of elites and entrenched constituencies for votes and benefits, respectively. Accordingly, these programs employ a set of ‘core strategies’ (e.g. election monitoring, economic and political sanctions, leadership workshops, academic exchanges, etc.) that have very little to do with the plight of ordinary citizens at the local level. Conventional democracy-promotion strategies fail to address specific grievances because they are ultimately concerned with bringing about certain results that would meet the approval of what are taken to be international democratic standards: free and fair elections, constitutional checks and balances, and basic press freedoms. In this respect, they are partial to elites and in positions of power – and, as the cases of Russia and many former Soviet republics demonstrate, such programs have historically resulted in the creation of what Fareed Zakaria (2007) has termed ‘illiberal democracies’. In contrast to this exclusivist approach, the model of democratic solidarity I have outlined above is premised on a principle of inclusivity.

Democratic institutions and practices are deemed legitimate when they are responsive to the varied historical experiences, political circumstances, and cultural traditions of a people.

As many leading liberal and secular democrats involved in the movement to replace the Shah have since explained, the major problem with the anti-Shah coalition prior to the 1979 revolution was that it was not inclusive enough. Pro-democratic views and debates about the right balance between civil rights and the rule of law or the tradeoffs involved in accepting an Islamic, as opposed to a liberal, view of gender equality, for example, were eschewed in favor of the singular goal of deposing the Shah and standing up to Western imperialism. Time and again, activists struggling on behalf of women’s, workers’, and ethno-religious rights were admonished by the elites spearheading the anti-Shah
coalition for engendering divisions and giving the impression to ‘the enemy’ that the opposition was too heterogeneous in their aims to mount a serious challenge (ironically enough, the Shah and his backers, as troves of declassified documents have since shown, believed that anyway). Therefore, much of the mainstream discussion at this time was framed in terms of anti-imperialism and social justice issues, and not about the future of democracy in Iran. As a result, pro-democracy activists and parties were excluded from the outset. As the plight of the pro-democracy movements in pre-revolutionary Iran demonstrates, the absence of a principle of inclusivity based on democratic ideals of mutual respect and reasonable dialogue was a major contributing factor to the anti-democratic results after the revolution. But this example also highlights how inclusion serves as a democratic check on the rise of charismatic and high-powered elites whose views may not be consistent with the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens for a future democratic order. By demanding adherence to the principle of inclusivity as part of a global dialogue about the future of democracy in non-democratic societies, proponents of democracy would not only be articulating the importance of the underlying ideals of reasonable dialogue and mutual respect, but would also be exemplifying democracy’s normative benefits in practice. Inclusion, however, does not entail acceptance; the principle merely guarantees that different political viewpoints can be aired freely.

Democratic solidarity is key to a reflexive perspective which understands the historically and culturally contextual nature of struggles for democracy

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Reflexivity As a matter of historical construction, democracy changes with the world it reflects upon. Different social contexts, as I have argued throughout, produce different yearnings and struggles for democracy. It follows from this that those who seek to advance the cause of democracy abroad must themselves be sufficiently reflective to understand the limitations and possibilities presented by each context. This means doing away with the tired slogans that credulously tout the virtues of democratic rights and values in the abstract, and setting about ameliorating the social arrangements that fall far short of democratic ideals. Rectifying such inequalities requires a reflexive inquiry into the meaning and scope of particular democratic ideals, such as autonomy and equality, but also, more importantly, into the historical and social circumstances that either preclude or engender disparities in the first place. The existing American templates for democracy promotion, for example, conceive of democratization as ‘consisting of a linear process from liberalization through transitional elections to eventual consolidation’ (Rose, 2000–2001: 197). This understanding has formed the basis of a universal template for providing aid to political parties, civil–military groups, constitutional assemblies, and civil society groups for over three decades. Yet, given the lack of reflexivity about the varieties of democratic experience outside of the US example, the template is premised on a set of bureaucratic checklists that reduce the complexity and inconstancy of the democratic process to a kind of static scientific stratagem...The point can be made more specifically to stress the potentially harmful implications of a democracy agenda (i.e. the Bush administration’s ‘freedom agenda’) that
relied on claims to valueneutrality. To paraphrase an oft-quoted insight in critical international relations theory, all knowledge is ‘always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981: 129) – and our knowledge about democracy is certainly no exception.

Accordingly, any democratic order is always representative of a certain set of interests and purposes over others. A reflexive perspective on democracy, therefore, would readily reveal the intricate connections between, say, vastly differential concentrations of political influence and economic wealth, on the one hand, and non-egalitarian state policies and laws, on the other. That is, reflexivity enables those concerned with advancing democratic zones of engagement (at home or abroad) to think through and interpret discrepant experiences of citizens otherwise endowed with the same abstract rights and obligations. Central to this delicate balancing act is the recognition that indeed knowledge of the social world can only be realized through the participation of the observers themselves, and that social rules and norms are constructed in the process of practice itself. It is only at the moment of democratic practice, therefore, that the interplay between objective claims and subjective experiences and among social structures and political agents are revealed. In this sense, the principle of reflexivity offers a great deal of insight as a certain methodological disposition toward the study of democratic forms. In sum, the principles enumerated here – non-interference, inclusivity, reflexivity – are meant to reformulate the terms of democratic engagement globally so that we may move beyond mere rhetorical flourishes about the self-evident virtues of electoral democracy. Needless to say, elements of each principle have at one point or another been observed and championed by state and nonstate entities seeking to promote democracy abroad. But, as many failed cases of democracy promotion from Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa, to the Middle East and Southeast Asia demonstrate, these principles have not been implemented either concurrently or consistently as part of a genuine effort to engage with the contextual bases of struggles on behalf of democratic legitimacy in non-democratic societies. By decoupling the pursuit of democracy from the cold considerations of the national interest, exclusive prerogatives of elites, and rigid universal templates, the model of democratic solidarity I have sketched aims to establish and assert the priority of the domestic sources of political legitimacy over any international concerns about the instrumental values of democratic change. The principles presented here thus seek to preserve a necessary separation between the universal appeal of democratic ideals, on the one hand, and their contingent forms and realization in different settings, on the other.

Obama’s vocal support for Iran’s Green Movement proves the counterplan is key to effectively assisting democratic movements

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Under Barack Obama By the time Barack Obama took office, democracy promotion was in deep disrepute, and the new administration even began signaling during the transition period that it would abandon the ‘freedom agenda’ altogether.4 In signaling a major shift from Bush-era approaches to the Muslim world, the new president stressed engagement and bilateral cooperation over confrontation and isolation, and instead of heaping empty praise on democratic ideals shifted the focus to domestic sources of political legitimacy. The significance of such overtures cannot be overstated for, given the tenor and improbable nature of the Obama candidacy, they signaled a genuine shift away from the status quo. From Tehran to Damascus to Cairo, the worst any authoritarian leader could say about the new policy of engagement was that they hoped the actions of the administration matched the words. Domestically, too, the speech offered a sense of renewal, a return to a more humble, sincere, and on the whole benevolent approach to asserting American values abroad. All this is worth mentioning because it provides us with the context in which the subtle move from aggressive democracy promotion in the Bush years to a more benign approach toward engagement in the Obama presidency began to take shape. Although many of the promises the Obama administration made early on (e.g. closing detention facilities in Guantánamo Bay,
The counterplan shifts away from democracy promotion and is the approach Obama pursued during the Arab Spring

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The biggest test of the administration’s commitment to the principles outlined in the Cairo speech, however, came in the period of popular uprisings in the Arab world, which have seriously tested Washington’s alliances across the region. It would be imprudent to comment on these developments here, since the revolutions and uprisings in almost all of the concerned countries – Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, to name the most volatile – are still ongoing at the time of this writing. But, so far, the public evidence shows that in almost every case the US government has refrained from directly intervening in the internal affairs of the concerned countries. In the case of Egypt, perhaps the closest Arab ally of the USA, the Obama administration expressed solidarity with the public from the outset and repeatedly insisted on the suspension of decades-old emergency laws and security courts, along with ‘a gradual and orderly transition’ toward new elections and the drafting of a new democratic constitution. Despite dire warnings by certain policy experts in Washington about the impending calamity of a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government in Egypt (Gelb, 2011; Hadley, 2011), the administration refused to force the Egyptians to delay elections, a move largely welcomed by the Egyptians themselves across party lines. In fact, it has now emerged that US organizations such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and others played an active role in training and financing some of the civil society groups involved in the Arab uprisings. As the executive director of one such group, the Project on Middle East Democracy, explained to the New York Times, “We didn’t fund them to start protests, but we did help support their development of skills and networking… That training did play a role in what ultimately happened, but it was their revolution. We didn’t start it” (cited in Nixon, 2011). That such training and funding programs have been in place since the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983 (which funds the organizations named above) is evidence enough of them having played a relatively minor role in the recent uprisings. But, throughout those years, the United States government had articulated a vision of democracy based primarily on instrumental arguments for security and ‘regional stability’ in the Middle East. What changed with the Obama administration, however, was a definitive move away from such instrumental arguments. Starting with the president’s inaugural and Cairo speeches, and exemplified by the administration’s response to the post-election protests in Iran, the US approach to democracy in the Middle East has changed from promotion to solidarity. This is indeed a welcome development, for ‘the most effective way for the United States to shape outcomes in an increasingly democratic Arab world is to be seen as a champion of popular aspirations’ (Traub, 2011). In a recent speech on the developments in the Middle East and North Africa, President Obama (2011) himself echoed this very point: ‘failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people will only feed the suspicion that has festered for years that the United States pursues our interests at their expense’. In the remainder of the speech – which was almost universally applauded by civil society leaders and pro-democracy activists in the region – the president outlined a series of specific diplomatic, economic, and strategic initiatives that commit the United States to ‘promot[ing] reform across the region, and to support[ing] transitions to democracy’. Of course, these initiatives go far beyond the limited notion of democratic solidarity that I outlined in the previous section. But, given the magnitude of changes in the region and the fact that in places like Tunisia and Egypt the former ruling families are no longer in power, such efforts amount to a form of democratic assistance, not democracy promotion. They are carried out with the full consent – indeed, invitation – of civil society groups and political parties themselves, and not imposed from the outside. It would be a futile exercise at this juncture to offer any predictions on the future of the Arab and Iranian upheavals, but it is surely a welcome development that reverence for democratic ideals is once again accompanied by a deep and abiding appreciation for the contextual sources of political legitimacy.

Democracy promotion fails to leave political developments up to locals — only democratic solidarity accounts for the contextual sources of democratic legitimacy

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In response to this, the global effort to help the cause of democracy in these countries (and the wider region) must not fixate on any particular model of democracy. Rather, by publicizing and engaging in the substance of debates concerning particular rights and freedoms (e.g. equal rights for women and minorities, academic freedoms, separation of powers, religious freedom, etc.) outsiders can demonstrate their solidarity with core democratic values of autonomy, equality, and mutual respect. The particular institutional configuration to which a meaningful democratic dialogue will lead is ultimately up to the local inhabitants of the region; however, foreign governments and nationals can influence the substance of local debates by going beyond the tested and tried, ultimately selfinterested ways of democracy promotion by states. While this assertion may seem overly abstract or lofty, its validity is in fact attested to by the quite vocal but non-intrusive approach of the Obama administration vis-a-vis both Egypt and Tunisia, and even more instructively so in the case of post-armed-intervention Libya. Still, more can be done by the international community (of states and peoples) to enlarge the parameters of the global conversation surrounding the democratic bases of legitimacy in each case. Beyond demonstrating the futility of using democracy promotion as a tool of statecraft, the chief aim of this article has been to show how the cause of democracy ought to be advanced in places where it is either nascent or missing. It has not been my intention, however, to discourage any efforts by state and non-state entities to assist and cultivate the emergence of democratic movements abroad. Democratic solidarity obliges us to continually engage with the plight of those seeking to attain their basic rights and freedoms; in doing so, it also commits us to constantly interrogate the deeply contextual sources of democratic legitimacy.
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Politics
Link turn – there is pressure in favor of the aff. Obama is losing capital he could gain through the plan. And there’s more democracy promotion to come, non-uniques the link, Ottaway 09

Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate and Director, Middle East Program, “Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street” [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

The promotion of democracy, or even of a modicum of effort on political reform, has so far been missing from the Obama administration’s Middle East policy. The administration has focused on the toughest issues first, by necessity in the case of Iran and Afghanistan, and by choice in the case of the Arab–Israeli peace process. Political reform and democracy have been put on the back burner, but this is likely to change. Appeals by parts of the U.S. policy community, Arab dissidents, and Middle Eastern and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are putting pressure on the administration to do, or at least say, something beyond the eloquent statements in the president’s Cairo speech of June 2009.

She continues

It is only a matter of time before the Obama administration seeks ways to relaunch a political reform agenda in the Middle East. In fact, some discussions are already taking place, although there is no indication that an approach has yet taken shape. In the early months of his administration, buoyed by his popularity across the Arab world, expectations of a breakthrough in the Arab–Israeli peace process and in negotiations with Iran, President Obama could ignore the issue of political reform. But the hope for quick breakthroughs has been replaced by the certainty that these issues will require a long, hard slog with uncertain results at the end. The Arab press is now openly questioning Obama’s determination to change U.S. policies in the region and denouncing his acquiescence to the Israeli government, and it is only a matter of time before it starts claiming that he has abandoned the political reform agenda. In addition, there is renewed concern that countries with large problems but sclerotic governments, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, could
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Capitalism
Democracy promotion is all about spreading and maintaining crony capitalism on the global stage

Jadallah 12

Jadallah, Dina. Dina Jadallah is a PhD candidate at the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Arizona. Arab Studies Quarterly 34.4 (Fall 2012): 205-229.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ABSTRACTED SOVEREIGNTY [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

The state, however, is fundamentally different in the core than it is in the periphery of capitalism. Democracy promotion aims to reproduce convenient and beneficial pluralist democratic arrangements internationally. For example, in Egypt, international financial institutions plied "odious" debts onto dictators and their cronies, raising the national debt level, while debt interest payments (outflows) exceed inflows. This constitutes an appropriation of national wealth for the benefit of neoliberal capitalism and its agents. In the Arab world, the pseudo-sovereignty of the state is critical to the functioning and flows of the US-dominated neoliberal and "globalized" order. Gowan points out that the state plays a pivotal role in establishing the legal and institutional framework for the operation of markets. The pluralist democracy promoted in these states often obscures its neoliberal twin which penetrates traditional state sovereignty, diminishes the political space for mass popular demands, and consequently allows the persistence of global oligopolies.

The United States uses democracy promotion strategies to produce the consensual domination that is necessary for the reproduction of inequality, the consequential extraction of wealth, and the redirection of a portion to the capitalist core. In Egypt, the distinction between oligarchs and rulers (the crony capitalism of Mubarak) was materially reinforced via the institutions of rigged elections, the National Democratic Party, and partial reforms. The dependence of the ruling regime on US aid after the Camp David Agreement was also detrimental to the Egyptian economy (e.g. dependence on US wheat imports). "Peace" came at the societal cost of infitah economic policies, which instituted neoliberal privatization.

Successive US administrations knowingly funded corruption among the military and the ruling capitalist elite. Eighty percent of US aid went to the military: of the 1.3 billion dollars in aid, only 20 million dollars went to "democracy promotion." Of those, most went to civil society organizations and think tanks that promoted neoliberalism. The United States also trained and funded groups like the Muslim Brotherhood who have positions that are inconsistent with some aspects of modern democracy, like secularism and women's rights. To put things in perspective, according to the World Bank in 2010, Egypt's gross domestic product stood at 218.89 billion dollars - which only reinforces how cheaply an entire state can be geo-strategically and economically bought if the aid goes to the right coercive powers. Stephen Zunes and Saad Eddin Ibrahim show how the United States emphasizes economic freedom (i.e. neoliberalism) as being at least as important as political freedom. In 2007, the Center for International Private Enterprise, that was headed by Gamal Mubarak, was the largest single Middle Eastern recipient of funding from the NED. It received in Egypt and Algeria three times as much NED funding as did all Egyptian human rights, development, legal, and civil society organizations combined.

US democracy promotion is a form of neoliberal imperialism—its fixation on elections props up major disparities in wealth and power

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Two dramatic structural shifts have taken place across the Middle East region over the past two decades. First, since the mid-1980s, most countries have seen far-reaching changes in their economic policies. Under the stewardship of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), governments have embraced policies of privatization, dismantlement of state-owned industries, an end to guaranteed public employment, reductions in tariffs and taxes and an opening to foreign capital. The basic precepts of neo-liberalism are common to the economic policies of virtually all states in the area. At the same time, the rapid succession of elections in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and Palestine is indicative of a political transformation occurring across the region. Alongside the growing pressures from below for democratization, commentary from the Bush administration has praised the supposed ‘democratic winds’ sweeping the Middle East region (with the pointed exception of Hamas’ recent victory in elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council).

What is the relationship between these two shifts in the context of US intervention in the region? Much has been written about US democracy promotion and its role in bringing to power pro-American individuals to reinforce imperial strategic interests in various parts of the world. In particular, William Robinson’s 1996 book, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, provides a prescient analysis of the evolution and strategy behind US democracy promotion from the 1980s onwards. Robinson argues that democracy promotion is aimed at strengthening polyarchy – the rule of a small minority in which mass participation consists of periodic choices in formally free elections managed by competing sections of the elite. Robinson argues that polyarchy’s fixation with the formal act of voting serves to justify the influence and power that comes with possession of material wealth. Democracy promotion thus plays an ideological role in legitimating the division between politics and economics predicated in liberal theory. By concentrating on the form of elections, it serves to justify prodigious concentrations of wealth both within and between nations. Robinson documents how US foreign policy took a conscious shift in the late 1970s-early 1980s towards a strategy based upon democracy promotion. Rather than solely providing military, economic and political support to unpopular military dictatorships, the US government moved towards attempting to influence and control social and political mobilization ‘from below’. US government functionaries and political elites began to work at diffusing social tensions through a strategy of co-option and managed dissent. Robinson and others have documented the mechanics of this strategy through US government institutions, semi-private and private organizations. Key to this strategy is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), established in 1983 and funded by the US State Department through organizations such as USAID. NED, in turn, supports other ‘democracy promotion’ organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) – linked to Democratic and Republican Parties respectively – and bodies such as the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the Solidarity Center (affiliated to the AFL/CIO). A host of other private corporations and NGOs are also involved. The aim of this paper is to explore how US support for democracy promotion in the Middle East is intimately connected with the spread of neo-liberalism throughout the region. Understanding US democracy promotion as one component of neo-liberal imperialism involves challenging a concept of democracy that does not envision real popular control of both politics and economics. How does democratization – as it is understood by US foreign policy makers – facilitate the penetration and spread of foreign capital throughout the Middle East?

Democracy promotion in the Middle East manifests in a neoliberal impetus to decentralize and privatize state activities

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Decentralization and Local Governance While decisions over the direction of economic policy are being centralized in the hands of international capital and local elites, neo-liberalism has simultaneously promoted a de-centralization of governmental functions to the local level. Government departments are forced to compete against each other for funding that is distributed (and set) centrally. Departmental success is
measured through ‘performance budgeting’ schema that is ultimately concerned with the cost effectiveness of outputs. By creating this form of decentralized horizontal competitiveness between government departments that are vertically constrained through budgetary controls set from the center, **neo-liberalism** naturalizes the cutting-back of state activities as a normal part of everyday operations. This process of **decentralization also obfuscates the locus of power** within state structures by shaping the ‘reform process’ as a multitude of locally-driven management decisions that are difficult to oppose and organize against because of their diffuse nature. In Egypt, for example, decentralization has been used as a state-facilitated strategy to reduce public expenditure and increase the extraction of wealth at the local level. This strategy is marketed as being ‘more efficient’, ‘less bureaucratic’, ‘more flexible’ but essentially means that local staff take more responsibility for fiscal matters (both expenditure and revenue). Given the vast needs of the population and the general lack of resources, this displacement of fiscal control to the local level is primarily designed to facilitate the implementation of fees-based service provision, i.e. accelerate the commodification of public sector activities. The World Bank praises one example of this in Egypt, where a local authority has begun to collect fees for its services: Some local administrations have negotiated the bureaucratic and legal space to tackle local development issues in a more flexible manner. For example, in Qena governorate, health care workers can draw supplemental income from funds generated by co-payments on health services imposed under the authority of the local Executive Council, leading to improved morale and better staffing and utilization of health care facilities. In Jordan, much of World Bank activity has focused on reconfiguration of the state through this centralization-decentralization dialectic. Control over the Jordanian budget has been tightly centralized in the General Budget Department and considerable operational autonomy has been given to the different ministries and departments. **Instead of funding these departments on the basis of annual estimations of input costs, a system of performance budgeting has been implemented in each sector and department.** This means that departments should determine their strategic objectives and budget accordingly on the basis of expected measurable outputs on which they will be judged. **In other words, instead of determining budgetary requirements on the basis of the service to be offered, the yardstick is the cost-effectiveness of the output achieved.** Coupled with the decentralization of operational control to the local level, this emphasis on cost-effectiveness means a continual pressure to reduce costs, cut back services and find means such as **marketisation of services to lower departmental budgets**. This structural configuration means that the government can pass a central directive and leave each individual department to determine how it will meet these directives. In March 2004, for example, the Jordanian government issued a blanket directive requiring all ministries to cut utility bills by 20% and ensure full payment of taxes for new projects unless donor financing requires tax exemption. This illustration shows how a simple budgetary decision will have a variety of different practical implications for the Jordanian population depending upon the ways different departments choose to meet the new requirements. In this way, the process of neo-liberal ‘reform’ is driven by the center’s ability to frame the context of de-centralized implementation through fiscal restrictions. **An understanding of this strategy is key to explaining the link between democracy promotion and neo-liberalism.** Democracy promotion is intimately concerned with ‘local governance’ and ‘decentralization’ – often couched in the language of the left, emphasizing ‘community-action’ and the priority of ‘locally-determined needs’. Notwithstanding the language employed, the role of community organizations and NGOs as alternative service providers in place of the state must be placed in the context of this neo-liberal program. **Indeed, a strategic orientation towards rapid decentralization may offer a quicker way to implement neo-liberal reforms that bypasses the need to tackle more entrenched state interests.** A recent World Bank report for Egypt notes: Consultations at the sub-national level proved useful in providing an appreciation of the scope for decentralizing the delivery of public services in Egypt. Evidently, much can be done in a decentralized manner without necessarily changing the formal political structures that govern center-local relations in the country.[18]

Organizations like NED have been funded by the US government to promote a neoliberal vision of democracy in the Middle East

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The NED, CIPE and Neo-Liberalism The NED was founded in 1983 following the backlash against covert CIA operations during the 1960s and 70s. Its role is to provide guidance for political parties, movements, individuals and other civil groups in order to align them with US interests. Robinson quotes former CIA director William Colby as stating "Many of these programs which ... were conducted as covert operations [can now be] conducted quite openly, and consequentially, without controversy." [26] The chairman of the NED board, Vin Weber, is a founding member of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century and was a signatory to the 1998 PNAC letter to Bill Clinton urging an attack on Iraq to protect the interests of the US. In his 2004 State of the Union Address, Bush requested a doubling of NED funding, from $40 million to $80 million, with all of the new funding to be aimed specifically at democracy promotion in the Middle East. While USAID and companies like Bearing Point rewrite the economic rules governing Middle Eastern economies, NED’s role is to build an ideological base for such policies. Through its support for particular individuals and organizations that can effectively articulate a justification for these policies to a domestic audience, NED facilitates the necessary structural shifts under the mantle of democratic choice. One of the NED’s ‘core’ institutes, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), clearly illustrates this role. In the case of Iraq, CIPE notes that institutionalizing an independent central bank able to direct financial policy in the country is key to the neo-liberal process. In doing so, what matters is how the public perceives such structural decisions being made: ... it would be better if [the Iraqis] could come to that conclusion themselves. We’ve seen this throughout the world that various decisions that the government needs to take tend to have more buy-in from the public if they're perceived as having been made domestically rather than imposed by the international organizations that control inflows of capital. [27]

Established alongside NED in 1983 by the US Chamber of Commerce, the CIPE vision clearly states that “market-oriented and democratic institutions ... are essentially two sides of the same coin.” [28] In 2004, more CIPE funds went to the Middle East than any other region in the world. Around 60% of these funds came from the NED and another 35% directly from USAID. A major CIPE policy paper from 2004, entitled Democratic Governance: The Key to Political and Economic Reform, provides a defence of the link between democracy promotion and neo-liberalism. The paper argues that “... many citizens in emerging democracies are rejecting democratic, market based reforms and are embracing populism, socialism, and terrorism.” [29] The main reason for this rejection of the market economy, argues the CIPE, is the influence of “bad governance”. The document goes on to explain how this impacts the adoption of neo-liberal principles. First, according to the CIPE, undemocratic regimes are not responsive to citizens’ needs because a “handful of elites design laws, policies, and regulations for their own benefit often to the detriment of the general population.” [30] This position sounds reasonable and would seem to be illustrated by the vast inequalities of wealth in most Third World countries. The massive protests that shook southern Jordanian cities in mid-1996 – following a tripling in the price of bread and an increase in school fees as a consequence of an IMF structural adjustment program – would seem to provide just one example from the Middle East. Reading on, however, it becomes clear that the CIPE did not have such an example in mind. The problems with undemocratic regimes are not related to increases in poverty resulting from neo-liberal polices. Rather, the problematic “laws, policies and regulations” are precisely those that obstruct the implementation of neo-liberalism. CIPE gives the example of “regulations ... that limit competition in certain sectors or [erect] barriers to entry.” [31] The CIPE goes on to argue that a lack of democratic governance “erodes legitimacy and support for democracy and key reforms”. [32] Once again this statement has a ring of truth about it. But digging a little deeper reveals that CIPE is not concerned with democratic control over a country per se. Rather, the lack of legitimacy for a government will make it difficult to gain support for “tough political and economic reforms, thereby hindering democratization and marketization.” In what appears to be a clear allusion to countries such as Venezuela and Cuba, CIPE goes on to express its fears that “... citizens may engage in coups or revolutions to dispose of illegitimate regimes, as has happened in a number of countries in Latin America." [33] A further problem with an undemocratic regime, according to CIPE, is that it “squanders and misallocates foreign and domestic resources.” [34] Once again this appears to be an accurate statement and the vast theft of Iraq’s resources in the wake of the US-backed occupation would appear to provide a clear example. Nevertheless, CIPE is not concerned with the outcome of privatization. Rather, what concerns it are policies of state protectionism that may support domestic industries in the face of multinational corporate investment. These industries “produce for the domestic market [and] are able to convince the government to provide subsidies or barriers that erode competition.” Furthermore, governments must be dissuaded from embarking on “huge public works projects that may not be in the public’s best interest or that are provided at exorbitant costs at the taxpayers’ expense.” [35] In summary, CIPE is wholeheartedly in favor of democratization. It is a vision of democracy, however, primarily concerned with weakening the power of the state to take measures to reduce the predatory activities of multinational corporations and intervene in the economy. Democracy – understood in the narrow sense of regular electoral competitions between different sections of the elite – is necessary to prevent “coupes or revolutions” and is aimed at providing popularly sanctioned legitimacy for neo-liberal economic measures. CIPE programs in Iraq reinforce this understanding. In
In July 2005, CIPE began broadcasting a weekly Arabic-language TV show in Iraq, Economic Files (Malaffat Iqtisadiyya) to further promote neo-liberalism. The first episode, appropriately titled The Private Sector, presented an argument for the leading role of the private sector that is indistinguishable from the neo-liberal positions discussed above. Subsequent episodes defend the importance of privatization, opening the country to foreign capital, and reducing public sector employment. The Economic Files is not a clumsy piece of neo-liberal propaganda; it presents itself as drawing upon a range of opinions as well as street interviews airing the concerns of the ‘average Iraqi’. In this manner, The Economic Files works by presenting academic and government neo-liberal supporters as having ‘expert opinion’ working for the good of the population. By limiting the range of debate to different shades of neo-liberal policies, it serves to constrain thought within a narrowly defined neo-liberal paradigm while presenting itself as an objective piece of economic journalism.

When some of the wealthiest people are putting their money into the US’s democracy promotion, you know there’s a link

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NED and the Iraq Foundation Another illustration of the link between NED-sponsored democracy promotion, US interests and neo-liberalism is the Iraq Foundation, established in 1991 by a group of Iraqi expatriates living in the US. In 2003, the Iraq Foundation received $1,648,914 in funding from NED and the US Department of State. This figure was a massive increase from the paltry $265,000 the group received in 1998. Not only is the organization heavily funded by the NED, but a former board member of the Iraq Foundation, Laith Kubba, is currently the senior NED program officer for the Middle East and North Africa. The main objectives of the Iraq Foundation read like a classic democracy promotion handbook: “To expand the constituency for democracy among Iraqis … educate non-Iraqis about Iraq and strengthen support for a democratic new beginning … educate non-Iraqis about the potential for Iraq to become a major contributor to democratic reform and socio-economic development in the region in a climate of democracy and an open society.” At first glance, the public face of the Iraq Foundation appears to have little to do with neo-liberalism. Its website focuses on democracy promotion in Iraq – displaying a concern for handicapped children in Iraq and constitutional and democratic rights. Digging a little deeper, however, reveals powerful ties between the Iraq Foundation and the neo-liberal agenda. The two founders of the Iraq Foundation are merchant bankers and currency traders. One of these individuals, Basil Al Rahim, heads MerchantBridge, one of the most high profile investment banking groups in the Middle East. MerchantBridge was the first private equity fund to focus on the Middle East and in 2004 was appointed by the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Materials to advise on the leasing of state owned firms to the private sector. As to be expected from his background, Al Rahim has emerged as a strong advocate of neo-liberal policies in Iraq. He has been a guest of the American Enterprise Institute and testified before the US Congress Joint Economic Committee (JEC) on the economic transformation of Iraq. In an economic paper for the Iraq Foundation, Al Rahim provides the classic neo-liberal argument: “The fact that the [Iraqi] state (through nationalization and expropriation) owns over 80% of the productive economic assets of the country must be recognized and immediately addressed. It is only by shifting these assets squarely back into the private sector that the economy will be properly invigorated and set on a path of sustainable long-term growth.” In his address to the JEC, Al Rahim speaks on the role of the state: “no economic rejuvenation and vitalization can happen without empowering the Iraqi private sector, therefore the role of the State has to be that of a facilitator and enabler to create the framework for a new economy.” Al Rahim advocates a simple six-step plan to phase out the Iraqi state sector and strengthen the private sector. His six guidelines – elimination of central planning, implementing laws to protect private property, eliminating debt and reparations, phasing-in free markets, re-building the banking sector, and re-building capital markets – coincide completely with the vision outlined in the GMEI. Al Rahim’s co-founder of the Iraq Foundation and its current Executive Director is another merchant banker, Rend Rahim Francke. Following the US occupation of Iraq, Francke was appointed by the Iraqi Governing Council as its representative in Washington D.C. In 2004, she was a guest of Laura Bush in the First Lady’s Box at the State of the Union address. The connections between the Iraq Foundation and US empire building, however, go far beyond the activities of Basil Rahim and Rend Francke. The Iraq Foundation is a founding member of the Iraq-America Freedom Alliance, which, according to its manifesto, “…will provide Americans with a fuller picture of Iraq by giving voice to Iraqis who are grateful for their newfound freedom and working to secure
The Iraq-America Freedom Alliance is a project of the notorious Foundation for the Defence of Democracies (FDD). Founded two days after the September 11 attacks, it would be difficult to conceive of an organization more centrally connected to US corporate interests and the neo-conservative agenda. The FDD is funded by private donations from some of the wealthiest individuals and companies in the US, including: [43] The Ameriquest Capital Corporation, the largest privately held mortgage company in the US, donated over $1.5 million to FDD in 2004. Ameriquest is headed by Roland Arnall, who with his wife Dawn has been the biggest contributor to the Bush campaigns since 2002. In 2005, Roland Arnall was appointed as US ambassador to the Netherlands while his company was under investigation for predatory lending practices in the US. Leonard Ambranson a member of the Board of Directors of the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., the Board of Trustees of the Brookings Institution, and the Board of Trustees of Johns Hopkins University. Ambranson personally donated $250,000 to FDD in 2004. Steinhardt Partners, one of the largest hedge funds in the world during the 1990s, donated $250,000 to FDD in 2004. Jerome Goodman, a former director of Aetna Inc., one of the largest health insurers in the US, donated over $240,000 to FDD in 2003. The Sarah Scaife Foundation, a well-known supporter of neo-conservative think-tanks whose fortune is financed by the Mellon oil and banking empire, donated $125,000 to the FDD in 2004. The Russel Berrie Foundation, which also funds ‘educational’ programs for Israeli soldiers, gave $75,000 in 2004. Appropriately enough – given that most of these names appear on the periodic lists of the wealthiest individuals and corporations in the US – Steven Forbes, CEO of Forbes Inc., sits on the three-person board of FDD. Forbes himself is a strident advocate of neo-liberal policies, in particular the introduction of a flat-tax that would see him pay the same amount of tax as the poorest working Americans. Forbes is also a board member of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), another neo-conservative think-tank. The ‘distinguished advisors’ to the FDD board of directors includes James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, Louis Freeh, former director of the FBI, and rabid neo-conservative Newt Gingrich. [44] It is worth recappping these relationships. The Iraq Foundation, an organization funded almost entirely by the NED and US State Department, works in close alliance with a flagship, neo-conservative entity such as the FDD, which, in turn, is funded by some of the wealthiest individuals and companies in the US. Both the Iraq Foundation and FDD are closely linked to the US-backed Iraqi government. Rend Francke, executive director of the Iraq Foundation as the representative of the Iraqi National Council in Washington D.C., and Tanya Gilly, former FDD staff member, as an elected representative in the current Iraqi government. These links indicate that concern with ‘democracy’ – the public face of both the Iraq Foundation and the FDD – are inseparable from the interests of US capital and neo-liberal policy makers.
Imperialism
Democracy promotion is a sham to justify endless military interventionism

Jadallah, Dina. Dina Jadallah is a PhD candidate at the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Arizona. Arab Studies Quarterly 34.4 (Fall 2012): 205-229. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ABSTRACTED SOVEREIGNTY

The American push to promote democracy while simultaneously stifling it is the result of two interactive processes. First, democracy promotion is used to sell interventionism domestically. The structures and procedures that are promoted are familiar to and resonate with the home audience. Concomitantly, universalist moralizing about freedom and rights becomes another arrow in the quiver of US justifications for interventionism abroad. The rhetoric and seemingly impartial structures and procedures further endow a façade of legality, falling into the general category of ostensible international consensus that seeks to impose a US vision on subordinate states. Second, the United States recognizes that any substantive democracy must be based on popular support. This gives structure, authority, and thus a measure of stability to the state's exercise of power. Ideally, from a US perspective, there would be democracies that are "moderate," that is, stable, aligned with Western interests, not opposed to pursuing normalization with Israel. These democracies would at the same time have either the support of a majority of their populations, which are more easily managed when apathetic. Herein lies the crux of the problem. Majority popular opinions sometimes diverge from the policies pursued by their governments. This divergence is particularly enormous in the Arab world. Hence, there is a need to stifle democracy and subvert popular agency that will contradict ruling interests. Thus, the divergence exists not just between state and society, but between the majority desires of Arab societies and Western interests. The two cannot be reconciled unless dominant US interests are reformulated to accommodate national, regional, and international perspectives which may conflict with its own. However, this would entail geo-strategic and economic losses to dominant international powers and elites, who are unwilling and unmotivated to give up their privileges, unless forced to do so by societal agitation. This explains the seductive pull of US reliance on intermediation by dictatorial regimes and democracy promotion strategies. The history and contemporary policies of the United States in the Middle East will be used to demonstrate that US dominance has effected an ideational, political, and economic pox - not pax - Americana for most Arabs. Deconstruction of the terms, critical analysis of the political theories, and historical contextualization of actual policies are essential to deciphering contemporary politics and the emergent popular struggles for sovereignty, in the Arab world, and indeed, internationally. This article posits that democracy promotion is a US method for separating the socio-economic from the political by attempting to structure the parameters and boundaries of popular sovereignty in subordinate Arab states. In this way, popular demands are controlled and hampered in their ability to alter, or even challenge, the established order. That order is capitalist, inequitarian, hierarchical, and necessitates a nation-state structure. As David Harvey argues, the geographical container of the state renders "coherent (by force if necessary) the institutional and administrative arrangements [such as property rights and market law] that underpin its [capitalism's] functioning."2 The evidence I present in this essay strongly suggests that the opposite of democracy - keeping the demos, or common people, down, vis-à-vis the kratos, rule/governance - is in fact the intent. Democracy promotion strategies aid the transitive exercise of power through local governance that nominally preserves independence. The aim is to sustain what Harvey calls a "networked set of neocolonial relations."3 A cursory look at recent political developments in the region would indicate that the interests of the United States and those of its subordinate allies of Arab dictatorial regimes like Qatar and Saudi Arabia are not always congruent.4 However, while regional interstate rivalry exists, the differences between some of their interests and those of the United States are cosmetic. Substantively, both sides are keen to preserve equilibrium. During the recent uprisings and especially in the on-going transitional period, some regional allies of the United States have been funding Islamist groups (of the Sunni variety) and arming affiliated "rebel" groups. They have also created, hosted, and established working relationships with new organizations and "leaders" whose job is to change (only) the heads of regimes that are regional competitors and who, coincidentally, do not consistently toe the line of US power (like Qaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria). These patronage types of intervention constitute externally directed geo-strategic regional post-Sykes Picot reconfigurations of power as opposed to any real interest in engendering or assisting indigenous democratic transformations. These attempts do not always work out as planned. Thus, in Libya there is now internecine fighting between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Gulf-funded and armed "rebel" militias that "liberated" the country.5 Moreover, the region of Barqa has declared its independence, foreshadowing partition.6 In Syria, the splintering of the opposition and the penetration of al-Qa'ida elements that pose as oppositional forces have caused the United States to back off against intervention (ostensibly to enforce democracy).7 Yet, Saudi Arabia and Qatar continue their policies of arming and funding some sectors of the opposition.8 Again, this only appears to contradict US interests. In a sort of Foucauldian self-disciplinary re-production of power relations, Arab guardians of the status quo
anticipate US desires and pursue policies that aim to curry favor. If they succeed, as happened when their financial support gave an electoral edge to Islamist candidates in the recent Egyptian election, the procedural veneer of democracy is produced. Meanwhile, dictatorship under the military rule of Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the newly paid for elected leaders is preserved. However, if the status quo regional powers fail, the United States remains "clean" by always urging democracy and praising the entirely cosmetic reforms in allied dictatorships. The outcome of procedural democracy is non-democratic in that elections and representative bodies do not necessarily represent the whole society, but the better funded and organized. In Egypt, this led to protests from various forces in society, including al-Azhar, against the "Islamist-overwhelmed parliament's monopoly" in the committee to write the new constitution "that should represent all sects of the Egyptian society." While democracy promotion is an ensemble of policies that are unrelated to popular democracy, the rhetorical reference to an imaginary real practice of democracy is what underlies, justifies, and sustains US interventions around the world. For example, in Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States managed a "transition" to democracy that entailed the transfer of power from former President `Ali `Abdullah Saleh to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in a February 2012 "election" in which the latter was the only candidate. Hillary Clinton hailed this transition as "democratic." This type of democratic spectacle is supplemented with active extra-judicial military intervention in the form of drone attacks against alleged al-Qa'ida suspects. The reality is that the United States cannot afford (popular) democracy: not in the United States, not in the Arab world, and not in the world at large. Domestically, pluralist liberal "democratic" theory and institutional practices disguise extreme concentration of power. Externally, democracy promotion is a strategic cover for US power: it is used to maintain geo-strategic and economic dominance in the global order, which are configured to asymmetrically benefit specific groups with real, quantifiable interests. In other words, what is promoted is a specific American democratic ideology that is embedded in material realities and is currently intrinsically tied to neoliberalism (disguised as globalization). As such, both the (elite-controlled) state and its ideology work in conjunction to sustain and reproduce a status quo equilibrium that is differential and inegalitarian.

That turns the aff – Middle East countries will pay lip service to democracy in exchange for complying with U.S. demands, but won’t be democratic. Also reject their empirics which define democracy too superficially. These aren’t democracies we’re propping up

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DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ABSTRACTED SOVEREIGNTY [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]
Aff Answers

Democracy promotion isn’t imperialist
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Some assert that the United States can’t promote democracy in the Middle East because it is an arrogant imposition of our values. They ignore two key facts. First, the desire to live in freedom is a universal human desire, not one only felt by those of us who happen to live in the West. Second, political and economic changes are coming to the Middle East. As a businessman in Dubai said recently, “All the old sheikhs are trying to brush the dust of centuries from their robes.” Five years ago newspaper editors in Egypt were looking for ways to move their operations offshore out of fear that they wouldn’t be allowed to publish in Cairo. Today an opposition press is thriving. Five years ago, no woman had ever run for office or voted in an election in most of the countries in the Gulf. Today they’ve done both. Five years ago, the region was dominated by men like Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein. Not anymore. At the same time, the forces of al Qaeda and terror-sponsoring states like Iran and Syria are strong and threatening. Today’s Middle East is at a crossroads with one road leading to freedom, and the other leading to terror and fear. America must support those risking everything for freedom. Democracy promotion is complex. It is not without its setbacks and disappointments. But America should never turn from hard tasks, or seek excuses to retreat. We’ve tried the path of supporting authoritarian regimes while ignoring their people’s aspirations for freedom. This policy brought only a false sense of security and stability. Promoting democracy in the Middle East today is smart and right.

Democracy promotion acknowledges each nation’s unique history while recognizing that the fight for freedom is universal
Baran 9

Little Hope For Compromise The prevailing view -- that Islamists should be co-opted into existing political systems -- simply will not work. Often, Islamists are willing to make superficial concessions while continuing to hold an uncompromising worldview. The United States simply does not understand Islam, even though it has been an active and increasingly powerful ideology over at least three decades. But although Islamism is not compatible with democracy, Muslims can be democrats. There is a huge difference. The academics, analysts, and policymakers who argue that a movement like the Muslim Brotherhood today is “moderate” seem to disregard its ideology, history, and long-term strategy. They even seem to disregard the brotherhood’s own statements. It is true that most affiliates of this movement do not directly call for terrorist acts, are open to dialogue with the West, and participate in democratic elections. Yet this is not sufficient for them to qualify as “moderate,” when their ideology is so extreme. Turning a blind eye to ideological extremism -- even for the sake of combating violent extremism and terrorism -- is a direct threat to the democratic order. It is critically important to recognize that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, anti-American movements, groups, and leaders from Russia to Venezuela have come closer together in a shared hostility to the Western, liberal system. The worldwide U.S. commitment to, and promotion of, liberal democracy must therefore not be tacked on to policy as an afterthought, but must be at the core of the U.S. foreign and national-security strategy. This means returning to the fundamentals of what America is about: defending and guaranteeing freedom and dignity. Anti-Americanism Alive And Well Yet, it is important to keep in mind that anti-American groups will continue to try to take advantage of open societies. Some intentionally provoke incidents to promote an “us versus them” mentality. They also feed conspiracy theories. The Islamist narrative is about victimization and humiliation; it is part of a deadly mixture of feelings of political and economic inferiority with a sense of ethical superiority. I believe having President Barack Obama in office will grant the United States only short-term relief; Islamists are working on new narratives and searching for new grievances, since their need to undermine the United States and its
democratic vision is so strong. Hopefully, the Obama administration will not be so eager to reverse the unpopularity of the Bush years that it will limit the emphasis on democracy. America needs to be true to its values and principles. The United States should not be promoting “moderate Islam,” but liberal democracy. There is no Arab or Muslim exceptionalism; leaders make these arguments in order to retain their hold on power over their people. Even though people in different parts of the world may use different terms, the yearning for what we call freedom and liberal democracy is indeed universal. There are no easy solutions, but if the United States does not show leadership, no one else will. We need to be patient and focus on institution building to enable democratic cultures to emerge. Each country has its own path that is based on its own history, culture, and traditions, and it takes time. There simply is no shortcut. We should take a lesson in patience from the legend of Scheherazade, whose stories spanned 1,001 nights. Her tale is one of the most beautiful narratives in human history, yet it is unavailable in many parts of the Muslim world where books that preach hatred are freely distributed. It is a story about a king who would marry and then kill his wives after their first night because he feared they would betray him. But Scheherazade survived, thanks to her wit and imagination: she began telling a tale that continued for 1001 nights, and in this process she gradually opened the king’s heart and soul to love. In the end he spared her. In many ways, she spared him too by awakening humanity that allowed him to love again. This is the kind of story we need. If Scheherazade had not had the right tools to capture the king’s imagination, she would have been killed like the others before her. And the king and the kingdom would have continued to suffer. By spreading the narrative of democratic progress, we can help save other women and men, the rulers and the ruled, and ultimately ourselves. 

Democracy promotion isn’t an imposition of Western values—it’s about basic human rights that people overseas are also fighting for

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Here are a few things for democracy’s advocates to bear in mind as they engage in the debate over the future course of the struggle: Don’t accept the “who are we to judge” argument: In promoting democracy, governments and activists are not imposing their own self-righteous judgments on unwilling foreign societies. In fact, the most powerful statements in support of freedom and human rights have been made by those who have endured oppression: Sakharov, Wałęsa, Aung San Suu Kyi, Mandela. In every instance, the heroes of the freedom struggle—including today’s lesser-known figures—have appealed to the United States, Europe, and other democratic societies for solidarity and help. They are our allies. They are under fire. They deserve our assistance. Remind the skeptics of what you support: The basics of democratic governance are straightforward: honest elections, freedom of speech and the press, rule of law (meaning a judiciary that is independent of political domination), an end to torture and persecution, the protection of minority and women’s rights. Governments endowed with the legitimacy that comes from true popular consent do not fear these values. Leaders who raise the specter of coups and infiltration when confronted by a reform movement, who conflate modest political openings with Iraq-style invasions under the tainted rubric of “regime change,” are betraying the unease of illegitimate rulers throughout history. The undeniable
The fact is that authoritarian systems, by their nature and structure, cannot uphold basic human rights like those listed above. Given such a regime, change is both necessary and desirable, and history has shown again and again—from Poland to Taiwan—that it need not be accompanied by war or calamity.
“Middle East” PIC

“Middle East” is too imprecise
Khalidi 98
Rashid Khalidi (Palestinian American historian of the Middle East, the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, and director of the Middle East Institute of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs). “The “Middle East” as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping A Region in the Era of Globalization.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 1998. [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

There are other problems with the term “Middle East.” One is the lack of a precise definition of the areas, countries, cultures, religions, and language groups which are encompassed by this designation. In spite of the widespread use of the term, there is no consensus as to precisely where the “Middle East” is, what its limits are, and what it includes. While some definitions include North Africa, others do not. The United States State Department, for example, for many years considered the “Middle East” to include the countries of West Asia and Egypt, but not the rest of North Africa. By some definitions, the region includes Turkey, while by others it does not; by some it includes Afghanistan, by others it does not, and so forth, stretching across a very broad range of countries on the “periphery” of the “central” countries of the region. Practically the only areas included in virtually every definition of the “Middle East” are the “Fertile Crescent” - another old term to signify geographical Syria and Mesopotamia - and the Arabian Peninsula. Iran and Egypt are almost always included, but are left out by a few definitions, and so it goes. Beyond this, even if there is a general sense of which broad areas are included, there is no clear idea of where the precise limits of the region are. This is true wherever no clear boundary is provided by a large body of water like the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, or the Indian Ocean. Thus the question arises in Western Africa over whether the “Middle East” ends in the Sahara or south of it, and in Eastern Africa whether it includes the Horn of Africa or not; or at the region’s eastern limits, in West Asia, where by some definitions Pakistan and Afghanistan are part of the “Middle East” and by others they are not; or to the north-east, where the question arises of how much, if any, of Central Asia is part of the region. The latter question has been reopened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and by the resultant closer involvement of the countries and peoples of Central Asia with the region, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other states to their south, which has renewed historic connections between them.

Use of the term “Middle East” fuels Eurocentric perceptions of the region
Khalidi 98
Rashid Khalidi (Palestinian American historian of the Middle East, the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, and director of the Middle East Institute of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs). “The “Middle East” as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping A Region in the Era of Globalization.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 1998. [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

In recent years, there has been increasing dissatisfaction among many scholars with the term “Middle East” as a designation for the vast region lying between the Atlantic Ocean, Central Asia and India. This dissatisfaction results in part from the fact that the term is one of many relics of an earlier, Eurocentric era, when things were “near,” or “far,” or in the “middle,” in relation to the privileged vantage point of Europe. While similar designations for other regions, such as “the Far
“Middle East” was a term invented to reify US colonialism, and contributes to perceptions which stigmatize Arab countries

Syed 15

The term “Middle East” was coined in 1901 by American geo-strategist and imperialist Alfred Thayer Mahan who strongly supported the naval capacities of the United States of America, and, in his article The Persian Gulf and International Relations, Mahan stated his wish for its enterprises to expand in the world. His ideas in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History lead to a global naval arms race. In the late 1910’s the government of Britain separated Ottoman regions, while Russia had been planning on setting an imperative in India. The British government did not want “Muslim states” to turn against them via Russian rule—thus Britain eventually promised Jewish-Israelites a homeland in Palestine, creating “Middle Eastern” allies (as Britain had a significant zionist population), Egypt is North African, Turkey is half European-half Asian, and the rest of the “Middle Eastern” countries are Asian countries in the South West and central South. Thus, the loose term “Middle East” is used to simplify intercontinental lands in order to militarily categorize diverse regions of the world. Many would argue that this term has re-expanded to include Pakistan simply because Pakistan has a slight Islamfist influence which the West somehow has to “dismantle” (i.e. the term “Middle Eastern” became popularized in reference to Pakistan after Osama bin Laden’s death there). Middle Eastern countries are often categorized as having combinations of oil money, rapid stages of revolution, violence, extremism, and/or Arab and Islamic influences. For some, it is difficult to name the continents that the nations of the “Middle East” include, and many are unaware of the influence that American colonialism has had on this term. But most importantly, “Middle Eastern” countries have been stigmatized in the West, thus it is important to note the cultural beauty of such nations.
such as wars, legal traditions, women’s rights, environmental rights and employee treatment, we must recognize that the “Middle East” is much more than what Western media shows the world; even the West has a host of issues it needs to solve. The "Middle East" is diverse in languages, economies, governments, religions, traditions and issues. It is important to look forward to the progress of these states and their diversity. It is also important to look at the historical constructs of such states, and the negative connotation behind the simplified term "The Middle East," rather than perpetuating the idea that "The Middle East" is only a troubled region.
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Aff
Non-unique, I-Law already restricts sovereignty

Young


Even though many theorists and political actors today question the idea that the realistic response to most claims of nations or peoples to self-determination is to establish a separate sovereign state for each people, most writings on self-determination assume the model of state sovereignty as their paradigm. I refer to this as the non-interference model of self-determination. For the group to be self-determining means primarily that outsiders do not interfere with the decisions and actions those governing institutions make over what goes on inside their territorial jurisdiction. Arguably, a pure non-interference concept of sovereignty has never existed in practice. International law and practices of international governance in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, moreover, increasingly involve forms of transnational authority constraining the actions of sovereign states and forms of negotiation and cooperation between entities within different states.

Autocrats don’t have sovereignty when they don’t truly represent their people—they also don’t respect the sovereignty of other countries

Puddington


Rebuff the sovereignty argument: While a measure of hypocrisy is inevitable in diplomatic affairs, there are limits. Vladimir Putin, who invokes sovereignty when confronted by foreign criticism over domestic repression, is currently engaged in an aggressive assault on the sovereignty of neighboring countries that have decided to orient their economies toward the EU. China’s regime is bullying its neighbors over territory and has increasingly gone beyond its borders to silence inconvenient critics. The Syrian government is likely responsible for the murder of political figures and journalists in Lebanon who sought to free their country from foreign domination. We are entering a realm in which autocrats assume the right to decide what qualifies as sovereignty and what does not. It is worth asking these rulers for their credentials as the supposed representatives of their sovereign people. They will have nothing to show but rigged elections and squatters’ rights.
Neg
Realism

Abstract moral principles can’t apply to states—they have to prioritize national survival above all else

Morgenthau 55


Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself, “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence, that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said: I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.

Since the international system is anarchic, states must maximize their relative power to survive

Kriesler and Mearsheimer 2


I agree with Waltz, that structure determines how states behave. In other words, it's the structure of the international system that causes states to compete for power. And it's an anarchical system that they have to operate in. Yes. It's an anarchical system, meaning that there's no higher authority that sits above states. So you have a “911” problem. If a state gets into trouble in the international system, it can't dial 911 because there's nobody on top to come to its rescue. It's this anarchy that pushes states to compete for power. So Waltz and I agree on that. But the fundamental difference between the two of us is that I believe that states seek hegemony. I believe that they're ultimately more aggressive than Waltz portrays them as being. The goal for states is to dominate the entire system. To put it in colloquial terms, the aim of states is to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. Because if you're the biggest and baddest dude on the block, then it is highly unlikely that any other state will challenge you, simply because you're so powerful. Just take the Western Hemisphere, for example, where the United States is by far the most powerful state in the region. No state -- Canada, Guatemala, Cuba, Mexico -- would even think about going to war against the United States, because we are so powerful. This is the ideal situation to have, to be so powerful that nobody else can challenge you.
But Waltz would argue that it’s not a good idea to be so powerful, because when you push in that direction, other states balance against you to try and cut you down at the knees.

Realism entails rejecting democracy promotion
Zelizer 11

Princeton, New Jersey (CNN) -- When the Egyptian people took to the streets of Cairo to protest the oppressive government of President Hosni Mubarak, they instantly challenged one of the most powerful strains of U.S. foreign policy thinking. In American diplomatic circles, the "realists" have long argued that the U.S. must be primarily focused on national self-interest, rather than concentrating on trying to promote democracy and human rights in other countries. They object to the style of idealism promoted by President Woodrow Wilson, who envisioned that war and diplomacy could transform international relations by institutionalizing cooperation among nations, allowing for the self-determination of people and ending war for all time. In The New York Times, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger -- one of the most famous proponents of realism -- wrote that his approach to foreign policy respected the importance of values but insisted "on a careful, even unsentimental, weighing of the balance of material forces." By contrast, he wrote, trying to promote idealism in foreign policy "translates it into a call for crusades on behalf of regime change." One of the classic formulations of these ideas was penned by Georgetown professor -- and future Reagan adviser and U.N. ambassador -- Jeane Kirkpatrick in 1979. In her article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Kirkpatrick argued that often the U.S. could not be on the side of democracy if it meant supporting governments that would be hostile to U.S. interests. She criticized President Jimmy Carter for being hostile to autocratic governments that were willing to work with the U.S. against communism.

Kirkpatrick rejected the idea that it was possible to democratize countries in all circumstances. Nowhere has the power of realism been stronger than in U.S. Middle East policy. For many decades the U.S. has supported Arab governments whose behavior fundamentally contradicts democratic ideals. U.S. policymakers concluded that there were no other options. It is impossible, they said, for democracy to take root in the Middle East given the history of the region. To protect strategic interests, such as access to oil, they felt it essential to make peace with bad rulers.
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No topic is more alluring and yet more contentious in contemporary democratic theory than that of democracy promotion. In the last two decades, there has been a conspicuous shift in the way academics and practitioners understand, espouse, or pay lip service to the virtues of democracy. Whereas the appeal of earlier commitments to the spread of democratic values and institutions (e.g., Wilsonian idealism) faded in the face of strategic interests and intensified great power rivalries spanning much of the globe, the post-Cold War order did in fact fortify democracy’s normative status in international politics. No sooner was the triumph of capitalist democracy declared ‘the end of history’ than scholars and practitioners of international politics were rushing to welcome the onset of a ‘third wave’ of democratization (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1991). Indeed, as Michael McFaul (2004: 138) has argued, at the dawn of the 21st century, democracy promotion had virtually become an established ‘international norm’, as much so that ‘the normative burden has shifted to those not interested in advocating democracy promotion’. Yet, in spite of the near-universal sentiment in support of the idea of democracy promotion, there is nothing even remotely approaching a consensus as regards the means of its implementation. Should promoters limit their efforts to offering electoral assistance, building institutional capacities, and/or facilitating civic engagement, or must they use other means, such as military force, economic sanctions, or other invasive strategies, to spur democratic change? While some have argued vociferously that Western democracies (especially the United States) should pool their considerable military and economic resources to spread and promote democratic values across the globe (Ikenberry, 2000; McFaul, 2010; Muravchik, 1993; Talbott, 1996), others have warned of the inevitable politicization, and hence illegitimacy, of such programs when used as tools of statecraft (Robinson, 1996; Smith, 2000). Still others have argued that only NGOs and transnational bodies have the legitimacy and disinterested motives to promote democracy (Archibugi, 2008; Carothers and Ottaway, 2003; Pevehouse, 2005; Zweifel, 2006). Nor is there general agreement about the desired or likely outcomes of democracy promotion (Brown et al., 1996).
Definitions of Middle East

Dictionary.com

Also called Mideast. (loosely) the area from Libya E to Afghanistan, usually including Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries of the Arabian peninsula.

The countries included in the Middle East are arbitrary to some degree, but we can define a core set that should be included.


The concept of a region called the “Middle East” is a relatively recent and unstable construction. Since the term was first coined at the beginning of the 20th century, it has been applied to different sets of countries and territories. To complicate matters further, territories which have at times been categorized as “Middle East” have also attracted other designations: Near East, western Asia, eastern Mediterranean, the Arab world, and so on. These designations all represent different ways of conceptualizing what these territories have in common and how they relate to other parts of the world. For practical purposes, CCSMEMC uses an admittedly arbitrary designation of contemporary nations into “core areas” and “extended regions” of the Middle East as follows:

Core Areas: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus (northern), Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza (Palestine) and Yemen.

Extended Regions of Muslim Civilizations: Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sahara, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The Middle East is the Arab League countries, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

[Arab League Countries = Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen]

September 11. 2001 terrorist attacks profoundly affected the international system, such as they almost radically changed the terms and scope of the debate related to the Middle East. Immediately after the terrorist attacks the terms like the Greater Middle East, the Broader Middle East or the Islamic Greater Middle East entered into the literature of the international relations. On the identification and the scope in 19th and 20th century and today at the beginning of 21st century the terminology on the Middle East is determined by the great powers (Ehrhardt and Johannsen, 2005, 11).

Today, the boundaries of the Middle East, the countries of the Middle East are solely determined by the only global super-power USA. At the same time, America has the power to set such political terminology. American political scientist Harkavy wrote, for the first time, an article about the concept of "the Greater Middle East" in the light of geopolitical developments (Harkavy, 2001, 37-53). (Harkavy and Kemp 1997) Later on, strategists like Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack who took office in 2002 Clinton Administration have developed the idea of democratic transformation of the Great Middle East. Indeed they published their views as a new transatlantic project at the fall of 2002 (Pollack and Asmus, 2003). To summarize, America should take initiative for the political transformation of the Great Middle East for a long period according to Asmus and Pollack, e.g. Neo-cons who were influential in George W. Bush Administration advocated a new and radical fresh start on the democratization of the Middle East. In this context, President Bush began to express his project named "the Greater Middle East Initiative" (GMEI) at every opportunity towards the end of 2003. The project was intended to establish democracies in the entire Islamic world (Schoch, 2005: 30-48). Model concept of the project was embodied at the G-8 Summit held in Sea Island, Georgia; then its content was published for the first time in Al-Hayat English Newspaper based in London. The geography which was described as the Greater Middle East in the Project comprised the Arab League countries, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Central Asian countries was not included in the project, because these countries were already acting with the United States in her joint fight against terrorism within the scope of policy and the US began to deploy military bases in their territories after the September 11.

There is no stable definition of the Middle East—it is a political and cultural definition, not a geographical one. Özalp 11, (Osman Nuri Özalp, Kırklareli University, Turkey, “Where is the Middle East? The Definition and Classification Problem of the Middle East as a Regional Subsystem in International Relations,” Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 2, Winter 2011, www.tau.edu.tr/img/files/A1.pdf) [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

As a result, reasons for the lack of consensus on the very different definition and on the issue of boundaries at the scientific literature related to the Middle East can be summarized as following: Different official agencies of different countries define different definitions and border for the Middle East. Different branches of science use different definitions for the Middle East. Definition of the Middle East can be done in various ways because of different interests. Most of the definitions related to the Middle East are the European-based and they are defined with different content and different times in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Most of the European-based definitions are shaped according to the interests of the imperialist point of view and of the great powers.

Term of the Middle East is not primarily a geographical definition, rather it is a modern political term. It has, again, dynamic characteristics according to the changes in the world politics and changes in the region. The debate about the definition becomes important in terms of both a better understanding of current political developments in the geography of region including Turkey and prediction of regional political perspectives of the major powers towards near future. At this point, it should be noted that term of the Middle East contains not a geographical restriction, but the political and cultural identity, in parallel with the changes in world politics and regional developments, it is always likely to make new definitions related to the Middle East.