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November/December 2017 LD Brief

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## Introductory Note

Friends of Premier Debate,

This is Premier’s Nov-Dec brief, and the topic is “Resolved: Wealthy nations have an obligation to provide development assistance to other nations.”

We’re always looking for ways to make the briefs better, so please, let us know what you think! And send them around. If you use these briefs please help us and direct other debaters to PremierDebate.com/Briefs where we will continue uploading .DOC versions of the briefs.

We’d like to thank Blake Andrews, Katya Ehresman, Xavier Roberts-Gaal, Amy Santos, Bo Slade and Parker Whitfill for their efforts toward this communal resource. They worked really hard to provide some of the best evidence you’ll see this early on the topic. Do send them a thank you for their hard work!

Lastly, we want to remind the readers about standard brief practice to get the most out of this file. Best practice for brief use is to use it as a guide for further research. Find the articles and citations and cut them for your own personal knowledge. You’ll find even better cards that way. If you want to use the evidence in here in a pinch, you should at least re-tag and highlight the evidence yourself so you know exactly what it says and how you’re going to use it. Remember, briefs can be a tremendous resource but you need to familiarize yourself with the underlying material first.

Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

Bob Overing & John Scoggin

Directors | Premier Debate

## Brief Introduction (Parker Whitfill)

During my time debating, Nov-Dec was traditionally a legal topic. I am, and I am sure many others, are glad to see a new type of topic this Nov-Dec. We haven’t had an international topic for a while, so this should be a breath of fresh air.

Affirmatives on this topic have a wide array of options, especially if you are reading a consequentialist framework. There are seemingly endless advantage areas in the topic, including very technical plans. You’ll find a lot of resources for these positions in this brief. Think strategically about whether you want to read an advantage that terminates in an extinction-level impact or a high probability structural violence scenario. I think the most important thing for affs to plan for is for a lot of negative solvency turns, and thus they should pin down the affs they think avoid these objections the best like the technology plan. Another note for affs is to consider that neg lit is very kritik heavy, so perhaps the BLA plan or a structural violence aff would be a more strategic.

Negative options seem to be more limited on this topic. There is strong K literature, especially with the colonialism K, but no other off-case leaps out a strong option. There are some DA’s and CP’s, but it seems like the best neg consequential responses are solvency turns. This brief contains a substantial amount to peruse over, but I am sure there are more out there as well, so use what we have as a jumping off point. Topicality will be a stock neg option on this topic as both “developmental assistance” and “wealth nations” are vague terms, and it’s unclear exactly what plans the aff can fairly defend.

Parker Whitfill

Faculty | Premier Debate

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# Affirmative

## Inherency

#### Development assistance reform is necessary- countries are not meeting goals.

Hirvonen 05. Hirvonen, Pekka. Deputy Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Stingy Stingy: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor.” Global Policy Forum. 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html>. [Premier]

Toward a Comprehensive Solution When examining the increases in official development assistance since 2001, one can hardly conclude that UN Under Secretary General Egeland was completely on the wrong track when he called rich nations stingy. While the nominal value of international aid has increased, the old 0.7 percent aid goal still looks far away for most donors. In fact, most countries are struggling even to maintain their current ODA/GNI levels, and Italy and Japan have cut their aid funding in recent years. Some donors, most notably the United States, have succeeded in boosting significantly their foreign aid. However, the bulk of the new money has not gone to fighting poverty in Africa, the world's poorest region, but to advance US strategic goals in the "war on terror" in Iraq, Afghanistan and a handful of other countries. The Millennium Challenge Account, President Bush's bold development initiative, has so far been marred by bureaucracy and lack of funding. Furthermore, much of the development assistance remains inefficient. Donors often accuse recipients of wasting aid funds, but part of the reason why aid does not work well lies in donor governments' own policies. Tied aid, overpriced technical assistance, counting debt relief as development aid and including immigration-related costs in aid figures may serve donors' interests but they do not contribute to eradicating poverty. As an ActionAid report recently put it, "If aid currently has a mixed record in terms of its impact on poverty reduction," this is due to the fact that tackling poverty "is often not what [aid] is designed to do."(37) On a more positive note, the UN Millennium Development Goals have stimulated discussion on increasing development assistance and finding new ways to finance development. To contribute to the MDG process, European Union countries have come forward with a collective timetable for increasing their aid budgets. The EU has also been discussing new finance mechanisms such as global taxes and an International Finance Facility to provide additional funds for international development. But time is running short if rich countries are serious about their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals. Mere promises, discussion and new timetables will not be enough to get the MDGs on track. Governments must take action. This means not only more funds for development but also reforming the aid system. To make aid work for the poor, donors should end their practices of tied aid and statistical spin-doctoring. Rich countries' short-sighted agenda of pursuing their own economic and strategic interests will have to give way to an approach that prioritizes recipients' needs. The aid reform should also be complemented with a comprehensive debt relief package and a global trade deal that would make trade fairer. Anything short of a 100 percent debt cancellation will only mean circulating aid money back to rich countries' pockets in the form of debt servicing. It is also unrealistic to expect development assistance to bear fruit if rich countries continue to give an unfair advantage to their own farm products in the world market by spending billions of dollars on agricultural subsidies each year. Unfortunately, the outlook for this kind of comprehensive solution remains poor. The current G8 initiative on debt relief is too limited and contains too many conditions to make a lasting impact on global poverty. The WTO Doha Round trade negotiations are also in trouble because of rich countries' reluctance to make concessions in the areas of farm subsidies and agricultural tariffs. Being generous is not easy. It costs money and requires some sacrifices. But if rich countries do not want to be called stingy, they should be prepared to offer a bit more than just talk and half-hearted efforts that only lead to continued poverty and inefficient use of aid resources.

#### Development assistance programs for health face challenges and need reform.

Ottersen et. al. 2017. TRYGVE OTTERSEN (Department of Global Public Health and Primary Care, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway Department of International Public Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway Oslo Group on Global Health Policy, Department of Community Medicine and Global Health and Centre for Global Health, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway), APARNA KAMATH (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts), SUERIE MOON (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts), LENE MARTINSEN )Department of International Public Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway) JOHN-ARNE RØTTINGEN (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Department of Health Management and Health Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Infectious Disease Control and Environmental Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway) “Development assistance for health: what criteria do multi- and bilateral funders use?” *Health Economics, Policy and Law*, Vol 12, pp 223-244, Cambridge University Press, 2017. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/3AC02C98148A293290BACC109D49BB10/S1744133116000475a.pdf/div-class-title-development-assistance-for-health-what-criteria-do-multi-and-bilateral-funders-use-div.pdf> [Premier]

The past two decades have witnessed an unprecedented growth in development assistance for health (DAH). Disbursements by bilateral, multilateral and other donors increased from $7 billion in 1990 to $34 billion in 2010 (2015 $US) [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 2016]. In the ‘golden age’ between 2000 and 2010, the annual growth rate was more than 11% in average, and DAH grew almost three times faster than development assistance to non-health sectors (IHME, 2016). Now, however, the DAH system is challenged on several fronts. One challenge is the economic downturn and stagnation of DAH, with only 1.2% in average annual growth since 2010 (IHME, 2016). Another challenge is the epidemiological transition and the triple burden of disease that many countries are facing today (Frenk et al., 2011; Frenk and Moon, 2013). New challenges, and opportunities, for the DAH system are also emerging with the economic transition and the rise of middle-income countries (MICs). The MIC category now comprises 105 countries (fiscal year 2015), 70% of the world’s population, over 30% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), over 75% of the world’s poor, and almost 70% of the disease burden in the world (Sumner, 2012) (based on data from the World Bank and the IHME). These transitions raise questions about which countries should receive DAH and how much, and, fundamentally, which criteria promote fair and effective allocation of DAH across countries. The weight of this question is now being increasingly appreciated, as indicated by the recent Equitable Access Initiative (EAI, 2015). This initiative was led by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF) and eight co-conveners, with the aim of developing a new framework to classify countries and guide global health investments. The initiative recommended the use of a multi-criterion framework that takes into account income levels and health needs, in addition to domestic capacity and policies, where relevant (EAI, 2016). In the search for the best allocation policy, an understanding of the criteria used by major funders of development assistance can provide a valuable basis. A good understanding of these criteria is also relevant for the many new global financing mechanisms that have been proposed (Ooms et al., 2006; CEWG, 2012; Moon and Omole, 2013; Gostin, 2014; OWG, 2014). Over the recent years, we have started to get better grip on the range of allocation criteria currently used for DAH (Salvado and Walz, 2013; Burgett et al., 2016), but we still lack an in-depth broad comparative review focussing on these criteria.1 The objective of this paper is to provide a broad comparative overview of the allocation criteria stated by major funders of DAH. We reviewed the policy documents made readily available to the public, and we communicated directly with the funders on points in need of clarification. In this article, we first categorise allocation criteria for development assistance, next examine the criteria stated by bilateral and multilateral funders, and finally consider similarities and differences among the criteria.

#### Civil wars have pushed out investment by private firms, money has been flowing out rapidly.

Ayittey 13

Ayittey, George B.N.. (Ayittey is a professor @ American University) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

Civil wars continue to wreak devastation on African economies. They cost Africa at least $15 billion annually in lost output, wreckage of infrastructure, and refugee crises. The crisis in Zimbabwe, for example, has cost Africa dearly. Foreign investors have fled the region and the South African rand has lost 25 percent of its value since 2000. More than 4 million Zimbabwean refugees have fled to settle in South Africa and the neighboring countries, and the South African government is preparing a military base at Messina to house as many as 70,000 refugees. Since 2000, almost 60,000 physicians and other professionals have left Zimbabwe.16 According to the London Observer, Zimbabwe’s economic collapse caused $37 billion worth of damage to South Africa and other neighboring countries.17 South Africa has been worst affected, while Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia have also suffered severely. Finally, the neglect of peasant agriculture, the uprooting of farmers by civil wars, devastated infrastructure, and misguided agricultural policies have made it difficult for Africa to feed itself. Therefore, Africa must resort to food imports, spending $15 billion in 1998. By 2000, food imports had reached $18.7 billion, slightly more than donor assistance of $18.6 billion to Africa in 2000.

## Advantage Areas

### Ableism

#### Persons with disabilities lack a voice in the public narrative of development assistance

Lord et al 10 DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES JANET LORD, ALEKSANDRA POSARAC, MARCO NICOLI, KAREN PEFFLEY, CHARLOTTE MCCLAIN-NHLAPO AND MARY KEOGH MAY 2010 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/Publications-Reports/Disability_and_Intl_Cooperation.pdf> pg. 2-3 [premier]

**Persons with disabilities often lack a voice in the public discourse, and their interests and needs are frequently neglected. The negative interaction between persons with impairments and functional limitations and attitudinal and other environmental barriers creates disability and hinders their participation in social and economic life. These barriers to inclusion have profound social and economic effects not only on individuals with disabilities but also on their families and/or caregivers who often forego economically productive activities to stay at home and provide care. The exclusion leads to the loss and inefficient use of human capital, reduced individual and national productivity, the loss of fiscal revenues, and increased fiscal costs. 1.2.3 Empirical evidence suggests that poverty is associated with disability and that disability may increase the risk of poverty. In low income settings, poverty is found to cause malnutrition, which leads to micronutrient deficiency and developmental disability. Poverty causes underinvestment in children’s education, particularly in the case of children with disabilities. Poor people often have no choice but to take any job available, working in difficult and unsafe conditions where workplace accidents frequently occur. Lack of access to health care can cause even mild or treatable health conditions to develop into permanent disabilities. On the other hand, disability often leads to a decrease in family income and may increase the family’s vulnerability to poverty. 1.2.4 A central theme emerging from the CRPD,3 and specifically reflected in its obligations, is the need to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities in all spheres of life, including the development of national and international laws, policies and programs.4 This includes ensuring the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of each country’s development programs in order to [ensuring] a full success in the implementation of poverty reduction and other economic and social development strategies.5 At the international level, a number of multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as agencies and programs across the UN system, have been working to address disability inclusion in the context of their development assistance.**

#### Existing models for disability right declaration utilize ableist rhetoric and are too outdated for pragmatic implementation

Lord et al 10 DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES JANET LORD, ALEKSANDRA POSARAC, MARCO NICOLI, KAREN PEFFLEY, CHARLOTTE MCCLAIN-NHLAPO AND MARY KEOGH MAY 2010 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/Publications-Reports/Disability_and_Intl_Cooperation.pdf> pg. 3-4[premier] **bracketed for ableist language**

**The UN Declaration on the Rights of [differently abled] Persons6 and the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, adopted in the 1970s, were the first international instruments to set forth human rights principles relating specifically to persons with disabilities. The adoption of these instruments represented, at the time, progress in terms of situating disability rights on the international agenda. Nonetheless, these documents were soon seen as outdated by the disability community for their approach to disability as they reflected medical and charity models of disability which served to reinforce paternalistic attitudes (Oliver 1996). Progressively, the disability community supported a social model of disability, which offered a fundamental conceptual shift “away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular individuals to the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain groups or categories of people” (Oliver 1983:23).8 2.1.2 During the 1980s, human rights-based approaches started to take hold at the international level. The human rights of persons with disabilities garnered heightened attention by the UN during the 1980s with designations of the International Year of the Disabled in 19819 and the International Decade of Disabled Persons from 1982-1991.10 These UN-sponsored decades served to raise the profile of disability issues and helped to foster the emergence of a global disability community. Emphasis on social development and the importance of including persons with disabilities in policies and programming also formed part of an evolving international dialogue. 3 DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2.1.3 In 1982, the launch year of the International Decade, the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons11 was adopted by the General Assembly as a means of encouraging national level programs to achieve equality for persons with disabilities.12 The World Programme of Action, among other things, urges the organizations within the UN system to “explore, with the governments to which they are accredited, ways of adding to existing or planned projects in different sectors, components that would respond to the specific needs of disabled persons.”13 The Programme is presented as a global strategy with three core objectives which include enhancing disability prevention, rehabilitation and equalization of opportunities, to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities in social life and national development.14 2.1.4 The adoption of the World Programme was followed by the 1993 adoption by the General Assembly of the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for persons with disabilities.15 This instrument was designed to serve as a blueprint for policy-making and provide a basis for technical and economic cooperation among states.16 Rule 21 of the Standard Rules specifically addresses the responsibility of States in the realm of technical and economic cooperation and thus may be regarded as an important antecedent to Article 32 of the CRPD. Rule 22 specifies the need for States to participate actively in international cooperation concerning policies for the equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities. The Standard Rules, while non-binding, nevertheless served to inform State policies and practices and, in some instances, provided the framework for bilateral donor policies on disability.17 2.1.5 Beyond disability-specific instruments, the core human rights conventions establish a general human rights framework that is applicable to persons with disabilities and upon which the Standard Rules are based.18 Notably, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)19 includes a specific provision pertaining to children with disabilities (Article 23). The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women20 provides a general framework for ensuring the rights of all women, including women with disabilities.**

#### There is still work to be done – further integration of disability into models of international development are imperative to fill exclusionary gaps in global progress

Lord et al 10 DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES JANET LORD, ALEKSANDRA POSARAC, MARCO NICOLI, KAREN PEFFLEY, CHARLOTTE MCCLAIN-NHLAPO AND MARY KEOGH MAY 2010 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/Publications-Reports/Disability_and_Intl_Cooperation.pdf> pg. 30-31 [Premier]

**6.2 Disability has become a part of international cooperation and development aid. It is found that that all reviewed agencies have included disability in either their policies and/ or programs. Some policies and programs are new, others are long-established. In most of the cases, the inclusion is explicit, underpinned by relevant policy frameworks defined by resolutions, strategies, actions plans and other 30 DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES national, regional and international instruments, and effectuated through development aid programs. In some cases, while specific disability policy framework is absent, disability is an integral part of the implemented programs. 6.3 International cooperation policies often link disability to MDGs. A vast majority of the reviewed policies link the achievement of MDGs to the inclusion of disability in development. The MDG 1 – Eradicate hunger and extreme poverty, and 2 – Achieve universal primary education, are most frequently mentioned in this context, pointing that neither of them is likely to be achieved, unless issues specific to poverty and access to education among persons with disabilities are adequately addressed. 6.4 The policies and practices reviewed often combine several approaches to frame the inclusion of disability in development cooperation. They include human rights, participation, inclusion and development. A human rights-based approach is increasingly being used in conjunction with other approaches for the inclusion of disability into international cooperation policies and programs. The human rights-based approach is either disability specific, or informed more generally by international and/ or domestic human rights framework. 6.5 With respect to implementation and practice, the prevailing trend is to incorporate disability-specific/ targeted and mainstreaming/ inclusion/ integration programs. Most of the surveyed agencies combine approaches and instruments to include disability in development cooperation and aid. Thus, their programs would typically include: (i) disability specific programs, targeting persons with disabilities and their specific needs; (ii) disability-specific components that are appended to mainstream programs; and (iii) persons with disabilities and their specific needs are addressed within the framework of mainstream programming and across sectors. Differences in this regard seem to be a matter of degree and emphasis, not necessarily distinct approaches. 6.6 Policies and programs are dynamic and have changed over time. The review covers policies and programs aimed at including disability in international cooperation and development aid over the last 15 years. Although the period is short, the changes have been quite rapid, reflecting international developments with regards to disability which have culminated in the adoption of the CRPD.**

#### Current MDGs exclude disability from their global development goals – change is practical and needed now

Provost 11 Disability must be seen as a development issue, says report [Claire Provost](https://www.theguardian.com/profile/claire-provost) Thursday 9 June 2011 12.49 EDT Claire Provost is a journalist and the editor of [openDemocracy 50.50](https://opendemocracy.net/5050) covering gender, sexuality and social justice. She previously worked on the Guardian's Global development site including as a data journalist following the money in international aid. She was a Bertha fellow at the Centre for Investigative Journalism (2014-2016). https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/jun/09/world-disability-report-development-issue , web article no pages, DOA 10/10/17 [Premier]

**The UN millennium development goals (MDGs) may not be met by 2015 unless urgent action is taken to address the needs of people with disabilities, according to the first world report on disability. More than 1 billion people live with a disability, says the** [**world report on disability**](http://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/en/index.html)**, published by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank on Thursday. It covers all forms of disability, from blindness to mental health issues. It updates global disability estimates for the first time in 40 years and finds that 20% of the world's poorest people have disabilities and nearly 80% of people with disabilities live in low-income countries. "Addressing the health, education, employment and other development needs of people living with disabilities is fundamental to achieving the millennium development goals," said the World Bank president, Robert Zoellick. Children with disabilities are less likely to attend and complete school, says the report, putting at risk international targets for universal primary education. Disabled women are more likely to be victims of discrimination and sexual violence, pushing back progress on global goals for gender equality. People with disabilities are at greater risk of HIV and Aids than "classic risk groups" such as drug users. And children with disabilities have higher mortality rates – because of medical conditions and because of challenges accessing public services. The higher living costs faced by people with disabilities also mean that they have a 50% greater risk of incurring "catastrophic health costs" – those so high that they push them under the poverty line. But despite being pivotal in global efforts to reach the MDGs by 2015, people with disabilities are largely invisible in development statistics and absent from aid budgets. sA key challenge is how complex and diverse disabilities are, argues the report. While policies are usually written with thresholds and targets in mind, "disability is a matter of more or less, not yes or no", says the report. However, aid donors cannot afford to plan and fund development programmes that neglect the needs of people living with disabilities, says Tom Shakespeare, one of the report's authors. "Aid donors should not be funding projects that are not inclusive to people with disabilities," says Shakespeare, a technical officer at the WHO. "They should not, for example, be building schools that are not accessible." Donors must include people with disabilities in all mainstream development projects and make specific investments to enable people with disabilities to participate in broader society, he says. "You are simply not going to meet the MDGs unless you include them." One of the report's key messages is that disability is less about health conditions and more about social and economic barriers to inclusion. This is a bold stance for the WHO to take, says Shakespeare, and one that points the way to cost-effective strategies to overcome the disadvantages associated with disability. "Making a building accessible, for example, adds just 1% to the total cost of construction," he says. Training teachers to consider the special needs of children with disabilities is another low-cost but highly effective strategy to help tackle discrimination and keep children in school, he adds. But while disability has been largely absent from the international agenda, many developing countries have already been making significant – though partial – progress on including people with disabilities in development projects. "Lots of countries have done good things," says Shakespeare. Uganda, for example, has enshrined disability rights in its constitution, and people with disabilities participate at every level of the political process. Vietnam and Laos get top marks for a project to make schools inclusive. And Yemen gets Shakespeare's applause for its support services. "Even somewhere in crisis has a good story to tell. But no country has got it completely right." Disability must be seen as a development issue, says the report, but like obesity and ageing, it is an issue that transcends the traditional north-south distinctions. "Disability is part of the human condition," says the WHO director general, Margaret Chan. "Almost every one of us will be permanently or temporarily disabled at some point in life." But even in high-income countries, up to 40% of people with disabilities do not have access to the services they need. A stronger focus on disability will only become more important as the world's population ages and chronic diseases – such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease – spread, the report says. •**

#### There is a correlation between global disability and poverty; thus wealthier nations have an obligation to endorse development initiatives to include a marker of disability equality in development agencies and correct current aid data. Ableist discrimination is already high now which means its try or die for the aff.

Meeks 17 Why aid data needs to say more about persons with disabilities Feb 09, 2017 [Poverty](http://devinit.org/themes/poverty) Commentary blogs, written by Polly Meeks, Deputy Director of Policy and Influencing at ADD International, WEB, <http://devinit.org/post/why-aid-data-needs-to-say-more-about-persons-with-disabilities/> DOA 10/18/17 [Premier]

**“How much aid money goes to disability-inclusive projects?” With global disability prevalence estimated at more than 15%, and with known links between disability and poverty, it’s an obvious question – all the more so in the era of the Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDG) pledge to leave no one behind. On the surface, it’s a very simple question too. But when I put this question to a major development agency a few years ago, I was surprised to see how laborious it was to piece the information together, project by project, from across the agency’s £4 billion bilateral aid programme. Although the agency gathered a wealth of transparency metrics, the information on disability just wasn’t there. This isn’t an isolated challenge: Concluding Observations from the** [**UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities**](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx) **have also pointed to a lack of data on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in development programming – for example in Germany (in May 2015) and the European Union (in October 2015). But luckily, in the case of donor governments under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)** [**Development Assistance Committee (DAC)**](http://www.oecd.org/dac/)**, the challenge could have a neat solution. The OECD’s database on official development assistance (ODA) – the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) – includes ‘markers’ that flag aid flows for particular policy objectives such as** [**gender equality**](http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm)**. If the system also included a marker for disability equality,****[[1]](http://devinit.org/post/why-aid-data-needs-to-say-more-about-persons-with-disabilities/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) that development agency would have had the tools to respond to my question in a matter of minutes. Bringing information on disability-inclusive aid flows to the fingertips of policymakers is critical to starting a conversation on whether aid allocations are living up to the global commitment to leave no one behind. The limited available data suggests that such a conversation is urgently needed. For example, in 2015, US academics painstakingly examined documents from some 2,500 World Bank projects. They concluded that** [**just 2%**](http://aiddata.org/blog/tracking-investment-in-disability-inclusive-development) **were inclusive of persons with disabilities. Of course, the past 18 months have already seen some major commitments on disability data – such as on data disaggregation in the** [**SDG indicator framework**](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/2016-2-SDGs-Rev1-E.pdf)**, and** [**new plans**](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/582315/Data-disaggregation-action-plan-Jan-2017.pdf) **at individual agencies such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID). If more development actors get on board, these commitments** [**could be game-changing**](http://devinit.org/post/disability-data-to-leave-no-one-behind/)**, and at first sight, you might ask why another layer of data was needed too. But existing data commitments focus on outputs and outcomes (for example, numbers of people reached): and while such data is vital, the missing piece of the puzzle is to understand how these outputs and outcomes relate to development finance inputs.****[[2]](http://devinit.org/post/why-aid-data-needs-to-say-more-about-persons-with-disabilities/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) The added value of OECD DAC markers is that they are clearly input-focused. They report spending commitments, which means that they can provide an early warning if donor allocations are at risk of leaving some people behind – potentially years before this starts to show up in output and outcome data. And the more it is possible to marry up input and outcome data on disability (**[**combined with relevant qualitative information**](https://www.bond.org.uk/sites/default/files/resource-documents/leaving_no_one_behind_final.pdf)**), the more development actors will be able to make informed decisions on the relative value for money of different approaches to disability-inclusive programming. What is more, the OECD DAC CRS also offers the potential to record more granular data on disability. For example, it includes a code to track allocations for institutions and organisations working for women’s rights. Introducing a similar code could, for instance, highlight the work of organisations of persons with disabilities, which our experience at** [**ADD International**](https://www.add.org.uk/reports-resources/voices-marginalised) **shows can play a critical role in reversing misconceptions and discrimination. And because the OECD DAC markers are used by other data systems, successful introduction of a disability marker would have benefits beyond the CRS. In particular, organisations publishing data to the** [**International Aid Transparency Initiative**](http://www.aidtransparency.net/) **(IATI) Standard would be able to use the disability marker, and those interested in analysing data on disability-related activities would be able to use tools like** [**d-portal**](http://d-portal.org/ctrack.html?search=disability#view=main) **to extract this information from IATI data. But the results from this tool are only as good as the underlying data on which they are based – and until the data includes a systematic marker of disability inclusion, we will only ever get part of the picture. To be sure, markers are no silver bullet. They involve some subjectivity, and they only work if donors are prepared to use them. That’s why it’s so important for staff right across development agencies to be part of the process, and for work on data to go hand-in-hand with work on policy and awareness raising. This is what’s begun to happen** [**among many agencies that use the gender marker**](http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Handbook-OECD-DAC-Gender-Equality-Policy-Marker.pdf)**, and – although challenges remain – analysis by Development Initiatives shows that uptake has steadily increased over time, and is now relatively high, around 89% for bilateral donors. Last summer, the OECD DAC proposed that the CRS could be updated to align more closely with the SDGs. This is a very welcome first step, and it couldn’t have come at a better time, coinciding with a groundswell of interest in disability from a** [**widening community of donors**](http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/glad)**. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has** [**introduced a marker system**](http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/PDA-INGLESE-ESEC-web.pdf) **in its aid spending, and DFID is actively championing the introduction of a marker in the OECD DAC. Time will tell whether the OECD DAC can capitalise on this recent momentum, or whether some members will block progress. But for persons with disabilities, who for so long were invisible on the global development agenda, there’s very little time to lose. The SDGs’ vision of a world where no one is left behind is too important to fall at the first hurdle through a lack of basic aid data.**

#### Empirics prove when development goals don’t address disability then the risk of systemic poverty, marginalization and prejudice drastically increases globally – wealthy nations are especially qualified

Groce 11 Disability and the Millennium Development Goals A Review of the MDG Process and Strategies for Inclusion of Disability Issues in Millennium Development Goal Efforts United Nations New York, 2011 prepared by Professor Nora Ellen Groce of the Leonard Cheshire Disability and Inclusive Development Centre, University Collge London <http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/review_of_disability_and_the_mdgs.pdf> Pg 7-9 [Premier]

**The global focus on poverty highlighted by the MDGs is of particular concern to persons with dis- abilities. A growing body of research now shows that the most pressing issue faced by millions of persons with disabilities worldwide is not their disability but rather poverty.29 Much of this poverty is the direct and indirect result of exclusion and marginalization of persons with disabilities due to stigma and prejudice about disability. is stigma and prejudice, in turn, is often the result of a lack of knowledge of and awareness about people with disability which exists at all levels—from the family to the community to decision makers at the highest levels—and includes all those who simply have not understood that persons with disabilities need the same opportunities and rights available to all other members of society. Such stigma and prejudice leads to social marginalization and lack of equal access to educa- tional, employment and social support mechanisms that result in profound poverty for millions of persons with disabilities. e interconnection between disability and poverty has been described by many as a “feedback loop” with “disability being both a cause and a consequence of poverty”.30 While not all individuals who are born with disability or become disabled are poor, the poor are more likely to become disabled due to poor nutrition, lack of medical care, dangerous housing conditions, injuries on the job and violence. And once disabled, such individuals are signi cantly less likely to receive the education or training needed to nd employment, or have equal access to the social networks, community resources or economic and legal support systems that would bu er the impacts of poverty. A growing body of studies shows that the links between disability and poverty, while still poorly understood, are more complex and nuanced than previously thought.31 Nevertheless there 28 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals. 29 Yeo 2001, World Bank 2004a, Coleridge 2007.; Mont 2007. 30 DIFD 2000. 31 Braithwaite J, Mont D. 2009 ; e Lancet 2009. 8 Disability and the Millennium Development Goals is a strong consensus that people with disabilities and households with disabled members are dis- proportionately poorer, with fewer resources and more brittle support networks.32 e statistics on persons with disabilities and established risk factors for poverty are striking: it is estimated that persons with disabilities make up roughly 15% of the world’s population, but possibly 20% of the world’s poorest citizens.33, 34 One household in every four contains a disabled member—which means that 2 billion people live with disability on a daily basis.35 After a decade of concerted e orts, 90% of all disabled children in developing countries still do not attend school and the literacy rate for disabled adults may be as low as 1%.36 One out of every three street children are children with a disability.37 Unemployment rates for persons with disabilities in many countries routinely reach two-thirds or more of all those with disabilities, and many of those who are employed are able to nd only part-time positions.38 Moreover, when persons with disabilities do nd work they are likely to be the last ones hired and the rst ones red. ey also nd it far more di cult to advance to more skilled or more highly paid positions. e ability to nd and retain a job is of even greater concern in times of economic downturn.39 Not only are the links between disability and poverty of note in themselves, but the size of the global disabled population makes these links of particular concern to all those in international development working on poverty issues. Moreover, disability is a cross-cutting issue. e MDGs address poverty through tackling problems such as improving education, health, employment, gender equity and access to food, water and sanitation, trade and technology. ese issues are no less relevant to persons with dis- abilities than to all other members of society. In fact, in some instances, persons with disabilities may be at increased risk of becoming and remaining poor. For example, in the face of climate change, and in times of environmental or humanitarian disaster, the relative poverty of persons with disabilities, combined with problems of inaccessibility of relief services and low prioritiza- tion of disabled populations, may place persons with disabilities at greater likelihood of facing hardship, illness and death.40 Lack of access to information and resources, social marginalization and increased risk of violence places persons with disabilities at increased risk of exposure to HIV/ AIDS and decreases the likelihood that they will receive treatment or social or economic support should they become infected.41 us, all the MDGs have relevance to persons with disabilities and there is great need to ensure that all MDG Targets and Indicators identify, monitor and evaluate policies and program- ming for persons with disabilities, both as members of the general population and as a distinct vulnerable population.**

### HIV/Aids

#### Developing countries do not have the resources to combat HIV/AIDS

Katzenstein et al 03 David a; Laga, Marie b ; Moatti, Jean-Paul c (Official International AIDS Society Journal Wolters Kluwer, Volume 17, Issue, S1- S4, July 2003 Web, no page, DOA 6/18/17 [Premier]

**The evaluation of the HIV/AIDS Drug Access Initiatives in Côte D'Ivoire, Senegal and Uganda : [Show] how access to anti-retroviral treatment can become feasible in Africa . Effective anti-retroviral treatment of AIDS in resource-limited settings, particularly sub- Saharan Africa, has become a bellwether issue for patients, physicians and policy-makers. The immense tragedy and enormous challenge of global AIDS raises fundamental quest ions in ethics and human rights accompanied by key logistic and technical issue s in medicine, immunology, virology, public health, macroeconomics and social development. The successes of science and public health interventions in wealthy nations must be translated into a sustainable response for the 90% of people with HIV and AIDS in resource-limited settings. In the first two decades of the HIV epidemic, the parallel efforts of activists, scientists and clinicians resulted in a largely successful paradigm that included prevention of HIV infection and treatment of AIDS. In resource-rich countries these two key modalities reduced the growth of the epidemic and mortality, morbidity and health care costs , the latter most dramatically in the late 1990s with widespread (although not universal) access to highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART). By co ntrast, for the vast majority of HIV-infected people that live in sub-Saharan Africa, surveillance, education and information and (potential) vaccines strate gies were thought to be the only possible modalities to combat the epidemic. Although the efficacy of antiretroviral therapy was evident from results presented at the 11th World Aids Conference in 1996 in Vancouver, access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) was not considered feasible in developing countries by most expe rts in the field**

#### More developmental assistance is needed by wealthy nations to fight against HIV/AIDS and meet our moral target

MacDonnell no date The Legal Obligation of Wealthy Nations to Reach 0.7 percent of GDP as Official Development Assistance By Vanessa MacDonnell, University of Toronoto Faculty of Law, Paper, DOA 6/18/17 pg. 7-8 [premier]

**Despite the repeated pledges of wealthy nations to increase official development assistance, few mechanisms exist to enforce what are essentially political promises. International agreements to which Canada is a party are not binding unless the agreement is expressly incorporated into domestic law. There are practical reasons for this. The federal government is constrained by the limits imposed by the Constitution, and the division of powers prevents the federal government from exercising authority in areas of provincial jurisdiction.[[1]](#footnote-1) In the United States, non self-executing agreements must be approved by Congress to be legally enforced. Any agreement authorizing the expenditure of government funds, including pledges to increase levels of official development assistance, must be authorized by Congress to be operative. Absent the express incorporation of international obligations into domestic law, agreements such as the Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus are not binding on wealthy nations in the conventional sense. The numerous General Assembly Resolutions passed by the United Nations in support of increased ODA are similarly unenforceable. As Damrosch et al point out, “the U.N. Charter does not confer on the General Assembly power to enact binding rules of conduct.”[[2]](#footnote-2) An exception to the general rule that General Assembly resolutions are not binding may exist in the case of resolutions which contain explicit statements of law. These resolutions, while not directly enforceable in a court of law, can be tendered as proof of the existence of customary international law. Kropp and Attaran assert that the numerous U.N. Resolutions in support of reaching the 0.7 percent target provide evidence that this obligation is a principle of customary law. They find support for this proposition in a statement issued by U.S. Department of State: General Assembly resolutions are regarded as recommendations to Member States of the United Nations. To the extent, which is exceptional, that such resolutions are meant to be declaratory of international law, are adopted with the support of all members, and are observed by the practice of states, such resolutions are evidence of customary international law on a particular subject matter.[[3]](#footnote-3) Even a cursory assessment of state practice discredits the contention that the 0.7 percent threshold is a principle of customary law. Rather, the failure of wealthy nations to meet development assistance targets suggests that these resolutions are aspirational at best and are not intended to be statements of law.**

#### Wealthy nations are crucial to the fight against HIV/AIDS and have a global obligation to increase their efforts

MacDonnell n.d. The Legal Obligation of Wealthy Nations to Reach 0.7 percent of GDP as Official Development Assistance By Vanessa MacDonnell, University of Toronoto Faculty of Law, Paper, DOA 6/18/17 pg. 9-12 [premier]

**Another principle of international law which may assist in building the case for increased development assistance is that of state responsibility. This is an evolving principle of international law which can be used to establish a causal link between the developed world and the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa. State responsibility as a principle of law does not include any substantive content but rather provides a conceptual framework for claims of misconduct perpetrated by states. State responsibility has been codified by the International Law Commission in the Draft Article on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Article 2 states that, There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: is attributable to the State under international law; and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.[[4]](#footnote-4) Article 31 states that “the responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”[[5]](#footnote-5) Failing to meet the 0.7 percent target is an omission attributable to the State which could amount to a breach of an international obligation. The source of this obligation could include the Covenants to which wealthy nations are a party and other sources of international law. According to the principle of state responsibility, the imposition of insurmountable trade barriers and structural adjustment policies may also be seen as positive acts by wealthy nations for which a remedy is available under Article 31. The notion of state responsibility provides developing countries with a possible cause of action against the West. More often than not, however, compliance with international law depends on soft law notions. As Scott and Stephen point out, Compliance with international law derives from a mix of formal coercion imposed by independent law-enforcement bodies and informal incentives based on reputation, prospects of future interactions, and a preference for reciprocal fairness.[[6]](#footnote-6) These informal incentives may be influential in encouraging nations that are not legally obligated to increase aid flows to do so nonetheless. However, several obstacles persist in the use of soft law as a diplomatic tool. As Goldsmith and Posner point out, benefits often accrue to international actors who show a measure of disregard for reputation. They indicate that, A reputation for compliance with international law is not necessarily the best—and certainly not the only—means of accomplishing foreign policy objectives. States can benefit from reputations for toughness or even for irrationality or unpredictability. Powerful states, like the U.S., cannot be punished effectively when they violate international laws, so they may do better by violating international law when doing so shows that they will retaliate against threats to national security. [[7]](#footnote-7) The notion of fairness is also difficult to conceptualize in cases where there is a significant disparity in bargaining power. Fidler states that, Hegemony means that the United States enjoys immense freedom of action in its foreign policy because of its unmatched power. This context is an unattractive environment in which to effect significant change in U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS with respect to international human rights law. Those who want to increase the role of such law have to appeal to a hegemony that does not need such law to have influence.[[8]](#footnote-8) This remains a challenge for those who seek to use diplomacy to compel wealthy nations to play a role in fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa. In the context of the United States, it thus becomes essential to cast the fight against HIV/AIDS not as an international human rights issue but as an element of the U.S. national security agenda. National security is of paramount importance to Americans. The Associated Press reports that the cost of war in Iraq and Afghanistan will soon exceed $300 billion.[[9]](#footnote-9) Allocating even a fraction of these funds to HIV/AIDS would result in a measurable increase in human security worldwide. Situating development assistance within the context of a broader security agenda is but one example of the way in which the security paradigm is shifting. The traditional concept of state security now co-exists alongside a broader notion of human security, in which the individual is the primary unit of analysis. As the Canadian human security web site explains, Human Security is a people-centered approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives.[[10]](#footnote-10) Human security focuses on the physical safety of individuals. By expanding the notion of physical security to include freedom from threats to health such as HIV/AIDS, a responsibility to protect individuals from preventable illnesses can be imputed to wealthy nations who recognize human security as a legitimate foreign policy objective. HIV/AIDS is acknowledged in the most recent report of the Secretary-General of the U.N. as one of the foremost threats to security worldwide. The report indicates that, Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States’ capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure… Biological security must be at the forefront of prevention. International response to HIV/AIDS was shockingly late and shamefully ill-resourced. It is urgent that we halt and roll back this pandemic.[[11]](#footnote-11) A similar theme that figures prominently in recent U.N. reports is the notion of a Responsibility to Protect. The principle of sovereignty has traditionally limited the right of the international community to intervene in the affairs of sovereign nations to limited circumstances, such as self-defence. The concept of a right to intervene to prevent a humanitarian crisis is a contentious notion that evolved from the failure of national governments to respond to humanitarian crises within their own borders. The debate over the right to intervene under such circumstances has given birth to a body of literature around a ‘responsibility to protect’. The responsibility to protect is a continuous responsibility which belongs primarily to an individual’s own state but which extends to other states in the case of a failure by individual states to protect their own citizens. The United Nations has endorsed the notion of military intervention to protect the physical safety of individuals in the context of a humanitarian crisis. It is arguable that this protection should be extended to include a responsibility to intervene to address health crises such as HIV/AIDS. If countries are willing to assume the cost of military intervention, there is an argument to be made that they ought also to assume the cost of medical treatment for AIDS sufferers. Developing countries lack the capacity to protect their own citizens from threats to public health. Many developed countries concede that there is a responsibility to protect individuals from threats to bodily integrity caused by physical violence. Both the U.K. and Canadian Parliament have referenced the responsibility to protect in connection with the Darfur crisis.[[12]](#footnote-12) HIV/AIDS is a discrete form of physical threat, which ought to invoke the evolving notion of a responsibility to protect. Epidemiological threats to the individual necessitate an expanded notion of “intervention” which focuses not on military force but on creating health care infrastructure. These aspects of international law provide some basis for enforcing development assistance obligations. It is possible that courts competent to hear cases in international law could give effect to the unilateral declarations of political officials. Failing this, there is a strong argument that developed countries are at the very least estopped from acting inconsistently with these commitments. Evolving principles of international law, such as the responsibility to protect, may also persuade countries in the developed world to honour foreign aid commitments, particularly in the case of humanitarian crises such as HIV/AIDS.**

### LGBTQI+

#### Without international development and economic assistance to cultivate LGBTQI+ rights frameworks, sexual minorities are subjected to police abuse, workplace discrimination, violence, disease, and poor education. That has economic impacts, empirics prove.

Badgett et al 14 The Relationship between LGBT Inclusion and Economic Development: An Analysis of Emerging Economies M.V. Lee Badgett Sheila Nezhad Kees Waaldijk Yana van der Meulen Rodgers November 2014, Published by the Williams Institute of Law at University of Califonia Los Angeles. M.V. Lee Badgett is a Williams Distinguished Scholar at the Williams Institute, and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Administration at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, where she is also a Professor of Economics. Sheila Nezhad is a Public Policy Fellow at the Williams Institute. She holds a Masters Degree in International Development from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. Kees Waaldijk is Professor of Comparative Sexual Orientation Law, Leiden Law School, The Netherlands; during Spring 2014, Waaldijk served as McDonald/Wright Chair of Law, The Williams Institute, UCLA, Los Angeles. Yana van der Meulen Rodgers is Professor and undergraduate director in the Women and Gender Studies Department at Rutgers University and was President of Feminist Economics from 2013-2014. WEB. https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-inclusion-and-development-november-2014.pdfPg. 20-27 [Premier]

**The analysis in the rest of this report assesses the common connection across the four frameworks, using data at the individual or group level (the “micro” perspective) and data at the level of countries (the “macro” level) to address the key question: Is LGBT inclusion connected to economic development? One shortcoming of the existing literature at the “macro” level is that it focuses on attitudes toward homosexuality or on laws regarding rights of LGBT people rather than the lived experience of LGBT people. As noted earlier, these attitudinal and legal measures are used because of a lack of nuanced international indicators. Therefore, in this section we present a “micro-level” analysis of research that documents LGBT people’s exclusion in many countries and contexts, and we show how that exclusion inhibits economic development. There are types of LGBT human rights or freedoms that are not easy to quantify, and thus not measured in existing multi-country datasets. Nevertheless, despite being difficult to measure, it is important that we acknowledge the ways that the limitation of these freedoms constrains the ability of LGBT people to contribute to the economy. Below, we present findings about five freedoms that affect LGBT people and economic development: freedom from police abuse, freedom from workplace discrimination, freedom from violence, freedom from disease, and freedom to be educated. We also briefly discuss the connections of each freedom to major economic factors that influence economic output and growth. The examples used below come from research articles and human rights reports that focus on the 39 countries that are the focus of this study. However these forms of exclusion arguably exist in various forms around the world. Police Abuse All people, including LGBT people, have the right to be free of police abuse under the . Police officers, whether enforcing anti-LGBT laws or simply acting on behalf of personal prejudice (their own or that of their superiors), have unjustly arrested, detained, jailed, beaten, humiliated and extorted LGBT people. Such behavior creates negative economic effects. Police abuse unnecessarily uses government funds in the form of police salaries, the cost of jailing, and lengthy court proceedings–funds that could be put to more economically productive purposes. POLICE ABUSE Russia “We must all raise our voices against attacks on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex people. We must oppose the arrests, imprisonments and discriminatory restrictions they face.”--Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary- General of the United Nations, statement on Russia (Ford, 2014) Honduras “...male-to-female transsexual women have been beaten intentionally on their breasts and cheek-bones which had been enhanced by silicone implants, causing the implants to burst and as a result releasing toxic substances into their bodies.” (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 39) Kenya “In the Coast province, respondents who do sex work reported to have been arrested by the police officers on night patrol only for them to be raped in dark street alleys then thereafter released. Attempts to report such incidents to the police were unsuccessful due to the reluctance of the police to investigate and prosecute their own.” (The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011, p. 23) Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (High International Commissioner, 2011) 20 Additionally, LGBT people who are targeted by police have reduced labor force participation because they cannot work while they are in jail or because they lose their job when police “out” them to their employer and community. In addition, the fear of police abuse can reduce LGBT people’s participation in political activities or formation of organizations that promote social capital development. In some of the countries in our sample there have been reports of sexual and gender minorities experiencing various forms of police abuse, including the following: • Arrested, detained, and imprisoned (Coman, Ellis, & Tobias, 2007; The Council for Global Equality, 2013; HRW, 2009; HRW & IGLHRC, 2001; IGLHRC 2011; Johnson, 2007; The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011; High Commissioner, 2011); • Beaten, tortured, and humiliated while in custody (The Council for Global Equality, 2013; Dworkin & Yi, 2003; Global Rights et al., 2006; Global Rights et al., 2010a; Global Rights et al., 2010b; González, Russo, & Rocha, 2010; HRW, 2009; The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011; High Commissioner, 2011); • Sexually assaulted and subjected to medically-irrelevant anal examinations to “confirm” their homosexuality (The Council for Global Equality, 2013; Global Rights et al., 2010a; Global Rights et al. 2010b; High Commissioner, 2011; HRW, 2009; HRW, 2010; The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011; Paoli Itaborahy & Zhu, 2013). Even in those countries without explicitly anti-homosexual laws, there are reports of police arresting and detaining LGBT people under “public decency” laws or similar provisions that can be applied with little discretion (Global Rights et al., 2006; High Commissioner, 2011; IGLHRC, 2001; Ottosson, 2009). There are also reports of police officers extorting bribes by threatening to arrest LGBT persons or to “out” them to their employers or family members (The Council for Global Equality, 2013; Thoreson & Cook, 2011). With few lawyers willing to represent them within a biased legal system, LGBT people are left with little choice than to submit to extortion. In addition, police may refuse to investigate claims of LGBT-targeted violence, they may only show up hours after an LGBT person calls for help, or they may refuse to believe reports of LGBT victimization (The Council for Global Equality, 2013). 21 VIOLENCE Guatemala “From 2009 to 2010, at least 30 transgender individuals were killed...’Given the lack of official statistics and the likely reticence if not ignorance of the victims’ family members, there is reason to believe that the actual numbers [of murders of LGBT people] are significantly higher.’” (OTRANS et al., 2012, p. 14) Ecuador “That is to say, the State's failure to recognize lesbian and trans women places them in dangerous situations in private and public settings, and leaves unpunished violence, torture, sexual abuse, rape and discrimination in educational, health and workforce institutions. This affects their enjoyment of freedom and rights.” (Varea & Cordero, 2008, p. 4) “...[O]ne study in Ecuador found that a large percentage of middle-class lesbians(i.e., lesbians whose families could afford to send them to therapists and/or who could afford to do so on their own) interviewed had been forced or coerced to undergo electric shock therapy... Electric shock therapy is an accepted practice to ‘cure homosexuality’ among a significant contingency of therapists in Ecuador.” (Lind, 2009, p. 36) Violence The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protect LGBT people from violence based on their sexual orientation and gender identity (Dworkin & Yi, 2003). However, LGBT people face disproportionate rates of physical, psychological, and structural violence. Violence can limit the economic productivity of individuals for many reasons. For example, physical injuries may restrict someone’s ability to work, grief and trauma may make it difficult to concentrate on work, and fear of future assaults may make it difficult for people to travel to and from work. In the cases where victims are admitted to healthcare facilities, violence can also create a financial burden for individuals or governments. Although many minority groups are subject to violence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that Violence against LGBT persons tends to be especially vicious compared to other bias-motivated crimes...homophobic hate crimes and incidents often show a high degree of cruelty and brutality and include beatings, torture, mutilation, castration and sexual assault. (High Commissioner, 2011) It is difficult to identify the full extent of violence against LGBT people because of a lack of State monitoring that acknowledges LGBT-motivated bias and because many crimes may go unreported. Many LGBT people may be hesitant to report hate crimes to police because they may fear that the police won’t believe them (OSCE-ODIHR, 2012), that reporting may expose their sexual or gender minority status, or because the police may be complicit in—or perpetrators of—the violence (Padilla, del Aguila, & Parker, 2007). Lind (2009) notes that while gender non-conforming people and gay men in Ecuador were more likely to be assaulted in public spaces, lesbian and bisexual women were more likely to experience violence in private settings, such as a therapist’s office or within their homes. Violence against LGBT people goes beyond that which is perpetrated by individuals. Padilla and colleagues (2007) speak of State institutionalized discrimination, that is structural violence that offers blanket legitimacy to discriminate against (and to refuse protection to) this specific group of people. 22 WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION Bosnia and Herzegovina “LGBT persons faced frequent harassment and discrimination, including termination of employment. In some cases dismissal letters explicitly stated that sexual orientation was the cause of termination, making it extremely difficult for them to find another job.”(The Council for Global Equality, 2013, p. 32) Turkey “Many gay and bisexual women hide their identities in the work place for fear of losing their jobs... 58% [of 396 reported] hiding their identities from all their employers and managers...[Of 116 transgender women surveyed] 89.7% said that they were going to have to go into sex work due to a lack of alternatives.” (LGBT Rights Platform, 2009, p. 4) South Africa “Terry is a transgender man... at his last place of employment, he says that his manager took a dislike to him because of his gender expression...shouting at him and threatening him...Even when Terry approached the human resources department at the store and requested a transfer, his manager stalled his transfer. As a result he quit his job. At the time we spoke with him he was barely able to make ends meet and did not know when or if he would find another job.” (HRW, 2011, p. 57) Workplace Discrimination The Yogyakarta Principles9 (2007, principle 12) state, “Everyone has the right to decent and productive work, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.” LGBT people are not as productive when they face discrimination in the workplace. As the human capital approach suggests, LGBT people may be working in less productive positions than they are qualified for (e.g. working in the informal economy) because employers refuse to hire them or because they do not have the proper identification documents to be hired in more productive jobs. Additionally, LGBT people may lose their job if they are “outed” at work, which reduces the amount of labor being utilized in the economy and reduces output. Discrimination also reduces workers’ incentives to invest in human capital through training and education, since the return on those investments is uncertain; that is, more training doesn’t necessarily mean a promotion or higher wage. Survey data, reports based on anecdotal evidence, and other forms of research document the existence of employment discrimination that limits LGBT people’s ability to both contribute to the economy and to maintain an adequate standard of living. For example, in Nepal, 18% of 475 lesbians surveyed reported not getting a job, and 13% had lost a job in the last year (CREA, 2012). In Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, approximately one in four LGBT people felt discriminated against when looking for a job or at work because of their gender identity or sexual orientation (FRA, 2013). Transgender people face particular risk of being fired when they transition (Marcos, Cordero, & IGLHRC, 2009). The fear of discrimination and harassment is one reason why many LGBT people are not open about their sexual orientation or gender identity in the workplace, as reports from Turkey (LGBT Rights Platform, 2009) and Kenya (The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011) show. Low rates of openness, in turn, might reduce the amount of discrimination reported. 9 The Yogyakarta Principles are a groundbreaking guide to the application of universal human rights law as it applies to LGBT people. The Principles were developed at a 2006 meeting of international human rights experts. The Principles have not been adopted by States as a legally binding treaty, but instead serve as a tool to interpret and implement existing international law. 23 LGBT people who experience discrimination are often reluctant to report it, even when discrimination is illegal. For example, LGBT people in South Africa reported barriers such as fear of retaliation, lack of information about the reporting process, and lack of confidence in the legal mechanisms (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Health The Yogyakarta Principles (2007, principle 17) state, “Everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Sexual and reproductive health is a fundamental aspect of this right.” However, LGBT people experience many health disparities, such as elevated rates of depression, anxiety, suicidality, HIV/AIDS, and substance abuse. These health disparities likely arise as a result of minority stress (Meyer, 1995, 2003), population-specific targeting by tobacco and alcohol companies (Hipple, et al., 2011), and the failure of health systems to provide prevention and services that meet the needs of this population (UNDP, 2013). Health disparities affect LGBT people’s ability to be productive at work, reduce labor force participation when people cannot work, and burden public health care funds when individuals rely on emergency care rather than regular or preventative care. There are specific barriers to health for LGBT people living in emerging and developing countries. While many people in developing countries may rely on family members or kin networks to compensate for a lack of access to formal medical care or to healthy living conditions, LGBT people who have been rejected by their families do not have this resource. Even for those LGBT people living with their families, disadvantages exist if LGBT people are not able to talk about their identity with their families, perhaps leading to inappropriate care (Padilla, del Aguila, & Parker, 2007). The HIV epidemic has disproportionately affected the LGBT community, especially among gay and bisexual men and transgender women. In fact, a recent meta-analysis found that globally 19.1% of transgender woman are HIV positive, compared to 0.44% of all adults of reproductive age (Baral et al., 2013). This finding did not change for wealthier countries, likely because discrimination leads to the impoverishment of transgender woman in low and high income countries alike. Around the world, transgender women face discrimination in housing, employment, and access to services, all of which increase their odds of participating in risky sexual activity for economic reasons. The enormous amount HEALTH Venezuela “...the government systematically denied legal recognition to transgender persons by preventing them from obtaining identity documents required for accessing education, employment, housing, and health care” (The Council for Global Equality, 2013, p. 22). Kenya “’The doctor refused to believe that I was gay; he said he had only heard of gay people on TV and that I was simply lying.... He then called his colleagues to come spectate. It was quite embarrassing for me. He later told me to go read Leviticus 18:25, I felt judged... ,’ 23 MSM sex worker” (The Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011, 37). Turkey Of 116 transgender women interviewed, “39.7% of the participants said that they considered suicide because of the pressures they faced based on their identity, while 32.8% of these did attempt suicide” (LGBT Rights Platform, 2009, p. 3). 24 of funding spent on HIV/AIDS-related projects—in 2013 alone, PEPFAR10 distributed $5.1 billion (PEPFAR, 2014)—suggests that reductions in HIV prevalence among LGBT people could result in global financial savings that could be allocated to other development uses. However, the construction of such HIV-related programs may result in other forms of stigma that challenge the dignity and freedom of LGBT people. In fact, the narratives of many HIV/AIDS education programs have been presented in a way that reinforces heterosexual and cisgender gender norms.11 Portrayals of women as the guardians of their chastity and men as uncontrollably sexual leave no room for expressions of women’s sexual desire, men’s vulnerabilities, and non-heterosexual sexuality that allow people to make healthy sexual choices, including avoiding high-risk sexual behavior (Bhana, Morrell, & Pattman, 2009; Esacove, 2010; Walsh & Mitchell, 2006). As an additional threat to LGBT health, there are private religious organizations that have taken it upon themselves to conduct HIV education in the developing world. Focus on the Family, a U.S.-based Judeo- Christian organization dedicated to “helping to preserve traditional values and the institution of the family,” has developed a very specific sexual education curriculum entitled “No Apologies: the Truth about Life, Love and Sex” (SIECUS, 2005, p. 1). Originally developed for U.S. schools, Focus on the Family has exported this curriculum abroad to Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, Ukraine, South Africa, Singapore, and seven Sub-Saharan countries. “Educators” are given prompts such as the following to lead discussions: “What is the root of HIV/AIDS? (Answers may include unfaithfulness, lack of character or living outside the boundary for which sex was created: marriage” (SIECUS 2005, p. 2). In the sub-Saharan African region alone, Focus on the Family trained over 2,500 educators who have taught over 100,000 students between 2001 and 2004 (ibid.).12,13 10 The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is the United States program that funds HIV/AIDS related work globally. 11 Cisgender refers to people whose gender identity is the same as their sex assigned at birth (e.g. someone who was assigned female at birth and currently identifies as a woman). Cisgender is the antonym to transgender. 12 Although more recent figures were not available on the African Focus on the Family website, it is evident that the programs are still in place and have a significant presence in the field of HIV/AIDS education: https://www.safamily.co.za/?no\_apologies. 13 The preceding paragraph was excerpted from a previous paper of one of the authors (Nezhad, 2011). 25 Education Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to education” (UNGA, 1948, emphasis added), which includes LGBT students. However, LGBT students face discrimination in schools by teachers and other students. Discrimination discourages LGBT students from getting an education and/or hampers their ability to fully take advantage of their schooling opportunities. The economic impact is clear: education discrimination excludes LGBT students from opportunities to increase their human capital (that is, their knowledge and skills) and to be employed in higher-skilled jobs that contribute to overall economic productivity. Students have been pressured to drop out or have been denied admission to schools because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. For example, a study in India found that half of MSM (men who have sex with men) respondents had been harassed or assaulted by teachers and classmates, and this treatment reduced their ability to continue with their education (Khan et al., 2005). In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, 83-95% of LGBT people surveyed had witnessed negative comments or negative conduct in school because a classmate was perceived to be LGBT (FRA, 2013). Transgender people have been denied admission to school when they did not have paperwork or identification that matches their current gender presentation, even if there are no legal mechanisms to allow them to change their documents (UNCEDAW, 2013). When they are admitted to schools, transgender students are often abused in the classroom, such as a case in the Philippines where LGBT student groups “documented cases of transgender students who were made to leave the classroom or threatened with being barred from graduating on the basis of their gender expression” (IGLHRC, 2011, p. 12). In EDUCATION Guatemala “...a transgender student passed the entrance exam at El Instituto Técnico de Capacitación y Productividad (INTECAP), the primary technical training center in Guatemala. When the director of INTECAP learned that she was transgender, he told her that the institute’s regulations established that they could not take on students like her but ‘only men and women.’ As a result, she was barred from admission to the school.” (OTRANS et al., 2012, p. 12) Kenya “I was a student in Kenyatta University until 3 years when I appeared in the media and declared that I am gay and demanded legal recognition. What followed after this was a consistent chain of backlash. My landlord demanded that I move within a week, in college, my group members kicked me out of group work and failed to allot my course work. Some professors deliberately failed me and made side jokes about homosexuality in class all to spite me. It was difficult walking around campus as people would point fingers, whisper and sneer. I couldn’t bare the stigma and frustration in the school environment and my academic pursuits. Further to these was withdraw [sic] of financial support by my family due to my coming out. Eventually I dropped out of college and I am now trying to resume studies outside the country....” (The Kenyan Human Rights Commission, 2011, p. 32) Mexico “In November 2009, two lesbian students attending public high school were prevented from accessing school because of their sexual orientation. Previously, they had been subjected to homophobic assaults, both verbal and physical, from teachers and students. One of the young women was struck by fellow students with a bag filled with rocks, which resulted in bruising. When she complained to her teachers, they responded that she had provoked the attack by being different from everyone else. The students presented a complaint to the State Commission for Human Rights, which concluded that no discrimination or rights violation had occurred.” (Global Rights et al., 2010a, p. 8) Colombia “Why would someone go to school when they’re always rejected there? You can’t do well on your school work, you can’t study well, so you stop going to school. They rejected me, they were always looking to start something with me . . . you’re going to school to learn but your classmates and your teachers have something against you because of who you are. So I dropped out, I decided to stop going to high school....” (UNCEDAW, 2013, p. 31). 26 addition to losing out on skill-building opportunities, the UN notes, “Isolation and stigma generate depression and other health problems and contribute to truancy, absenteeism, children being forced out of school, and, in extreme cases, attempted or actual suicide” (High Commissioner, 2011, p. 19). Summary Surveys and human rights reports from many countries provide evidence of the harmful experiences for LGBT people with police abuse, violence, employment discrimination, health disparities, and educational exclusion. • Police officers unjustly arrest, detain, jail, beat, humiliate and extort LGBT people. Police abuse misuses government funds and takes LGBT people out of productive employment by detaining them or by “outing” them to their employers. • LGBT people face disproportionate rates of physical, psychological, and structural violence. Violence has an economic impact when physical injuries are costly and restrict someone’s ability to work, when grief and trauma make it difficult to concentrate on work, and when fear of future assaults may make it difficult for people to travel to and from work. • Workplace discrimination causes LGBT people to be less productive in the workplace and to avoid seeking or be denied higher skilled jobs because of employer bias. • LGBT people face multiple barriers to physical and mental health, including high HIV rates, a lack of competent and affirming medical practitioners, and denial or insurmountable expense of transgender-related care. • The future careers of LGBT people are limited when LGBT students face discrimination in schools by teachers and other students, which hampers their learning and encourages students to drop out. At this micro-level, the costs to the economy of just these five examples of types of exclusionary treatment include lost labor time, lost productivity, underinvestment in human capital, and the inefficient allocation of human resources through discrimination in education and hiring practices. The decreased investment in human capital and suboptimal use of human resources in turn acts as a drag on economic output and growth at the macro level. In the next two sections, the empirical analysis shifts to the macro-level to compare measures of economic development and LGBT human rights, an important aspect of LGBT inclusion, across 39 different countries.**

#### Global trans rights are severely underdeveloped in terms of access to hormone treatment, legal recognition and legal protection.

Badgett et al 14 The Relationship between LGBT Inclusion and Economic Development: An Analysis of Emerging Economies M.V. Lee Badgett Sheila Nezhad Kees Waaldijk Yana van der Meulen Rodgers November 2014, Published by the Williams Institute of Law at University of Califonia Los Angeles. M.V. Lee Badgett is a Williams Distinguished Scholar at the Williams Institute, and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Administration at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, where she is also a Professor of Economics. Sheila Nezhad is a Public Policy Fellow at the Williams Institute. She holds a Masters Degree in International Development from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. Kees Waaldijk is Professor of Comparative Sexual Orientation Law, Leiden Law School, The Netherlands; during Spring 2014, Waaldijk served as McDonald/Wright Chair of Law, The Williams Institute, UCLA, Los Angeles. Yana van der Meulen Rodgers is Professor and undergraduate director in the Women and Gender Studies Department at Rutgers University and was President of Feminist Economics from 2013-2014. WEB. <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-inclusion-and-development-november-2014.pdf> Pg. 32-34 [Premier]

**In 2012, Transrespect versus Transphobia Worldwide (TvT), an ongoing research project conducted by Transgender Europe, published a transgender “map” that presents information about 15 possible rights (legal and medical) available to transgender people in 58 countries. The data come from a questionnaire that was completed by transgender activists and experts in 18 of the 39 countries analyzed in this report.20 For our analysis, we used these data, roughly following the same index-building approach as was used for GILRHO: we assigned one point to each right (or lack of discriminatory law), and half a point for countries with rights only available in parts of the country, under certain circumstances, or through risky means (e.g. surgery available but not under licensed medical supervision). To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first use of this data in an index format.21 Points A – E summarize the Transgender Rights Index, with index values in parentheses: A Legal Recognition: Legal change of name (1) and legal change of gender (1) B Legal Protection: Recognition of gender identity in anti-discrimination legislation (1); recognition of transgender or gender identity in hate crime laws (1); inclusion of transgender people in asylum guidelines (1); and inclusion of transgender or gender identity in the constitution (1) C Legal Discrimination: The lack of the following: Laws criminalizing trans people and trans-related issues (1); prosecution of trans identities under such laws(1); and state-sponsored discriminatory use of general laws(1) D Hormone Access: Access to hormones under medical supervision (1); access to hormones without medical supervision (.5); and the presence of funding for hormones through the public health system or private insurance (1) E Transgender-Related Treatment: Availability of any forms of surgery (1); requirements for medical supervision of the practice (1); availability of funding (1); and alternative forms of transgender-related surgery available when medically supervised options are unavailable (.5) The results of this index should be interpreted with caution. It is a provisional measure based on a one- time survey. The weighting of the different elements in this index is thus largely the result of the number of questions asked in the TvT questionnaire. Future research should examine the correlation of these medical and legal rights with the lived experiences of transgender people. Legal Recognition: The index contains two measures of legal transgender recognition: legal change of name and legal change of gender. Being able to change one’s name and gender marker is important for transgender people’s safety and economic security. There have been accounts of transgender people being stopped by police and subsequently abused when their appearance is incongruent with their legal documents (UNCEDAW, 2013). Additionally, people who have been offered jobs have had job offers rescinded when their employment paperwork reveals their transgender status (UNDP, 2013). Countries were given one point for each legal recognition measure. 20 Not included in the TvT project were Albania, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Taiwan, and Ukraine 21 Appendix C presents the underlying data by country for the Transgender Rights Index. 32 Legal Protection: The index contains four measures of legal transgender protection: recognition of gender identity in anti-discrimination legislation; recognition of transgender or gender identity in hate crime laws; inclusion of transgender people in asylum guidelines; and inclusion of transgender or gender identity in the constitution. These legal protections offer transgender people the possibility of recourse in the event of discrimination, and may give them assurance that they can pursue a career that maximizes their skills and human capital, rather than choosing a career based on what will keep them safest. Countries were given a full point for each legal protection measure that they had. Legal Discrimination: The index contains measures where countries gain points for not having three common forms of legal discrimination: laws criminalizing transgender people and trans-related issues, such as outlawing cross-dressing or gender-related surgeries; prosecution of transgender identities under such laws, meaning that the laws are on the books and they are actively enforced (vs. older laws that may have been carried over from colonial times or an earlier era but are not actively enforced); and state-sponsored discriminatory use of general laws, meaning that laws that do not explicitly criminalize gender identity or transgender people are used to target and persecute transgender people, such as prostitution, loitering, or nuisance laws. Countries were given a full point per measure that they did not have (that is, countries with all discriminatory legal measures received no points). Countries were awarded a half point if they still have the discriminatory measure in parts of the country, or if transgender people have to undergo gender reassignment surgery in order to avoid legal discrimination. Hormone Access: The index contains three measures of hormone access: access to hormones under medical supervision; access to hormones without medical supervision (such as through the internet, pharmacies, or the black market); and the presence of funding for hormones through the public health system or private insurance. Not all transgender people choose to use hormone therapy, but for those who do, hormone access has been proven to be a medically necessary procedure (Coleman et al., 2012) that can affect individuals’ capacity to function to the best of their ability. Hormone therapy needs to be monitored by a doctor as misdosage can have serious health consequences (Hembree et al., 2009). However, even in places where legal medical supervision of hormone therapy is not available, access to hormones without supervision may improve the quality of life for trans people (Murad et al., 2010). Finally, despite the fact that transgender medical care has been proven to be medically necessary, many private and public insurers refuse to fund any transgender-related care, which shifts the financial burden to individual transgender people (UNDP, 2013). Countries could score a maximum of 2.5 points on these measures. Countries were awarded a full point if they had hormone access with medical supervision. They were awarded a full point if they had funding available, but only a half point if funding was only available in certain parts of the country. Countries were awarded a half point if they had hormones available without medical supervision. Transgender-Related Treatment: The index contains four measures of transgender-related treatment: availability of any forms of surgery; the presence of requirements for medical supervision of the practice; the availability of funding; and whether alternative forms of transgender-related surgery available when medically supervised options are unavailable. Like hormone therapy, transgender- related surgeries are medically necessary for transgender people who desire them, and they may affect people’s productivity and be helpful to people even if they are provided under dangerous 33 circumstances, which may arise because of a lack of availability or a lack of funding. Countries could score a maximum of 3.5 points for these measures. Countries were awarded a full point if they had some forms of surgery available, a full point for medically-supervised surgery, and a full point for funding. Countries were awarded a half point if they had gender-related surgeries available outside of medical care.22**

#### Rights development would not only sponsor individual capacities for freedoms and equality for sexual minorities but bolster national GDP – The aff is a step in the right direction to get legal and equality equality for the LGBTQI+ international community

Badgett et al 14 The Relationship between LGBT Inclusion and Economic Development: An Analysis of Emerging Economies M.V. Lee Badgett Sheila Nezhad Kees Waaldijk Yana van der Meulen Rodgers November 2014, Published by the Williams Institute of Law at University of Califonia Los Angeles. M.V. Lee Badgett is a Williams Distinguished Scholar at the Williams Institute, and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Administration at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, where she is also a Professor of Economics. Sheila Nezhad is a Public Policy Fellow at the Williams Institute. She holds a Masters Degree in International Development from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. Kees Waaldijk is Professor of Comparative Sexual Orientation Law, Leiden Law School, The Netherlands; during Spring 2014, Waaldijk served as McDonald/Wright Chair of Law, The Williams Institute, UCLA, Los Angeles. Yana van der Meulen Rodgers is Professor and undergraduate director in the Women and Gender Studies Department at Rutgers University and was President of Feminist Economics from 2013-2014. WEB. <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-inclusion-and-development-november-2014.pdf> Pg. 45-46 [Premier]

**Overall, then, we find strong evidence that countries that have more rights for LGBT people also have higher levels of economic development. And the same may be true for countries with more rights for transgender people given the simple correlations seen in one year of data in Figures 6 and 8. Both GDP per capita and the Human Development Index are higher in countries that have more rights related to LGBT people (as measured in GILRHO), and also in countries with more right for transgender people (as measured in TRI). For LGBT people, the simplest correlation shows that one additional right is associated with approximately $1400 more in per capita GDP and with a higher HDI value. The relationship remains strong for LGBT rights even after taking into account other factors that influence development, although the effect is smaller. The impact of an additional right on per capita GDP is approximately $320 after those controls, or about 3% of the average GDP per capita in our sample. The positive relationship persists when we look at some specific rights within the GILRHO (but not for all). The impact of GILRHO also persists after we control for a measure of gender equity. The positive link found between LGBT rights and economic development supports the models outlined in section 3 that predict a positive relationship. These findings at the macro-level are properly thought 37 The models include population, employment, capital, and international trade; the human capital index was omitted since the HDI includes measures of educational attainment. 38 Note also that the time period for the HDI models is 2000-2011, a shorter period than the GILRHO models, which could be another source of the difference in findings. 45 of as correlations, and at this stage of research we cannot separate out the causal direction to say whether rights have a causal effect on development or that development has a causal effect on rights. However, it seems likely that all of the theoretical factors could be at work and we are seeing their net effect in this study. More rights might allow LGBT people to achieve their fuller economic potential when they can get education and training that improves their productivity and when they are treated equally in the labor market (the human capital model). Greater rights and freedoms might improve individual well-being by expanding individuals’ capabilities to be and do what they value (the capabilities approach). Greater economic development might make countries more likely to respect the rights of LGBT people, as LGBT can freely organize and push for legal changes and as public opinion shifts to support greater individual autonomy and minority rights (the post-materialist hypothesis). And countries hoping to become more visibly modern and successful trading partners might be using LGBT rights strategically as a way to promote and expand economic opportunities (strategic modernization).**

### Mental Health

#### Development aid can help create mental health programs in undeveloped countries.

Gilbert et al 2015. Gilbert Barnabas, Patel Vikram, Farmer Paul, Lu Chunling. Gilbert is a grad student at Harvard University. Vikram Patel is a professor of global health and social medicine and psychiatrist at Harvard whose work over the past two decades has focused on reducing the treatment gap for mental disorders in low resource countries. Dr. Farmer and his colleagues in the U.S. and abroad have pioneered novel, community-based treatment strategies that demonstrate the delivery of high-quality health care in resource-poor settings in the U.S. and other countries. Dr. Lu is the director of the Program in Global Health Economics and Social Change at Harvard Medical School. Her research focuses on measuring and analyzing global health finance and its effectiveness on population health outcomes at multiple levels. “Assessing Development Assistance for Mental Health in Developing Countries”: *PLoS Med* 12(6): e1001834. 2015 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001834>[Premier]

A growing body of **evidence suggests that effective interventions could be integrated into** **existing health systems at** relatively **low cost in developing countries** [8,24,28,29]. **It is estimated that every US$1 million invested in an** effective **treatment package for mental health would generate 350–700 million extra healthy life years** [28]. **Despite this** evidence on the effectiveness and affordability of mental health interventions in developing countries, our findings show that **mental health remains a low priority** in the agendas of funders **of development assistance** for health. While many middle-income countries like India, China and Brazil, which are not reliant on DAH, have ramped up their funding for scaling up mental health services, there is little sign of this evidence being put into action in low-income countries, which are reliant on DAH. While there are several well-described reasons that may explain the apparent lack of enthusiasm in investing in mental health [30], we believe that **this generally reflects the stigmatized and misinformed attitudes towards mental health** problems that pervade the DAH community—**for example, the misconceptions that mental disorders are not problems of the poor, that mental health problems do not kill, and that cost-effective treatments are not available in low-resource settings.**

#### Mental illness causes suicide, costs the economy trillions, and creates suffering for millions of people

Patel and Saxena 14. Vikram, Patel and Saxena, Shekhar. Vikram Patel is a professor of global health and social medicine and psychiatrist at Harvard whose work over the past two decades has focused on reducing the treatment gap for mental disorders in low resource countries. **Shekhar Saxena**, since 1998 has worked at the [World Health Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Health_Organization)] and since 2010 has been the Director of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (MSD) at [World Health Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Health_Organization)'s Headquarters Office in [Geneva, Switzerland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva%2C_Switzerland) “Transforming Lives, Enhancing Communities — Innovations in Global Mental Health” *New England Journal of Medicine.* 2014 <http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1315214#t=article>. [Premier]

**At least 10% of the world's population is affected by** one of a wide range of **mental disorders;** as many as **700 million people had a mental disorder in 2010**. The 2010 Global Burden of Disease Study showed that mental disorders account for 7.4% of the world's burden of health conditions in terms of disability-adjusted life-years1 and nearly a quarter of all years lived with disability — more than cardiovascular diseases or cancer. Incredibly, these numbers probably underestimate the true burden, since they do not include the effects of mental disorders on other high-priority health conditions — for example, the effect of maternal depression on infant undernutrition in low-income settings.2 Furthermore, the trends in the global burden of disease suggest that the proportionate burden of mental disorders will continue to grow.**There is** a **robust** body of **evidence testifying to the** enormous **personal and societal impact of this burden**, from the distress associated with the experience of psychiatric phenomena to the **hundreds of thousands of lives lost to suicide**; indeed, suicide is a leading cause of death among young people globally. The economic effect of mental disorders, both due to the costs of formal and informal care and due to lost productivity, is staggering. The global **economic costs of mental disorders were estimated at $2.5 trillion in 2010 and are projected to reach $6.0 trillion by 2030**.3 But arguably the most important reason for action is the disturbing evidence that **people with mental disorders**, like Mr. K., **are subject to** some of the most **severe human rights violations** encountered in modern times. Such experiences include being tied to their beds or **kept in isolation in psychiatric institutions, being incarcerated in prisons, being chained and caged in the community, and being abused** by some traditional healing practices.4 In short, the human rights abuses visited on people with mental disorders amount to a global emergency that requires immediate and sustained action. **At the heart of these injustices is a lack of access to evidence-based treatment and care.** Despite the robust evidence testifying to the effectiveness of a range of pharmacologic, psychological, and social interventions that can transform lives and enhance communities,5 **the majority of the world**'s population **has no access to these interventions**. In no country is the financial allocation for mental health care proportionate to the contribution of mental disorders to the burden of disease; the average allocation for mental health in low-income countries is a meager 0.5% of the total health budget.

### Soft Power

#### **Development assistance can strengthen soft power. Japan’s use of development assistance to develop radar satellites in Vietnam proves.**

Bennett 16. Marshall, Bennett. Marshall worked for NASA, the U.S. Embassy in Toyko, and has degrees from Georgetown and Stanford University. Rising Moon: The Geopolitical Significance of Japan’s First Moon Shot in 2018 *Intersect,* Vol 9, No 3 2016. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/ojs3/cgi-bin/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/789> [Premier]

In conjunction, this diplomatic offensive in the region has also been supplemented by Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), from which Vietnam (in particular) has benefited immensely. Moltz attributes the development of this relatively new relationship between JAXA and the Vietnam Academic of Science and Technology (VAST) to China’s rise in space, arguing that its actions have caused unlikely partners to form new strategic alliances (Covault, 2012). Specifically, **in 2013**, Prime Minister Abe announced that **Japan** would **provide[d] $1 billion USD in space development assistance to Vietnam** **for constructing a National Space Center** by 2017; **the center would be used for developing and operating two radar imaging satellites** (Covault, 201**2). Given Japan and Vietnam’s shared distrust of China, these Vietnamese spacecraft will be used to overfly not only Vietnam but also** China, and Vietnam will likely **share** the **information with Japan** (Moltz, personal communication, June 5, 2015). **Undoubtedly,** **China and Japan are both using soft power strategies to build** respect and political **influence in Asia and the world.** However, even with APSCO and APRSAF’s extensive projects with lesser space powers, complete region-wide space dialogue and planning remains infrequent. The truth is that both China and Japan have cooperated with major powers to acquire needed technology and with developing spacefaring states to advance their own interests in exporting technologies (Moltz, 2011, Dec.). In regards to the latter, while such initiatives are a good start, they are unlikely to result in broader cooperation and may actually continue to widen the existing regional divide between APSCO and APRSAF (Moltz, 2012, p. 206).

### Water Shortages

#### Assistance helps solve water shortages through infrastructure development and education

Dunn 13. Dunn, Gregory. Gregory Dunn graduated from Harvard University, was an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, a writer for Harvard International Review, and he has written numerous published articles on the impact of technology and emerging powers on world affairs. “Water Wars: A Surprisingly Rare Source of Conflict.” *Harvard International Review*. November 2013. <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=10414> [ Premier].

**Modern times are associated with** **increasing** rates of **water depletion**, but also with a rise of international institutions, diplomacy, and conflict mediation. History has shown that these forces are not always powerful enough to overcome wars fought for political or strategic reasons (notably, the Iraq war was launched to destroy the military threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction). However, **water scarcity is a problem related to** economic **development**. Thus, **wars associated with water scarcity are not based in** **the wishes of leaders, but rather a failure of environment or leadership.** International organizations are able to respond to a nation’s failures, and leaders are generally willing to receive aid to complete tasks they have been unable to accomplish. **Failures in water supply and distribution can be remedied with aid**, **which can install wells, aqueducts, and water purification** facilities **to improve access to clean water**. **Additionally,** educational aid can help develop better practices for water use and conservation in an area of water scarcity. **A large proportion of drinkable water is wasted or contaminated** before it is available to those who need it to survive, **a problem that can be solved through** proper **education and infrastructure development.**

#### Growth leads to technology, like desalination, which makes water usage more efficient.

Dunn 13. Dunn, Gregory. Gregory Dunn graduated from Harvard University, was an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, a writer for Harvard International Review, and he has written numerous published articles on the impact of technology and emerging powers on world affairs. “Water Wars: A Surprisingly Rare Source of Conflict.” *Harvard International Review*. November 2013. <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=10414> [ Premier].

A similar line of thought can be applied to water. Currently, many people access water from wells or rivers, sources that are susceptible to environmental changes. However, **technological and** economic **growth allow**s **for the development of** aqueducts to service areas with little water, and the adoption of **more efficient methods of using water** (**notably, watering plants with drip irrigation results in** substantially **less water loss**), resulting in greater water availability. As evidenced by the development of the arid West of the United States, a lack of water does not necessarily mean that humans cannot survive, it merely means that technology and capital is required for survival. **As nations continue to grow economically, they** can **acquire more resources and develop new technologies , such as water sanitation and** treatment or **desalination**, to give their people better access to water, thus decreasing water scarcity over time. In fact, the University of California, San Diego’s Erik Gartzke notes that global warming is associated with a reduction, rather than increase, in interstate conflict. He goes on to note that while resource depletion associated with global warming may contribute to instability, the economic growth that is associated with it results in an overall reduction of crime. Gartzke concludes that the only way climate-induced conflict might come about is if efforts to stem global warming at the expense of economic growth lead to a loss of wealth, and thus conflict. Although water scarcity may be a factor that can cause conflict, the economic development associated with modern water scarcity results in more peace, not more war. **As nations develop**, **they gain** the technology by which they can mitigate the effects of climate change, and **the capital with which to implement these** technological **advances**

#### Water storage is essential for developing nations fighting droughts or floods

Tortajada 16. Tortajada, Cecilia.Cecilia has over 20 years of experience in water, environment and natural resources management, agricultural development and capacity building. She has been an advisor for several international and national organisations, cooperation agencies, governments and development banks such as UNDP, FAO, Canada International Development Research Center (IDRC), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank among others. She is past President of the International Water Resources Association and also of the Third World Centre for Water Management in Mexico. “Policy dimensions of development and financing of water infrastructure: The cases of China and India”, *Institute of Water Policy*, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore. 2016 <https://thirdworldcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Policy-dimensions-of-development.pdf>

Investments in numerous construction and modernization projects have been the results of increasing water, energy, and food-related needs as well as climate-related security (Tortajada, 2014; Kenny, 2015). **Water infrastructure for domestic, agricultural, energy and environment-related** **uses** (pipes, treatment plants, groundwater recharge and storage, rainwater harvesting, small, medium and large dams, etc.) **are essential for developing countries** **located in the tropical and subtropical** **regions** compared to countries in temperate zones. **This is the case in India and China**, **where high rainfa**ll inter- and intra-annual **fluctuations result in** more **erratic rainfall patterns making reservoirs essential to store water** whenever this is available to **use** it **during the rest of the year** (Biswas, 2012). **Given that** **reservoirs are** some of the most **important buffers against droughts** **and** that one of their most important roles is **flood protection**, the question arises as to whether construction of new reservoirs should be encouraged or whether small projects should be developed instead. Since new construction may not always be possible for economic, social, environmental or dogmatic reasons, a feasible alternative to new reservoirs is to look into their re-operation that can be more effective under the present, and perhaps also future, conditions. A limitation could be, however, that re-operation of reservoirs requires comprehensive policy, management, governance (formal and informal institutions and decision making processes) and financial considerations that are very complex to realize (Tortajada, 2016).

#### China has successfully supported the development of dams in multiple countries

Tortajada 14. Tortajada, Cecilia. Cecilia has over 20 years of experience in water, environment and natural resources management, agricultural development and capacity building. She has been an advisor for several international and national organisations, cooperation agencies, governments and development banks such as UNDP, FAO, Canada International Development Research Center (IDRC), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank among others. She is past President of the International Water Resources Association and also of the Third World Centre for Water Management in Mexico. “Dams: An Essential Component of Development” *Journal of Hydrologic Engineering.* 2014. <https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/46584142/Dams_An_Essential_Component_of_Developme20160617-24098-1krb0xj.pdf> AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1507414960&Signature=31ctJE%2BZ8iGLMZaHr62aPM4iMeo%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DDams\_An\_Essential\_Component\_of\_Developme.pdf [Premier]

Overall, it is **China** that **has been investing** more **heavily in the water sector** through its support for large infrastructure in theseveral countries, mostly in terms of dams. At present, the countryfar outweighs the support of all the development banks (includingthe World Bank) in aids to development of water infrastructure. In2008, Chinese companies were involved in 97 dam projects in 39countries. **By 2011, the country was supporting the development of 251 dams in 68 countries** (Tanaka 2011). Some **examples include** financial support of $448 million to help finalize the NeelumJhelum project in Pakistan by China Exim Bank (Hydropower& Dams 2012b). In Nepal, the 750 MW West Seti hydro project in Nepal will be developed by CWE Investment Corporation, asubsidiary of Three Gorges Corporation. **In Nigeria**, there are **two hydropower stations with a total capacity of 3,750 MW with China’s Sino hydro corporatio**n **and Gezhouba Group** Company,and the 3,050 MW Mambilla plant and the 700 MW Zungeruplant—85% financed by China’s Export-Import Bank with thebalance being financed by Nigeria and private equity funds. In Cambodia, the first-scale hydropower project of the country, a194 MW Kamchay storage project with a 100-m high dam andtwo power plants built by Sinohydro Corporation, is a 400-MW storage hydropower project—a joint project by Cambodian, Chinese, and Vietnamese companies, and there are four more projects with a combined capacity of more than 900 MW by Chinese companies (Hydropower & Dams 2012a; <http://eng.sinohydro.com/>).

### Women’s empowerment

#### Women’s empowerment is a key development assistance goal and a moral obligation.

Malhotra et al. 02. Malhoutra, Anju (PhD, International Center for Research on Women); Schuler, Sidney Ruth (PhD, JSI Research and Training Institute); and Boender, Carol (Consultant, JSI Research and Training Institute). “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. June 28, 2002. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3884/dd80b9b88a18251a608d47ecda59b5a0f528.pdf [Premier]

The World Bank has identified empowerment as one of the key constituent elements of poverty reduction, and as a primary development assistance goal. The Bank has also made gender mainstreaming a priority in development assistance, and is in the process of implementing an ambitious strategy to this effect. The promotion of women’s empowerment as a development goal is based on a dual argument: that social justice is an important aspect of human welfare and is intrinsically worth pursuing; and that women’s empowerment is a means to other ends. A recent policy research report by the World Bank (2001a), for example, identifies gender equality both as a development objective in itself, and as a means to promote growth, reduce poverty and promote better governance. A similar dual rationale for supporting women’s empowerment has been articulated in the policy statements put forth at several high level international conferences in the past decade (e.g. the Beijing Platform for Action, the Beijing+5 declaration and resolution, the Cairo Programme of Action, the Millennium Declaration, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW]).

#### Development assistance *with an emphasis on agency* is a critical resource in bringing about women’s empowerment.

Malhotra et al. 02. Malhoutra, Anju (PhD, International Center for Research on Women); Schuler, Sidney Ruth (PhD, JSI Research and Training Institute); and Boender, Carol (Consultant, JSI Research and Training Institute). “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. June 28, 2002. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3884/dd80b9b88a18251a608d47ecda59b5a0f528.pdf [Premier]

In identifying agency as the essence of women’s empowerment, we are not suggesting that all improvements in women’s position must be brought about through the actions of women themselves or that empowering themselves is the responsibility of individual women. There is ample justification for governments and multilaterals to promote policies that strengthen gender equality through various means, including legal and political reform, and interventions to give women (and other socially excluded groups) greater access to resources (e.g. World Bank 2001a). National and international institutions have the responsibility for ensuring the inclusion of disadvantaged populations socially, economically, and politically. The question is whether it is useful to describe all actions taken toward that end as “empowerment”, and we would suggest that it is not. The major reason for the emphasis on agency as the defining criterion is because of the many examples in the literature of cases in which giving women’s access to resources does not lead to their greater control over resources, where changes in legal statutes have little influence on practice, and where female political leaders do not necessarily work to promote women’s interests. Thus while resources—economic, social and political--are often critical in ensuring that women are empowered, they are not always sufficient. Without women’s individual or collective ability to recognize and utilize resources in their own interests, resources cannot bring about empowerment. Having argued that “agency” should be treated as the essence of empowerment, and resources and achievements as enabling conditions and outcomes, respectively, another caveat is necessary. While distinctions such as those between “resources, agency and achievements” (Kabeer 2001) or “sources versus evidence” of empowerment seem clear at the conceptual level, it is not always easy to completely separate them in developing empowerment indicators. And too, a given variable may function as an indicator of women’s access to resources (or an enabling factor) in one context, of women’s agency in another, and may represent an achievement in still other contexts. For example, microcredit programs and employment opportunities are often seen as resources for women’s empowerment. But if a woman seeks to gain access to microcredit, or to get a job, then getting the job or joining the credit program might be best characterized as a manifestation of women’s agency, and the benefits she draws as a result—income, discretionary spending, healthcare, etc--as achievements. In some analyses discussed in Section III, below, women’s economic contribution is treated as an enabling factor and used to predict other outcomes such as control over important decisions and even the outcomes of decisions such as family size or contraceptive use. But in other contexts women’s economic contribution would be more accurately described as a form of agency or, again even an achievement. Similarly, assets owned could function as sources of empowerment (e.g. Kishor 2000a) but they could also constitute evidence that empowerment had been achieved. The meaning of any empowerment indicator will always depend on its inter-relationships with other variables.

#### Development assistance must take a top-down approach to achieve women’s empowerment.

Malhotra et al. 02. Malhoutra, Anju (PhD, International Center for Research on Women); Schuler, Sidney Ruth (PhD, JSI Research and Training Institute); and Boender, Carol (Consultant, JSI Research and Training Institute). “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. June 28, 2002. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3884/dd80b9b88a18251a608d47ecda59b5a0f528.pdf [Premier]

The second element of empowerment that distinguishes it from other concepts is agency—in other words, women themselves must be significant actors in the process of change that is being described or measured (G. Sen 1993; Mehra 1997). Thus, hypothetically there could be an improvement in indicators of gender equality, but unless the intervening processes involved women as agents of that change rather than merely as its recipients, we would not consider it empowerment. However desirable, it would merely be an improvement in outcomes from one point in time to another. The importance of agency in the discourse on empowerment emerges from “bottom up” rather than “top down” approaches toward development (Oxaal and Baden 1997; Rowlands 1995; Narayan et al. 2000a & 2000b). At the institutional and aggregate levels, it emphasizes the importance of participation and “social inclusion” (Friedmann 1992; Chambers 1997; Narayan et al. 2000a & 2000b) At the micro level, it is embedded in the idea of self-efficacy and the significance of the realization by individual women that they can be the agents of change in their own lives.

#### Universalist standards in development assistance allow for more effective aid towards women’s empowerment.

Malhotra et al. 02. Malhoutra, Anju (PhD, International Center for Research on Women); Schuler, Sidney Ruth (PhD, JSI Research and Training Institute); and Boender, Carol (Consultant, JSI Research and Training Institute). “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives. June 28, 2002. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3884/dd80b9b88a18251a608d47ecda59b5a0f528.pdf [Premier]

Measuring empowerment from a universalist perspective. As we move from a discussion of conceptualizing empowerment to measuring it, it is important to note that measures of empowerment must involve standards that lie outside localized gender systems and a recognition of universal elements of gender subordination (Sen and Grown 1987; Bisnath and Elson 1999; Nussbaum 2000). It is clear from the literature on gender and empowerment that the role of gender in development cannot be understood without understanding the socio-cultural (as well as political and economic) contexts in which development takes place. The concept of empowerment only has meaning within these specific contexts. At the same time, operational definitions (e.g. definitions embodied in indicators to be applied in the context of development assistance policies, programs, and projects) should be consistent with the spirit of international conventions to which countries providing international development assistance have been signatories. The approach based in universal human rights offers the best operational framework for this task. Local structures of gender inequality are typically experienced as “natural”, and therefore may seem unalterable to actors in a particular social setting. Kabeer (2001) elaborates on this point drawing on Bourdieu’s 1977 idea of “doxa”, -- the “aspects of tradition and culture which are so taken-for-granted that they have become naturalized”. When women internalize their subordinate status and view themselves as persons of lesser value, their sense of their own rights and entitlements is diminished. They may acquiesce to violence against them, and make “choices” that reinforce their subordinate status. For example, in her life cycle, a South Asian woman may “graduate” from the comparatively subservient position of daughter-in-law to that of mother-in-law, and in this role she may dominate her son’s wife. Based on the “agency” criterion for describing something as empowerment, one might call this behavior empowered. As a mother-in law, the woman gained the ability to exercise agency (in the form of power over another person), in a way that she could not when she was a young woman herself. But, we would argue against such a use of the term empowerment. The mother-in-law is acting within an inequitable gender system that severely constrains her ability to make strategic life choices. The system lets her exercise power, but only in ways that reinforce the system. This sort of agency is similar to what Kabeer (2001) describes as choices that reflect women’s consent and complicity in their own subordination. When they lack agency in a broader sense, women should not be considered to be making empowered choices. Internalized subordination receives particular attention among writers on international education, informed by a Freirian perspective on raising the critical consciousness of the poor (Freire 1994[1973]). For example, Stromquist writes that empowerment includes cognitive and psychological elements: It involves “women’s understanding of their conditions of subordination and the causes of such conditions at both micro and macro levels of society…It involves understanding the self and the need to make choices that may go against cultural and social expectations” (1993:14). Thus, universal standards are necessary to identify empowerment.

#### Foreign aid providing contraceptive access allows for family planning – key to poverty reduction.

Gates 17. Gates, Melinda (philanthropist, co-founder of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). “Foreign aid cuts to contraceptives in Trump's budget hurt millions of women.” USA Today. April 2017. [Premier]

Contraceptives are one of the greatest antipoverty innovations the world has ever seen, and we can give women access to them. Last week, just a few days after the White House proposed dramatic cuts to health and development aid, I headed to Indonesia. The timing was coincidental — the trip had been planned for months — but the reason I was going happened to be especially relevant to our country’s national debate. Indonesia has strategically used foreign aid to transform itself from a poor nation into a middle-income one. I was there to talk about the role that smart investments in contraceptives have played in the transformation. Many people don’t realize the role contraceptives play in building a more stable and prosperous world. For most of my life, I certainly didn’t. But after Bill and I started our foundation and I began spending time in developing countries, women kept telling me about their unmet need for family planning and asking what I could do to help. When I started looking at the data, I learned that contraceptives are actually one of the greatest anti-poverty innovations the world has ever seen. Consider the fact that 50 years ago, fewer than one in 10 Indonesian women were using family planning tools. The average Indonesian woman had five or six children, and she was raising them in extreme poverty. Then, with support from donor nations like the U.S., Indonesia implemented a hugely successful family planning program. In just one generation, access to contraceptives skyrocketed to over 50%. Most women decided to have just two or three children. More of those children were able to stay longer in school, more women were able to work outside the home, and prospects for families across the country began to improve. Today, Indonesia is the world’s eighth largest economy and one of our country’s biggest trading partners. It is a steady ally in an unstable world and an important market for U.S. goods. More important, as more Indonesian children have grown up healthy and well-educated, the world has gained millions of minds that can drive progress for everyone. Our foreign aid investments there have paid dividends. Even so, our work is not finished. Indonesia has yet to complete the transition to a fully developed nation — in part because there are still millions of women across the country who are not using contraceptives due to a lack of access, information or options that meet their needs. During my trip, there was a morning when three women mentioned to me that they had had unplanned pregnancies. he good news is that Indonesia knows what it needs to do to reach those women, and that work is already underway. When Indonesia completes its economic transformation, it will be in no small part due to the efforts of health workers, midwives and community volunteers — almost all of them women, almost all of them people of faith — who are pioneering ways to get more women across the country the tools and information they need to plan their families and contribute to Indonesia’s future. Just outside Yogyakarta, I toured a hospital with Dr. Ivanna Beru Brahmana, an OB-GYN who is passionate about counseling families about contraceptives because she wants each child she delivers to have the best possible start in life. Like many of the people I talked to, she believes that part of being a good Muslim is being a good parent, and that part of being a good parent is spacing pregnancies so parents are able to devote time and resources to each one of their children. I also sat down with a woman named Suparti, who like many Indonesians goes by only her first name. She is a community volunteer who uses an interactive e-tablet to educate women about contraceptives and combat misinformation. Concerned that some women in her community might still be falling through the cracks, Suparti persuaded a local religious leader to incorporate family planning lessons into the prayer meetings he leads, to help meet women where they are. And I’m still thinking about the high school student whose name I didn’t get but whose words I will always remember. She said she plans to use contraceptives in her future because of something her parents told her: “This is a developing country. It’s your job to develop it.” Like so many of the Indonesians I met, she is not merely hopeful her country will continue to rise — she is determined to do her part to lift it. Foreign aid helps make sure that more young people have that chance. As the debate over cutting funding for development assistance continues, we will be asked whether we believe that investing in developing countries and the women and girls who live there is worth it. I hope you will insist that it is. And as the White House implements the Mexico City policy, which prohibits U.S. aid from supporting international groups that promote abortion, and considers cuts to things such as foreign aid, I hope you will speak up loud and clear for the power of contraceptives to transform nations and build a better world for all of us — and that you will keep the image of the Indonesians who are carrying out this work in your mind and in your heart. Indonesia is only one of many countries whose future will be impacted by the funding decisions the U.S. makes — and its story is a reminder both of what is possible and what is at stake. With so much achieved already, now is not the time to turn our backs. At home and overseas, there are people depending on us.

#### Development must focus on women’s empowerment and gender equality.

Lefton 13. Lefton, Rebecca. Rebecca Lefton is a Senior Policy Analyst working on international climate policy at the Center for American Progress. “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Are Key to Addressing Global Poverty.” Center for American Progress. March 2013. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2013/03/11/56097/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-are-key-to-addressing-global-poverty/ [Premier]

President Barack Obama pledged during his January 2013 State of the Union address that the United States would join with its allies to “eradicate” extreme poverty over the “next two decades” by connecting more people to the global economy and empowering women. Putting an end to extreme poverty requires providing opportunities for all individuals, especially women, to thrive through education, nutrition, and health. In order to achieve this goal, a greater emphasis must be placed on gender equality and the removal of barriers that disproportionately affect women. A great deal of progress has been made in the fight against poverty, particularly since the adoption of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs, in 2001. From 1990 through 2008, the number of people worldwide living in extreme poverty fell by more than 800 million. Yet barriers to prosperity still remain—such as inequality and discrimination against marginalized populations—and new challenges continue to emerge that impede goals to reduce poverty. Approximately 1.3 billion people still don’t have access to electricity, and overcoming the lack of reliable sources of energy is an absolute hurdle to getting out of poverty. Other threats to the economic well-being of individuals and families—including climate change—endanger development gains and threaten to reverse them. And where there has been measurable progress alleviating poverty, that progress has been uneven: The most disadvantaged and poorest of the poor have not received the same benefits of development. While the poverty rate has declined in many developing countries, much of that improvement has been concentrated in China. Worldwide, rural populations, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and women have not benefitted from the rising economic tide. From a global perspective, women own only 1 percent of property, earn 10 percent of all income, and yet they produce half of the world’s food. Any poverty agenda must focus on women because they are 70 percent of the world’s poor. Women comprise two-thirds of the global illiterate population and all women face additional hurdles to their economic and social well-being, including the pay gap and the fact that women are much more likely to hold vulnerable jobs. Because women constitute the majority of the world’s poor and because development goals have not been achieved—particularly where gender inequality thrives—women’s empowerment and gender equality must a focus of the U.N. development agenda beyond 2015 when the Millennium Development Goals are set to expire. The expiration of the Millennium Development Goals and the development of new Sustainable Development Goals are stimulating global conversations about how to address poverty and sustainable development. This issue brief looks at gender equality and women’s empowerment in the post-2015 U.N. development agenda framework. Why focus on women? The vital role of women in sustainable development has long been recognized. The 1995 Beijing Declaration from the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women and the 1992 Rio Declaration recognized that empowering women is essential to sustainable development. Yet gender discrimination continues to be a key driver of poverty.

#### [solvency advocate for women’s rights plan] We need new development plans to ensure sustainable development and women’s rights – key to growth and competitiveness.

Lefton 13. Lefton, Rebecca. Rebecca Lefton is a Senior Policy Analyst working on international climate policy at the Center for American Progress. “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Are Key to Addressing Global Poverty.” Center for American Progress. March 2013. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2013/03/11/56097/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-are-key-to-addressing-global-poverty/ [Premier]

Because the Millennium Development Goals will expire in 2015, the United Nations has now begun the process of evaluating them and deciding whether to renew or rework them. After several reports were published on the current state of achieving the goals, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon last July created a High-level Panel on the global development agenda for the period post-2015. The panel is tasked with providing recommendations on continuing the U.N. global development framework. The High-level Panel is being chaired by Liberia President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron. The panel is comprised of 27 leaders from civil society, the private sector, and government. To date, the panel has convened three times—September 2012 in New York at the opening of the U.N. General Assembly; November 2012 in the United Kingdom; and most recently in Monrovia, Liberia, in January 2013. The panel’s final report is expected to be released at the end of May 2013 at the conclusion of two more meetings—one in Indonesia at the end of March, and one final meeting in New York at U.N. headquarters. The communiqué from the third panel meeting in Monrovia indicates that there is agreement among panelists that a development agenda should extend beyond economic growth to focus on equality, sustainability, and reaching populations that were left behind in the Millennium Development Goals. The communiqué emphasizes that any post-Millennium Development Goals global development agenda must include the empowerment of women and girls, the expansion of social protection schemes, and universal access to health care—including sexual and reproductive health. In addition, growth must be inclusive and accompanied by strong institutions and transparent government to protect rights. The next meeting of the High-level Panel will be in Bali, March 25–27, and will focus on methods of implementation. Expectations for the panel giving due consideration to women’s issues runs high. President Sirleaf and another panel member Tawakkul Karman, a women’s rights activist, jointly received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for their promotion of women’s rights and peace. President Sirleaf, a long-time champion of women’s rights, is the first democratically elected female president in Africa. Karman, who became the face of the 2011 uprising in Yemen as part of the Arab Spring uprisings, and is known as “mother revolution,” is at the forefront of the fight for democracy in Yemen. Lifting the earnings of 1 billion people who currently live on less than $1.25 a day is a key part of addressing extreme poverty. But alleviating poverty among the most marginalized populations requires moving beyond traditional measures of gross domestic product and focusing on the roots of poverty from discrimination against marginalized populations to the poor’s lack of access to markets, property, and employment. John Podesta, a member of the U.N. High-level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda, as well as the founder and current Chair of the Center for American Progress, explained in a recent issue brief on inclusive economic growth that “Sustainable economic growth is not simply about increasing the size of national economies but about shaping enduring systems that respect the rights of individuals and give them the tools they need to help lift themselves out of poverty now and forever.” Podesta prescribes an inclusive approach to economic development, one that combats discrimination, provides economic opportunities, and improves the infrastructure—access to energy, property rights, and employment—to allow individuals and families to thrive. Of particular significance to women, Podesta points out that reproductive and sexual rights and land tenure property rights are two components of development. Only between 10 percent and 20 percent of women in developing countries have land rights, and women hold fewer assets and face more difficulty attaining credit. Yet according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, if women had the same access to land, technology, financial services, education, and markets as men, yields on women’s farms could increase from 20 percent to 30 percent, which would feed between 100 million and 150 million more people—children, women, and men who would otherwise go hungry. A World Economic Forum report titled, “The Global Gender Gap Report 2011,” underscored the imperative of women’s empowerment for national prosperity: Because women account for one-half of a country’s potential talent base, a nation’s competitiveness in the long term depends significantly on whether and how it educates and utilizes its women … in order to maximize competitiveness and development potential, each country should strive for gender equality—that is, should give women the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities as men. Looking forward, there are a number of other intergovernmental processes and civil society engagement processes surrounding the post-2015 development agenda preparations, which will also eventually impact the outcome of these deliberations. During the Rio+20 conference, world leaders agreed to a process to consider the creation of a set of companion Sustainable Development Goals, which will focus on priority areas for the achievement of sustainable development that were laid out in the outcome document—including gender equality and women’s empowerment. A U.N. Open Working Group of 30 representatives shared by 70 member states has been created and will seek to develop a proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, which “should be coherent with and integrated in the United Nations Development Agenda beyond 2015.” There are a number of other relevant intergovernmental processes for the post-2015 development agenda from now until 2015, such as the 2015 World Conference on Disaster Reduction and the 20-year review of the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development in 2014. In addition, world leaders and civil society are gathering at the 57th Session of the Commission of the Status of Women at U.N. headquarters in New York over the next two weeks to discuss how to eliminate and prevent all forms of violence against women and girls, which is this year’s priority theme in line with International Women’s Day. They will also assess progress on the Millennium Development Goals and key gender equality issues to be reflected in the post-2015 development agenda. Besides these processes, the United Nations plans to garner input from a variety of stakeholders, including the private sector, philanthropic organizations, and citizens, as it formulates the post-2015 agenda. Thus far civil society has responded with thoughtful proposals outlining the need to focus on addressing underlying inequalities and how to avoid uneven results. For example, Save the Children’s vision for a post-2015 framework recommends zero-based goals to tackle persistent inequalities, and think tanks such as the Overseas Development Institute are offering similar approaches to ensure the next development approach reaches everyone. Globally, significant economic, social, and cultural barriers remain that prevent women from participating in economic development, which hinders the broader efforts to combat poverty and pathways toward sustainable development. Further progress will require a sustained effort to ensure that women around the world have greater economic rights, including the right to own property, as well as security to ensure they are protected from violence. Establishing these conditions will hinge on international development processes making women’s empowerment and gender equality pivotal to their efforts.

### Misc/Top Shelf

#### Development assistance is just another tool in the toolbox.

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

Now we have come to one of our main theses, that economic aid from the powerful to the powerless countries, from the metropole to the satellites, is an instrument of power politics. How much a country lends to another country will not be determined by its need, or its potential, or its past economic performance, good or bad, or its virtue, but by the benefit it yields in terms of political support. In granting assistance, economic efficiency or social justice or any other criterion is subordinate to national interest. Economic aid is merely one other instrument of foreign policy, an instrument like diplomacy, cultural exchange, technical assistance, export of munitions, military intervention, and war. To the capitalist countries-from whence most aid comes-it is a way of safe- guarding relationships with their client states, of maintaining the status quo.

#### Compared with other measures to change the political ideology of a developing nation, development assistance is best

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As an instrument of policy, as a method for the strong to control the weak, foreign assistance may be less iniquitous than some of the other policy devices. It may not be positively beneficial, but it may-as the Latin Americans say-be "menos mal," less bad. Our reason for believing so is that foreign aid is more restricted in its distribution and less destructive in its effects than the other major political instruments. Those who give assistance are those who have resources to spare. When expended on diplomacy, they probably cause little harm; and on symposia and cultural exchanges they are innocuous; but neither of these devices consumes enough of the resources which the strong countries are willing to expend to protect and extend their interests. Only shipment of military equipment or of troops can rival foreign assistance in magnitude. Given the hostility of the major powers, it is almost inevitable that they will de- vote a great volume of resources to combat, conflict, and competition -and only economic aid and military intervention are sufficiently large and conspicuous outlets to absorb this competitive energy.4 Thus one justification for foreign assistance is that it is "menos mal" than its alternative.

#### Our failure to maintain commitments is a large reason why current assistance fails

Sachs 13, Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

The overwhelming problem is that, until now, these repeated pledges have not been fulfilled. Real cash flows of ODA have hardly risen since 2004, especially taking into account global inflation and exchange-rate movements. While President George W. Bush promised in 2002 that the Millennium Challenge Account would be funded at the level of $5 billion per year by fiscal year 2006, in fact the funding has been under $2 billion per year. Poor countries, unsure whether the promises will ever be fulfilled, are therefore not able to plan for the future, and they are certainly not able to rely on pledges to make multiyear investment decisions, including investments in capacity and training. The United States should now join the European Union in setting a specific timetable for increasing aid through the period to 2015. The United States should commit to reach 0.5 percent of GNP no later than 2012, and 0.7 percent of GNP by the year 2015. Such a guaranteed schedule of aid would underpin global success in achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and would put the world on a trajectory to achieve the end of extreme poverty by the year 2025 (as I have described in The End of Poverty 4). Of the total aid package, roughly half the U.S. aid should be allocated through multilateral channels (such as IDA; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria; and a new Global Fund for African Agriculture), and roughly half should be allocated through U.S. bilateral initiatives (such as PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and other effective programs).

#### Leadership is the primary problem with Africa’s current development assistance

Ayittey 13, Ayittey, George B.N.. (Ayittey is a professor @ American University) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

Monumental leadership failure remains the primary obstacle to Africa’s development. After independence in the 1960s, the leadership, with few exceptions, established defective economic and political systems that set the stage for the ruination of postcolonial Africa. The economic system of statism (or dirigisme), with its plethora of state controls, created chronic commodity shortages and black markets and spawned a culture of bribery and corruption, virtually destroying Africa’s productive base. The political system of one-party states and military dictatorships degenerated into tyranny, as these systems, concentrating enormous economic and political power in the state, evolved into “vampire states.” Government, thus, has ceased to exist as an institution— its power having been hijacked instead by a phalanx of unrepentant bandits and thugs, who use the state machinery to enrich themselves, their cronies, and their tribes. Those who do not belong to this charmed circle of relatives, cronies or tribesmen are excluded from the gravy train. The richest persons in Africa are heads of state and their ministers, and, quite often, the chief bandit is the head of state himself. Eventually the “vampire state” metastasizes into what Africans call a “coconut republic” and implodes when politically-excluded groups rise up in rebellion: Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Burundi (1995), Zaire (1996), Sierra Leone (1998), Liberia (1999), Ivory Coast (2000), and Togo (2005). Only reform—intellectual, economic, political, and institutional—will save Africa, but the leadership is not interested.

## Solvency

### General

#### Multiple examples show that development assistance has been key to progress in health, education, and poverty reduction.

Goldin et al. 02. Ian Goldin (Professor at Oxford University), Halsey Rogers (Lead Economist with the Education Global Practice), and Nicholas Stern (Chair of the Grantham Research Institute, professor at Oxford). “The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from World Bank Experience.” A Research Paper from the Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank. 2002. [Premier]

This progress on health, education, and income is not accidental. Governments, with the support of the development community and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have accelerated growth and poverty reduction by improving their policies, institutions, and governance, and through well-designed projects and programs. iv • Programs like Progresa in Mexico and the Bolsa Escola in Brazil have used financial incentives and parental involvement in school management to induce families to keep their children in school, substantially raising school enrollments among the poorest children. Progresa, for example, increased secondary enrollment rates by 8 percent for girls and 5 percent for boys in just four years. • Targeted action by a global public-private partnership has eliminated the disease of riverblindness from much of West Africa, following the global community’s earlier success in eradicating smallpox from the planet. • Bangladesh has cut infant mortality in half (from 140 to 71 per 1,000 live births in the past 30 years), reduced fertility sharply (from 7 births per woman in 1970 to 3.2 births in 1999), and achieved near-universal primary enrollment for girls in an environment where they historically faced high barriers. The country’s innovative NGOs played an especially important role in this progress, but outside assistance was also strongly supportive. While the growth rate of per-capita incomes has not been high in Bangladesh, it has increased in each decade since independence. • Market-oriented reforms in Vietnam and China have helped catalyze domestic and foreign investment there, lifting tens of millions of people out of abject poverty in the former and hundreds of millions in the latter. These are just a few examples. More systematic evidence presented below and in greater detail in the full paper supports the case that good policies and external support have been the key to progress.

#### The international donor aid community is committed to improving the efficacy of development assistance, and it’s working.

Kaufmann 09. Kaufmann, Daniel. Daniel Kaufmann is an economist and the president and CEO of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, formerly the Revenue Watch Institute - Natural Resource Charter. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Brookings. March 2009. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aid-effectiveness-and-governance-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/> [Premier]

Aid effectiveness has become a central notion in the lexicon of the aid industry. This is in contrast to two decades ago, when official donors would not hesitate to provide major funding to governments like that of Mobutu in Zaire and Marcos in the Philippines. Such extreme misgovernance in official aid by traditional donors is rare today. For instance, even though multilateral financial institutions continue to fund governments where there is high level corruption and tend to be silent about dramatic governance debacles such as in Zimbabwe, at least they refrained from funding Mugabe’s government during the worst excesses. Further, for over a decade there has been increasing recognition that aid flowing to governments implementing ineffective policies is wasteful, in line with research findings since the early 1990s. As a result, aid has tended to support domestic policy reform efforts of recipient countries, even though narrow political objectives of donors still play a dominant role in many aid decisions today. The official donor aid community has also become committed to improving aid effectiveness through better coordination mechanisms, as illustrated by the important Aid Effectiveness High Level Forum (HLF) process initiated in Rome in 2003, followed by the (unusually) substantive and concrete Paris Declaration in the second HLF held in early 2005. At that time official donors agreed on certain targets to be met by 2011. A serious monitoring mechanism was put in place. Even though the Aid Effectiveness High Level Forum (HLF) agenda focused narrowly on donor harmonization and coordination, some governance topics featured explicitly in the Paris HLF agenda, notably on public sector management (the “supply side,” e.g. public finance management and country procurement systems). The problem of corruption was mentioned, and commitments were made on transparency and “mutual accountability.” The third installment of the HLF was recently held in Accra, Ghana, this past September. As compared with the previous Paris HLF, the event in Accra was much more inclusive, significantly broadening the participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). During the Accra HLF itself, CSOs were critical of the lack of transparency on how official donor monies are spent, and demanded that such items be explicitly included in the final resolution (the “Accra Agenda for Action”). At the eleventh hour, this was done. While not path-breaking, these last minute changes signaled an “official” recognition of the role that CSOs can play.

#### Development assistance is a good investment and is effective – Ghana proves.

Worthington and Yohannes 11. Worthington, Samuel (Samuel Worthington is the President and CEO of InterAction, the largest alliance of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations) and Yohannes, Daniel (Daniel W. Yohannes is the CEO of the U.S. Government's Millennium Challenge Corporation). “Foreign assistance, even in tough times, is a good investment.” The Guardian. November 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/23/foreign-assistance-is-good-investment> [Premier]

Investing in overseas development is sometimes a hard sell when our own country is focused on economic recovery and job creation. Sustainable development creates stronger economies, with more consumers to trade and do business with in our interconnected global marketplace. This, in turn, creates growth opportunities at home and abroad. Effective development directly improves the lives of the world's poor and contributes toward a thriving international economy that serves our shared economic interests. That's why, even in these tough times, foreign assistance is a good investment and, when done right, delivers results. So, when government leaders, the aid community and civil society organisations from around the world meet in Busan, South Korea, next week to discuss making development assistance a more effective investment, development experts might look to Ghana for insights. In 2000, Ghana recognised that growing its economy depended on increasing agricultural productivity. The challenges were immense. In many rural areas, nine out of 10 people were living in poverty. Use of modern farming techniques was rare, and infrastructure to expand agricultural exports was inadequate. Between harvest and market, farmers often lost as much as 30% of their yields. To address this challenge, Ghana funneled development assistance, including a $547m (£344m) grant from the US government's Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), toward improving agricultural productivity and food security. The country embraced MCC's approach, requiring partners to consult with their citizens to determine their constraints to growth and then reform policies and design programmes to tackle them. Ghanaians used this strategy along the entire agricultural value chain – including training farmers, opening post-harvest cold storage facilities and building roads to markets – and factored in measures to monitor progress. Although Ghana has a way to go, the efforts are already paying off. The Overseas Development Institute calculates that, since 1983, Ghana's agricultural sector has grown by more than 5% a year, helping to fuel the economy's overall growth. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate has been nearly halved from 51.7% in 1991 to 28.5% by 2006, and Ghana is poised to meet the UN millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015. Why are these returns in Ghana so impressive? They exemplify the principles that make development a prudent investment: a partnership rooted in country-owned solutions, a demand for results and a commitment to transparency. Effectively targeted development investment allows countries to prioritise their needs, design and implement programmes and build for sustainability in consultation with their citizens. The growth of Ghana's agricultural sector, and its impact on the poor, depends on the participation of small shareholder farmers, particularly women who run subsistence farms. An environment that encourages participation of civil society organisations is also necessary to ensure that non-governmental voices are not just tolerated but heard. An inclusive, enabling environment improves opportunities for trade and investment too. Results are fundamental to making the case that foreign assistance is a good investment. The evolution from aid inputs to development outcomes means improving technically rigorous, systematic and transparent methods for projecting, tracking, evaluating and communicating impact. This process must be inclusive and not overlook the poor, ensuring that economic growth improves the lives of the vulnerable and marginalised. MCC, for example, tracks a continuum of results throughout the lifecycle of its programmes. MCC captures policy and institutional reforms countries make from the start to ensure sustainability. As programmes mature, interim outputs and outcomes are assessed, like the MCC-funded training so far of more than 64,000 Ghanaian farmers. MCC's continuum includes post-programme impact evaluations to understand if income increases are attributable to MCC's investments and to learn whether programmes were designed correctly. Maximising the impact of development requires embracing transparency as the basis for accountability and good governance. Partner governments must be held to account, both to donors and to their own citizens for how development resources are used and what they achieve. In these ways, Busan can push the practice of development effectiveness, grounded in a non-negotiable commitment to responsibility, accountability and transparency. Because of this approach, Busan can reaffirm that development is a good investment worth making.

#### Previous development assistance has been successful

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

In the broadest terms, national and international efforts to promote economic development around the world during the past fifty years have been highly successful, with the notable exception of large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, which remain trapped in extreme poverty. The biggest development successes have come in Asia, a vast region with more than half the world’s population. Economic growth in China, India, Korea, and many other countries— along with public investments in health, education, and infrastructure—have powered the most rapid improvement in living standards in world history. Aid has played an enormous role in those gains. The fact that Asia can feed itself is due in no small part to the Green Revolution that began in the 1960s, heavily supported by the U.S. public and philanthropic sectors. The fact that disease burdens have come down sharply is due in important part to global aid successes such as smallpox eradication, widespread immunization coverage, malaria control (outside of Africa), and the uptake of oral rehydration to fight death from diarrhea. The fact that population growth has slowed markedly is a success of aid-supported family planning efforts, which the United States has helped to initiate since the 1960s. The fact that countries such as Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand became manufacturing successes grew out of U.S. and Japanese aid for core infrastructure and technological upgrading.

#### Distrust Neg studies- economic failure causes development aid, not the other way around

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

The discussion on aid effectiveness is clouded by confusions, prejudices, and simple misunderstandings. Many studies try to find a correlation between overall aid and economic growth; when they find little positive correlation, they declare aid to be a failure. But the low correlation does not prove that aid is failing, since much of the aid is directed to countries in violence, famine, or deep economic crisis. It ought not to be a surprise, therefore, that aid often correlates with “economic failure”—not because aid has caused the failure, but rather because aid has responded to it.

#### Laundry list of successful development assistance

Sachs 13

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The Asian Green Revolution. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Rockefeller Foundation and other donors spurred the development of high-yield seed varieties and new techniques for modernized farming. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped to finance the rapid uptake of these new technologies, including the improved seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation. Dramatic successes were achieved in the 1960s in India and Pakistan, and later in China, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the developing world. Smallpox Eradication. In 1967 the World Health Organization (WHO) established the Smallpox Eradication Unit and launched a donor supported worldwide campaign to eradicate the disease. By 1980, WHO was able to declare the world free of smallpox. Family Planning. During the 1960s, the U.S. government and various organizations (including the Ford Foundation and the Population Council) launched a global effort to spread access to modern contraception, based on individual voluntary choices. The uptake of these contraceptive methods, supported by international and U.S. funding, has been widespread (though still largely bypassing sub-Saharan Africa). As a result of these actions, together with declining child mortality rates, spreading literacy, and broader economic trends, fertility rates and population growth rates have declined sharply throughout most of the developing world. The Campaign for Child Survival. In 1982 UNICEF launched a campaign to promote child survival, based on the powerful combination known as GOBI: growth monitoring of children, oral rehydration therapy, breastfeeding for nutrition and immunity to infectious diseases, and immunizations against childhood killers. Backed by development assistance, the package enjoyed a remarkably rapid uptake, enabling many of the poorest countries to reach at least 80 percent immunization coverage. Treatment for AIDS, TB, and Malaria. After years of international neglect and underfinancing, international donors agreed to step up their actions to fight three killer pandemic diseases: AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. At the urging of the then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, they formed a new Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, as a means to pool their resources and invite countries to formulate national strategies that would be backed by development aid. In a period of only five years, the Global Fund successfully financed the access of more than 1 million HIV-infected individuals to antiretroviral medicines; the distribution of more than 30 million bed nets (protective against mosquitoes), mainly in Africa; and the treatment of more than 2 million individuals for TB. At the same time, the United States launched the PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) program to extend AIDS prevention and treatment programs in low-income countries.

#### When the aid is audited, monitored and is practical, it works

Sachs 13

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Much is made of the difficulty of delivering such technologies to the poor— focusing on perceived high risks of corruption, mismanagement, and other delivery failures. Yet such fears have been shown time and again to be misplaced as long as the aid is practical, subject to monitoring, adapted to local circumstances, endorsed by local communities, and embedded in a sensible delivery system with audits and evaluation. In recent years, enormous successes have been achieved in the mass distribution of anti-malaria bed nets, the mass scale-up of new vaccines (through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations), the mass treatment of children for worm infections, the mass increase in primary-school enrollments and completion rates by eliminating school fees, and the mass access of farmers to high-yield inputs through voucher systems. In all of these cases, success has resulted from transparency, specificity, accountability, and auditing of delivery systems.

### Country-Specific

#### China

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China. The past 20 years of reform in China have contributed more to poverty reduction than any other growth episode in history. Un-questionably, this process of growth and development was driven by China itself. The composition, sequencing, and timing of reforms were designed at home, and built on China’s existing strengths in such areas as literacy and basic health. At the same time, support from outside helped make reform happen and contributed to the structure of the reforms. In the early stages of market-oriented reform, the World Bank provided advice on laying the foundation for the private investment and productivity growth that has buoyed the country’s remarkable progress. The Bank provided the government with the first in-depth overall analysis of China’s economic problems, and it helped China engage with the outside world (again, on the country’s own schedule) through advice on liberalization, exchangerate unification, and port modernization. The Bank’s rural development projects and analytical work complemented strongly these improvements in the overall business environment by targeting poverty where it was most prevalent—in the countryside. The Bank, as both a knowledge and lending institution, thereby made a significant supporting contribution to the massive reduction in rural poverty: from 34 percent of the rural population in 1985 to just 18 percent in 1998.

#### India

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India. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s India was weakly integrated into the international economy and relied heavily on planning and licensing; as a result, economic growth and poverty reduction were unimpressive. Growth accelerated in the 1980s but was based in large measure on unsustainable public spending and foreign borrowing. With the entry of a reformist government in 1991, the Bank provided support for trade and other reforms to stabilize and open up the economy. Over the past five years, the Bank has supported India’s decentralization process, working closely with state, local, and municipal governments committed to reform. Powerful demonstration effects are beginning to emerge.

#### Mozambique

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Mozambique. Mozambique is a recent example of successful post-conflict reform. The country emerged in 1992 from a long civil war, which—combined with a socialist experiment— had left the country one of the poorest in the world. Since then the World Bank has helped the government to design and implement exchange rate reform, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, and privatization. In this more stable and open environment, GDP has grown at an average rate of 8.4 percent—in part due to revitalized agricultural growth and to increasing exports, which had been stagnant for a decade. The private sector has responded: foreign direct investment (FDI) grew some 500 percent between 1992 and 2001. Today, the focus has shifted xi towards two areas of continued weakness: strengthening the social sectors (Mozambique is struggling against the AIDS epidemic), and reforming judicial and tax systems.

#### Uganda

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Uganda. Uganda’s new government in the mid-1980s inherited a country that was devastated by years of conflict and economic mismanagement. Starting with advice, the Bank helped the government learn from the comparative experience of Ghana and other countries and helped it design and implement key measures on fiscal adjustment, exchange rate reform, and trade liberalization. Aid and the conditionality associated with Bank-supported adjustment lending helped generate policy reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period during which multilateral assistance from the Bank and other lenders was particularly important. Since that period, Uganda has achieved a remarkable recovery: it has increased private investment, reversed capital flight, increased external trade, and privatized commercial public enterprises. It has made great strides in primary education, with several million additional children attending school during the first year of a Bank adjustment loan. Uganda has also reversed income poverty sharply, from 56 percent in 1992–93 to 35 percent by the year 2000.

#### Poland

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Poland. Poland was the first country to emerge from the transition recession in 1992 and has since maintained an average GDP growth rate of 3.7 percent, the highest among transition economies. Positioned to gain access to the European Union (EU) in 2004, Poland has led the way in many reforms, often taking major risks. Outside assistance has also helped. From the early phases of Poland’s economic transformation, the Bank provided advisory and financial support. Activities included aiding macroeconomic reforms, supporting the creation of an institutional and regulatory framework, helping with the restructuring and privatization of industries, upgrading infrastructure with private-sector participation, and helping to restore Poland’s creditworthiness. Finally, the Bank also helped to improve public understanding of the government’s economic strategy.

#### Vietnam

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Vietnam. Vietnam has also moved strongly to reform its economy and reduce poverty over the past dozen years, beginning when it was still politically and economically estranged from major donors and therefore could not receive large-scale aid. The Bank began to provide advice to Vietnam in 1989, at a time when the country’s disastrous economic policies had produced a crisis of hyperinflation, falling economic activity, and mass exodus of economic migrants. Although it did not provide finance until 1993, the Bank advised the government on stabilizing the macroeconomy, opening to foreign trade and investment, and reforming property rights. As reforms took hold, the Bank later shifted its focus to infrastructure and primary education. The results have been remarkable: the income poverty rate was cut from 58 to 37 percent in just six years.

## Aff Ideas/Plans

### Refugees

#### Development assistance includes refugee aid.

OCED 08. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “Is it ODA? Factsheet.” November 2008. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf>. [Premier]

This is often the decisive criterion for determining ODA eligibility. In the final analysis it is a matter of intention. But in order to reduce the scope for subjective interpretations and promote comparable reporting, Members have agreed to limits on ODA reporting, e.g.: Exclusion of military aid - The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. On the other hand, additional costs incurred for the use of the donor’s military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services are ODA-eligible. Peacekeeping - The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilisation of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal. (Net bilateral costs means the extra costs of assigning personnel to these activities, net of the costs of stationing them at home, and of any compensation received from the UN.) Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code. Activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, are not reportable as ODA. Civil police work - Expenditure on police training is reportable as ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as counter-insurgency work or intelligence gathering on terrorism. The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience is not reportable. Social and cultural programmes - As with police work, a distinction is drawn between building developing countries’ capacity (ODA-eligible) and one-off interventions (not ODA-eligible). Thus, the promotion of museums, libraries, art and music schools, and sports training facilities and venues counts as ODA, whereas sponsoring concert tours or athletes’ travel costs does not. Cultural programmes in developing countries whose main purpose is to promote the culture or values of the donor are not reportable as ODA. Assistance to refugees - Assistance to refugees in developing countries is reportable as ODA. Temporary assistance to refugees from developing countries arriving in donor countries is reportable as ODA during the first 12 months of stay, and all costs associated with eventual repatriation to the developing country of origin are also reportable. Nuclear energy - The peaceful use of nuclear energy, including construction of nuclear power plants, nuclear safety and the medical use of radioisotopes, is ODA-eligible. Military applications of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation activities are not. Research - Only research directly and primarily relevant to the problems of developing countries may be counted as ODA. This includes research into tropical diseases and developing crops designed for developing country conditions. The costs may still be counted as ODA if the research is carried out in a developed country. Anti-Terrorism - Activities combatting terrorism are not reportable as ODA, as they generally target perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the recipient.

#### Developmental assistance from wealthy countries is pivotal to develop refugee infrastructure

White 16 Wealthy countries further cannibalise development budgets to host refugees By [Cécile Barbière](http://www.euractiv.com/authors/cecile-barbiere/) | [EURACTIV.fr](http://www.euractiv.com/content_providers/euractiv-fr/) | translated by [Samuel White](http://www.euractiv.com/translators/samuel-white/) Sep 20, 2016 (updated: Oct 27, 2016) <http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/wealthy-countries-further-eat-into-development-budgets-to-host-refugees/> DOA 6/18/17 [Premier]

Faced with what promises to be a long-term migration crisis, more and more donor countries are using their development budgets to fund their domestic asylum policies, a trend that is set to become increasingly the norm. EURACTIV France reports. A growing share of aid budgets are being allocated to the hosting of refugees as Europe’s migrant crisis shows no sign of slowing down, according to the 2016 Data Report by ONE, a development aid NGO, published on Monday (19 September). In 2015, the world’s main donor countries provided $131 billion of official development assistance (ODA), a 7% increase on 2014. But after deducting the $12bn these countries spent hosting refugees, the increase comes to a less impressive 1.8%. **The refugee crisis has caused the development assistance budgets of seven European countries (Greece, Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia) to increase by more than 20%.** In Italy, Greece and Sweden, the countries most affected by the refugee crisis, the cost of hosting refugees represents up to half of all bilateral aid. In its report, the NGO criticised the imbalances caused by this deployment of funds, which often occurs at the expense of developing countries. For example, according to the report, “The Netherlands gave more aid to itself ($1.58bn) for in-donor refugee costs in 2015 than it gave to the whole of Africa ($1.48bn) in 2014.” “As the refugee crisis continues in 2016, the amount of aid spent on refugees in aid-giving countries is likely to rise,” the report added. France has ring-fenced ODA in its latest budget. In 2016, the French government also promised a 23% increase to its ODA budget, in order to cover the cost of hosting refugees without cutting aid elsewhere. The overall budget will also see a slight increase, thanks to the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). France is due to present the broad lines of its 2016 budget soon, but ONE fears that President François Hollande’s promised increase of $4bn by 2020 will be impossible to fulfill. “We are within our rights to question how the president will keep his promise of increasing the budget [...] at that speed,” said Friederike Röder, the director of ONE France. In 2015, after four consecutive years of cuts, France increased its official development assistance by 1.5% to €8.19bn.

### Rights Model

#### A rights based approach to development takes into account local perspectives and minimizes exploitation from developed nations.

Galo 2010. Gallo, Carol. Carol Jean Gallo received her MA in African Studies from Yale in 2009 and began a PhD program in Politics and International Studies a t the University of Cambridge in 2011.  Her research focuses on peace and security in Africa, in particular disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in peacekeeping settings. “Rethinking the Development Aid Paradigm.” *Yale Journal of International Affairs,* March 31, 2010. <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105117gallo.pdf> [Premier].

A **rights-based approach to development sees people not as beneficiaries of** charitable **services or aid, but as rights-holders**. **This** also **makes governments**, financial institutions, and transnational corporations **duty-bearers**.6 In 2003, UNICEF released a comprehensive publication on the rights-based approach to programming. The report detailed how **people living in poverty** **are not just** “passive **beneficiaries**” of aid. **Rather they** **navigate their daily circumstances, actively making decisions** and choices **based on the resources and information available** at any given moment**. Their active role in their own lives cannot be discounted** in development schemes.7

**Development aid should be more than a project designed to facilitate** peaceful **integration of a** peripheral **country into the capitalist** world **system so that it may continue to be exploited** by economic powers.8 “**Development” should be a process in which people** and their well-being **are prioritized** **over** an exclusive focus on **income-generation**; where economic security, broadly defined, is paramount, but is only one of a number of components of human security; and where people are at the center of “development.”

### Rawls

#### The original position can be applied on the intentional stage

Rawls 71

Rawls, J. A. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

One may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states. Following out the conception of the initial situation, I assume that these representatives are deprived of various kinds of information. While they know that they represent different nations each living under the normal circumstances of human life, they know nothing about the particular circumstances of their own society.... Once again the contracting parties, in this case representatives of states, are allowed only enough knowledge to make a rational choice to protect their interests but not so much that the more fortunate among them can take advantage of their special situation. This original position is fair between nations; it nullifies the contingencies and biases of historical fate [378].

#### A nation’s natural resources are chosen arbitrarily, the original position solves for the inequity

Beitz 75

Beitz, Charles R. (Professor of Politics @ Yale) “Justice and International Relations.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, 1975, pp. 360–389. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2265079. [Premier]

The fact that national societies are assumed to be self-sufficient does not make the distribution of natural resources any less arbitrary. Citizens of a nation which finds itself on top of a gold mine do not gain a right to the wealth that might be derived from it simply because their nation is self-sufficient. But someone might argue that self- sufficiency, nevertheless, removes any possible grounds on which citizens of other nations might press claims to equitable shares. A possible view is that no justification for resource appropriation is necessary in the global state of nature. If, so to speak, social cooperation is the root of all social obligations, as it is on some versions of contract theory, then the view is correct. All rights would be "special rights" applying only when certain conditions of cooperation obtain.8 I believe that this is wrong. It seems plausible in most discussions of distributive justice because their subject is the distribution of the benefits of social cooperation. Appropriate distributive principles compensate those who are relatively disadvantaged by the cooperative scheme for their participation in it. Where there is no social cooperation, there are no benefits of cooperation, and hence no problem of compensation for relative disadvantage. (This is why a world of self- sufficient national societies is not subject to something like a global difference principle.) But there is nothing in this reasoning to suggest that our only moral ties are to those with whom we share membership in a cooperative scheme. It is possible that other sorts of considerations might come into the justification of moral principles. Rawls himself recognizes this in the case of the natural duties, which are said to 'apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts" (114) and, apparently, without regard to our institutional memberships. In the case of natural resources, the parties to the international original position would know that resources are unevenly distributed with respect to population, that adequate access to resources is a prerequisite for successful operation of (domestic) cooperative schemes, and that resource supplies are scarce. They would view the natural distribution of resources as arbitrary in the sense that no one has a natural prima facie claim to the resources that happen to be under [their] his feet. The appropriation of scarce resources by some requires a justification against the competing claims of others and the needs of future generations. Not knowing the resource endowments of their own societies, the parties would agree on a resource redistribution principle which would give each national society a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an economy capable of satisfying its members' basic needs.

#### The talent objection doesn’t apply here

Beitz 75

Beitz, Charles R. (Professor of Politics @ Yale) “Justice and International Relations.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, 1975, pp. 360–389. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2265079. [Premier]

While I believe that Rawls' discussion of talents can be defended against objections like these, that is not my concern here. I want to argue only that objections of this sort do not apply to the parallel claim that the distribution of natural resources is similarly arbitrary. Like talents, resource endowments are arbitrary in the sense that they are not deserved. But unlike talents, resources are not naturally attached to persons. Resources are found "out there," available to the first taker. Resources must be appropriated before they can be used, whereas, in the talents case, the "appropriation" is a fait accompli of nature over which persons have no direct control. Thus, while we feel that the possession of talents confers a right to control and benefit from their use, we may feel differently about resources. Appropriation may not always need a justification; if the resources taken are of limited value, or if, as Locke imagined, their appropriation leaves "enough and as good" for everyone else, justification may not present a problem. In a world of scarcity, however, the situation is different. The appropriation of valuable resources by some will leave others comparatively, and perhaps fatally, disadvantaged. Those deprived without justification of scarce resources needed to sustain and enhance their lives might well press claims to equitable shares.

### Generic Plan

#### The US should commit to meet Millennium goals and focus itss aid on the poorest nations

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

The priorities for U.S. development assistance should be based mainly on the development commitments that the United States and the rest of the world have made in recent years, after considerable diplomatic and scientific discussions and negotiations. At the core of the effort should be the Millennium Development Goals, which are already the central organizing tool for most development agencies and multilateral development institutions around the world. The MDGs have the profound advantage not only of specifying explicit and quantitative targets, but also of automatically aligning U.S. efforts with those of partner countries, thereby massively leveraging American resources and expertise. The focus of the development challenge is in those regions still trapped in extreme poverty, or those places suffering extremely high burdens of hunger, disease, or lack of infrastructure. This means that U.S. efforts should be mainly directed toward sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Andean region, Haiti, and the remaining pockets of extreme poverty in South Asia. Development aid for middle-income countries (such as China, Brazil, and Mexico) should be scaled back accordingly, since these regions can generally finance their own investment needs.

### Cabinet Position Aff

#### The USFG ought to establish a new cabinet position for development assistance

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

There is a strong case for moving U.S. development assistance to a new, separate, cabinet-level Department for International Sustainable Development (DfISD). The new department would house the existing USAID, PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and emerging initiatives in climate change, especially vis-à-vis the developing countries. The case for a separate department rests on the following principles: The need to upgrade U.S. development assistance as a pillar of U.S. national security. The need to improve U.S. government management and expertise in public health, climate change, agronomy, demography, environmental engineering, and economic development. The need to work effectively with similar cabinet-level departments and ministries in partner countries. The need to depoliticize development assistance, so that it can be directed at the long-term investments that are critical in the fight against poverty, hunger, disease, and deprivation. The need for coherence of U.S. policies that impact international sustainable development, including ODA, trade relations with low-income countries, efforts on climate-change adaptation and mitigation, and efforts on global public health and disease control.

#### The current system fails and a new cabinet position would fix those problems

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

The current system, in which USAID is a part of the Department of State, is failing. U.S. aid is excessively politicized by connecting aid with short-term foreign policy exigencies (such as the war in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine crisis). It would be very useful to insulate development aid from such short-term diplomatic pressures. Moreover, USAID has been gutted of much key talent and staffing, and the U.S. government is currently unable to attract the best young experts in development fields—and it will remain unable to do so until the status of sustainable development within the government is improved. The organizational upgrade in the United Kingdom from a mere subcabinet development agency (the Overseas Development Administration) to a cabinet-level department (the Department for International Development, DfID) has dramatically increased that nation’s standing, reputation, and expertise in the area of international development. DfID is far ahead of USAID as a global thoughtleader in development policy, and DfID’s departmental rank is playing a key role in that success. The new U.S. cabinet-level department would have several specific tasks in its start-up years, in addition to the development challenges already described. DfISD would bring together countless aid programs now strewn in a disconnected way across the U.S. government. It would bolster technical competence (in health, agronomy, engineering, climate, hydrology, finance, and other areas related to sustainable development), and it would fix the procurement and contracting systems, widely regarded to be broken. It would promote results based aid delivery, with monitoring, accountability, and audits. DfISD would be much better placed than USAID to work with counterpart Ministries of International Development and to coordinate multilateral efforts. DfISD would promote partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Businesses, especially, would be encouraged to utilize their technologies (in sectors such as health, agriculture, energy, logistics, finance, and ICT) in partnership with the U.S. government and multilateral agencies.

### BLA (Beneficiary-Led Aid)

#### Beneficiary-led aid reshapes the current paradigm of top-down, donor-focused development assistance, promoting efficiency and creating a new model for genuine participation.

Flint and zu Natrup 14 [Flint, Adrian (Lecturer in Development Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies/University of Bristol) and Christian Meyer zu Natrup (Director and Head of Advisory at MzN International Development Experts, leading a team of consultants working with NGOs, donors and governments on development assistance). “Ownership and Participation: Toward a Development Paradigm based on Beneficiary-led Aid.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, 3 (2014): 273–295.] [Premier]

The provision of development aid has been – despite nearly two decades of “ownership,” “participation,” and “partnership” involving beneficiaries – an expert-led enterprise. Aid agencies, staffed by experts well schooled and trained in various aspects of aid delivery, have traditionally determined the direction and allocation of funding streams in a “top-down” manner. However, advances in the last decade mean that changes in the way that aid is provided might be ripe for reconsideration. As information and communications technology (ICT) becomes ever more advanced and readily available, even amongst the poorest of communities, so the opportunities for accessing the “wisdom of beneficiaries”1 becomes more practicable. Accordingly, what “participation” should mean in an aid context is the key focus of this study, one in which we advance a case for beneficiary-led aid (BLA).2 We define BLA as a process through which aid and assistance programs are determined and materially designed by those at which they are aimed. It differs from participation in that there is no a priori design of the “listening process,” and beneficiaries are trusted by donors and agencies to make decisions, rather than simply to offer input. For this to work, the capture, in a meaningful sense, of beneficiary views must be possible. Initiatives like Mission 4636 in post-earthquake Haiti, and the Map Kibera Project in Kenya (http://mapkibera.org), and other ICT4D (ICT for development) projects have caught the imagination of donors and policymakers alike. Understandably, there has been a great deal of excitement, in academic and practitioner circles, as to the potential of harnessing ICTs with respect to other aspects of aid delivery. In particular, we, in this study, focus on the potential impact of harnessing preferences garnered by way of new methods of data collection like, for example, “crowdsourcing.”3 In so doing, we consider the potential (and related implications) of a development model predicated on practical and meaningful forms of aid that are beneficiary-led. The benefits of a genuine BLA paradigm, we will argue, are clear and compelling: it would represent a bottom-up approach to delivery, it would speed up the decision-making process, it would have clear efficiency gains, and, furthermore, it would improve immeasurably the actual value of aid budgets “on the ground.” BLA would also overcome questions of paternalism, neoimperialism, and agenda-setting; in short, it would democratize and go some way toward depoliticizing aid. Ever since the acceptance, during the 1990s, that aid to regions like sub-Saharan Africa had failed to generate much in the way of development or poverty alleviation, the discourse of the donor community has shifted increasingly from the language of structural adjustment toward one based on “people-focused” solutions. The “new aid agenda,” a popular buzz-phrase in the early 2000s, coming in the wake of the Millennium Development Goals and the post-Washington Consensus World Bank/ IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), was, and remains, all about beneficiary “ownership,” “participation,” and “engagement.” In itself, this was a significant departure from the technocratic days of the 1980s – development’s “lost decade.” This new approach, in the discourse at least, was to be one that signaled a shift away from the top-down, expert-led directives that had emanated from the centers of Europe and North America. Contemporaneous to the changing language of the new aid agenda discourse was a sudden boom in the size and scope of the aid “industry.” The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre saw the emergence of a development and security nexus that conceptualized development in terms of human security.4 As donor governments poured money into aid programs targeting “fragile states” like Afghanistan, NGOs were increasingly called upon to act as agents of development, resulting in the rapid expansion and professionalization of the sector. However, despite the change in focus and the ways in which aid was disbursed, the tangible effects of development programs have remained limited. Critics have long argued that, with respect to the design and implementation of aid programs, there needs to be “real” engagement with communities. A workable model has, until now, remained largely elusive. Theoretical debates pertaining to aid delivery have – like many debates in international political economy and development – long been viewed through “problem-solving” versus “critical” lenses (Cox, 1981). The former broadly argues in favor of improving efficacy while the latter points to seemingly fundamental structural impediments to the efficacy of aid delivery. Accordingly, “problem solvers” within the development community have demanded more efficient and accountable institutions. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have pointed to what they perceive to be far more deep-seated concerns. For example, Mark Duffield (2007, 2012) has argued that the linkage of development and security, post 9/11, has had the effect of locating the practice of development within the vanguard of an increasingly hegemonic neoliberal security agenda. He argues, too, that concerns over insecurity and any exposure to risk have led to the retreat of NGO personnel into the new equivalent of “green zones”; the fortified aid “bunker.” This “architecture of aid” has served to alienate NGO personnel from the communities they are supposed to “serve.” This, in turn, has resulted in an increased distancing of donors from beneficiaries on the ground, regardless of the rhetoric of closer engagement.

#### Tech limitations prevent top down aid delivery from working, but the infrastructure exists to allow BLA to make a substantial difference in participation.

Flint and zu Natrup 14 [Flint, Adrian (Lecturer in Development Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies/University of Bristol) and Christian Meyer zu Natrup (Director and Head of Advisory at MzN International Development Experts, leading a team of consultants working with NGOs, donors and governments on development assistance). “Ownership and Participation: Toward a Development Paradigm based on Beneficiary-led Aid.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, 3 (2014): 273–295.] [Premier]

The effective delivery of aid is determined largely by intelligence concerning the situation on the ground, including the anticipation of needs and problems. Due to technological limitations, the provision of aid has been, almost unavoidably up until this point, a largely expert-led enterprise. Despite continuous talk of the merits of “bottom-up” consultation amongst aid donors this has often proved to be difficult and, in emergency situations, almost impossible. As a result, donor agencies and NGOs, staffed by experts often well schooled and trained in various aspects of aid delivery, have traditionally determined the direction and allocation of funding streams in a “top-down” manner, albeit with some degree of participation from local stakeholders. However, technological developments in the last decade mean that the paradigm governing the way in which aid is provided might be ripe for reconsideration. Evidence has shown that “group intelligence” can be remarkably adept at problem solving and, in many instances, the “wisdom” of the group can outweigh that of the individual expert, both in terms of scope and intuition (Howe, 2009; Surowiecki, 2011). This runs counter to the long established prevailing view which prioritizes the expert-view so as not to dilute its “potency” (Larrick & Soll, 2006, p. 19). Basically, when faced with a problem, most people (and institutions) tend to “chase the expert” when, in reality, others might be better placed to proffer solutions. The growing ubiquity of the Internet has enabled the development of vast transboundary communities and networks, the majority operating in a largely anarchic and non-hierarchical manner. These communities have shown themselves to be capable of incredible feats of self-organization and creativity, despite having little-to-no managerial input or organizational structure. By harnessing group knowledge – crowdsourcing is one such technique for doing so – whole new approaches to addressing a host of different problems have become evident. The most compelling argument for the effectiveness of “the crowd” in producing sophisticated outcomes with very little organization or expert input is the evolution of the Linux operating system. Linux is produced by a huge network of largely anonymous, unpaid, and unvetted volunteers all operating without direct guidance from “above.” Yet the result is a product that can compete on an equal footing with anything produced by experts employed by companies like Microsoft.5 Wikipedia is another example. Originally envisaged as a free online encyclopedia designed to compete with Encyclopaedia Britannica, it has far outstripped its original target in terms of its sheer scale and ubiquity (Howe, 2009). What has facilitated the development of such initiatives – initiatives where the focus is on the importance of genuine group participation rather than the knowledge of individual experts – is the fact that the costs associated with the necessary technology have declined dramatically. The media and music industries are just two examples in which ever more widely accessible tools have led to a boom in amateur input and a steady decline in the traditional way in which these products are produced and consumed. The advent of cheap video cameras and platforms like You Tube have allowed millions to make and show (although the quality varies) short films. Likewise, recording software has enabled musicians to record music in their bedrooms, while the blogosphere and Twitter have re-invented the way in which news is discussed and disseminated. The availability of such technology is not only restricted to developed countries. The ubiquity of mobile phones across many African countries reflects the global (albeit unevenly distributed) nature of this phenomenon. According to the International Telecommunications Union (2012), there are approximately 6 billion mobile-cellular subscriptions in the world today. Much of the growth in subscriptions is located in developing countries. By the end of 2011, nearly one-third of the world’s population (2.3 billion people) had access to the Internet (International Telecommunications Union, 2012). A total of 62 percent of these users were from developing countries. While regions like sub-Saharan Africa remain someway behind other regions in terms of the number of available handsets, network coverage, and user-costs, even here the ICT market is expanding rapidly. This in turn means that new forms participation in an aid context, represents a real possibility in the near future, even in some of the poorest regions of world.6

#### Status quo participation is subtly influenced by the donor community to legitimize dominant viewpoints and silence dissent; BLA ruptures the dominant paradigm, laundry list of advantages.

Flint and zu Natrup 14 [Flint, Adrian (Lecturer in Development Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies/University of Bristol) and Christian Meyer zu Natrup (Director and Head of Advisory at MzN International Development Experts, leading a team of consultants working with NGOs, donors and governments on development assistance). “Ownership and Participation: Toward a Development Paradigm based on Beneficiary-led Aid.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, 3 (2014): 273–295.] [Premier]

Inadvertently or not (and there have been very sincere efforts on the part of NGOs to mitigate such imbalances), practitioners have a tendency to shape the results of participatory processes to suit (and legitimize) outcomes (Mosse, 2001). Similarly, “participation” can serve to legitimize local top-down structures. For example, in interaction with donors, local elites claiming to speak for the whole community can effectively silence dissent and competing views (Pottier & Orone, 1995). It can be tempting for donors to interpret “the community” as being somehow organic and homogenous, ignoring competing/dissenting voices of, for instance, women (Cleaver, 2001). Those who claim to speak for the community are frequently male and, thus, through the legitimization of patriarchal perspectives as those of the community as a whole, gender hierarchies may be further entrenched. Given that local elites can often stand to benefit the most from aid projects, they may have an interest in legitimizing donor visions, particularly since their recognition by outsiders as community leaders tends to entrench existing power bases. The relationship between local elites and donors is therefore frequently symbiotic. Hence, the makeup of user committees, long-established tools for facilitating participation, has been a source of concern for critical theorists for some time (Manor, 2004). While NGOs and aid agencies recognize this as a problem, through the unintended development of client–patron relationships, participation, instead of shaping structural adjustment programs, can actually serve to buttress established viewpoints. BLA, as a form of aid predicated specifically on input from the community as a whole, would address many of the failings highlighted here. It would be needs-based (as perceived by beneficiaries) rather than donor-driven, it would be bottom-up and inclusive in terms of decisionmaking, it would serve to break down entrenched local hierarchies, it would remove the perception of donor agenda-setting, it would build on local infrastructures, it would be more cost effective, and importantly, decision-making would be in the hands of the beneficiaries themselves, rather than those of experts.

#### BLA challenges bureaucracy and paternalism within NGOs, forcing them to be more responsive and engendering radical change that’s attitudinally impossible within the squo development sector.

Flint and zu Natrup 14 [Flint, Adrian (Lecturer in Development Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies/University of Bristol) and Christian Meyer zu Natrup (Director and Head of Advisory at MzN International Development Experts, leading a team of consultants working with NGOs, donors and governments on development assistance). “Ownership and Participation: Toward a Development Paradigm based on Beneficiary-led Aid.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, 3 (2014): 273–295.] [Premier]

While the professionalization of the development sector remains somewhat removed from that of the medical profession, it has developed steadily in this direction from the early days of Save the Children (established 1919), Oxfam (established 1942), and CARE (established 1946) when these groups were dominated by a largely amateur volunteer ethos (in some respects, the fundraising aspect of NGOs remains so). As NGOs have become central actors within development politics so they have evolved into professionalized careerist organizations, in many respects closer in their ethos to that of their donors than their target communities (Ebrahim, 2005; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Alongside such developments have come, in many cases, a strong sense of corporate identity and established bureaucratic elite. Linked to the changing makeup of NGOs has come criticism from critical theorists that the role played by NGOs is increasingly that of donor agent (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). The value of a BLA approach lies in its ability to force donors to confront a somewhat paternalistic view of development based on experts deciding on behalf of beneficiaries what is “good for them” and “what really works.” At the heart of many development initiatives is the expert determination of what constitutes the “needs” of beneficiaries (as opposed to “wants”). BLA dispenses with this bifurcation. Beneficiaries’ perceptions of “need” are frequently very different to those expressed by donors. For donors the distinction is important; “needs” are worthy, “wants” are often frivolous. Yet, the evidence shows that, when offered a choice, beneficiaries often tend to make wants/needs decisions that run counter to expert expectations. Surprisingly for many in developed countries, the poor in developing countries are not simply focused on survival. As Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo point out in Poor Economics (2011), the very poor often spend a seemingly disproportionate percentage of their incomes on what most donors would perceive to be “wants” rather than “needs.” For example, festival attendance, television, radio, and mobile phone ownership, and means of transport all frequently rank alongside food as spending priorities. Accordingly, there is an argument to be made, based on Amartya Sen’s notion of “development as freedom,” for viewing “wants” as part of any developmental framework (Sen cited in Heeks, 2009). BLA differs from participation in that it seeks to refine not only how aid should be delivered but what aid is for. BLA also redefines the role of the development agency as being that of facilitator rather than designer of projects. However, while many in the donor community are happy to embrace the problem-solving aspects of, for example, ICT4D projects that offer value for money and improved efficiency, it is by no means clear that there is enthusiasm for any radical (in the true sense of the word) change to the system.

#### BLA is a new paradigm for the development sector: it offers maximal efficiency with a side of actual participation.

Flint and zu Natrup 14 [Flint, Adrian (Lecturer in Development Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies/University of Bristol) and Christian Meyer zu Natrup (Director and Head of Advisory at MzN International Development Experts, leading a team of consultants working with NGOs, donors and governments on development assistance). “Ownership and Participation: Toward a Development Paradigm based on Beneficiary-led Aid.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, 3 (2014): 273–295.] [Premier]

Developments in ICT have made the potential for BLA a distinct possibility. Examples of genuine participant engagement – ranging from emergency situations such as that of Haiti following the earthquake, to more basic development projects like the Map Kibera Project in Kenya – have demonstrated, in a very real way, the value of real participation in an aid context. Furthermore, as ICT becomes ever-more readily available amongst even the poorest of communities, so the opportunities for accessing beneficiaries become more practicable. However, despite the increasing ubiquity of ICT4D projects, in the rush for the “new,” the radical aspect of many such projects has been dramatically overemphasized. In many respects, ICT4D “innovations” are simply a case of “old wine in new bottles”: the same model of development sporting improved technology. This is not, however, to disparage ICT4D projects per se. Rather, it is an effort to emphasize that few of these initiatives are genuinely radical in intent – rather, they are refinements on what has gone before. However, the deployment of BLA to its fullest extent will involve not just a technical revolution in data gathering but a complete re-evaluation of how development aid is dispensed and, from a critical perspective, what it is for. BLA would involve not just the dissemination of information or the collection of data but the outsourcing of project design to beneficiaries themselves, with the associated caveat that, having outsourced the “problem of aid,” donors respect the “solution” irrespective of their concerns regarding needs/wants and political sensitivities. In short, BLA is a model that will empower beneficiaries to decide the “when” and “what,” while agencies and NGOs concentrate on facilitation. The rewards are potentially telling, not least in terms of genuine engagement with beneficiary communities. Furthermore, the concept of BLA squares the circle with respect to critical and problem-solving debates pertaining to development. For the former, BLA goes some way toward addressing structuralist concerns regarding aid and the perception of an “aid industry” in thrall to donor interests. For the latter, BLA offers greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, and value for money. In short, it offers a conceptually-unified response to the question of what development aid and assistance is for.

### Tech Plan

#### Technological development is a key starting point for economic growth and social change- empirics prove

Schia 16 [Niels Nagelhus Schia (Niels Nagelhus Schia is a senior research fellow and manager for the Cyber Security Centre at NUPI. He is a former fellow of the NSSR (New School for Social Research) and holds a PhD degree in social anthropology from the University of Oslo). “‘Teach a person how to surf’: Cyber security as development assistance.” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* Report no. 4, 2016.] [Premier]

The need to build the correct environment for technology before businesses can begin to thrive and then reap the benefits of digital connectivity has been emphasized by international organizations and policymakers (see for instance ITU 2012, WDR 2016). Research has pointed in the similar direction, like the study by Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015) and the Dalberg Report (2013) Based on a survey of more than 1300 businesses, 1000 small and medium-sized enterprises and extensive interviews in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, the Dalberg Report maps the impact of the Internet as a force for growth and social change. It describes the digitalization of these countries as a work in progress, with the potential still largely untapped. Further, the Dalberg Report calls for more and better information that can guide policymakers and investors in capitalizing on this potential, and stresses that countries will need to invest in infrastructure and the broader ecosystem for innovation. It further identifies ‘core infrastructure’ and ‘conditions for usage’ as the two key pillars for a well-functioning Internet economy (2013: 9). The Dalberg Report highlights how core infrastructure requires an environment not just with mobile and Internet access, but also with electricity, skills, knowledge, education and awareness of corruption. Establishing such an environment is dependent of a set of conditions for usage such as costs, education, and relevance of services. These conditions are in turn influenced by degree of access, relevance, availability and attractiveness. In other words, digital dividends need to be built on analogue foundations. Core traditional development politics and projects become central elements for bridging the digital divide. In order to illustrate and contextualize the importance of this aspect, let me offer a few empirical snapshots from developing countries currently experiencing rapid digitalization. Botswana has one of the highest percentages of Internet subscribers on the African continent. The digitalization of Botswana has mushroomed: there have been substantial investments in digital infrastructure; the country scores high on Internet usage; Botswana has a national policy on Internet distribution and access points (including rural areas), and the highest percentage of social media users on the sub-Saharan mainland. Such statistics would indicate that Botswana has indeed become an Internet society – but, looking beyond these figures and studying the actual impact of digitalization on people’s everyday lives, the picture is rather different. Examining Botswana’s two major industries – diamonds and cattle farming – the anthropologist Jo Helle-Valle demonstrates the relevance, or lack of relevance, of digital technology and the Internet in the lives of ordinary people (2015). The diamond industry is global and very much controlled by foreign capital, and through these connections the industry might be said to be fully digitalized. However, as Helle-Valle notes: ‘… the Botswana work-force in this sector is typically manual labour, with little or no digital technological competence being required’ (2015: 3). In this important sector Botswana is not very digitalized, nor is there perceived to be any great need for this. The situation in the cattle industry is very different. Helle-Valle shows how broad and innovative ICT projects have led to effective management of the national stock and a thriving export industry. Thanks to new technology, most of the cattle in Botswana are now included in a system which, by means of digital chips in each animal, can monitor and identify sickness, ownership, breed, theft, etc. The data can be read through handheld devices such as smartphones, tablets or computers, and are loaded into large databases. (Helle-Valle 2015: 3). Through this system, cattle owners can communicate more easily with veterinaries as well as buyers and sellers. Digital technology has also been used in Africa to strengthen internal solidarity and economic growth. In Kenya, fundraising campaigns through mobile phones and social media have raised considerable amounts of money for famine relief in the northeast of the country. In 2007, the telecom company Safricom launched a mobile money service called M-PESA which attracted six million customers within two years, transferring billions annually. Through M-PESA, people without bank accounts could leapfrog from traditional brick-and-mortar finance to digital economy (Mbogo 2010, Bright and Hruby 2015). The launch of M-PESA sparked a series of digital innovations in the country. Ushahidi, an app for digitally and rapidly reporting and tracking outbreaks of violence in connection with elections, was also launched in 2007; in the following year it became an international tech company based in Ngong Road, or what has become known as the Silicon Savannah, the tech-hub of East Africa. In 2011, the Kenyan Red Cross together with Safaricom led the Kenyans for Kenya campaign, raising almost 12 million dollars in four weeks for aid during a severe famine. The social media were also used to inform and coordinate help during the Westgate crisis, and the Kenyan Red Cross employed the social media to get blood donors following the attack (Were: 2013). A few years earlier such mobilization would not have been possible. Another country that is now surfing the digital wave is Rwanda. Considerable investments have been made in ICT technology in schools as well as in infrastructure, aiming to ‘… strengthen skills training centres and develop an ICT culture in schools as a means of creat[e]ing a critical mass of IT professionals’ (Tafirenyika 2011). Furthermore, together with the Rwandan government, the Kigali Bus Service has invested in a cashless, card-based public transport ticketing system known as twende. By 2015, more than 30,000 customers had signed up for this system. This initiative was part of the government’s Smart Kigali programme for rapid modernization and digitalization of the capital city (Dusabirane 2015). While the digital dividends in the cattle industry in Botswana, in the social media campaigns in Kenya and the digitalization programmes in Rwanda are evident, there are still many hurdles to be dealt with before most people in these countries can enjoy extensive use of the Internet, the most important hurdle being economic. Although the importance of being connected is recognized, the consumer costs are still too high for most people to be able to afford to use the social media and the Internet on a daily basis. The World Bank also highlights this aspect, and how the bottom billion are reaping only a modest share of the digital dividends: In the Central African Republic, one month of internet access costs more than 1.5 times the annual per capita income. Even mobile phones are expensive: the median mobile phone owner in Africa spends over 13 percent of her monthly income on phone calls and texting. And many poor lack the basic literacy and numeracy skills needed to use the internet. (World Bank 2016: 16) The digital gap is closely linked to the economic gap: the ‘haves’ can make use of the new technology and reap digital dividends, while the ‘have-nots’ are left behind. This is where development efforts can make a difference. By helping to bridge this infrastructural gap, donor countries can play a key role in contributing to improve the technological business environment in developing countries.6

#### Middle- and last-mile initiatives are key – urban-centered digitalization is problematic.

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Much has been done in African countries in order to improve the first mile and the international gateway, the point where countries connect to the global Internet. Since 2009, thousands of kilometres of undersea broadband cables along the coasts of East Africa (see e.g. SEACOM) and West Africa (see e.g. WACS) have been bringing faster Internet to the continent. These cables provide countries such as Djibouti, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania, and with high-speed Internet. While governments can negotiate higher Internet speed, better prices and greater bandwidth, user conditions and Internet accessibility/availability are very much conditioned by the middle mile, the national backbone and intercity networks. These, in turn, depend on the degree of competition between public and private actors in the country. The rules of the market competition vary from one country to another, and affect the user side of digital networks and infrastructure. Liberalizing the market for the middle mile is an effective way of providing open access and Internet to end users – but, as the World Bank has pointed out, this entails a risk ‘… that the most popular routes – say, between the two main cities – are ‘superserved’ while the rest of the country is underserved.’ (2016: 219)

In developing countries, the last mile is rarely served through fixed copper cables, as local access to networks is dominated by wireless alternatives. This is where the digitalization trajectory of developing countries differs the most from developed countries, due largely to the problem of the fixed vs wireless networks. Whereas the developed countries had achieved almost universal fixed-line access before wireless technology took over around 2001, most developing countries never built fixedline networks. The World Bank sees this point as important … because wireless networks […] are not fully substitutable for fixed networks […] either in usage (which rarely offers flat-rate pricing, without data limits) or in performance (where speeds are generally lower) […] many developing countries are stuck with a second-class internet that may fail to deliver the expected benefits, especially for business users. (2016: 208)

The 2016 World Bank report goes on to describe how developing countries will have to struggle to achieve a fully and sufficient middle mile or national backbone. Some developing countries may achieve such a backbone through private–public partnership, but creating fixed-line networks in rural areas is still challenging and not very likely. Moreover, according to the report, fragile countries such as DR Congo and South Sudan are unlikely to ever get fixed-line access, even in urban areas. Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015: 9) note the importance of internet availability and an adequate backbone network infrastructure, network ownership and geographic patterns of network development as key for better business environments and improved digital dividends. Furthermore, they claim that this situation creates ‘… few incentives for local actors to either build network capacity in mostly rural areas or to expand network coverage. Development efforts need to focus on bridging this infrastructural gap, as a key determinant in an enabling business environment’ (ibid.). Other countries, such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda Swaziland, Tanzania and Togo completely lacked the last mile (WDR 2016: 255). In these countries analogue foundations for digital enterprises are weak, and there are no incentives for digital companies, such as online retailers. Unless global development initiatives intervene, these developments point towards a trajectory of urban-centred digitalization in the developing world, with new kinds of societal vulnerabilities.

#### Fragile states w/ hollow digitalization create vulnerabilities in the global cyber environment

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ICT has become a highly important foundation for most infrastructures in developed societies, and the developing countries are now following in their path. Individuals, businesses and nations are depending more and more on data and systems in the virtual world. In this global transition into the digital era it is easy to forget that the Internet was not invented for carrying the critical features and infrastructure that it does today, including key societal sectors such as energy, power, economy, health, communications and transport. The increasing interconnectedness of these features implies a major change in the societal risk factors facing us today, and also highlights the tight linkages between the domestic and international dimensions of politics. Global, complex and rapidly shifting trends impinge on domestic political contexts, especially along the security dimension. Along with the opportunities and possibilities shaped by the digital revolution come new, more transnational challenges to major areas of societal infrastructural as well as industry, innovation and business. These threats cannot be reduced to technological concerns, as they are interconnected with international politics and global trends. Fragile states with poor infrastructure and governance are rapidly being connected to the Internet – but the digitalization of these countries is hollow. This hollowness can provide room for cyberspace actors with bad intentions that will affect not only domestic problems in developing countries and fragile states, but global society as well. Although developing countries are following in the path of developed countries and becoming more digitalized, they are taking a different route. For the developed countries, digitalization has been a long-term sequential evolution: initially based on state-led investments in fixed telephone infrastructure, it was followed by private initiatives and innovations, and then, building on this infrastructure established gradually over more than a hundred years, came the addition of mobile phones, smartphones and the Internet. Developing countries, by contrast, are leapfrogging straight into wireless technology and mobile and internet networks that are often built by the private sector (which obviates the need for investments in wiring with expensive copper cables). Jumping into the digital age has provided developing countries with digital technology, new opportunities and better connectedness. But the introduction of technology in these societies has been proceeding far more rapidly than the building of state institutions and other mechanisms that can manage new challenges arising from this technology. Digital technologies are being put to use before good, functional regulatory mechanisms have been developed and put in place. The resultant shortcomings – in state mechanisms, institutions, coordination mechanisms, private mechanisms, general awareness, public knowledge and skills – open the way to new kinds of vulnerabilities. Developing countries become digitalized rapidly, but they are weak in the knowhow, awareness, institutions and skills needed for dealing with cyber security issues. This vulnerability can be met through development assistance from donor countries to projects and activities focusing on awareness, knowledge, information, education and employment. In this context, Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) becomes integral to development.7 Linking CCB to the SDGs can strengthen the sustainability aspect of these goals. Moreover, the dissemination of accurate information regarding security and structural aspects of the Internet is likely to make developing countries more competent actors on the global arena where international cyber politics is developed, and thus better positioned to exert influence on their own position in the future.

#### Cyber security is essential in developing nations- laundry list of reasons

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Botswana, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda and Tanzania are developing countries experiencing a rapid growth of digitalization and digital connectivity. This connectivity fuels a fundamental transformation in these countries’ social, political and economic spheres, changing people’s everyday lives. The up-side of this digital revolution is that it can help people out of poverty, and turn the economies in some African countries into some of the fastest growing in the world. When entrepreneurs, farmers or fishermen can receive and transfer money digitally through the Internet it becomes easier and safer to run small and medium-sized businesses. Connectivity also makes it possible to compare prices and different markets, which farmers, fishermen as well as small and medium-sized businesses can put to good use. However, along with the up-sides come some down-sides. The digital trajectories of developing countries involve a different set of cyber threats than those in the developed world (Subrahmanian et al. 2015). Nir Kshetri has described the digitalization of the Global South as characterized by a certain hollowness (2013: 153), involving different things for different entities. For instance, it may refer to weak institutions, poor organizational and individual defence mechanisms, better recruitment basis due to high unemployment and low wages, and a lack of capacity to manage risks and vulnerabilities in society (Kshetri 2010: 1057). Botherders8 and other cyber criminals tend to come from locations where high-paying IT jobs are rare or unavailable (Sullivan 2007); and in developing countries the growth of IT jobs is lower than the growth of Internet penetration (Kshetri 2010: 1071). The lack of capacity can be due to technological, behavioural and policy-related factors. Generating innovation, primarily driven by commercial forces, without attention to security has left a digital hollowness in these developing countries which makes it easy to target unprotected devices and unskilled users which in turn makes these countries attractive for cyber criminals. Developing countries also lack the resources to build institutions to combat transnational crime (Cuellar 2004). Laws that recognize cyber crime, law enforcement mechanisms, personnel who understand cyber crime, as well as the awareness necessary for dealing with cyber crime – all these remain inadequate. Given their weak institutions, limited capacity, and generally low resources for fighting cyber crime, these countries are likely to remain attractive for cyber-criminals also in the future. Without attentions to analogue foundations, there is a risk that this hollowness will escalate when developing countries invest in more sophisticated ICT technology and digital connectivity. In addition to investments in security measures such as anti-virus programmes, there is also a need to improve basic knowledge about ICT. Poor and fragile institutions in many developing countries have contributed to this digital hollowness. Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute and founding member of the Worldwide Cyber Security Initiative, has noted the statistics on the high numbers of PCs infected with viruses and malware in Africa and how these computers are easy targets for botnet operators (2010). Several experts have pointed out how rogue states and developing countries become hosts to outlaw servers, also called bulletproof hosting. The hosts of these servers operate beyond the reach of most law enforcers and enable cyber crime elsewhere (Palmer 2016, Goncharov 2015). Others have highlighted how certain vulnerabilities in the global network such as on the SS7 (the network that allows cellular carriers to route calls, text and other services to each other), which was built in the 1980ies, can be used by people with illicit intentions for surveillance and may undermine the privacy of cellular customers (Landau 2010). Through the SS7 “... a single carrier in Congo or Kazakhstan […] could be used to hack into cellular networks in the United States, Europe or anywhere else.” (Timberg 2014). In 2011 Immacuate Karambu pointed out that little was being spent on cyber security, also in the financial sector. In 2011 only 40% of banks in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were prepared against cyber threats (Kshetri 2013: 159). Weak institutions and law enforcement mechanisms on cyber crime contribute further to the digital hollowness of developing countries. Digitalization can be a key factor for economic and social development, and even democratization, but such a development also opens new frontiers for criminals and others with bad intentions. As Langø has argued: ‘ICT can potentially be either a boon or a threat to democracy: it can aid peaceful opposition or violent rebellion; help governments enforce the rule of law or repress the population.’ (2016: 5). Policymakers concerned with building cyber security capacity should take such threats and risks into account when engaging in developing countries. The prior analogue foundations in a country very often determine the direction of the digitalization. 9 Not only within the individual developing country, but also in the region and furthermore as host for malicious activities, CCB in these developing countries can ultimately impact on the security of donor countries as well. In order for economic and social development to be sustainable, and in order to achieve the goals of the international community to combat poverty and inequality by 2030, cyber security must be recognized as a key element; and needs assessments of developing countries’ cyber security maturity should be included as an important mapping activity towards achieving these goals.10 Digital hollowness must be addressed comprehensively, and cyber/capacity needs should be understood and contextualized in connection with core conditions for economic and social growth in developing countries. This includes the rule of law, education, programmes to promote small and medium-sized businesses, as well as donor programmes facilitating participation of developing countries (civil society and governments) in the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance.

#### Norway is a model to replicate- they have boosted cyber security in developing nations

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Baseline studies show that there is a gap between development goals and intentions in donor policies, and the level of digital vulnerability and cyber security in developing countries. This indicates that, if digital development is to be sustainable, it will need to be followed up by a focus on digital security. Here donor countries can assist, through core development and aid activities, with projects focused on improving the analogue foundations for the digital technology such as knowledge, information, education, employment and institutions – but also by facilitating arenas where experience and lessons learnt can be shared at local, national and regional levels. Norway has a long track record of development assistance as well as with multilateral diplomacy. Combining these two dimensions, through cyber security capacity building (CCB), could provide excellent opportunities for Norwegian foreign policy to strengthen Norwegian long-term interests like the production of new norms, as well as following up on the SDG commitments by contributing to the digital revolution in developing countries. Because digitalization has been driven primarily by commercial interests, greater public–private cooperation is necessary in the development sector. Developing countries should be trained in how to gear themselves to become part of the international CERT cooperation. Donor countries like Norway could help to facilitate this through capacity building, collaborating with actors such as FIRST, and by improving knowledge and expertise in developing countries about CERTs. FIRST has a limited number of Fellowships, and seeks to partner with organizations willing to contribute to the fellowship programme. Here is an opening for ministries of foreign affairs, or other sponsors, to strategically sponsor such fellowships in developing countries on their focus lists. While maintaining its focus and prioritized collaboration with international organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO and AU, Norway should also seek ways of working together with major private enterprises, perhaps especially when engaging in development and aid. Awareness-raising information campaigns and gatherings with constellations of authorities, local authorities, international organizations, national organizations, NGOs, private actors, senior networks and women networks may considerably improve the level of cyber security level within a country. The awareness dimension and the facilitation of various niche capabilities and institution-building are also areas where Norwegian expertise could be exported, to help in counteracting the hollow digitization of developing countries. To this end, Norway could for instance export the concept of Nasjonale sikkerhetsmåned (National security month) focusing on cyber security. Other potential niche capabilities for export through development activities include nettvett.no slettmeg.no and Security Divas – the latter in particular would readily fit with Norway’s traditions of enhancing and strengthening women’s rights and security in developing countries.

### Malaria

#### Plantext: The United States federal government should fund, create, and deploy long-lasting Insecticidal nets and indoor residual sprays through the President’s Malaria Initiative.

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USAID serves as the lead implementing agency for USG global malaria efforts. Other agencies involved in responding to malaria include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Most bilateral U.S. malaria efforts are consolidated under PMI, though some malaria activities fall outside the initiative. Collectively, these efforts reach more than 30 countries. The U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator, who is appointed by the President and reports to the USAID Administrator, has direct authority over both PMI efforts and non-PMI USAID malaria programs. The President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI).29 Launched in 2005, PMI is an interagency initiative led by USAID and implemented in partnership with CDC. It is overseen by the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator and an Interagency Advisory Group made up of representatives from USAID, CDC, DoD, the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget. PMI efforts focus on expanding access to and the use of four key malaria control interventions – ITNs,[and] IRS, IPTp, and diagnosis of malaria and treatment with ACTs – and support a range of malaria control activities, including technical assistance to affected countries, monitoring and evaluation, supply chain management, and commodity procurement (since the start of PMI, USG support for commodities, such as ITNs, insecticides, and antimalarial drugs, like ACTs, has increased significantly).30 It also supports activities in the following areas: behavior change communication, health systems strengthening, monitoring and evaluation, and operational research. PMI spans 19 sub-Saharan African “focus countries” (gradually scaled up from three countries in FY 2006), as well as Southeast Asia under the PMI Greater Mekong Subregion regional initiative (see Figure 1). Focus countries are selected based on the following criteria: high malaria burden; alignment of National Malaria Control Plan (NMCP) with WHO standards; country capacity to implement national control policies; willingness to partner with the USG in fighting malaria; and involvement of other international donors (e.g., Global Fund, World Bank). Both USAID and CDC station staff in each PMI focus country. Other USG Malaria Efforts. The USG also supports malaria activities in other countries and regions, with several agencies providing smaller-scale support for the prevention and treatment of malaria (including technical assistance as well as support for monitoring and evaluation, operational research, and some commodities) in these areas, and supports malaria research and development (R&D) efforts. Among these agencies are USAID, CDC, NIH, and DoD. USAID supports activities in the Central and South American region through its Amazon Malaria Initiative (AMI, which supports regional efforts to monitor antimalarial drug resistance, understand the changing nature of malaria in the region, and strengthen data-based decision-making in their malaria control programs) as well as in the African and Asian regions.31 CDC provides technical assistance to AMI countries, PMI countries, and additional countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia with a focus on monitoring, evaluation, surveillance, and operational and implementation research, and it has been designated as the WHO Collaborating Center for Prevention and Control of Malaria.32 NIH, as the lead agency for USG malaria R&D efforts, supports an array of efforts, including its International Centers of Excellence for Malaria Research program, which established a global network of malaria research centers in 2010 to support research activities in malaria-endemic countries.33 DoD also supports extensive R&D efforts, worldwide malaria disease surveillance, and technical assistance and capacity building efforts with local partners.34 Multilateral Efforts. The USG partners with international institutions and supports global malaria funding mechanisms. Key partners include WHO, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, and the World Bank. Additionally, the USG is the largest donor to the Global Fund, which has committed over $8.8 billion in funding for malaria programs worldwide.35 U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDING36 U.S. bilateral funding for malaria, which includes support for PMI as well as other malaria control efforts and research activities, has increased from $146 million in FY 2001 to $861 million in FY 2016 (see Figure 2). The President’s FY 2017 request for malaria totaled $934 million;37 if approved by Congress, this would be an increase of $73 million (8%) above the FY 2016 enacted level. Most USG funding for malaria is provided through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account at USAID with additional funding provided through NIH, CDC, and DoD. The majority of USG malaria funding is directed to PMI focus countries, with additional funding directed to other bilateral and regional malaria efforts as well as malaria research activities. Looking Ahead Over the past decade, USG global malaria control efforts and funding have expanded, as have those of others. As global efforts work toward achieving malaria elimination in a growing number of countries, key issues and challenges for PMI and other USG malaria efforts going forward include: sustaining and enhancing malaria control efforts in the context of weak health systems; tackling drug and insecticide resistance; addressing the availability of substandard and counterfeit antimalarial treatments; supporting research and development efforts to advance new drugs and insecticides as well as further an effective malaria vaccine; continuing to expand access to malaria commodities, among other tools and approaches, in the current restrained fiscal environment; and coordinating malaria efforts with other USG global health efforts, particularly maternal and child health activities, as well as those of other donors (including the Global Fund)

#### Current levels of Insecticide Treated Nets have increased but remain short of universal coverage—additional funding is needed.

WHO 15 (World Health Organization, “World Malaria Report 2015,” *World Health Organization*, pg.22-25 [http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/200018/1/9789241565158\_eng.pdf)](http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/200018/1/9789241565158_eng.pdf%29) [Premier]

The proportion of the population sleeping under an ITN has increased dramatically in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000. Most malaria endemic countries have adopted policies promoting universal access to ITNs. However, ITNs have been most widely deployed in Africa, which has the highest proportion of the population at risk of malaria, and has malaria vectors most amenable to control with ITNs. Based on data from household surveys and reports from manufacturers and national malaria control programmes (NMCPs), the proportion of the population sleeping under an ITN has increased markedly in sub-Saharan Africa, from less than 2% in 2000 to an estimated 46% in 2014 (95% CI: 42–50%) and 55% in 2015 (95% CI: 50–58%) (Figure 3.1). The proportion of children aged under 5 years in sub-Saharan Africa sleeping under an ITN increased to an estimated 68% (95% CI: 61–72%) in 2015. Although these results represent a substantial increase since 2000, they fall short of universal (100%) coverage of this preventive measure. The continent-wide estimates of those sleeping under an ITN obscure variations in progress among and within countries. For example, in 2015, the median proportion of the population sleeping under an ITN was 74% among the fi ve countries with the highest estimates and 20% among the five countries with the lowest estimates (Figure 3.2). The rise in the proportion of the population sleeping under an ITN is driven by increasing access to ITNs in the household. The proportion of the population with access to an ITN in their household increased to 56% in 2014 (95% CI: 51–61%) and 67% in 2015 (95% CI: 61–71%) (Figure 3.1). This is a substantial increase from the less than 2% with access to an ITN in 2000 but it is still lower than the universal (100%) access called for in the updated GMAP targets. In sub-Saharan Africa, estimates suggest that, overall, a high proportion (about 82%) of those with access to an ITN sleep under an ITN. Thus, while encouraging consistent ITN use among those who have access remains important, ensuring access to ITNs for those who do not have them is the highest priority activity to increase the population protected by this intervention. An increasing number of ITNs have been delivered to sub-Saharan African countries, but those numbers are still insufficient to achieve universal access. Most nets delivered by manufacturers to countries are subsequently distributed by NMCPs to households. The number of nets delivered by manufacturers in a given year usually does not exactly match the number distributed by NMCPs, because of delays between delivery to the country and distribution through campaigns. About 143 million LLINs were delivered to countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013, over 189 million were delivered in 2014, and at least 154 million are projected to be delivered in 2015 (Figure 3.3). In recent years, most nets delivered have been LLINs. The 189 million nets delivered in 2014 represent the highest number delivered in a single year. This fi gure approaches the estimated 200 million nets required each year to achieve universal access to ITNs, if nets were allocated to households with maximum effi ciency (i.e. every household received the exact number of nets required for 100% access within households) and nets were retained in households for at least 3 years. However, this is the best-case scenario; in reality, based on the current distribution patterns of nets in households and the loss of nets estimated from distribution and survey data, as many as 300 million new nets would be required each year to ensure that all persons at risk of malaria had access to an LLIN in countries in which the use of LLINs is the primary method of vector control.

### Right to development

#### Wealthy nations have a moral obligation to assist less development countries in a contract of mutuality and not providing assistance would infringe on the universal right to development.

MacDonnell no date The Legal Obligation of Wealthy Nations to Reach 0.7 percent of GDP as Official Development Assistance By Vanessa MacDonnell, University of Toronoto Faculty of Law, Paper, pg. 19-20 <https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/HIV_MacDonnell.doc> DOA 6/18/17 [Premier]

Another lasting contribution to Third World development literature is the notion of a Right to Development. The Right to Development is a third generation right which incorporates numerous first and second generation rights. In 1986, the United Nations ratified the Declaration on the Right to Development. Article 10 of the Declaration provides that, “steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other measures at the national and international levels.”[[13]](#footnote-13) Article 8 of the Right to Development indicates that, “states should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.”[[14]](#footnote-14) These statements create an obligation on the part of the developed world to provide funding for the development process. The Right to Development suffers from the same problem as foreign aid in general: in the words of Marks, “states tend to express rhetorical support for this right but neglect its precepts in development practice."[[15]](#footnote-15) This declaration has been subject to much discussion and, despite numerous attempts, has never attained the status of a ratified convention. In 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution expressing support for drafting a Convention on the Right to Development, and named an Independent Expert to examine the issue. Although the Independent Expert’s reports contributed significantly to the scholarship in this area, his recommendations were not implemented. The United States has been extremely reluctant to acknowledge a right to development. The U.S. stated in 2003 that, The right to development is not a “fundamental,” “basic,” or “essential” human right. The realization of economic, social and cultural rights is progressive and aspirational. We do not view them as entitlements that require correlated legal duties and obligations. States therefore have no obligation to provide guarantees for implementation of any purported “right to development.”[[16]](#footnote-16) Just a year earlier, George Bush remarked at Monterrey that, “developed nations have a duty not only to share our wealth, but also to encourage sources that produce economic wealth: economic freedom, political liberty, the rule of law, and human rights.”[[17]](#footnote-17) There appears to be fear on the part of developed nations that recognizing a Right to Development may give rise to substantive legal obligations. When the Resolution was drafted in 1986, delegates expressed concern that a resolution recognizing a right to development could serve as an opportunity to renew the principles articulated in the New International Economic Order (NIEO).[[18]](#footnote-18) The Right to Development re-emerged as a theme most recently in the Millennium Development Goals..

#### Mutual contracts prevent imperialist destruction of local development infrastructure. Development assistance through the model of international initiatives looks like the assistance for project mobilization and local support, not colonial occupation. Empirics prove that this model is successful in establishing international peace and prosperity.

MacDonnell no date The Legal Obligation of Wealthy Nations to Reach 0.7 percent of GDP as Official Development Assistance By Vanessa MacDonnell, University of Toronoto Faculty of Law, Paper, pg. 20-21 https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/HIV\_MacDonnell.doc 10/19/17 [Premier]

The Independent Expert also advocates the creation of development compacts in which “obligations of developing countries to carry out rights-based programmes are matched by the reciprocal obligations of the international community to cooperate to enable the implementation of the programmes.”[[19]](#footnote-19) These agreements more closely resemble domestic contracts than traditional international agreements, in that there are clear obligations created, there is consideration, and a reliance or an expectation interest created. This type of compact would likely be enforceable in domestic or international courts, instead of relying on the good faith of the parties to honour their commitments. Funnelling foreign aid through a development compact also creates mutuality. The Independent Expert has also advocated the drafting of an agreement between developing nations, the West, and relevant global institutions focusing on three key areas, one of which is the right to primary health care. De Feyer indicates that in order to meet development goals, a novel legal framework is required that incorporates both private and public law, as well as domestic and international legal institutions.[[20]](#footnote-20) De Feyer adverts to transnational law in his discussion of what this system might look like. He argues that by creating contract-like agreements, the expectations of each of the parties are clear. Donor nations would put forth funds to mobilize the project, and developing nations would be responsible for the outcome of the project. The benefit of the development compact, according to De Feyer, is that “contracts result in legal certainty for the contracting parties as to commitments made.”[[21]](#footnote-21) The creation of contracts also necessarily implies a method of dispute resolution in the event that contractual terms break down. De Feyer notes that the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration has expanded considerably in recent years and could prove to be an appropriate forum for settling disputes arising from contractual agreements related to development, provided that the international organizations involved consented to a waiver of their immunity.[[22]](#footnote-22) Parties to such an agreement would have standing under Article 1 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration between Two States. These rules state that, Article 1 Where the parties to a treaty or other agreement have agreed in writing that disputes shall be referred to arbitration under the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States, then such disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree in writing.[[23]](#footnote-23) The rules governing the Permanent Court of Arbitration allow the court to apply general principles of international law in reaching its decisions. This would allow the Court to reference the Responsibility to Protect and other aspects of international law sympathetic to human rights and development. This model could provide the missing link in the current international aid system. The potential for recourse to domestic courts when aid agreements are breached is highly contentious, and international law is rarely helpful in the absence of non-binding promises to increase ODA. The increasing use of arbitration boards to decide matters of international law has potential to expand into the realm of development practice if contractual agreements such as the ones advocated by De Feyer, Sangupta, and others take hold. There are also shortfalls to this approach. Since countries appear to have a prevailing fondness for bilateral aid flows over multilateral aid flows, contractual agreements will create transaction costs that expend a developing nation’s resources and divert funds from where they are most needed. In addition, the creation of a contract, as De Feyer indicates, is premised on the notion of mutuality.[[24]](#footnote-24) Convincing developed nations to be bound by contractual obligations with developing nations will be difficult, especially given the reluctance of countries to sign on to any UN-sponsored resolutions creating substantive obligations to deliver resources under a Right to Development. On the other hand, if the issue can be framed as one in which there is a pressing security interest, the establishment of “development compacts” may prove effective in addressing human rights issues. The agreements created under the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the United States fall within this framework. One might advocate for less stringent criteria in determining the recipients of aid, and greater willingness to allow multilateral organizations to act as agents for both developed and developing nations in negotiating these agreements. This would reduce transaction costs and allow compacts to be developed that better represent the interests of developing countries. Again, the challenge lies in convincing developed nations that this new form of negotiation would be in their best interest. De Feyer also suggests that it may be possible for individual citizens to launch a class action in negligence against international organizations who fail to live up to the terms of negotiated agreements, though he cautions that this avenue has not really been explored.[[25]](#footnote-25) The threshold to class action certification is quite onerous, and the potential liability virtually infinite. There have been some critics of the Right to Development. Ghai indicates that, The value of the concept of a right is that it creates entitlements, and the entitlements are easier to enforce if the contents and beneficiaries of the right are clearly specified. In the case of the right to development, it is not clear who are the right and duty bearers. Equally vague is the content of the right.[[26]](#footnote-26) Bunn indicates that **despite difficulties in elucidating the substance of the Right to Development, there is consensus on the right’s existence**. Bunn makes it clear though, that “while one principle of the right to development is differential treatment of developing nations, this stops short of any entitlement to assistance or aid.”[[27]](#footnote-27) Developed nations, by and large, have curtailed the interpretation of this right to limit the possibility of the creation of substantive obligations. As a matter of moral obligation, however, **it is clear that the Right to Development does have normative implications for the relationship between developed and developing nations.** In the words of Kofi Annan, The rights-based approach to development describes situations not simply in terms of human needs, or of development requirements, but in terms of society’s obligation to respond to the inalienable rights of individuals. It empowers people to demand justice as a right, not as charity, and gives communities a moral basis from which to claim international assistance when needed.[[28]](#footnote-28)

#### Despite difficulties in implementation, discourse surrounding the universal right to development is uniquely important to respect international rights obligations. Realization of this binding internal obligation is a step in the right direction towards identifying mechanisms of legal adoption.

Sengupta 08 Arjun K. Sengupta Chair for the Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to Development, was a Member of the [Parliament of India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_India), was one of India's most noted economists, and led a multifaceted career as an academician and economic policy administrator, Web article, *Implementing the Right to Development The Role of International Law,* Stephen P. Marks, Editor published through Harvard School of Public Health Program on Human Rights Development, 2008 ed. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/05659.pdf> pg. 8-10 [Premier]

The discourse on the Right to Development has evolved significantly in the twenty-two years since it was proclaimed in the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986. Initially it was described as a right that was qualitatively different from other rights reaffirmed in the human rights covenants. As international co-operation was a crucial element in the realization of any development, it was blown up as a “third-generation solidarity right,” as distinct from the first and second-generation rights, involving the primary obligation of national states. Because the developing countries were the principal sponsors of this right, it was described as a right of the developing countries, although many developed countries joined the sponsorship and the right was to be exercised and enjoyed by individuals from both the developed and developing countries, like any other recognized human rights. As the right to development was defined as involving the progressive realization of all fundamental freedoms and rights, it was regarded as an ‘aspirational’ right, which can only be aimed at but not ‘realized’, even if it is feasible to phase in the realization of different rights at different points of time consistent with the expansion of resources and technology. The debates on all these issues are now mostly settled. After the Vienna Conference on Human Rights of 1993 and several other international conferences and summits, the right to development is now recognized as a ‘human right’ like other internationally accepted human rights. It clarifies norms and standards of behavior in different societies, providing grounds for individuals to claim their rights, which the authorities at the national and international level are obliged to fulfill. The debates in this area have now shifted towards the implementation of the right to development and mechanisms and policies to be ad- opted by the authorities to enable the realization of this right in a progressive manner. The duty to implement all human right applies to all developed and developing countries, wherever individuals suffer from the lack of these rights. The right to development is a special right, in the sense that it is a composite of all, or at least the basic rights. But in all other respects, it is as much a human right, as any other civil and political, economic, social or cultural right. There are three main considerations in any process of implementation of this right. First, this right has to be identified with some indicators that can be unequivocally defined, corresponding to the content of the right. An increased value of the indicators would imply improved realization of the right. This exercise, however, should not be confused with the exercise of defining the content of the right. It is of course essential that the content be defined and that its justification as an ethical demand of a paramount importance be under- stood as reflecting accepted values and norms of behavior. From this definition and justification derive obligations of the authorities to enable the fulfillment of the right. Indeed, the content of any right should be defined in such a way that it is distinct from any other right, although all rights are interdependent when it comes to fulfillment. In other words, they can be evaluated separately both as objectives and as instruments for realizing other rights. But all definitions of content and the formulation of norms must occur before identifying the indicators and measuring whether and to what extent there has been any improvement in the realization of human rights. The fulfillment of human rights, including the right to development, also requires specific policies and programs, with corresponding resource allocation. This is necessary to establish the feasibility of the right, so that the obligations of the duty- bearers can be specified. A right always entails obligations of some agents in the society, the state- authorities or other actors, who have the power to 8 PREFACE THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW deliver the right or adopt policies that have a high likelihood of delivering the right. If a right is not feasible, there can be no duty or obligation of any agent to deliver the right, in which case the targeted objective cannot be a right. For the right to development, which is a composite of different rights, this would require formulating a development programme, consisting of coordinated policies to fulfill the different rights in a phased manner. The society has to decide, through a process of consultation, which rights have to be taken first, and which later in successive phases, as a part of the development process and policies for realizing those rights, coordinated both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally. Even if a complete programme covering all the rights cannot be established immediately, there is a minimum obligation to start with policies aimed at fulfilling a limited number of rights considered essential to development, such as those relating to food, health, education or employment opportunity. Such policies must be coordinated with given re- sources as well as programmes to increase those resources. This focus on coordinated policy and resources differentiates the fulfillment of the right to development from the fulfillment of other specific rights, and cannot be bypassed by just concentrating on some individual rights. For instance, the right to health could be implemented on its own but, when treated as a component of the right to development, its realization must include policies to expand resources as well as institutions over time, taking into account competing claims of other rights, which must be coordinated with the right to health. Such exercise might imply a much larger claim on resources and much greater inputs from international cooperation than would be the case for the fulfillment of the right to health by itself. Clearly, such an exercise of designing development programmes will have to be context-specific, depending upon conditions prevailing in a particular country. But, from a human rights perspective, each program must specify the obligations of the different duty-bearers that will maximize the realization of the rights in question. This is an essential step in the exercise if the right to development is accepted as a human right. If such obligations for each duty-holder contributing to fulfilling the right to development, then it is possible to speak of binding obligations on individual agents. It is to be expected that those who consider the right to development to be like any other human right would seek to establish such binding obligations through international law. However, as the preceding discussion shows, there are difficulties in formulating the right to development in terms of binding obligations. For example, the obligation of agent A to adopt policies X, Y, Z would have to be based on a clear demonstration that those policies do indeed fulfill the right. The obligation would be binding only to the extent that a causal link can be established between non-performance of the duty and the failure to achieve the results required by the right to development. For economic and social rights, it is always difficult to establish this link and it is even more difficult to do so for the right to development, which involves the fulfillment of the number of rights. The inter-dependence between the rights and the actions of the different duty- bearers especially in an environment of many unforeseen factors would require the identification contingent obligations. Thus it will be necessary to identify not only the policies the agent ‘A’ must adopt, but also how those policies should be adjusted if other agents B, C or D adopt some actions that impact on the fulfillment of the right. The obligation to adopt these policies would be contingent on the other actions being taken, and cannot be regarded as binding independent of those actions. It is, of course, in principle possible to identify such contingent obligations but to make them “binding” one has to demonstrate the effectiveness of such a procedure in fulfilling the right. That would require some case studies and other evidence adequate to persuade the society to accept them as binding obligations. Once the obligations were deemed binding, it would be necessary to work out a mechanism of enforcement, whether in the domestic legal system or under international law or through a process of peer pressure and moral suasion. These issues have to be examined in terms of accepted legal principles and procedures – a process that may take quite some time and persistence in consensus building. It is of course possible to say that the obligations can be fulfilled often without legal enforcement but rather basing behavior on ethical demands used in the society to gauge legitimacy of governance. But that will not obviate the need for formulating binding legal obligations, how- ever long and arduous it may be to reach consensus. It is worth the effort to reach such a consensus in order to make the right to development a proper human right, comparable to the other internationally accepted human rights. This book is a major attempt to move towards this objective. **It brings out clearly the difficulties of the process, the problems associated with con- verting the ethical demands of action to legal obligations and identifying the mechanism of adopting corrective actions when the obligations are not fulfilled**. The human rights community, government legal offices, academics, and the broader public interested in the law and politics of human rights will no doubt welcome this publication and the light it sheds of the potential uses of international law to further the ethical demand to realize the right to development and the acceptance of the obligations it implies by all members of the international community.

## Case Blocks

### AT Private Market solves

#### Private economic development doesn’t help the poorest nations- they need developmental aid

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

\*ODA=Official Development Assistance

Meanwhile, it is often said that development assistance is passé, since private financial flows of all kinds (development assistance, foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investments, and so on) now swamp official flows. Still, this fact does not make ODA obsolete, because the private capital flows are heavily concentrated in middle-income countries and in low-income countries with high-value natural resources such as hydrocarbons, minerals, or precious metals. Private capital flows bypass the world’s poorest countries, which lack the basic infrastructure—roads, power, ports, clinics, and schools—that is needed to attract private investments in the first place. ODA is complementary to private capital flows, and it must generally precede private flows into impoverished regions. We should therefore think about using ODA to create the base—in infrastructure, health, skills, and other necessary conditions—to attract private capital.

## Off-Case Blocks

### AT K-Colonialism

#### **Right to development assistance enables developing countries to reclaim power for self-determination – opposition to development assistance stems from concerns of weakening western heg.**

Bawa 17. Bawa, Sylvia. Bawa has a PhD in Sociology from Queen’s University, where she now teaches. Her research interests include gender, postcolonial feminism, globalization, gender and development, international political economy, social justice, and human rights. "Assessing Universalism and The Rhetoric of Development Assistance in Human Rights Research: Canadian-Ghanaian Human Rights Engagements." The Transnational Human Rights Review. 2017. <http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=thr> [Premier]

Beyond the tired traditional debates on CP rights and ESC rights, the more nuanced debate on the right to development (RTD) has also garnered much attention, especially among critical scholars from the Third World. While this rights claim resonates strongly with southern academics and states, northern politicians and states are skeptical about its provisions. They worry that it empowers already authoritarian states that will pursue economic development to the detriment of individual civil rights. Less obviously stated in these concerns is the potential for the RTD to weaken the hegemonic hold of the West on southern states. In tracing the history of the emergence of the RTD rhetoric, Ibhawoh makes connections between its emergence, the New International Economic World Order (NIEO) and decolonization of the Third World. The 1970s heralded another wave of decolonization agenda setting from the Third World to challenge western hegemony. RTD (which is not to be confused with a rights-based approach to development) was therefore a forceful way of using human rights language to center the need for economic development and basic subsistence needs. Ibhawoh points out paradoxes in the right to development framework, citing in particular the tendency for state actors in the south to use the argument of the RTD to conceal human rights violations and ignore other internationally sanctioned environmental policies, such as carbon caps. While touting the importance of economic development, he is cautious about overwhelmingly privileging economic rights (in the hands of the state) over the important civil rights of people.18 Nevertheless, the RTD enables Third World states to reclaim power for self-determination, especially in prioritizing subsistence and basic needs over equally important rights.

### AT K-Gift

#### Link turn: gift giving solves cap and heteropatriarchy.

Simpson 05. Simpson, Kathryn. University of Birmingham. Economies and Desire: Gifts and the Market in "Moments of Being: 'Slater's Pins Have No Points'" Journal of Modern Literature, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 2005), pp. 18-37. [Premier]

Feminist critic Hélène Cixous characterises the gift economy as feminine, and as one which offers a resistance to the commodifying impulse of capital- ism.8 It emphasizes fluidity, indeterminacy, a destabilization of hierarchies and rational systems, and a disturbance of property rights. It doesn't try to recover its expenses or to recuperate its losses - in fact giving, excess, and overflow are recognized as sources of pleasure and jouissance. The gift economy is based on social and personal connection, intimacy, generosity, and risk-taking. I want to suggest that a focus on the gifts exchanged in Woolf s texts, and consideration of the symbolic operation of the two economies in conjunction, can realize a different economy of desire. Gifts in Woolf s texts suggests another dimension to the wants, needs, and appetites that commodity culture can engender, and signal the release of libidinal longings in excess of the rigid structures of capi- talist exchange and heterosexual norms. Displacing the emphasis from the pos- session of commodities to the giving and dispersal of the pleasures commodities signify and embody, the gift economy in Woolf s texts works to facilitate the realization and satisfactory.

#### She continues,

Simpson 05. Simpson, Kathryn. University of Birmingham. Economies and Desire: Gifts and the Market in "Moments of Being: 'Slater's Pins Have No Points'" Journal of Modern Literature, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 2005), pp. 18-37. [Premier]

Gift-giving, then, can be ambivalent and problematic. The issues of moti- vation, the imperative to respond with reciprocal gift or gratitude, or the sense of obligation generated by a gift are issues that trouble Cixouss thinking about the gift. For Cixous this is "the paradox of the gift that takes," a gift given with the hope of return, or a gift whose value is "annulled" by a "countergift" ("Laugh" 263; Conley 158, cited in Still 167). There is also the danger of collud- ing with heteropatriarchal power structures that identify woman as a gift to be exchanged between men11 and of using the gift as a strategy for wielding power over the recipient. However, gift-giving also creates a Utopian and liminal space; it has a disruptive effect in suggestively and ambiguously sidestepping the calculation of market exchange and eluding the fixity of heteropatriarchal economies. The gift, to retain its identity and integrity as a gift, must remain in circulation. Drawing on a number of anthropological studies Lewis Hyde remarks, "[t]he only essential is this: the gift must always move . There are other forms of property that stand still, that mark a boundary or resist momentum, but the gift keeps going" (4, Hyde's emphasis). In Woolf s writing gifts facilitate fluidity and the transgression of boundaries, opening up subversive possibili- ties. I will explore these ideas through a close reading of "Moments of Being: 'Slater s Pins Have No Points/" and will argue that the gift economy intercon- nects with market economies in this short fiction to generate homoerotic pos- sibility and to create a sense of resistance to sexual and economic conventions.

#### The growing gap between theory and practice in feminist discussions surrounding rhetoric prevents policies from being carried out.

Jacquette 17. Jacquette, Jane S.. Jacquette is a professor of politics, diplomacy, and world affairs at Occidental College. She has a PhD in Politics from Cornell in political science. “Women/Gender and Development: the Growing Gap between Theory and Practice.” Studies in Comparative International Development. Vol 52, No 2, pp 242-260. 2017. <https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.lib.purdue.edu/article/10.1007/s12116-017-9248-8> [Premier]

Marking the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the Women in Development Office at USAID (in 2014), the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action (in 2015), and the continued commitment to gender equality in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, this essay reflects on the origin, evolution, and future of the field of Women/Gender and Development. I draw on my personal experiences as a scholar, bureaucrat, and activist to argue that the sometimes contentious exchanges between feminist theorists and those designing and carrying out women and development policies were often productive in the past.1 Today, however, the field of women/gender and development is stalled, and the gap between theory and practice has grown wider. Many feminist theorists now argue from anti-bureaucratic and anti-neoliberal positions that obstruct potentially fruitful dialogues that could advance the field and increase its positive impact. In the past, shifting ideological and practical challenges led to critical engagement between feminist theory and development practice. Development emerged both as an academic field and as a policy challenge during the 1970s, when Cold War conflicts between East and West and North-South debates over the causes of underdevelopment stimulated often heated conversations among feminists about the rationales for and effects of women and development practices. The liberal egalitarian convictions of the US feminists who lobbied for the establishment of a women in development (WID) office in the US Agency for International Development (and in turn provided the impetus for WID programs in other bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance agencies) were challenged by Marxist and dependency theorists as well as by cultural^ or difference^ feminists (Jaquette 1982). In the late 1980s, post-modern and postcolonial theorists added new critical perspectives.2 Facing several barriers, from institutional resistance to gaps between project goals and results, practitioners looked to feminist theorizing in order to adapt their strategies and buttress their arguments for prioritizing women and gender equity (Jaquette 1990; Kabeer 1994). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, this led to a shift from BWomen in Development^ (WID) to BGender and Development^ (GAD). Today, WID and GAD are institutionalized, but have lost dynamism, while feminist theoretical critiques have now coalesced around a rejection of neoliberalism^ and a demand for structural^ or Btransformative^ change (e.g., Jahan 1995; Runyan and Petersen 2014). The field of women/gender and development could be reenergized by a more fruitful engagement between feminist theorists and WID/GAD practitioners. But the longstanding feminist bias against bureaucracy (Ferguson 1985) means that critics often do not think constructively about how to address gender and development policies that must be made and carried out by government, multilateral, and NGO bureaucracies. The prevalent feminist perspective rejects neoliberal capitalism^ and, in doing so, interprets women’s work, women’s individual agency, and the stake women have in a capable state in ways that close off rather than expand the possibilities of improved policies and practice. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which feminist theory and practice might reconnect and thereby improve the positive impact of women and development practices across the global South.

# Negative

## Counterplans

### Laundry List CP

#### Wealthy nations have plenty of other genuine ways to help poorer ones

Glennie 11

Glennie, Jonathan. (Glennie is a writer and researcher on international development and cooperation. He is director of sustainable development research at Ipsos MORI. He is a visiting fellow at the International Development Institute at King's College London.) “Giving Aid to Poor Countries Is Hardly a Great Act of Generosity.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 14 June 2011, www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/14/aid-is-hardly-an-act-of-great-generosity-effectiveness. [Premier]

But the main point is that giving aid is not actually a great act of generosity. Aid buys things donors want (such as political support and economic advantage, whether directly for donor businesses or indirectly through policy change). The other things rich countries need to do to really show solidarity with the poor will require if not more generosity (as we can turn them to our economic advantage) then certainly greater risk: accept fairer trade rules, adapt rapidly to climate change and resource scarcity by limiting our consumption, accept the employment consequences of a more just arms trade, clamp down on tax havens and force our international companies to abide by social, environmental and accounting norms (to name a few).

### Stop Climate Change CP

**I**f large wealthy nations want to help developing countries, they should stop climate change

Walsh 09

Walsh, Bryan. (Walsh is a contributor to TIME. Previously, he was TIME’s International Editor, its energy and environmental correspondent and was the Tokyo bureau chief in 2006 and 2007.) “COP15: Climate-Change Conference.” Time, Time Inc., 10 Dec. 2009, content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1929071\_1929070\_1947076,00.html. [Premier]

But the question of exactly what the rich nations of the world owe the poor ones is still up in the air. According to many environmental activists and representatives of the most vulnerable nations in the world, climate change should be viewed first and foremost as an ethical challenge rather than an economic or political one. Industrialized nations have flourished in part because they were able to burn fossil fuel indiscriminately for decades, and the impact of those emissions is only now being recognized as climate change. As poor countries see it, rich nations got rich at their expense: as the planet continues to warm, it will heighten water scarcity, intensify flooding and droughts and worsen some infectious diseases — all of which will first hit developing countries that have not yet had the chance to burn fossil fuels in large quantities. "We are living on the front lines of climate change," said Dessima Williams, head of the Alliance of Small Island States, a coalition of 43 island nations. Poor nations around the world have struggled with natural disasters and disease for years, of course, and developed countries have always felt an obligation to help; hence, global programs like the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, which aim to reduce poverty, disease and mortality, and empower developing countries. But from an ethical perspective, climate change is different because it has a clear cause: man, or more specifically, Western man. The ability to track carbon emissions means that we can calculate how much responsibility each country — and practically each person — bears for a warmer world. And because carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere for centuries, we can even calculate the historical responsibility that nations bear for global warming. Although there is a long list of other past actions by rich nations — colonialism, racism, slavery, war — that have retarded [slowed] the development of poorer countries, the exact nature of those effects is difficult to quantify. With climate change, a hard number can be assigned to historic responsibility, and worse, the consequences tend to multiply. "The impact of emitting greenhouse gases will go on for a millennium or more," said Dale Jamieson, an environmental ethicist at New York University, in a speech last year. "It's as if I stood on your foot for a while. It hurts, but when I take my foot off you, the pain gets worse and goes on longer. That's the kind of problems we deal with in climate change, and that's why we need to act sooner rather than later."

## DA’s

### Environment

#### Growth and development hurt the environment and social well-being

Kallis, Giorgos 2015. Giorgos Kallis is an environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology. He is a Leverhulme visiting professor at SOAS and an ICREA professor at ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona. “The Degrowth Alternative,” *Great Transition Initiative.* February 2015. <http://www.tellus.org/pub/Kallis-The-Degrowth-Alternative.pdf> [Premier]

There is a substantial body of evidence that demonstrates how **growth threatens both environmental and social well-being**.**7 Continued economic growth makes us** more **likely to exceed the safe operating space defined by planetary boundarie**s, making life harder for everyone, especially the most vulnerable. Although “green growth” has become a buzzword in recent years, it remains an oxymoron. Its emphasis on enhanced efficiency creates a paradox: decreased resource requirements lead to lower costs and so—by the simple workings of supply and demand—a rebound in the consumption of resources.8 This is part of the fundamental dynamic of capitalism: increasing productivity frees up resources that are invested to provide yet more growth. Continued economic **growth** in wealthy nations **is also** proving **inimical to well-being**. As Herman Daly observed, “illth” (congestion, crime, and other undesirable side effects) increases as fast as, or faster than, wealth as measured by GDP.9 Redistribution, not growth, is what improves well-being in affluent nations. Moreover, **despite significant economic growth, people in the U**nited States and most countries of the West **are at best only marginally happier than they were in the 1950s**. The wealthy are happier than the poor, but **wealth, in the aggregate, does not translate into** a **higher** average **level of happiness** **because aspirations** also **increase and comparisons intensify with higher standards of living**. Growth can never quench the desire for positional goods; only redistribution and new values can. What about those in poor nations who have yet to see the benefits of growth? Degrowth in the Global North can provide ecological space for the Global South. For example, strong carbon caps for the North and better terms of trade for the South can help compensate for past carbon and resource debts, redistributing wealth between North and South. Economic **growth** in the South, moreover, **threatens** alternative, **non-monetized means of livelihood, generating** the **poverty that, in turn, makes more growth “necessary**.” Degrowth in the North, then, can provide space for the flourishing of alternative cosmovisions and practices in the South, such as *buen vivir* in Latin America or *ubuntu* in Africa. These are alternatives to development, not alternative forms of development.

### Global Tensions

#### Aid is usually given with strings attached, which sows the seeds of discord between great powers

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

Although weak countries do fight one another, the strong are fortunate in that through foreign assistance they can engage in symbolic battles. Perhaps the world should be grateful to the politicians and economists who have created a means by which resources devoted to conflicts can be destroyed without physical injury. This, however, may be too optimistic a view, for the powerless countries in accepting the assistance of the powerful may accept their antagonisms as well. It is very difficult to take assistance from one of two adversaries without becoming involved oneself, that is, to solicit gifts without taking sides. The assistance is given, after all, to gain favor and to influence policy in the receiving country. Favors granted are favors asked, for the favor to a lender is often a disfavor to the lender's opponent. Thus foreign assistance can be dangerous because it spreads and perpetuates the animosities that motivate the great powers; it sows the seeds of discord, and both the strong and the weak may harvest the crop.

### Human Rights Violations

#### Development aid is often coupled with indirect human rights violations through environmental degradation.

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This Canadian support for the promotion/protection of certain categories of human rights in Ghana is coupled with the indirect violation of human rights through mining activities. The activities of Canadian mining corporations in Ghana represent another area of human rights engagement that merits critical attention in the scholarship. The government of Canada reports that there were 14 Canadian mining companies in Ghana in 2015.25 These companies provide some form of “development aid” to the communities they work in, largely through obligations set out in their corporate social responsibility stipulations (CSR). Mining activities cause environmental degradation, including water and air pollution, resulting all-too-often in disastrous consequences for host communities. Asad Ismi of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, reports that: “A recent fact finding mission carried out by Ghana's Human Rights and Administrative Justice Committee in the Wassa area confirmed reports of "arbitrary arrests, violations of the right of access to food, forceful evictions, inadequate compensation and demolishment of villages…[The government body found] overwhelming evidence of human rights violations occasioned by the mining activities which were not sporadic but a well established pattern common to almost all mining communities.”26 In this light, it is ethically difficult to give credit to Canada for its role in alleviating poverty and poverty-related issues through its development aid activities in the country. It is also curious then that such gross human rights violations caused by Canadian mining companies do not constitute a priority in terms of the funding provided by Canada for human rights work in Ghana. Indeed, that Canada’s engagement does not address the human rights violations of Canadianowned companies in the extractive industries in countries like Ghana leaves much to be desired. Is Canada itself, then, complicit in violating human rights in Ghana and similarly situated countries through the mining activities of Canadian companies?

### Conditional Aid

#### Wealthy nations use of conditional aid fail to successfully spur development and are counterproductive to local officials and development goals.

Bourguignon and Sundberg 07 - Bourguignon, François, and Mark Sundberg. "Aid Effectiveness—Opening the Black Box." American Economic Review 97.2 (2007): 316-21. Jstor. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30034468.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af1549857521f26b09492c56640de778e>. (François Bourguignon is the former [Chief Economist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_Chief_Economist) (2003–2007) of the [World Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank). He has been the Director of the [Paris School of Economics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_School_of_Economics),[[1]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Bourguignon#cite_note-1) and from 1985 to his retirement in 2013 a professor of economics at the [École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89cole_des_Hautes_%C3%89tudes_en_Sciences_Sociales) in Paris, Mark Sundberg received his doctorate degree in Applied Behavior Analysis from Western Michigan University (1980), under the direction of Dr. Jack Michael. He is the author of the Verbal Behavior Milestones Assessment and Placement Program (VB-MAPP), and co-author of the original ABLLS and the book Teaching Language to Children with Autism or Other Developmental Disabilities. He has published over 50 professional papers and 4 book chapters.[Premier]

The link from policymakers to policy formulation and implementation depends largely on governance systems. There is some evidence that good governance is associated with good policies3, although the direction of causality is hard to untangle. In practice, most research has focused on the relationship between governance and development outcomes, bypassing the impact on policies and pointing to the impo tance of good governance for better outcomes (Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2005). This logic lies behind using governance in performance-based aid allocation systems. The third link, from donors to policymakers, reveals a body of evidence that is more circumstantial and is built, in large measure, on years of failed aid efforts. Political and historical drivers of aid include post-colonial relations, commercial interests, the Cold War, and, more recently, the "war on terror" (David Dollar and Victoria Levin 2004; Jacky Amprou, Patrick Guillaumont, and Sylviane Guillaumont-Jeanneney 2005; Fitzpatrick, Gelb, and Sundberg, forthcoming). More importantly, donor views of the "right development policies" have been promoted through aid conditionality with little reference to country context. Public enterprise privatization and finance liberalization at times have been treated as necessarily good, often ignoring local parameters, making such measures ineffective, risky, or counterproductive. In hindsight, problems with failed policy conditionality are unsurprising. Donors and agencies presumed that heavy-handed conditionality on a set of policies would "make development happen." Conditionality was aimed at binding policymakers around donor priorities. Loans typically included dozens of far-reaching conditions, which were viewed as the main instrument to ensure policy compliance and implementation. In some cases, this undermined local officials while failing to reach donor objectives (World Bank). Fragmentation of aid across donors has also contributed to higher "compliance costs," less predictability, and greater aid volatility. Aid flows are more volatile than public revenues which, with imperfect credit markets, under- mine long-term investment planning. The need to improve aid quality and redesign delivery systems to improve aid "harmonization and alignment" is now widely recognized.

#### Conditional aid undermines government policymaking and drains developing nations of human capital.

Bräutigam and Knack 04 - Bräutigam, Deborah A., and Stephen Knack. "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa." Economic Development and Cultural Change 52.2 (2004): 255-85. Jstor. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/380592.pdf?refreqid=search%3A3e3047df619df02cfe9731a47eb60461>. (Deborah Brautigam is Professor and Director of the International Development Program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC and the author of The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. A long-time observer of Asia and Africa, she has lived in China, West Africa, and Southern Africa, and travelled extensively across both regions as a Fulbright researcher and consultant for the World Bank, the UN, and other development agencies. Stephen Knack is a Lead Economist in the Development Research Group (Human Development and Public Services Team). His recent research addresses the impact of aid on policy reform and on public sector capacity and accountability. He is a specialist on actionable governance indicators for monitoring progress of public sector reforms, and has oversight responsibility for the public sector management and governance items in the Bank's annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessments. Prior to joining the Bank in 1999, Knack was a Research Associate at the University of Maryland's IRIS Center, and Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University. He received a PhD in Economics from the University of Maryland in 1991.) [Premier]

Each project (or agenda) requires government oversight and reporting. In Ghana, one of the most heavily aided African countries, senior officials each spent as much as 44 weeks a year facilitating or participating in donor supervision missions, time they were unable to devote to their ministries’ own priorities.31 The aid community clearly recognizes the problem. As the World Bank has commented, “donors may fragment central capacity for policy formation, entering with ministries into bilateral deals on multiple projects without determining whether their cumulative effects are collectively sustainable or mutually consistent.”32 Yet donors and African countries seem unable to solve the problem of institutional destruction.33 Related to the high transaction costs and fragmentation that accompany high levels of aid are the direct effects of donor competition for scarce staff and the provision of technical assistance that substitutes for the government’s own capacity. Because governments cannot possibly manage the multiple projects that donors want to fund, donors have set up units independent from the government with off-budget funding. For example, a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study of the aid system in Mali showed that between 1985 and 1995, the majority of donors used project implementation units rather than working through the regular bureaucracy; some donors, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and Germany (GTZ), used them for all of their projects in Mali.34 Part of the path to good governance involves learning. Providing technical assistants who do not transfer skills but simply do the work themselves, or setting up bypass units, limits a central (or local) government’s ability to learn skills for more effectively managing and administering. Governance improves by the continual practice of these skills; this applies to the crafting of policy as much as to the implementation of projects. A recent World Bank study on aid and reform in Africa highlighted this effect of aid dependence: “In aid dependent countries such as Zambia, donor conditionality undermines genuine policy learning. Once they understand that donors mean to set policy, ministries become passive. Individual officials have negative incentives to disagree with the donors since this will only serve to delay the arrival of the much-needed resources.”35 In addition, with multiple projects to administer, donors require local staff, and in many countries, trained people are scarce. Donors consequently bid up the price of capable staff, pulling them both from the private (productive) sector and from the government.36 Not long ago, a donor-funded agricultural project in Kenya hired seven local economists away from the civil service, offering monthly salaries of US$3,000–$6,000, compared with government salaries of approximately US$250.37 This “poaching” weakens institutions as it creates resentment and lowers morale for those left behind.

## K’s

### Colonialism

#### Wealthy countries providing developmental assistance uses humanitarianism as a camouflage to their selfish, imperialist desires

Fawcett 12 The Humanitarian Aid Regime as Hegemony Theory Essay on Gramsci Tami Fawcett 12/16/2012 GS 300, Dr. Poethig <https://tfawcettportfolio.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/gs-300-theory-essay.pdf> Disseration for Political Science [Premier]

Another common theme in the literature is the concept of globalization and its neoliberal ideology that promotes the capitalist system. Expanding upon this theme is the idea that Western, capitalist states have set up international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations in an effort to secure global governance for their economic interests. It is through this system that a vast majority of aid is delivered. Yet, this aid is often conditional or tied to certain sectors. **It is heavily regulated behind the scenes to benefit the donor countries, ultimately, while pushing a public agenda that claims to reduce world poverty, relieve humanitarian crises or build needed infrastructure in developing nations**. Valerie Kaussen (2011) explores this concept with a case study on Haiti after the 2010 earthquake where billions of dollars were poured into the country. Yet, even today, local Haitians are still struggling with little or no infrastructure improvement, food and water shortages and uninhabitable living conditions while American companies have profited a great deal from the aid contracts they received for work in Haiti. Robert Hunter Wade (2002) does the same with a focus on the U.S. as a donor to the World Bank. He explains that after the Cold War especially, the dominant worldview in our international system is that the open market economy is the cornerstone of the best societies. Because of the perception that an open market economy is the way to building the best society, despite evidence to the contrary on many occasions, there is a perceived mutual benefit that has been accepted by not only the global ruling class (developed nations, especially the U.S.) but also those who aspire to be the ruling class. This is precisely Gramsci’s concept of the dominant worldview being accepted or consented to by those who it does not benefit.

#### Development Assistance is a Western Concept that depicts the developing world as inferior and ignorant

Gordon And Sylveste 04. Gordon, Ruth and Sylveste, Jon. Professor Gordon is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, New York University School of Law, New York University School of Arts and Sciences, and Stuyvesant High School in New York City. Gordon has taught a variety of International Law courses, including Public International Law, International Organizations, International Trade and Investment, International Business Transactions and a seminar on International Environmental Law. Professor Sylveste ws a Fulbright Scholar (East Africa 1992-93), Formerly a New York Times Fellow, and is a professor of Law at Golden Gate University. “Deconstructing Development” *Villanova University School of Law*. 2004. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art4/. [Premier]

A critical aspect of **the dominance of the West resides in its power to produce and propagate knowledge** and to thereby create categories such as the underdeveloped. 351**The West has been able to define and** indeed **to create the “Other”** – **objects to be studied, described and developed**,352 and **that “Other” is** invariably **lacking, deficient, inferior,353and in need of** Western **assistance**.354 This power to define and represent others isassumed “in the portrayal of ways in which people live their lives, in articulating theirexperiences – and on this basis, in shaping the processes of change.”355 Peoples with complex and varied histories, cultures and communities became homogenized masses mired in intolerable poverty and in need of Western assistance.356 The objects ofdevelopment proliferated and included, inter alia, poverty, insufficient technology andcapital, rapid population growth, inadequate public services, and archaic agricultural practices; new problems were continually incorporated, categorized and furtherdefined.357 Indeed, the “vast surface over which the discourse effortlessly moved eventually covered practically the entire cultural, economic and political geography of the Third World.”**Development problems were** invariably **framed in a manner that required Western intervention** **and the input of “experts**”,359 and it was **the discourse of development** that **determined who qualified as “expert**.”360 Economists, demographers, educators, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and specialists in agriculture, public health and nutrition were enlisted to carry out the modernization project.361 Development professionals were generally dispassionate academics and practitioners, who were usually far removed from the experiences and lives in which they intervened.362 **Locating knowledge in specialists**, however, **privileges some voices and silences others**.363 **It** also **means solutions emanate from foreign sources**,364 **while local** knowledge and **ways of knowing** and being **are ignored, discarded or co-opted**. 365 Overpowered by the hegemonic discourse of the West, Third World **societies** often **were effectively prevented from articulating their own identities** and worldviews. Many seem to have internalizedthe perspectives of the modernizers and developers, a process facilitated by comprador Third World intellectuals

#### Development assistance justifies intervention in undeveloped nations rendering them powerless.

Gordon And Sylveste 04. Gordon, Ruth and Sylveste, Jon. Professor Gordon is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, New York University School of Law, New York University School of Arts and Sciences, and Stuyvesant High School in New York City. Gordon has taught a variety of International Law courses, including Public International Law, International Organizations, International Trade and Investment, International Business Transactions and a seminar on International Environmental Law. Professor Sylveste ws a Fulbright Scholar (East Africa 1992-93), Formerly a New York Times Fellow, and is a professor of Law at Golden Gate University. “Deconstructing Development” *Villanova University School of Law.* 2004. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art4/. [Premier]

The concept of **development privileges certain societies,** cultures and institutions, **while disparaging others**; it is grounded in defining the “Other” as incompetent, inferior and in need of transformation. **That most “undeveloped” people are people of color only reinforces the Western view of the developing world as** essentially **dysfunctional**, for **it comports with American views of** brown and **black people** in the United States. For Europeans **the development project continues the colonial civilizing mission**.13 Taking up where colonialism and the “White man’s burden” left off, the development project **provides** the **legal and moral justification for** substantial **interventions** **in the affairs of those** who have been **categorized as underdeveloped**.14 It justifies and supports the economic and political status quo and the imbalance of international power, **and** **it renders the underdeveloped powerless,** **for it is the developers who name subjects, problems and solutions.** The objective in the following pages is to construct and then deconstruct the concept of development, and to question whether development is so fundamentally flawed that it should be abandoned in favor of a post-development paradigm.

#### Specifically, representations of development come prior to policy actions. They shape reality.

Gordon And Sylveste 04. Gordon, Ruth and Sylveste, Jon. Professor Gordon is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, New York University School of Law, New York University School of Arts and Sciences, and Stuyvesant High School in New York City. Gordon has taught a variety of International Law courses, including Public International Law, International Organizations, International Trade and Investment, International Business Transactions and a seminar on International Environmental Law. Professor Sylveste ws a Fulbright Scholar (East Africa 1992-93), Formerly a New York Times Fellow, and is a professor of Law at Golden Gate University. “Deconstructing Development” *Villanova University School of Law.* 2004. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art4/. [Premier]

**People now identified as impoverished** may have **viewed themselves** and theirplace within their respective communities quite **differently before the advent of** **“development**,” 48 as most societies had found ways of “defining and treating poverty thataccommodated visions of community, frugality and sufficiency.” 49 Professor Nanda Shrestha, writing of “becoming a development category,” describes one such different vision.50 Without romanticizing the pre-development period, **Professor Shrestha paints a** complex **picture of his village,** his family **and his life in 1940s Nepal**. He begins by describing life in Nepal **before “development,”** where **his family was extremely poor by World Bank standards. Nonetheless, neither his family nor** others in **the village thought** that **people were lesser beings because of their poverty**. This is not to say that life was idyllic and indeed he notes elements of a type of caste system, which he does not defend. Yet, Professor **Shrestha also observes a sense of responsibility and** a **community that** **protected even the very poor,** such as his family**, from utter destitution**.While most traditional societies rejected the idea that poverty necessarily reflected personal inadequacy, this belief was a major component of the new international value system. 51 Within this new paradigm economic poverty was perceived and acted upon as a disgrace and a scourge.52 Accordingly**, with development**, the **poverty** experienced by Professor Shrestha and his family **became a problem to be solved**, **and development** **experts were** thought **to have the solution**. All that the Nepalese brought to the table was summarily discarded by those who assumed that the culture, knowledge, wisdom, insight and judgment that Nepalese villagers brought to their own lives and existence was for the most part worthless. In some ways the villagers came to believe this of themselves. TheNepalese began to want to be like the developers. **In the end, development plans** and strategies **did not actually lessen poverty, but they did diminish self-sufficiency and** a sense of **community**, **as functions that were formerly** the **collective responsibility** of the community were now left to the developers.53

#### Foreign assistance that targets specific victims fails to creates victimization and causes serial policy failure.

James, Erica 10. Erica Caple James is a medical and psychiatric anthropologist who received an A.B. from Princeton University (Anthropology 1992), an M.T.S. from Harvard Divinity School (1995), and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University (Social Anthropology 1998, 2003). Her work focuses on global health and security; violence and trauma; human rights and humanitarianism; democratization and postconflict transition processes; race, gender, and culture; and religion and healing. “[Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti](http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520260542)” University of California Press. 2010 <https://books.google.com/books/about/Democratic_Insecurities.html?id=6aox-Wm2pI4C>. [ Premier]

Theorists of human rights and humanitarianism have depicted these ethical challenges as arising from processes of selective recognition. **During a crisis or emergency the humanitarian gaze tends to focus on certain forms of victimization** or victim identities deemed emblematic of acute suffering (Fassin 2007; Malkki 1995; Pandolfi 2003, 2008; Redfield 2005; Ticktin 2006) **Selective recognition** practices frequently **generate** “triage” **interventions that remedy immediate** or acute **suffering rather than transform the structural political, economic, and social conditions that contribute to** chronic forms of **insecurity** ( Hopgood 2006; Redfield 2008). In so doing, **interventions directed to categories such as victims of human rights abuses, rape survivors, refugees, trafficked women,** or sufferers of other forms of abuses target their objects at the level of “bare life” (Agamben 1998 [1995]) at the biological or “prepolitical” body. This is in part because such interventions are frequently conducted under organizational and contextual constraints that permit enactments only of what Peter Redfield( 2005: 344) calls a “minimalist biopolitics,” a “ temporary administration of survival.” Thus, however well intended they may be, when triage interventions **depoliticize the roots of chronic conditions** of sociopolitical instability (like Haiti’s ensekirite) **in favor of immediate palliative responses**, **they can** reinforce or **exacerbate preexisting power inequalities** **between actors across and within border** (Agamben 1998 [1995]: 126-35; Terry 2002): “ IN the final analysis… humanitarian organizations… can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves , maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers that they ought to fight’ (Agamben 1998 [ 1995]:133)

Development assistance programs lack flexibility and rely on colonist logic.

Galo 2010. Gallo, Carol. Carol Jean Gallo received her MA in African Studies from Yale in 2009 and began a PhD program in Politics and International Studies a t the University of Cambridge in 2011.  Her research focuses on peace and security in Africa, in particular disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in peacekeeping settings. “Rethinking the Development Aid Paradigm.” *Yale Journal of International Affairs,* March 31, 2010. <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105117gallo.pdf> [Premier].

Secondly, **the aims of development are narrowly defined**—**the end result Is expected to look the same everywhere**. **The model lacks** sufficient **flexibility.** For one, the state must support a deregulated economy compliant with the contemporary model of free trade. The much sought after sustainable local ownership, “empowerment” of women, and other such catch-phrase necessities that are paid policy lip service in **development programs cannot be achieved without questioning the assumption that what works in one place will work everywhere else despite** enormous **economic and cultural diversity.**

**Fanon captured** **early on much of what continues to plague the paradigm** today. In 1963, he argued that, in a colonial context, Europe’s wealth was a direct result of the plunder of its colonies, not a result of free trade between sovereign states. So “when we hear the head of a European nation declare with hand on heart that he must come to the aid of the unfortunate peoples of the underdeveloped world, we do not tremble with gratitude. On the contrary, we say among ourselves, ‘it is a just reparation we are getting.’” He argued that **for development aid to work, it must be the result of a “dual consciousness” in which the colonizers understand that they owe a debt and the colonized understand that they are due this debt**—a conceptual framework in which, for Fanon, aid as charity is unacceptable.2

#### Aid is used to promote the interests of the donor country. Even the donors admit it.

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

Cessation of assistance seems to occur as a consequence of sudden and dramatic shifts in the political system or, more importantly, in the international alignment of the receiving country. When a country ceases to support one of the great powers, it also loses its claim upon that power's largesse. The dissolution of economic ties follows the dissolution of political ties. If the poor country then gives its favor or its allegiance to another major power, it can usually anticipate receiving a considerable benefaction, as did Cuba from Russia, and Guatemala from the United States. International politics consists of the great powers maneuvering among other great powers and the small powers vacillating back and forth in response, in part, to alternative offers of foreign assistance. Now we have come to one of our main theses, that economic aid from the powerful to the powerless countries, from the metropole to the satellites, is an instrument of power politics. How much a country lends to another country will not be determined by its need, or its potential, or its past economic performance, good or bad, or its virtue, but by the benefit it yields in terms of political support. In granting assistance, economic efficiency or social justice or any other criterion is subordinate to national interest. Economic aid is merely one other instrument of foreign policy, an instrument like diplomacy, cultural exchange, technical assistance, export of munitions, military intervention, and war. To the capitalist countries-from whence most aid comes-it is a way of safe- guarding relationships with their client states, of maintaining the status quo. This is obvious and seldom denied by the donor countries. For example, H. B. Chenery, at one time an official in the Agency for International Development, has stated that "the main objective of foreign assistance, as of many other tools of foreign policy, is to produce the kind of political and economic environment in the world in which the United States can best pursue its own social goals.

### Anthro

#### Development and radical environmentalism are mutually exclusive.

Kallis, Giorgos 2015. Giorgos Kallis is an environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology. He is a Leverhulme visiting professor at SOAS and an ICREA professor at ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona. “The Degrowth Alternative,” *Great Transition Initiative.* February 2015. <http://www.tellus.org/pub/Kallis-The-Degrowth-Alternative.pdf> [Premier]

**The conflict between environment and growth is ever-present**. **For “developers,”** the value of **growth is not to be questioned**: **more** mining, drilling, **building, and manufacturing is necessary to expand the economy.** **Against developers stand radical environmentalists** and local communities, who are often alone in questioning the inevitability of “a one-way future consisting only of growth.”1 In this opposition to development projects, philosopher Bruno Latour sees a fundamental rejection of modernity’s separation of means and ends.2 **Radical environmentalists recognize that ecology,** with its focus on connecting humans with one another and with the non- human world, **is** inherently **at odds with growth that separates and conquers.** The rise of mainstream discourse on **sustainable development** effectively erased the radical promise of ecology. The notion of sustainability that emerged from the 1992 Earth Summit **neutralized and depoliticized the conflict between environment and growth**. **Since then**, negotiations between **government**, businesses**, and “pragmatic” environmentalists** have **assumed that new markets and technologies can** simultaneously **boost economic growth and protect natural systems**. Environmental problems have been largely consigned to the realm of technical improvement, the province of experts and policy elites. Ten years ago, **the** provocative formulation of “**degrowth”**—a so-called “missile **concept”**—**was** put forward **to challenge this de-politicization of environmentalism and attack the “oxymoron of sustainable development**.”3 The use of a negative word for a positive project was intentional: **by subverting the desirability of growth, degrowth** **aimed** to identify and question the ideology that must be confronted in order **to transition to a truly sustainable world**: the ideology of growth. Degrowth theorists call for an “exit from the economy,” an invitation to abandon economistic thinking and construct viable alternatives to capitalism. However, proposing alternative economic models is not enough. We must also question the existence of an autonomous sphere called “the economy.” The “free market” is not a natural process; it has been constructed through deliberate governmental intervention. Re- politicization of the economy will require hard-fought institutional change to return it to democratic control.

#### **Sustainable development incentivizes resource extraction and oppresses nonhumans**

Sutherland 17. Sutherland, Derek. Derek has a PhD in Environmental Protection and Policy from the University of Tartu and a Masters of Philosophy from the University of Saskatchewan. His work focuses on the environment, ethics, and sustainability. “The Possibility of a Non-Anthropocentric Notion of Environmental Sustainability.” 2017. <https://ecommons.usask.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10388/7948/SUTHERLAND-THESIS-2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Premier].

**Sustainability declarations are** political tactics **saturated with anthropocentric elements**. In one instance, the **government establishes regulatory codes for corporations to enact and use the nonhuman world to meet the needs of the human population**. At the same time, the corporation itself is part of the grander discourse that the current form of global liberalism promotes. **An example of this is many governments now have incentives for sustainable development**. At their core, **these incentives have allowances for resource extraction and production in an environmentally sustainable fashion. However** environmentally aware this type of **sustainable development** seems, it **is not close to** **moving** sustainability **toward a comprehensive ethical**, **non- anthropocentric environmental discourse.**

#### Sustainable Development treats nonhumans as a means to an end and prevents genuine experiences for both human’s and nonhuman’s.

Sutherland 17. Sutherland, Derek. Derek has a PhD in Environmental Protection and Policy from the University of Tartu and a Masters of Philosophy from the University of Saskatchewan. His work focuses on the environment, ethics, and sustainability. “The Possibility of a Non-Anthropocentric Notion of Environmental Sustainability.” 2017. <https://ecommons.usask.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10388/7948/SUTHERLAND-THESIS-2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Premier].

For all practical purposes, **sustainable development is simply a ‘light’ version of the developmental narratives that pervade most western** **economic ideologies**. **These** western economic **ideologies view the management, conservation, and preservation of the natural environment for the sake of allowing individual humans to develop and realize their full potential**. This form of instrumentalism clearly does not allow humans to bracket anthropocentrism. In its place, whether ideologies foment from socialist, humanist, traditional, religious, capitalist, communist, anarchist, fascist or nationalistic beliefs, there seems to be a consistent anthropocentric similarity in its focus on the open development and enhancement of the human species. **In this belief framework**, only the development of humankind is really important. **Even if the nonhuman has an ethical value, it only has instrumental ethical value in an anthropocentric context**. **The nonhuman only has ethical value in relation to people**. **This is where the** **Heideggerian** **argument that one is thrust into an already formed world that is not of one’s making is relevant** (Heidegger 127). In the plight and existence of humans, to say nothing of the nonhuman, **there is rarely time for** deep **reflection on the dominant belief systems that influence how we interpret and act in the world. In the context of** the dominant discourse of the economics of **sustainable development, there is no space for promoting a genuine human and nonhuman experience**

#### Sustainable development leads to human domination over the environment

Sutherland 17. Sutherland, Derek. Derek has a PhD in Environmental Protection and Policy from the University of Tartu and a Masters of Philosophy from the University of Saskatchewan. His work focuses on the environment, ethics, and sustainability. “The Possibility of a Non-Anthropocentric Notion of Environmental Sustainability.” 2017. <https://ecommons.usask.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10388/7948/SUTHERLAND-THESIS-2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Premier].

Instead of granting a space for the languages and practices of non-anthropocentric views of sustainability, the approaches of many of the alternative environmentally based views end up polarizing the story. Under this version of **sustainability, whether it is used by the environmentalist or otherwise,** ethics **will only form out of separating the human** and their attendant intellects **more from the environment** (Metcalf 102). At the same time, **the environmental movement struggles to** **move** liberalized global society **away from the grip of the powerful** **institutionalized anthropocentric discourses on sustainability.** **This i**nitial false assumption of **environmentalism** **advances into a realm where the interconnectedness with the nonhuman**, though embraced and given worth through belief systems such as ecological ethics**, remain invisible**. **The assumption is built on the dominance of the human and that the human**, even if more environmentally aware still **has to be a steward of the natural environment.** This is the reason that ENGOS have been unable to move the direction of the environmentally sustainable ways of interacting with the nonhuman out of the confines of the dominant caretaker mindset. As mentioned in Chapter one even if one were to adopt a viewpoint of seeing Nature as a Friend in the spirit of Bannon it is still based on an anthropocentric account of how we value the “otherness” of the nonhuman (nature). At the same time, politically the will to facilitate and introduce a non-anthropocentric view of environmental sustainable discourse into environmentalism is met with suspicion from many shallow and deep ecologists since many still see conceptualizations, despite the use of more non-instrumental discourse and language, as inherently anthropocentric.

## T

### Non-Military

#### Military aid is not reportable as official development assistance.

OCED 08. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “Is it ODA? Factsheet.” November 2008. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf>. [Premier]

This is often the decisive criterion for determining ODA eligibility. In the final analysis it is a matter of intention. But in order to reduce the scope for subjective interpretations and promote comparable reporting, Members have agreed to limits on ODA reporting, e.g.: Exclusion of military aid - The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. On the other hand, additional costs incurred for the use of the donor’s military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services are ODA-eligible. Peacekeeping - The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilisation of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal. (Net bilateral costs means the extra costs of assigning personnel to these activities, net of the costs of stationing them at home, and of any compensation received from the UN.) Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code. Activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, are not reportable as ODA. Civil police work - Expenditure on police training is reportable as ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as counter-insurgency work or intelligence gathering on terrorism. The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience is not reportable. Social and cultural programmes - As with police work, a distinction is drawn between building developing countries’ capacity (ODA-eligible) and one-off interventions (not ODA-eligible). Thus, the promotion of museums, libraries, art and music schools, and sports training facilities and venues counts as ODA, whereas sponsoring concert tours or athletes’ travel costs does not. Cultural programmes in developing countries whose main purpose is to promote the culture or values of the donor are not reportable as ODA. Assistance to refugees - Assistance to refugees in developing countries is reportable as ODA. Temporary assistance to refugees from developing countries arriving in donor countries is reportable as ODA during the first 12 months of stay, and all costs associated with eventual repatriation to the developing country of origin are also reportable. Nuclear energy - The peaceful use of nuclear energy, including construction of nuclear power plants, nuclear safety and the medical use of radioisotopes, is ODA-eligible. Military applications of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation activities are not. Research - Only research directly and primarily relevant to the problems of developing countries may be counted as ODA. This includes research into tropical diseases and developing crops designed for developing country conditions. The costs may still be counted as ODA if the research is carried out in a developed country. Anti-Terrorism - Activities combatting terrorism are not reportable as ODA, as they generally target perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the recipient.

#### Development assistance is non-military peacebuilding.

Branczik 04. Branczik, Amelia. Amelia Branczik is a graduate student at SAIS, the School of Advanced International Study, John Hopkins University. “Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance.” Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base. February 2004. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/humanitarian-aid>. [Premier].

External development assistance, to reconstruct a country's infrastructure, institutions, and economy, is often a key part of the peace accord in the aftermath of war. This assistance ensures that the country can develop, instead of sliding back into conflict. The key requirements include: Reconstruction of property and infrastructure: to facilitate return of the displaced security, governance, transport of food and supplies, and rebuilding of the economy. Transition to normal security conditions: demilitarization, demobilization, reintegration of ex-combatants and an adequate police force. A functioning judiciary to enforce the rule of law. Governance and government services. Democratization: representative government to moderate conflict. Economic development and a stable macroeconomic environment to promote political stability and facilitate a solid financial base for government. Local capacity building: once the donors leave, the country needs to function independently of aid. The link between underdevelopment and propensity to conflict makes development assistance important also in violence prevention. The structural factors contributing to conflict include political, economic, and social inequalities; extreme poverty; economic stagnation; poor government services; high unemployment and individual (economic) incentives to fight. Development assistance must attempt to reduce inequalities between groups, and reduce economic incentives to fight, by controlling illicit trade, for example in arms, drugs, and diamonds. Perhaps the most important principle of development assistance is the use of aid conditionality to promote economic and political practices that strengthen peacebuilding. Donor assistance is often conditional on acceptance of a peace settlement by all sides, and continued commitment to implementing and consolidating peace.

### More than financial

#### Development assistance’s key goal is to accelerate growth and reduce poverty – doesn’t have to be financial.

Goldin et al. 02. Ian Goldin (Professor at Oxford University), Halsey Rogers (Lead Economist with the Education Global Practice), and Nicholas Stern (Chair of the Grantham Research Institute, professor at Oxford). “The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from World Bank Experience.” A Research Paper from the Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank. 2002. [Premier]

This paper aims to assess how development assistance has contributed to the development progress of recent decades. Development assistance encompasses both financial and nonfinancial instruments that are aimed at supporting the recipient country’s efforts to accelerate growth and reduce poverty.

#### Development assistance encompasses more than financial aid.

Goldin et al. 02. Ian Goldin (Professor at Oxford University), Halsey Rogers (Lead Economist with the Education Global Practice), and Nicholas Stern (Chair of the Grantham Research Institute, professor at Oxford). “The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from World Bank Experience.” A Research Paper from the Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank. 2002. [Premier]

Resource transfer is an important part of development assistance, and the quantitative analysis in this section will focus largely on assessing its effects. But finance is only one of the instruments used to support development and, in some situations, it is not even the most useful one. Development assistance also includes analysis, advice, and capacity-building. Many of the country boxes in this paper highlight the importance of these nonlending tools, especially in situations—such as early in a reform era—when finance is not likely to contribute to poverty reduction. The mixture of instruments to be used in any particular country depends on the specifics of that country’s needs and capacity. Attempts to assess the contributions of external assistance face inherent difficulties. Dealing with them requires the use of a variety of types of evidence.

#### Development assistance is a combination of money, advice, and conditions.

Easterly 07. Easterly, William. Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 328-332, American Economic Association. May 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034470> [Premier]

Development assistance is the combination of money, advice, and conditions provided by rich nations and international financial institu- tions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is designed to achieve economic development in poor nations. This article argues that development assistance was based on three assumptions that, with the benefit of hindsight (although a wise few also had foresight), turned out to have been mistaken.

### Wealthy Nations

#### The metric for determining wealthy nations is really important for determining who is and is not wealthy

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/1152061](http://www.jstor.org/stable/1152061). [Premier]

If our measure of riches and [poor] poverty were income per capita, then we would find poor countries such as Japan ($685 per person), Italy ($475), and China ($80) in the list of donors, and Israel ($1,160), Venezuela ($800), and Chile ($475) in the list of recipients. If the measure were total national income, then the Netherlands ($15.7 thousand million), Belgium ($14.6 thousand million), and Kuwait ($1.7 thousand million) would be on the first list, and India ($40 thousand million), Pakistan ($10 thousand million), and Mexico ($17.5 thousand million) in the second. If the measure of richness and poverty were the existence of extraordinarily wealthy citizens, then Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Peru would be included among the rich, and Norway, Sweden, and Denmark perhaps among the poor.

#### Using one quantitative metric to determine a wealthy nation leads to silly arguments about which metric, a country that is intent on influencing and has the resources to do is a wealthy nation.

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

If we were to try to identify a single characteristic which distinguishes those countries which provide assistance from those which receive, we would not choose the relatively precise measures of the economist but the imprecise measures of the politician. It is not richness or poverty that distinguishes China, a lender, from Brazil, a receiver; it is the 'desire of the country for power. China is intent on influencing, and does influence, events in other countries; Brazil, in general, is not and does not. China wishes, by means of the granting of assistance, to influence the behavior of those countries to which [it] she gives it; Brazil has no such wish. Thus, in general, it is the powerful countries, and those seeking power, which provide assistance to the relatively less powerful, and it is the motives of the former in granting aid and the consequences of this aid upon the weak which interest us.

## Neg Solvency

### Top shelf

#### Academics and policy experts don’t know how to achieve development – no one set of policies that will work everywhere, nothing guaranteed to work.

Easterly 07. Easterly, William. Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 328-332, American Economic Association. May 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034470> [Premier]

In the new millennium, a remarkably broad group of academics and policymakers seem to agree that, after all, maybe we don't know how to achieve development, although they are reluctant to say so exactly. The World Bank (2005) was either giving up or offering instantaneous non- falsifiability: "Different policies can yield the same result, and the same policy can yield dif- ferent results, depending on country institutional contexts and underlying growth strategies." The Barcelona Development Agenda (2004), a who's who of leading economists, concluded that "there is no single set of policies that can be guaranteed to ignite sustained growth. Nations that have succeeded at this tremendously important task have faced different sets of obstacles and have adopted various policies regarding regulation, export and industrial promotion, and technologi- cal innovation and knowledge acquisition.”

#### Development aid statistics are inflated by rich countries counting non-aid expenses as ODA.

Hirvonen 05. Hirvonen, Pekka. Deputy Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Stingy Stingy: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor.” Global Policy Forum. 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html>. [Premier]

Non-Aid as Aid: Inflating the Statistics A separate but related issue are non-aid expenses that rich countries often include in official development assistance statistics. These expenditures do not benefit donor countries the way tied aid and technical assistance do, but they boost ODA figures artificially, making rich countries look more generous than they really are. Examples of this statistical spin-doctoring include counting debt relief as development aid and classifying immigration-related costs within the donor country as development assistance. In the Monterrey Consensus, rich countries pledged to "take steps to ensure that resources provided for debt relief do not detract from ODA resources intended to be available for developing countries."(27) Despite this commitment, all debt relief since 2002 has been counted as official development assistance, creating a perception that more money has been spent on ODA than is actually the case.(28) Large debt relief initiatives are reflected in the ODA figures as spending spikes: According to official OECD statistics, Belgian development assistance jumped 40.7 percent from 2002 to 2003, largely because of a debt relief package to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The nominal increase in aid spurred the Belgian government to boast how development assistance now amounted 0.61 percent of the GNP and how aid was "increasing steadily and more quickly than GNP." In the absence of new debt relief packages, however, Belgian development assistance fell to 0.41 percent of GNI in 2004 – a figure that is actually lower than in 2002.(29) Similarly, some countries include refugee-related expenditures in the development assistance figures. Costs arising from refugees and asylum-seekers in the donor nations artificially inflate ODA statistics, as the money actually never leaves the country and does not contribute to global poverty reduction. Biggest spenders under this category include France and Australia that use five and six percent, respectively, of their "foreign" aid on refugee-related costs. Globally, $1.5 billion of ODA was spent on refugee costs in 2003.(30)

### Generic

#### Aid worsens democracy, government efficiency, rule of law, and corruption – means people can’t signal dissatisfaction with foreign aid programs and we can’t know which ones are working – accounts for many failures of development assistance.

Easterly 07. Easterly, William. Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 328-332, American Economic Association. May 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034470> [Premier]

Simeon Djankov, Jose Garcia-Montavlo, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2006) and Stephen Knack (2001) find empirically that aid worsens democracy, beurocratic quality, the rule of law, and corruption. The confidence that aid would raise growth was also naive about the knowledge and incen- tive problems that afflict the foreign aid agen- cies. Foreign aid is a public entity spending the money of rich people on the needs of poor people. Unlike most market transactions, the recipient of the aid goods has no ability to signal their dissatisfaction by discontinuing the trade of money for goods. Unlike the provision of domes- tic public goods in democracies, the recipient of aid-financed public services has no ability to reg- ister dissatisfaction through voting. With little or no feedback from the poor, there is little infor- mation as to which aid programs are working. Nor is there much incentive for the aid agency to find out what works when there is little account- ability (see Easterly 2006). These problems may account for many of the more well-documented foibles of the aid system: an emphasis on loans made rather than on the results of those loans, a surplus of reports that no one reads, a fondness for grand frameworks and world summits, moral exhortations to everyone rather than any agency taking responsibility for any one thing, foreign technical experts to whom no one is listening, health clinics without medicines, schools with- out textbooks, roads and water systems built but not maintained, aid-financed governments that stay in power despite corruption and economic mismanagement, and so on. Having development be the goal of develop- ment assistance made these problems regarding incentives and information worse for the aid agencies than if they had focused on more spe- cific tasks such as combating childhood diseases, for example. With many aid agencies operating in each country, with development of that coun- try depending on many other factors besides aid agencies, and with the inability to map actions to development anyway, it was very hard to hold an individual aid agency accountable for a good or bad development outcome. Hence, development assistance, as it is not conceived, is inherently unaccountable and unable to process feedback.

#### Foreign aid in the form of development assistance was a mistake and doesn’t culminate in actual development.

Easterly 07. Easterly, William. Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 328-332, American Economic Association. May 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034470> [Premier]

In sum, we don't know what actions achieve development, our advice and aid do not make those actions happen even if we knew what they were, and we are not even sure who this "we" is that is supposed to achieve development. I take away from this that development assistance was a mistake. Yet it doesn't necessarily follow that foreign aid should be eliminated. Once freed from the delusion that it can accomplish development, foreign aid could finance piecemeal steps aimed at accomplishing particular tasks for which there is clearly a huge demand-to reduce malaria deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain roads, to provide scholarships for tal- ented but poor students, and so on. It could seek to create more opportunities for poor individu- als, rather than try to transform poor societies. The knowledge and incentive problems for each such focused effort seem more solvable than that of "development assistance," although not easy. As far as the experts are concerned, they would do well to remember the principles of the division of labor and gains from specialization, focusing on problems such as inflation stabiliza- tion, financial regulation, or elimination of red tape encountered by businesses. They probably have a lot to offer in those areas. Economists still have a more general role to play in making the case for individual freedoms that allow the spontaneous, bottom-up processes to work. Fortunately, the inability of the experts and the aid donors to provide the answers for development has not stopped development from "just happening" on its own. Economic growth, without much influence by experts or much contribution by foreign aid, is happening around the world in places like China, India, Chile, Botswana, Turkey, and Vietnam, gener- ally involving homegrown, gradual movement toward freer markets. Even though some of these success stories could later flop, history suggests their place will be taken by new permanent exits from poverty. This should be enough to reassure those who care about world poverty to have some hope rather than despair.

#### Security and development policies are distinct. Trying to combine military intervention with development fails.

Mayeda 2012. Mayeda, Graham. Mayeda joined the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa in 2005. His current research focuses on theories of global justice, law and development, criminal law, and legal philosophy. From 2006 to 2010, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC). ISAC is a legal aid clinic established by Legal Aid Ontario in 2001 to conduct test-case litigation for low-income residents of Ontario. “Legal Aspects of the Security-Development Nexus: International Administrative Law as a Check on the Use of Development Assistance in the "War on Terror". Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 13: No. 1, Article 5. 2012 <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol13/iss1/5>. [Premier]

To conclude this section, from a pragmatic point of view, **the integration of security and development policy** in a way that subordinates development tothe security of the donor country **is** likely to be largely **ineffective in achieving development or security goals.** **Not only does** such **integration violate the best practices of development, which require** that **developing countries set the goals and priorities for development** and participate fully in the delivery of these programs**,** **it also overlooks the** underlying **causes of violent extremism**. This **extremism is exacerbated by foreign military intervention,** especially when it targets groups within a developing country who, as a result of this targeting, willbe marginalized and denied access to political voice. Moreover, **allowing the military to be heavily involved in delivering aid or establishing aid priorities undermines** the **trust** on which this aid is supposed to be based.

#### Foreign aid is failing miserably – multiple warrants.

The Economist 2016. “Misplaced charity.” Foreign Aid, The Economist: Print Edition. June 2016. https://www.economist.com/news/international/21700323-development-aid-best-spent-poor-well-governed-countries-isnt-where-it [Premier]

NOT long ago Malawi was a donor darling. Being dirt poor and ravaged by AIDS, it was needy; with just 17m inhabitants, a dollop of aid might visibly improve it. Better still, it was more-or-less democratic and its leader, Joyce Banda, was welcome at Westminster and the White House. In 2012 Western countries showered $1.17 billion on it, and foreign aid accounted for 28% of gross national income. The following year corrupt officials, businessmen and politicians pinched at least $30m from the Malawian treasury. A bureaucrat investigating the thefts was shot three times (he survived, somehow). Germany said it would help pay for an investigation; later, burglars raided the home of a German official and stole documents relating to the scandal. Malawi is no longer a donor darling. It now resembles a clingy lover, which would be dumped were it not so needy. It still gets a lot of foreign aid ($930m in 2014), but donors try to keep the cash out of the government’s hands. Foreign aid can work wonders. It set South Korea and Taiwan on the path to riches, helped extinguish smallpox in the 1970s and has almost eliminated polio. Unfortunately, as Malawi shows, it is liable to be snaffled by crooks. Aid can also burden weak bureaucracies, distort markets, prop up dictators and help prolong civil wars. Taxpayers in rich countries dislike their cash being spent on Mercedes-Benzes. So donors strive to send the right sort of aid to the places where it will do the most good. How are they doing? A decade ago governments rich and poor set out to define good aid. They declared that aid should be for improving the lot of poor people—and not, implicitly, for propping up friendly dictators or winning business for exporters. It should be co-ordinated; otherwise, says William Easterly of New York University, “the poor health minister is dealing with dozens of different donors and dozens of different forms to fill out.” It should be transparent. Where possible, it should flow through governments. These are high-minded ideals, reflecting the time they were laid down: the cold war was over and the West had plenty of money. They are nonetheless sound. Aid-watchers, who row bitterly over whether the world needs more foreign aid or less, mostly agree with them. They tend to add that aid should go to relatively free, well-governed countries. By almost all of these measures, foreign aid is failing. It is as co-ordinated as a demolition derby. Much goes neither to poor people nor to well-run countries, and on some measures the targeting is getting worse. Donors try to reward decent regimes and punish bad ones, but their efforts are undermined by other countries and by their own impatience. It is extraordinary that so many clever, well-intentioned people have made such a mess. Official development aid, which includes grants, loans, technical advice and debt forgiveness, is worth about $130 billion a year. The channels originating in Berlin, London, Paris, Tokyo and Washington are deep and fast-flowing; others are rivulets, though the Nordic countries are generous for their size. More than two-fifths flows through multilateral outfits such as the World Bank, the UN and the Global Fund. Last year 9% was spent on refugees in donor countries, reflecting the surge of migrants to Europe. As the aid river twists and braids, it inundates some places and not others. India contains some 275m people living on less than $1.90 a day. It got $4.8 billion in “country programmable aid” (the most routine kind) in 2014, which is $17 per poor person. Vietnam also got $4.8 billion; but, because it is much smaller and rather better off, that works out to $1,658 per poor person (see map). By this measure South-East Asia and South America fare especially well. Western countries have mostly been shamed out of the cold war-era habit of funnelling aid to friendly regimes and former colonies. But aid is still used more-or-less explicitly as a tool of foreign policy—and increasingly so, says Owen Barder of the Centre for Global Development, a think-tank. Today’s enemy is not communism but radical Islam. Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey each got more net aid than Bangladesh in 2014, although none contains nearly as many poor people. This week the EU promised more aid to African and Middle Eastern countries that clamp down on migrants. Rewarding failure A better reason not to give much aid to the poorest countries is that many are badly run. But that is not why they get so little. Claudia Williamson of Mississippi State University has created a yardstick that measures both poverty and the quality of government. On her measure, the targeting of aid worsened between 2004 and 2012. “Aid goes to middle-income countries that are also poorly governed,” she says. Donors often reward democratic reforms; they also try to punish corruption and backsliding, as in Malawi. Between 2009 and 2014, 12 countries improved by at least two points on a 14-point scale produced by Freedom House, a think-tank, suggesting they became notably more democratic and liberal. Ten of them received more net aid in 2014 than five years earlier. Of the nine aid-receiving countries that worsened by two points or more on the same scale, six got less. But such inducements tend to be subtle, whereas the surge of aid into strategically important states is often huge. Net foreign aid to Turkey, an increasingly autocratic country that is not poor, rose more than tenfold between 2004 and 2014, to $3.4 billion. Besides, donors often have short attention spans. Two academics, Darren Hawkins and Jay Goodliffe, have shown that donors tend to reward countries that are becoming more like them. Once countries have joined the democratic club, aid drops. American aid to Peru followed that pattern. “You get penalised for achieving too high a level of democratic governance,” says Brad Parks of AidData, another think-tank. Even if Western countries sent clear, consistent signals, they might struggle to be heard. Aid has become less important to many poor countries than foreign investment or remittances. And donors have become far more diverse. Several countries that used to receive aid now hand it out; a few, including India and Turkey, do both. China distributed roughly $3.4 billion last year, according to the OECD. Although that is puny next to America or Britain, China is important because it can act as a shock absorber, moving into a country when others are pulling out. Last month it promised Malawi more food aid and 100 police cars. For corrupt dictators, Chinese aid is even better than the Western kind. China tends not to fuss over democracy, and it seldom objects to loans being spent on pointless grand projects: after all, it builds a lot of those at home. The money is easier to snaffle. One study found that Chinese aid is highly likely to flow to the districts where African leaders were born. In one big way, though, the proliferation of donors harms poor countries. Aid now comes from ever more directions, in ever smaller packages: according to AidData, the average project was worth $1.9m in 2013, down from $5.3m in 2000. Mozambique has 27 substantial donors in the field of health alone, not counting most non-Western or private givers. Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Sweden each supplied less than $1m. Such fragmentation strains poor countries, both because of the endless report-writing and because civil servants are hired away to manage donors’ projects. Donors would probably do more good by concentrating on a few projects in a few countries. But they strive to achieve the opposite. To them, and to the politicians who control the purse strings, plastering the world with flags is a sign of success. Erik Solheim, chairman of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, remembers trying to persuade his own country, Norway, to focus on what it really knows about (managing an oil boom) rather than on things like tropical agriculture. He did not succeed. A decade ago the approved cure for fragmentation was for donors to pay aid directly to poor countries to use as they please. This has become deeply unfashionable. A donor who funds a government feels responsible for every dismal thing that government does, whether it is passing anti-gay laws or stealing the cash. Once lost, trust is hard to recover. Donors seem disinclined to resume direct budget support to Malawi: one describes it as “in the past”. Britain’s department for international development, which used to proselytise about the virtues of budget support, said last year that it would stop doing it. Increasingly, donors also earmark the funds they provide to multilateral outfits. The situation is a mess in almost every way. Which is why it is good news that a great deal of progress has been made on one of the ideals agreed on in Paris a decade ago. Donors have become far more open about where their aid goes and how it is spent. It is because of the advances in transparency that we know just how badly things are going. But knowledge and the willingness to change are not the same.

#### Development assistance is ineffective and allows for corruption.

Kaufmann 09. Kaufmann, Daniel. Daniel Kaufmann is an economist and the president and CEO of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, formerly the Revenue Watch Institute - Natural Resource Charter. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Brookings. March 2009. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aid-effectiveness-and-governance-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/> [Premier]

The Ugly: Facing Up to the New World Reality The low priority given nowadays to the governance and corruption challenge is not the only indicator that part of the “aid effectiveness” field appears to be behind the curve. Absent from Accra’s HLF last year were the path-breaking IT innovations, in spite of the fact that they offer great promise to improve governance and aid effectiveness. Similarly, the traditional aid industry may not yet be grasping the seismic shift that has taken place as a result of private donor aid, trade, sovereign funds and new official donors such as China. Also absent from the official aid effectiveness Accra HLF were the innovative market- and private-driven solutions to development challenges. Enter now the global financial crisis. The fact that the aid industry is in need of a revamp has now become even stronger. Furthermore, once we draw the implications of the crisis, the particular priorities within governance may need to be altered in moving forward. This is because the world reality has fundamentally changed, and, within it, the role of government. Almost one-half of the financial industry in many rich countries has been wiped out, exposing major governance and corruption deficiencies in the US and other industrialized and emerging economies. The global economy, which is now mired in a deep recession, is under threat. Donor aid flows to developing countries are being compromised. Domestically, the US is attempting to quickly disburse trillions of dollars in financial bailout and stimulus packages, with many key OECD and important middle income countries following suit – including China. Many emerging economies and developing countries are preparing stimulus packages, and in some cases financial bailouts as well. The major ongoing shift in the role of government is multi-dimensional: governments will fund major infrastructure and other investments, select which financial institutions to provide massive public funds, own major financial and other assets; patch up social (and housing) safety nets, and also revamp and expand its regulatory role over the financial sector. Each one of these new dimensions of the role of government carries governance and corruption risks, which will need to be addressed, over and above the long-standing governance challenges in these areas which were pending from before. Donor agencies, bilateral and multilateral, and of course the IMF, are gearing up to try and quickly assist many governments in providing fast (and often large) infusions of funding. The governance and anti-corruption aspects of such endeavour require a much higher priority than accorded so far.

#### The current aid is used to wipe away guilt, it has never worked

Ayittey 13

Ayittey, George B.N.. (Ayittey is a professor @ American University) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

The “more-aid for Africa” campaign[s] has become so steeped in emotionalism, overt racial sensitivity, and guilt (over colonial iniquities) that pragmatism, rationality, and efficiency have been sacrificed. So many Western governments, development agencies, and individuals have tried to help a continent and its people that they do not understand. More than $450 billion in foreign aid—the equivalent of six Marshall Plans—has been pumped into Africa since 1960, with negligible results. Helping Africa is a noble exercise that has become a theater of the absurd, in which the blind are leading the clueless.

#### African political structure makes effective development assistance impossible

Ayittey 13

Ayittey, George B.N.. (Ayittey is a professor @ American University) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

Africa’s investment process may be compared to that leaky bucket. The level of the water therein—GNP per capita—is determined by inflows of foreign aid, investment, and export earnings relative to outflows or leakages of imports (food, luxury consumer items), corruption, and civil wars. In 2005 Africa’s balance of payment situation showed a payment deficit of $21.7 billion. This deficit had to be financed by new borrowing, which would increase Africa’s foreign debt, or by the use of reserves, which were nonexistent for most African countries. This number, however, does not tell the full story. Hidden from view was a much grimmer story—the other, more serious leakages. According to one UN estimate, “$200 billion or 90 percent of the sub Saharan part of the continent’s gross domestic product (much of it illicitly earned), was shipped to foreign banks in 1991 alone.” 5 Capital flight out of Africa is at least $20 billion annually. Part of this capital flight represents wealth created legitimately by business owners who have little faith in keeping it in Africa. The rest represents loot stolen by corrupt African leaders and politicians. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo charged that corrupt African leaders have stolen at least $140 billion (£95 billion) from their people in the decades since independence.6 Foreign aid has not been spared, either. Said The Economist: “For every dollar that foolish northerners lent Africa between 1970 and 1996, 80 cents flowed out as capital flight in the same year, typically into Swiss bank accounts or to buy mansions on the Cote d’Azur.” 7 At the Commonwealth Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, on December 3, 2003, former British secretary of state for international development, Rt. Hon. Lynda Chalker, revealed that 40 percent of wealth created in Africa is invested outside the continent. Chalker said African economies would have fared better if the wealth created on the continent were retained within: “If you can get your kith and kin to bring the funds back and have it invested in infrastructure, the economies of African countries would be much better than what there are today,” she said.

#### Development assistance programs have negative results – donors aren’t held accountable for the efficacy of foreign aid.

Kaufmann 09. Kaufmann, Daniel. Daniel Kaufmann is an economist and the president and CEO of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, formerly the Revenue Watch Institute - Natural Resource Charter. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Brookings. March 2009. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aid-effectiveness-and-governance-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/> [Premier]

The Bad: The Silent Crisis in Governance and Anticorruption

While actual implementation of the Paris Declaration has progressed in some fronts, in many areas progress is at glacial pace, such as on “mutual accountability.” There is also high variation across donors and recipients in their commitment to this aid effectiveness agenda. And recipient governments often see conditionality as being reshaped rather than reduced, and their own coordination on capacity development is wanting. A general commitment on transparency is certainly important for aid effectiveness, yet it will not suffice on its own. Governance and anticorruption are as important, yet except for rhetoric and some initiatives on transparency, they were accorded little attention at the recent HLF in Accra. In fact, the Paris declaration of many years ago was more explicit and further ahead on these issues than the very recent Accra HLF communiqué, suggesting that backtracking has taken place in this area. The recent neglect in addressing difficult challenges in good governance and anticorruption reflects the silent crisis plaguing the governance and anticorruption movement more broadly. Contrary to the importance these issues enjoyed worldwide earlier in the decade, in concrete terms they have now low priority in the aid effectiveness agenda. The Accra HLF merely mirrors such broader development. Fifteen years ago, governance, anticorruption and transparency in aid were largely ignored. Since the mid-1990s multilateral and bilateral official donor agencies paid much more attention to these issues. A multitude of projects and programs to assist on governance were started throughout the world, supported by many aid agencies. Yet over the past few years, the priority accorded to governance in aid has slackened. And the strategies and programs that donors implement nowadays are concentrated on the technocratic “supply side,” while often ignoring the need for supporting those governance and anti-corruption measures that matter the most for development. In its silent crisis, the anticorruption field and movement has not been able to effectively transition from the awareness-raising stage to the concrete action-oriented stage, nor from a supply side public sector management narrow focus to one encompassing the most relevant demand side challenges, and one that embraces a multitude of stakeholders. And the political dimensions of governance and corruption, which are key to improve aid effectiveness, have been often ignored or addressed naively. Instead, the focus today is on technocratic supply side discussion on “capacity;” on how donors can help “fix” technocratic issues through “harmonization”, infusions of technical assistance and “capacity,” by decreeing “ownership” by the recipient (often segments of central governments), and by often advocating to set up yet another new and insular institutional setup in a recipient country (e.g. project implementation units tailored to donor requirements, anticorruption commissions with no teeth, etc.).. At the time of the Accra HLF it should already have been abundantly clear that aid effectiveness was not to materially improve by mere efforts to “harmonization” and by further exhortations on “ownership”, or by discussing division of labor in providing “capacity building”. In reality, aid effectiveness will be determined by much more fundamental issues than those, such as governance. If governance is lacking, or, say, there is pervasive corruption in government or capture by the elite, a “well harmonized” donor funding strategy to government officials who fully “own” the program would have negative results. For years already (and certainly by the 2008 Accra HLF), the evidence has been clear that not only economic policies matter for aid effectiveness, but at least as important as determinant of aid effectiveness are good governance and corruption control. Empirical analysis indicates that governance and corruption significantly affect the likelihood of a successful aid project. More fundamentally, good governance and anticorruption are essential to ensure that aid supports domestically-led governance reforms and that it results in country-wide development and poverty alleviation impact.

### Economic

#### Development assistance is expensive and largely unsuccessful – other examples cherry pick data.

Easterly 07. Easterly, William. Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 328-332, American Economic Association. May 2007. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034470> [Premier]

Using the same judgment by stylized facts and country cases that has guided the evolu- tion of the conventional wisdom, development assistance has failed to achieve development. Over the past 42 years, $568 billion (in today's dollars) has flowed into Africa, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has been close to zero. The top quarter of aid recipients (heavily overlapping with Africa) received 17 percent of their GDP in aid over those 42 years, yet they also had near-zero per capita growth. Successful cases of development happening due to a large inflow of aid and technical assistance have been hard to find. South Korea is often cited, but it took off after aid was reduced, and the Koreans disregarded the advice of the aid donors (see James Fox 2000). Other more recent examples frequently cited (Ghana, Uganda, and Mozambique) were cases of recovery after steep collapse, and depend on rapid growth episodes that usually prove to be temporary (Ricardo Hausman, Rodrik, and Pritchett 2005). Botswana might be a better example of a long-term suc- cess story initially financed by aid, although the most well-known case study of Botswana (Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2004) doesn't even mention foreign aid. The currently most celebrated cases of rapid growth-India, China, and Vietnam-receive little aid as a percentage of their GDP.

#### Foreign aid discourages development and increases corruption in recipient countries.

Bandow 11. Bandow, Doug. Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine *Inquiry*. He writes regularly for leading publications such as *Fortune* magazine, *National Interest*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Washington Times*. “Foreign Aid, Or Foreign Hindrance.” *Forbes.* February 2011. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2011/02/22/foreign-aid-or-foreign-hindrance/#26a2591c1d77>[Premier]

Aid incentives are all wrong.  Observed Tate Watkins of the Mercatus Center:  "Systematic foreign aid createsopportunities for **corruption, cultures of dependency, and disincentives to development**.  The **aid** faucet **misaligns incentives between donors and recipients, making it** extremely **difficult to turn off the flow**. "Even money targeted at humanitarian needs has a disappointing record.  Disasters like the earthquake in Haiti typically open the aid spigots.  To what result?  Six months later in Haiti, [reported the *Wall Street Journal*](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703609004575355112899172210.html), "the process of reconstruction appears to have come to a halt."Aid groups acknowledge that progress has been limited at best.  [Reported the *Washington Post*](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/01/AR2011020102030.html):  "The effectiveness of the NGOs is now being questioned, by the groups themselves, and especially by Haitian leaders who complain that NGOs have become a parallel government hobbled by poor coordination, high turnover and a lack of transparency."At times **assistance programs have been** perversely **harmful**.  **U.S. "Food for Peace" shipments, used to dump farmers' domestic surpluses, is notorious for ruining local farmers and** thus undermining **local production**.  **This problem continues in Haiti**.  On returning from a private aid mission, Don Slesnick, the mayor of Coral Gables, Florida, complained:  "We were saddened to see **rice bags travel no more than 20 yards from the** gates of the **distribution site before ending up in the back of** a pickup **truck** presumably **headed for the black market**.  To our further dismay, we returned home to read news stories that those very same donations were undercutting Haitian rice farmers who needed income to support their own families."

#### Aid may slow long term economic growth

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

Aid may [slow] not only lead to lower savings, it may also retard long-run economic growth by altering the composition of investment to the disadvantage of the receiving country.25 A large proportion of publicly sponsored foreign assistance is channeled into activities which either are not directly productive or have long gestation periods. In the last decade, emphasis was placed on infrastructure, that is, roads, harbors, and air- ports. More recently, the emphasis has shifted somewhat toward education, housing, and the construction of large dams for irrigation and electric power generation (Volta, Aswan, Indus Basin Works, etc.). All of these projects, although perhaps desirable in themselves, tend to bias the allocation of investment in favor of schemes which have a very slight and long- delayed impact on output. Moreover, even when foreign assistance is channeled to directly productive activities, the consequences for growth may be small. When persons from wealthy and powerful countries contemplate undertaking a massive investment outside their boundaries, they naturally tend to consider those industries and methods of production which reflect their own pattern of resources. Most often these involve manufacturing goods with techniques that require considerable capital, both initially, while the plant is being constructed, and afterward, when it is in operation. These techniques of production are seldom appropriate in countries in which capital is very scarce. In addition, capital-intensive industries may become dependent, for long afterward, upon materials and spare parts whose importation puts a strain upon the country's foreign exchange reserves. Once attention becomes concentrated on creating new industries, the production of primary goods may suffer and earnings from exports may decline or become stagnant. To the extent that foreign assistance is biased in favor of capital-intensive technology, it has a tendency to increase the receiving country's subsequent need for capital, prejudice its exports,26 raise the capital-output ratio, and reduce the rate of growth.

#### Few of our actual resources are devoted to development assistance

Sachs 13

Sachs, Jeffery D. (Sachs is a world famous economist and is director at the Earth Institute at Columbia) “Chapter 3: Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?” Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, Edited by Peter Haas and John Hird, 2013, pp. 71–103., sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/controversies-in-globalization-2e/n3.xml. [Premier]

Although development, defense, and diplomacy are the three pillars of U.S. national security, the current investments in national security are almost entirely in the direction of defense spending. In 2007 defense spending was $611 billion, while spending for diplomacy could be estimated at around $9 billion and that for development assistance at $22.7 billion. The allocation of official development assistance is equally important. U.S. aid is divided between “bilateral” aid, given by the U.S. government directly to other countries, and multilateral aid, given by the U.S. government to international organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. Distressingly, only around one-quarter of overall bilateral aid is spent on development directed at long-term poverty reduction and disease control. The vast bulk of aid is devoted to emergencies and U.S. political aims, rather than to the objectives that are most effectively served by official development assistance: long-term economic development.

#### Development aid creates situations of moral hazard which stunts growths and dissuades beneficial government policy resulting in the cyclical failure of aid.

Bräutigam and Knack 04 - Bräutigam, Deborah A., and Stephen Knack. "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa." Economic Development and Cultural Change 52.2 (2004): 255-85. Jstor. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/380592.pdf?refreqid=search%3A3e3047df619df02cfe9731a47eb60461>. (Deborah Brautigam is Professor and Director of the International Development Program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC and the author of The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. A long-time observer of Asia and Africa, she has lived in China, West Africa, and Southern Africa, and travelled extensively across both regions as a Fulbright researcher and consultant for the World Bank, the UN, and other development agencies. Stephen Knack is a Lead Economist in the Development Research Group (Human Development and Public Services Team). His recent research addresses the impact of aid on policy reform and on public sector capacity and accountability. He is a specialist on actionable governance indicators for monitoring progress of public sector reforms, and has oversight responsibility for the public sector management and governance items in the Bank's annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessments. Prior to joining the Bank in 1999, Knack was a Research Associate at the University of Maryland's IRIS Center, and Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University. He received a PhD in Economics from the University of Maryland in 1991.) [Premier]

Moral hazard implies a situation in which having an insurance policy (or in this case, access to external resources) actually induces riskier (undevelopmental) behavior. As with many of the problems discussed in this section, the fear that aid might make governments less likely to put in place the policy framework, local funds, and trained personnel needed for development underpinned the early emphasis on “selfhelp” both in the Marshall Plan and in the early bilateral aid programs.44 If aid were clearly a supplement to the government’s own efforts in a project or program, moral hazard would be less likely to arise, and aid would be more likely to be a true partnership, supporting programs “owned” by governments. Over time, however, the emphasis on self-help dwindled, and problems of moral hazard arose. The moral hazard problem operates on two levels. First, it is possible that a history of high levels of aid may make it more likely that a government will allow corruption in the customs bureau or an ineffective internal revenue service to continue, or more likely that “credible constraints” on overspending and monetizing the deficit will be postponed, particularly if these reforms will eventually lead to a decline in budgetary support. Aid-dependent countries may be inclined to underutilize their available sources of tax revenues. Middleincome countries have increased tax revenue as a percentage of GDP from an average 16.5% (1972–76) to an average 21.1% (1995–99), but low-income countries (which receive more aid, on average) have seen their tax revenue fall from an average 17% to 14.3% over the same period.45 Seventy-one percent of the African countries receiving more than 10% of GDP in aid in 1995 were also in the group of countries judged in an IMF study to have lower than expected tax effort.46 It is possible that many years of being “rescued” may make aid-dependent governments less inclined (or less able) to adjust quickly through their own, proactive decisions, when the prices of their exports drop or that of oil imports rises. However, it is also the case that moral hazard operates within donor agencies. Staff face a moral hazard in that they have no internal sanctions when aid loans and grants fail to improve development performance in recipient countries. This has made them more likely to continue programming aid in situations where the risk of failure is high and the costs of failure do not fall on the aid agency. In addition, high levels of debt may increase the operation of moral hazard. As a recent study argued, donors may feel pressure to continue making loans to African countries who already owe them substantial amounts of money.47

#### Development Assistance, which relies on military intervention leads to insecurity and increased poverty.

Mayeda 2012. Mayeda, Graham. Mayeda joined the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa in 2005. His current research focuses on theories of global justice, law and development, criminal law, and legal philosophy. From 2006 to 2010, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC). ISAC is a legal aid clinic established by Legal Aid Ontario in 2001 to conduct test-case litigation for low-income residents of Ontario. “Legal Aspects of the Security-Development Nexus: International Administrative Law as a Check on the Use of Development Assistance in the "War on Terror". Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 13: No. 1, Article 5. 2012 <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol13/iss1/5>. [Premier]

Beyond soft law documents, recent social science **research indicates that to be effective, development** work **should focus on** development-that is, on **building the** capacity of the **state to respond to the needs of its citizen** **than on integrating development and military policies**. For instance, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness argue that **state intervention in Afghanistan** has in fact increased instability and **damaged the ability of the Afghan government to create stable economic, social, and political development.** In their view, a successful policy requires "the alignment of internal and external stakeholders to the goals of a sovereign state through the joint formulation, calibration of, and adherence to the rules of the game."64 Social Development Directs suggests that international development aid can contribute to this process **by** helping to alleviate inequalities between groups within the fragile state and facilitating a more equitable distribution of resources across different groups." Not only does **military involvement disrupt development work, it is itself a source of insecurity**. Political science research demonstrates that insecurity caused byforeign military **intervention is a** significant **cause of poverty**. As Frances Stewart asserts, "[N]ational insecurity (invasion from outside, or a high risk of it) can be an important source of such individual or community insecurity, as the current Iraq situation demonstrates."" Such **conflict destroys all forms of capital, increases the share of government expenditure devoted to the military,** decreases overall government revenue, **and negatively affects economic growth and** the provision of **government services."**

### Colonialism DA

#### Rich countries lack generosity with foreign development assistance – aid is used only as a tool to serve strategic and economic interests.

Hirvonen 05. Hirvonen, Pekka. Deputy Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Stingy Stingy: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor.” Global Policy Forum. 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html>. [Premier]

Generous or Not? At a news conference on December 27, 2004, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland called for a major international response to the Asian tsunami disaster. In his comments, Egeland lamented that donor countries, despite their unprecedented wealth, generally provide so little in international aid. Calling rich governments "stingy," Egeland expressed his astonishment over the fact that donors used to be more generous when they were less rich.(1) Egeland's remarks provoked a strong reaction, particularly from the US. Andrew Natsios, head of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), publicly refuted the view that the US was being tightfisted when it comes to assisting poor countries. "The notion that the United States is not generous is simply not true, factually. We've had one of the largest increases [in aid] of any country in the world," Natsios said. President George W. Bush in turn dismissed Egeland's comments by calling him "very misguided and ill-informed."(2) However, Egeland never singled out the United States. He was referring to donors – the rich countries – in general. As a whole, were his criticisms justified, or was he just ill-informed? Are rich countries, not only the US, but also the EU, Japan, Australia, and others, really that stingy? On the surface, it appears as if Egeland was wrong. In recent years, aid amounts have been on a constant rise. In 2004, official development assistance to poor countries reached its highest level ever. The United States alone provided almost $19 billion in aid – more than ever before.(3) But the recent increases do not tell the whole truth about rich countries' generosity, or the lack of it. Measured as a proportion of gross national income (GNI), aid lags far behind the 0.7 percent target the United Nations set 35 years ago. Moreover, development assistance is often of dubious quality. In many cases, aid is primarily designed to serve the strategic and economic interests of the donor countries or to benefit powerful domestic interest groups. Aid systems based on the interests of donors instead of the needs of recipients' make development assistance inefficient. Too little aid reaches countries that most desperately need it, and, all too often, aid is wasted on overpriced goods and services from donor countries. This paper presents an overview on the volumes, targeting and geographical allocation of development assistance over the past five years. It analyzes various features in rich countries' development assistance policies that make aid both insufficient and inefficient – despite the recent increases in nominal aid amounts that make rich nations seem generous.

#### Development assistance serves the strategic interests of the donor country rather than meaningfully impacting the recipient country.

Hirvonen 05. Hirvonen, Pekka. Deputy Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Stingy Stingy: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor.” Global Policy Forum. 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html>. [Premier]

Aid in the Service of Strategic Interests Sadly, failing to reach or set aid targets is not the only problem. Although the Cold War is long over, the geopolitical mindset governing the distribution of aid has not changed very much. Old recipient countries may have been replaced by new ones, but the underlying rationale of using aid to promote donor countries' strategic interests is still very much alive. Instead of allocating their aid based on where it is most needed, rich countries often favor recipients that are of direct political or economic interest to them. As a result, the most impoverished people of the planet actually receive less aid than people living in middle-income countries. Many European donors favor countries in former Yugoslavia, Europe's own restless backyard. In 2002–2003, ex-Yugoslav states ranked as number one recipient of aid from Austria, Germany, Greece, Switzerland, Norway and the European Union. Over 79 percent of all Greek development assistance went to other European nations. The corresponding figures for Austrian and German development aid were 34.2 and 13.1 percent respectively. Much of this aid is motivated by domestic political concerns, above all fears of uncontrolled immigration from crisis-stricken countries nearby. Other European nations have allocated less aid to former Yugoslavia, but many favor their old colonies where European companies often have a strong presence. In 2002–2003, Cí´te d'Ivoire and Cameroon ranked among top recipients of French development assistance; Timor-Leste, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola were biggest recipients of aid from Portugal; and Belgium sent most aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo.(15) Ex-Yugoslav republics and former European colonies are no doubt in need of aid from rich countries. However, allocating aid on the basis of geographical proximity or former colonial ties rather than of actual needs of the poor countries may result in diminished aid for those who most desperately need it. Much of the aid is thus serving the interests of the donors instead of those of the recipients – the people aid is supposed to help. The United States has a long history of using development assistance to serve its foreign policy goals. In 1982–1983 and 1992–1993, Israel and Egypt, both key US allies, ranked as biggest recipients of US foreign aid. Together these two countries accounted for more than half of total US development assistance. With its GNI of $19,440 per capita in 2002, Israel outranks such countries as Slovenia, Portugal and the Czech Republic in wealth, and is classified as a high-income economy by the World Bank. At the same time, however, Israel received more development assistance per capita from DAC countries – $115 – than some of the world's poorest nations like Burkina Faso ($40 per capita), Guyana ($85) and Mozambique ($111).(16) Since 9/11, the idea of using development assistance as a foreign policy tool has only gained more ground. In February 2002, US Senate resolved that "United States foreign assistance programs should play an increased role in the global fight against terrorism to complement the national security objectives of the United States."(17) Similarly, a USAID commission report from January 2004 called for greater "selectivity" in US foreign aid based on "relevance to US national security" and "greater aid effectiveness."(18) In practice, this policy paradigm has meant channeling massive aid flows to countries that are key US allies in the global "war on terror." Before 9/11, the United States had allocated just $10.5 million in aid for Pakistan for the fiscal year 2002. After the 9/11 terrorist strikes, the amount jumped to $673 million – a 64-fold increase. This boost made Pakistan the world's largest recipient of development assistance in 2002. Afghanistan in turn saw its aid from the US grow almost 100-fold from $2.9 million to $278 million, and aid to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was also multiplied.(19) Much of the recent increase in US development assistance has gone to funding state-building and reconstruction projects in regions that have been directly involved in US-led military operations. In addition to Afghanistan, Iraq with its enormous reconstruction needs has emerged as a new destination for US development aid. In 2004, the country received $2.9 billion in development assistance from the United States, while Afghanistan received $875 million.(20) Thanks to the boost in US aid funding, it appears that the "war on terror" has not diverted US aid flows from poorest countries. However, the much-advertised increases have not helped them, either. Despite the Bush administration's rhetoric on helping the world's poor, practically all of the new money appropriated for US development assistance has gone to countries that are of strategic interest for the US in the "war on terror."(21) As for other donors to Iraq and Afghanistan, the picture is even uglier. Since many of them have not increased their overall development assistance the way the US has done, money going to these two countries has been taken – at least in part – from existing aid programs.(22) While there certainly is an urgent need in Iraq and Afghanistan to restore the infrastructure destroyed by years of wars, political mismanagement and economic sanctions, there are other regions in the world where the humanitarian situation is even more pressing. Efforts to find money for the reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan will inevitably curtail development assistance and humanitarian aid in other parts of the world. The main reason for prioritizing Iraq and Afghanistan is political. The two countries receive huge amounts of aid because US policymakers see them as politically and economically crucial to Washington's global agenda. In the meantime, sub-Saharan countries with massive development problems receive only secondary attention, because the US and other donors have a lot less at stake in the region.

#### Development assistance only benefits the donor country’s economy and is ineffective at bringing about economic growth in poor countries due to tied aid.

Hirvonen 05. Hirvonen, Pekka. Deputy Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Stingy Stingy: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor.” Global Policy Forum. 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html>. [Premier]

Aid That Helps the Rich Rich countries do not use development assistance only to advance their political and strategic interests. They also seek to maximize the benefits of foreign aid to their own economies and in particular to powerful domestic lobby groups. Many rich nations tie their development assistance to purchases of goods and services from the donor country. Poor countries get aid, but only under the condition that they spend it in a way that benefits businesses in the donor nation. In effect, tied aid constitutes a form of government subsidy because taxpayer money is used to buy goods and services from domestic companies and aid recipients only get the product. Tied aid is a particularly inefficient form of development assistance because it does not help poor countries develop their economies. Instead of creating new businesses and jobs in recipient countries, most of the benefits remain in the donor nations. Tied aid is also inefficient because often goods and services would be available at a lower price from local producers or world markets. The South Africa-based NGO ActionAid estimates that $5 billion in aid goes wasted each year because tied aid inflates procurement costs. Furthermore, tying can slow aid down, as a lot of time goes wasted in complicated procurement procedures even in severe emergency situations.(23) Problems of tied aid have been known for a long time. Following years of discussion, major OECD donors finally agreed in April 2001 on a recommendation to untie official development assistance. The goal was also affirmed in the Monterrey Consensus in March 2002. Nevertheless, almost half of aid from Austria, Canada and Spain was still tied in 2003.(24) To make things worse, some countries, like the US and Italy, do not regularly report their figures for tied aid. It has been estimated that 70 to 80 percent of US official development assistance is still tied.(25) Overpriced technical assistance is a form of inefficient aid that is closely linked to tying. In 2003, an estimated $18 billion – more than a quarter of total aid – was spent on technical assistance, mainly on consultants advising and supporting recipient governments. While there is a very concrete need for expertise in poor countries, much of technical assistance is heavily overpriced. In 2002, aid donors spent an estimated $50 to $70 million on 700 international consultants in Cambodia – an equivalent of the salary of 160,000 Cambodian civil servants. As technical assistance is excluded from the OECD agreement on untying, most of it is tied to donor country firms, benefiting them instead of the recipients.(26)

## AT Specific Affs

### AT Rawls Aff

#### Rawls only applies domestically

Beitz 75

Beitz, Charles R. (Professor of Politics @ Yale) “Justice and International Relations.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, 1975, pp. 360–389. JSTOR, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/2265079](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265079). [Premier]

Justice, Rawls says, is the first virtue of social institutions. Its "primary subject" is "the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (7). The central problem for a theory of justice is to identify principles by which the basic structure of society can be appraised. Rawls' two principles characterize "a special case of the problem of justice." They do not characterize "the justice of the law of nations and of relations between states" (7-8) because they rest on morally significant features of an ongoing scheme of social cooperation. If national boundaries are thought to set off discrete schemes of social cooperation, as Rawls assumes (457), then the relations of persons situated in different nation-states cannot be regulated by principles of social justice. As Rawls develops the theory, it is only after principles of social justice and principles for individuals (the "natural duties") are chosen that principles for international relations are considered, and then only in the most perfunctory manner.

### AT Refugees Aff

#### Increased aid promoted insurgent violence in developing nations – especially in refugee camps.

Iwicki & Patterson 16 - Iwicki, Carolyn, and Soren Patterson. (Executive Editor - William & Mary Policy Review Master of Public Policy, William & Mary, Bachelor of Science in Environmental Biology, Christopher Newport University) "Aid to refugee camps brings help - and harm." AidData. N.p., 25 Oct. 2016. Web. 02 July 2017. <http://aiddata.org/blog/aid-to-refugee-camps-brings-help-and-harm>. [Premier]

Humanitarian aid has become an increasingly crucial component of the international community’s response to violent conflict. Outflows of humanitarian aid commitments from OECD member states [have nearly doubled over the past decade](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-2013.pdf), rising from around US$7 billion in 2000 to US$13.8 billion in 2010. While some humanitarian aid projects simply seek to provide relief for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, others are interwoven with counterinsurgency efforts seeking to win over “hearts and minds” and detract support from insurgent groups. But [recent](http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora76&div=73&g_sent=1&collection=journals) [studies](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14387) have suggested that aid projects in conflict zones can produce external costs to civilian populations, such as violence. Dr. Reed M. Wood, a professor at Arizona State University who co-manages the Political Terror Scale, and Dr. Christopher Sullivan, an assistant professor at Louisiana State University, used AidData’s georeferenced datasets to study the relationship between humanitarian aid and violence against civilians by insurgent or government groups. They find that the introduction of aid into conflict zones is accompanied by a rise in one-sided insurgent attacks against civilians, but that there was no rise one-sided government attacks. While in some cases humanitarian aid can [suppress violence and bring about more security](http://www.nber.org/papers/w14606), in other cases it may also [feed civil wars](http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nq3/NANCYS_Yale_Website/resources/papers/FAidConf_20130806_FINAL.pdf) and promote the diffusion of conflict. When examining these trends at the micro-level, it appears as though the presence of aid may spur violence in the local area, a theory supported by Strandow, Findley, and Young in their AidData working paper, [Foreign Aid and the Intensity of Violent Armed Conflict](http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wps24_foreign_aid_and_the_intensity_of_violent_armed_conflict.pdf). Insurgent violence against civilians may stem from two different strategies. In the first, insurgents resort to violence in an effort to secure the resources provided by humanitarian aid for themselves. Insurgents predate aid to augment their war efforts, either by using the aid materials themselves or selling them on the black market. Such looted aid can be quite valuable; for example, rebel factions [looted around US$20 million worth of aid](https://www.rienner.com/title/Do_No_Harm_How_Aid_Can_Support_Peace_or_War) from aid organizations operating in Monrovia during the Liberian Civil War. Insurgents may also view humanitarian aid projects as direct challenges to their authority and control over the local area, particularly aid projects that can seen as politically biased, such as “hearts and minds” projects. When aid agencies essentially provide an alternate form of civil structure in large projects such as refugee camps — by providing public goods, services, nominal security, etc. — insurgents view the aid agencies as direct competitors for civilian loyalty. This effectively robs civilians of their neutrality and ability to capitulate to insurgent demands, making them acceptable targets in the eyes of insurgents. Humanitarian aid projects may also spark violence between legitimate governments and civilians. Projects such as refugee camps sometimes serve as recruitment beds for insurgent groups, and may prove camouflage to insurgents seeking to blend in with the civilian population. Since distinguishing insurgents and civilians can be a time and resource consuming process, some governments may simply choose to target entire camps if they believe them to be of aid to insurgents. However, since governments receiving humanitarian aid are subject to the leverage of donor countries as well as the approval of the public they wish to serve, they very rarely resort to such violence.

#### Empirics prove – when developed countries give aid it escalates conflict in developing countries

Nunn & Qian 13 - Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian. (Nathan Nunn is Frederic E. Abbe Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Professor Nunn was born in Canada, where he received his PhD from the University of Toronto in 2005. Professor Nunn’s primary research interests are in economic history, economic development, cultural economics, political economy and international trade. He is an NBER Faculty Research Fellow, a Research Fellow at BREAD, and a Faculty Associate at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA). He is currently a co-editor of the Journal of Development Economics.)( Nancy Qian is a porfessor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences. She is a native of Shanghai, China and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prior to Kellogg, Professor Qian taught at Yale University and Brown University, and was a visiting scholar at the department of economics at Harvard University while she was post-doctoral fellow of the prestigious Harvard Academy Scholars program.) U.S. Food Aid and Civil Conflict. Rep. N.p., 16 Aug. 2013. Web. 2 July 2017. <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nq3/NANCYS\_Yale\_Website/resources/papers/FAidConf\_20130806\_FINAL.pdf>. [Premier]

Given the dramatic shift in foreign policy that occurred when the Cold War ended, we also examine the differential effects of food aid for the Cold War and post-Cold War era. Specifically, we investigate whether the shift in U.S. aid policies that occurred with the end of the Cold War (e.g., Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 1998) influenced the link between food aid and conflict. Column (5) shows that the interaction of food aid and a Cold War indicator variable is negative, moderate in magnitude, but statistically insignificant. The last dimension we examine is the political alliance between the recipient country and the United States. This could affect the links between food aid and conflict if, for example, the United States makes a greater effort to protect the food aid from rebel factions if the aid is being shipped to a political ally. We measure alliance using the fraction of a country’s votes in the U.N. General Assembly that are aligned with the U.S.40 Column (6) shows that the differential effect for U.S. allies is negative, moderate in size, and statistically insignificant. Finding that the positive link between food aid and conflict is isolated to countries that have experienced conflict in the recent past is consistent with the earlier result that food aid increases the duration of conflicts. Other than the finding that ethnic polarization exacerbates the link between food aid and conflict, we do not find any other evidence of heterogeneous effects. Part of this may be due to the coarseness of the data used in our macro-level analysis. It may also be due to the weakness of the instruments in the first-stage.41 Thus, the heterogeneity estimates should be interpreted with these shortcomings in mind. Humanitarian aid is an important international policy tool for providing relief for populations that face endemic poverty. However, recent critics observe that humanitarian aid, and food aid in particular, may actually promote conflict. This controversial topic has sparked much debate among aid watchers. However, without more systematic evidence, it is difficult to begin to redesign policy. Our study takes a first-cut at this and aims to facilitate the discussion by providing novel rigorous causal evidence of the average effect of U.S. wheat aid on conflict in recipient countries. Our findings show that the concerns of critics are very real and that U.S. food aid indeed promotes civil conflict on average. An increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence of armed civil conflict in recipient countries. U.S. food aid does not crowd out other forms of aid or aid from other donors. Thus, the increase in conflict is really due to an increase in aid. The effects we find are due to aid prolonging existing conflicts. We do not find evidence that aid precipitates the onset of new conflicts. Consistent with this, we also find that the adverse effects of food aid are concentrated among countries with a recent history of civil conflict.

1. *Ibid.* at 539. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Lori Damrosch et al, *International Law: Cases and Materials* 4th ed. (St. Paul: West Group, 2001) [Damrosch]. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Douglas Kropp & Amir Attaran, *Legal Implications of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Calling for an Official Development Assistance Target of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product* [forthcoming 2005].  [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. David Harris, *Cases and Materials on International Law*, 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2004) at 506 [Harris]. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Ibid.* at 535. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Robert Scott & Paul Stephan, *The New Leviathan: Enforcing International Law in the 21st Century* [forthcoming] online: <http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalTheory/documents/Stephan-ScottBook.doc>. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, “International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach” (2003) 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 113 at 137 [Goldsmith & Posner]. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. David P. Fidler, “Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy” (2004) 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 100 at 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. John Lumpkin, “Pentagon spending more per soldier than during any previous war,” *Associated Press* (15 February, 2005), online: Occupation Watch <http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=9232>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. “Freedom From Fear” online: Canada’s Human Security Web Site <www.humansecurity.gc.ca>. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” online: Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change <Summary: http://www.un.org/secureworld/

brochure.pdf> [*Secure World*]. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect,” online: The House of Commons International Development Committee <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/

67/67i.pdf>; also “Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations,” online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=266>. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. DRD, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Stephen Marks, “The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality” 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Ibid.* at 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Ibid.* at 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Ibid.* at 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Ibid.* at 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Koen De Feyter, “Contracting for Human Development: International Law and Development Revisited” 10 Asia Pac. L. Rev. 49 at 57 [De Feyter]. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Ibid.* at 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Ibid.* at 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration Between Two States*, online: Permanent Court of Arbitration <www.pac-cpa.org>. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. De Feyter, *supra* at 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Ibid.* at 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Isabella Bunn, “The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law” (2000) *Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.* 1426 at 1435 [Bunn]. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Ibid.* at 1451. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Ibid.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-28)